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Abstract 
This thesis proposes that Evaluative Adjectives (EA), such as brave, intelligent, rude, 
are stative causative predicates that undergo the causative alternation just as verbs such 
as break do. It is argued that once EAs are understood to be stative causatives their 
syntactic and inner-aspectual properties follow from a single lexical entry. The analysis 
of EA aspectual properties leads to an investigation of inner-aspectual primitives more 
generally, and to the conclusions that the only primitive aspectual argument denotes a 
state, and that Davidsonian eventivity is epiphenomenal. 
EAs are compared with adjectives of psychological experience (eager, willing) and 
relational adjectives and adjectives denoting physical states (Canadian, tall). Adjectival 
argument structures are shown to be as complex as verbal ones, and it is argued that the 
category distinction between verbs and adjectives is morphological, and not syntactic. 
Although EAs produce agentive inferences, these inferences are argued to be 
implicatures that derive from a causative aspectual structure and an animate external 
argument. They are not entailments that merit a non-stative variant. On the contrary, 
EAs are shown to be stative on all their usages. In showing this, arguments against an 
activity analysis and a coercion analysis of EAs are given, together with an extended 
argument against the non-stative copula “active” be. 
EAs are also often analysed as Individual-Level (IL) predicates. It is shown that 
EAs only partially overlap with IL predicates, and that they have a distinct aspectual 
signature that matches verbs classified as Davidsonian-States (Maienborn 2007) and 
stative causatives (Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2000). In arguing against an IL analysis 
of EAs an argument against the Individual/Stage distinction (Carlson 1977) is given. 
Once EAs are diagnosed as stative causatives it is shown that there is no primitive 
event argument. Eventivity effects are shown to be derivative of causation, and 
ultimately pragmatic. A consequence is that the notions of change or process are not 
represented in inner-aspect decomposition. This leads to the development of a new 
theory of inner-aspect in which the only aspectual distinction is between states and 
causatives built out of states. This theory supports the proposal that EAs are stative 
causatives that undergo the causative alternation, while substantially reducing the 
number primitives involved in the composition of inner-aspect. 
Key Words: Evaluative Adjectives, Causative Alternation, Argument Structure, Inner-
Aspect, Event Semantics 
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Resumen 
 
El objetivo de esta tesis es el de desarrollar un análisis que explica las propiedades 
sintácticas y aspectuales de los Adjetivos Evaluativos (EA), tales como ‘kind’ amable, 
‘rude’ maleducado, o ‘careful’ prudente. El principal reto teórico que plantean, por 
lo menos desde Lakoff (1966), es el de explicar sus dos caras aspectuales de forma 
fundada. 
Por un lado, parecen portarse como estados prototípicos en muchos de sus usos, 
como por ejemplo, en el presente simple ((1a)). Por el otro, parecen tener propiedades 
agentivo-eventivas en otros usos, como por ejemplo, en el progresivo ((1b)), o 
cuando son modificados por un adverbial que expresa intencionalidad ((1c)). El aspecto 
más curioso de este comportamiento dual estativo/eventivo es que se da con adjetivos 
–la categoría léxica que, tradicionalmente e intuitivamente, tiene denotación 
únicamente estativa. 
 
(1) a. María es amable/maleducada/prudente 
b. María está siendo amable/maleducada/prudente 
c. María fue amable/maleducada/prudente a propósito 
 
 
Los análisis antecedentes de los EAs se pueden caracterizar de dos formas: o se 
analizan como inherentemente ambiguos en términos aspectuales y/o sintácticos (Partee 
1977; Dowty 1979; Stowell 1991; Bennis 2000, 2004; Landau 2009); o se propone que 
tienen una naturaleza base estativa que se coacciona en determinados contextos 
gramaticales para conseguir un uso eventivo (cf. Fernald 1999; Arche 2006; Kertz 2006, 
2010). Las dos opciones son plausibles y tienen el mérito de ser intuitivas, pero las 
limitaciones son iguales para las dos: no consiguen explicar ni por qué los EAs –y no 
otros adjetivos– se portan así de forma predictiva, ni cómo relacionar el 
comportamiento de justamente estos adjetivos a una teoría general de la composición 
del aspecto léxico. 
En esta tesis se propone un análisis de carácter diferente. Combina las dos líneas de 
investigación existentes sobre los EAs, es decir, la aspectual y la sintáctica, para 
demostrar que se complementan, y que a pesar de la primera impresión, los EAs no son 
nunca ambiguos. Para dar cuenta del carácter aparentemente polivalente de los EAs, la 
clave está en reconocer que en términos aspectuales, son causativos, a saber: 
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Propuesta principal: los EAs son predicados causativos estativos que 
tienen un argumento externo animado y un complemento proposicional, 
y además, están sujetos a la alternancia causativa, al igual que los 
verbos como romper. 
 
Una vez clasificados como causativos, sus propiedades agentivas reciben una 
explicación natural que se demuestra: en vez de ser entrañadas, son implicaturas 
generadas por la combinación del aspecto léxico causativo de los EAs y de sus 
argumentos externos animados. 
Con respeto a la parte de la propuesta que hace referencia a la alternancia causativa, 
la investigación de los EAs ha demostrado que los EAs son únicos entre las clases de 
adjetivos en tener una diversidad de estructuras sintácticas en las cuales legitiman sus 
argumentos animados y proposicionales (Wilkinson 1970, 1976; Stowell 1991; Bennis 
2000, 2004; Arche 2006; Kertz 2006, 2010; Landau 2009). 
La innovación de esta tesis es la de organizar los datos para poder apreciar el 
paradigma en (2), y demostrar que no es más que un caso especial de la paradigmática 
alternancia causativa verbal en (3).
1
 
 
(2) Inglés 
a. Causativo inacusativo 
That Emma left was prudent 
‘Que Emma se marchara fue prudente’ 
b. Causativo inacusativo + extraposición 
It was prudent that Emma left 
‘Fue prudente que Emma se marchara’ 
c. Causativo transitivo 
Emma was prudent to leave 
(
*
)‘Emma fue prudente marcharse’ 
                                                          
1
 El paradigma en (2) se da en inglés porque el ejemplo (2c) es agramatical en castellano, y por lo tanto el 
inglés ilustra el paradigma completo de forma abierta. El capítulo 5 compara el paradigma en numerosas 
lenguas germánicas, romances, y en el euskera. De todo el paradigma, la estructura de (2c) es el único 
punto de variación entre las lenguas, con la excepción del euskera, que además de no admitir la estructura 
de (2c), tampoco admite las estructuras (2e, f). Pero la agramaticalidad de estas dos últimas se explica 
porque, bajo este análisis, son estructuras pasivas, y el euskera tampoco tiene una pasiva verbal. Así que 
estos dos ejemplos se excluyen por motivos generales y consistentes con la lengua. 
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d. Causativo transitivo con infinitivo implícito 
Emma was prudent 
‘Emma fue prudente’ 
e. Causativo transitivo + pasiva 
To leave was prudent (of Emma) 
‘Marcharse fue prudente (por parte de Emma)’ 
f. Causativo transitivo + extraposición + pasiva 
It was prudent (of Emma) to leave 
‘Fue prudente (por parte de Emma) marcharse’ 
(3) Inglés 
a. Causativo inacusativo 
The window broke 
‘La ventana se rompió’ 
b. Causativo transitivo 
Peter broke the window 
‘Pedro rompió la ventana’ 
c. Causativo transitivo + pasiva 
The window was broken (by Peter) 
‘La ventana fue rota (por Pedro)’ 
 
La propuesta de analizar el patrón de los EAs como una manifestación de la 
alternancia causativa lleva a muchas preguntas porque la alternancia es considerada 
un fenómeno verbal que no se plantea nunca en las otras categorías léxicas. Para 
explicar cómo la alternancia puede darse tanto en los verbos como en los adjetivos, 
se desarrolla y defiende en esta tesis una nueva teoría de la composición del aspecto 
léxico, en la cual el argumento eventivo espacio-temporal (Davidson 1967) no existe: 
 
Propuestas auxiliares: 
i. El único argumento aspectual primitivo denota un estado. 
ii. CAUSA es la única relación aspectual. 
iii. La única distinción aspectual especificada por medio de 
argumentos aspectuales es entre estados simples y estados causativos. 
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Esta teoría de aspecto léxico de dos elementos, a saber, un argumento estativo y la 
relación CAUSA, predice que los diagnósticos clásicos de eventividad que acreditan la 
existencia de un argumento eventivo no darán resultados consistentes entre sí porque el 
componente locativo de la espacio-temporalidad eventiva no está representado en la 
teoría de aspecto léxico propuesta. Se demuestra que esta predicción es correcta y que 
los resultados de los diagnósticos de eventividad están sujetos a los factores 
independientes en (4). 
 
(4) Factores independientes que afectan a los diagnósticos de eventividad 
a. Si el predicado es causativo frente a un estado simple 
b. Si el predicado implica un cambio o no 
c. Si el predicado denota una cualidad física frente a una abstracta 
d. Si el argumento externo es animado frente a inanimado 
 
 
La consecuencia de un análisis detallado de los diagnósticos de eventividad es 
que las pruebas que justificaban un argumento eventivo son más bien señales de la 
naturaleza causativa del predicado. Al mismo tiempo, estos diagnósticos son sensibles 
a los detalles de la descripción de la predicación y al conocimiento conceptual 
asociado al predicado mismo. La implicación es que el argumento eventivo no es un 
primitivo de la representación de aspecto léxico. 
A raíz del análisis detallado del aspecto léxico de los EAs y la comparación entre 
los adjetivos y los verbos también se proporcionan argumentos consistentes en contra de 
la existencia de los siguientes sistemas aspectuales: 
 
i. La distinción entre predicados de individuo y estadio (Carlson 1977) 
ii. La clasificación aspectual de Vendler   (Vendler 1967) 
iii. La existencia de una cópula activa    (Partee 1977) 
iv. Los operadores aspectuales BECOME y DO  (Dowty 1979) 
v. Papeles temáticos 
 
La tesis se divide en seis capítulos. El capítulo 1 presenta un argumento deductivo 
en contra de la existencia del argumento eventivo, y a favor de la conclusión de que los 
efectos de la eventividad se derivan de una relación estativa causativa. Una 
Resumen 
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consecuencia del argumento es que los verbos y los adjetivos tienen el mismo grado de 
complejidad aspectual: los dos pueden denotar estativos simples y estativos causativos. 
El capítulo concluye con una presentación de las propiedades sintácticas de los EAs y 
de los análisis sintácticos alternativos. 
El capítulo 2 se centra en el diagnóstico de las propiedades sintácticas de los 
adjetivos para demostrar que sus estructuras son tan complejas como las de los verbos. 
Para ello se lleva a cabo una comparación entre verbos de distintas clases por un lado, y 
por el otro adjetivos como los EAs, los adjetivos de experiencia psicológica (PA), como 
ansioso o deseoso, y los adjetivos relacionales y los adjetivos que denotan estados 
físicos (RA), como canadiense o alto, entre otros. Las conclusiones que se extraen son 
las siguientes: (i) que las estructuras argumentales de los adjetivos son tan complejas 
como las estructuras argumentales de los verbos; (ii) que la estructura argumental es 
neutra con respecto a la categoría léxica; y (iii) que las estructuras sintácticas de los EAs 
tienen las propiedades de la alternancia causativa. 
El capítulo 3 argumenta que en términos aspectuales los EAs son únicamente y 
siempre estativos causativos. Analizando el aspecto léxico de los EAs, PAs, y los 
RAs, se define una clasificación tripartita entre los que muestran señales de eventividad 
(EAs), los que son estativos con lecturas existenciales típicas de los predicados de 
estadio (PAs), y los que son estativos y se comportan como predicados de individuo 
(RAs). Al mismo tiempo, se demuestra que los verbos encajan en la misma 
clasificación, y se introducen los resultados de los estudios de Maienborn (2005b, 2007) 
y de Rappaport Hovav y Levin (2000). Estos estudios investigan la misma clase de 
verbos, a saber, verbos de emisión como oler y brillar, desde dos direcciones diferentes. 
Maienborn los clasifica como estativos Davidsonianos y Rappaport Hovav y Levin 
como causativos estativos. Aquí se establece la conexión empírica entre la eventividad, 
la estatividad, y la causatividad, y lo importante es que se establece la conexión con 
verbos. El siguiente paso es el de demostrar que el patrón del aspecto léxico de los EAs 
es el mismo que el de los verbos de emisión, es decir causativo estativo. 
El capítulo 4 desarrolla la presente teoría de aspecto léxico aportando argumentos a 
favor de que la única distinción aspectual sea entre los estados simples y los estados 
causativos. Se ofrecen cuatro argumentos en contra del argumento eventivo y a favor de 
la presente teoría de aspecto léxico. Los primeros dos siguen de los análisis 
desarrollados de la pasiva y el progresivo. Se argumenta que estos dos fenómenos son 
operaciones que hacen referencia a la naturaleza estativa causativa del predicado, y se 
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definen  y  restringen  únicamente  de  esta  manera.  El  tercer  argumento  viene  de  la 
estatividad de oraciones existenciales. Se argumenta que la función gramatical de estas 
oraciones es la de convertir un argumento estativo del predicado en el sujeto de la 
oración. El cuarto argumento es una demostración de la inconsistencia de los 
diagnósticos de eventividad que es predecible si la eventidad es prágmatica, y no un 
primitivo semántico. Además, se especifican los mecanismos de interpretación de 
aspecto léxico y su mapeo al domino de la interpretación temporal de la cláusula; se 
proporcionan análisis formales de la voz activa y pasiva, el progresivo, y oraciones 
existenciales. Concluye argumentando que la causatividad es una propiedad léxica, y no 
una cabeza sintáctica ni una regla de interpretación. 
El capítulo 5 aplica el sistema aspectual del capítulo anterior al paradigma de los 
EAs en (2), analiza la alternancia causativa, y compara el paradigma de los EAs en 
numerosos idiomas germánicos, en romances y en el euskera. 
El capítulo 6 recoge los resultados, las implicaciones para la representación 
lingüística del aspecto léxico, e indica las líneas de investigación. 
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COMP Complementiser 
CONT Continuous Aspect Morpheme 
DAT Dative Case 
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ERG  Ergative Case 
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LOC Locative 
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NOM Nominative Case 
PART Participle 
PAST Past Tense 
PL Plural Number 
PREP Preposition 
PRES Present Tense 
PRT Particle 
SE  Third Person Reflexive Pronoun 
SING Singular Number 
SUBJ Subjunctive Mood 
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Chapter 1: 
Laying the Groundwork 
 
1 Introduction 
Evaluative adjectives
1
 (EAs), such as brave, nice, and rude, stand out because they 
violate basic assumptions about what lexical categories do. While verbs can denote both 
events and states, adjectives are supposed to be limited to denoting states. EAs seem to 
be the exception to the rule. They have stative readings, such as in the present simple in 
(1a). But they also produce agentive inferences when they appear in the continuous 
aspect ((1b)) or modified by an intention adverbial ((1c)).
2
 
 
(1) a. Emma is arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
b. Sam was being arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
c. Victoria was arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude on purpose 
 
EAs’ acceptability in agentive environments motivates specific extensions in 
theories of aspectual composition. Lakoff (1966) assigns EAs a non-state feature. Partee 
(1977) proposes a non-stative copula “active” be. Dowty (1979) posits the abstract 
predicate-modifier DO to capture a shift from states to activities. EAs thus seem to 
instantiate a unique stative/eventive ambiguity that is particularly striking because it 
occurs in adjectives. They have a long history and represent an interesting puzzle. 
This thesis proposes that a principled understanding of EAs has important 
consequences for the analysis of inner-aspect (i.e. lexical aspect). Rather than 
concluding that EAs are outliers that require stipulation, it aims to show that thorough 
examination of EAs justifies turning standard assumptions about aspectual composition 
on their head. So this thesis does two things at once: it analyses EAs and it follows the 
consequences for the theory of inner-aspect. 
 
                                                          
1
 I adopt the evaluative label because it is the term for these adjectives that is used in the recent literature 
(Kertz 2006, 2010; Landau 2009). All the labels used to categorise the different adjective classes are for 
descriptive purposes only. 
2
 I will use the term continuous aspect from traditional grammar (cf. Quirk et al. 1985; Side and Wellman 
2002) rather than progressive aspect in order to avoid a terminological confound. As will become 
apparent below, I will argue throughout this thesis that the notion of a process or change is conceptual and 
not represented in the aspectual decomposition of the predicate. So, I use the former rather than the latter 
term to avoid the inference that a process is involved in the progressive.   
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1.1 Front 1: the Proposal for EAs 
The start point is a new perspective on EAs: 
 
Proposal: EAs are stative causatives with an animate external argument and 
a propositional complement that undergo the causative alternation just as 
many causative verbs do. 
 
The causative alternation is a verbal phenomenon that this proposal extends to 
adjectives. The verb break in (2) provides a prototypical example of the alternation. We 
will return to detailed discussion of the alternation and this paradigm in chapter 2. For 
the moment, (2a) can be described as an intransitive predication with the logical direct 
object as its sole argument (i.e. unaccusative). Example (2b) is a transitive predication 
that now includes a causing individual. These two data points illustrate the causative 
alternation: the alternation between two syntactic structures, one that specifies the cause 
((2b)), and one that does not ((2a)). 
 
(2) a. The window broke    = Causative Unaccusative 
b. Peter broke the window   = Transitive Causative 
c. The window was broken (by Peter)  = Transitive Causative + Passive 
 
Example (2c) is the passive of (2b). Passives provide a counterpoint to 
unaccusatives in that the causing argument can be made overt in passives, but not in 
unaccusatives (cf. *The window broke by Peter). In extending the phenomenon from 
verbs to adjectives this thesis raises questions about the nature of the causative 
alternation. We consider some below. 
With regard to EAs, I propose the causative alternation paradigm in (3). Examples 
(3a, c, e) are the respective parallels to the examples in (2). 
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(3) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition  
            + Passive 
 
Chapter 2 addresses the differences between the paradigms. The central observation at 
this introductory stage is that, just as EAs are unique in producing agentive inferences, 
so they are in showing the argument structure pattern in (3). 
This thesis takes the perspective that EAs’ exceptional agentive inferences and their 
exceptional argument structure are the two faces of one problem that finds its solution 
in a causative alternation analysis. So rather than positing an ambiguity in EAs, this 
thesis explores the consequences of a unified analysis. 
It is organised as follows. Chapter 2 shows that predicative adjectives have 
argument structures of varying complexity. EAs are compared with psychological 
experience adjectives (PA), and relational/physical property adjectives (RA). I propose 
that their argument structures are as shown in (4). The inner-aspectual variable s is an 
argument of the predicate that denotes a state. 
 
(4) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
Chapter 2 shows that EAs have an animate external argument and a CP complement 
((4a)), just as PAs do ((4b)). RAs also have an external argument, but their complement 
is the state argument itself ((4c)). In the process of diagnosing adjectival argument 
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structure, significant parallels with verbs emerge that support this causative alternation 
analysis. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the diagnosis of inner-aspect. It is shown that EAs are 
unambiguously stative, and that the agentive inference they produce is an implicature 
and not an entailment. We will also see that EAs’ aspectual signature—rather than being 
exceptional—matches that of verbs independently classified as stative causatives (e.g. 
glow, sleep, wait).
3
 More specifically, it is argued that the occasional agentive 
implicature that EAs produce is due to their causative nature, not an aspectual 
ambiguity. PAs and RAs, on the other hand, are simple states. The two kinds of stativity 
are represented in (4) by the difference in aspectual argument complexity: the two state 
arguments in (4a) represent a causing-state and a result-state, respectively, while PAs 
and RAs each have a single state argument. Once again, in diagnosing the inner-aspect 
of adjectives, significant parallels with verbs emerge. 
Chapter 4 addresses the interpretation of argument structure, and its mapping to the 
inflectional domain of the clause. It presents arguments for the representation of the 
state arguments in the syntax as shown in (4). It also presents analyses of the active and 
passive voices, the continuous aspect, the present simple, the auxiliary and copula be, 
existential there, and the representation of causation, thematic roles, and spatio-
temporal modification. 
Chapter 5 returns to the analysis of the EA paradigm in (3) and the causative 
alternation in general. It concludes with a comparison of the EA paradigm in a number 
of Germanic and Romance languages, as well as Basque. 
Lastly, chapter 6 summarises the results and reflects on some of the broader 
consequences of this thesis for the organisation of the grammar. 
 
 
1.2 Front 2: the Theory of Inner-Aspect 
Developing a causative alternation analysis of EAs and accounting for their aspectual 
properties immediately opens up a second front. A theory of inner-aspect is needed that 
can support the analysis—a theory that makes the analysis principled and not ad hoc. To 
avoid an ad hoc analysis, relevant parallels need to be found. For this reason, adjectives 
                                                          
3
 Since we will be concerned with stative predicates, I introduce some terminology to avoid confusion. 
Stative causatives are stative predicates that, in some environments, naturally produce agentive inferences 
and/or give signs of being eventive rather than stative. Simple states, in contrast, do neither of these things 
and are transparently stative. We return to these differences in the next section. 
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and verbs are compared throughout the thesis. The next section discusses the differences 
between adjectives and verbs, and presents the core argument for the theory of inner-
aspect that emerges in the course of chapters 2, 3, and 4. The subsequent section 
presents the representation of causation. 
 
 
1.2.1 The Adjective Category and the Argument for the State 
Argument 
The comparison with verbs will be fundamental in the development of this proposal that 
EAs are causative alternating predicates. To my knowledge, the causative alternation 
has never been posited outside the verbal domain, so this section will justify the validity 
of extending the alternation to adjectives. To begin with, at the most general level, verbs 
and adjectives differ in three ways:
4
 
 
(5) a. Adjectives do not assign case to their complement ((6)). 
b. Adjectives do not carry temporal or aspectual morphology ((7a) vs. (7b)). 
c. Adjectives do not convey a notion of change, whether spatial ((7b)) or 
temporal/physical ((8)). 
(6) Emma is proud *(of) Peter   (cf. Chomsky 1981: 49, ex. (4))  
(7) a. Emma was rude 
b. Victoria pushed the cart 
(8) Peter broke the window 
 
Differences (5a) and (5b) are morphological reflexes. They do not track inner-
aspectual differences, but they do account for significant swathes of surface distribution 
facts. For example, since adjectives require a preposition to license a nominal 
complement EAs cannot have a transitive surface structure that parallels (9a). But since 
clauses do not require case, they can realise a transitive structure with a clause ((9b)).
5
 
                                                          
4
 At the theoretical level adjectives and verbs are also considered to differ fundamentally in their 
argument structures. One of the conclusions offered here is that adjectives and verbs in fact have 
argument structures of parallel complexity. The comparisons between adjectives and verbs throughout the 
thesis substantiate this. 
5
 A couple of comments are in order here. First, case theory generally falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
In this respect, the proper treatment of clauses does, as well. For descriptive simplicity I will assume that 
the surface pattern indicates that clauses do not require case. While further research may lead to the 
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(9) a. Peter broke the window 
b. Emma was rude to leave 
 
Similarly, since only verbs carry temporal and aspectual morphology, only they 
passivise with overt passive participle morphology ((10a)). Nevertheless, structures with 
the properties of the passive are found in the nominal and adjectival domain ((10b, c)). 
So, differences (5a) and (5b) explain some surface effects. Difference (5c), in contrast, 
goes straight to the heart of inner-aspect. 
 
(10) a. The window was broken (by Peter) 
b. The city’s destruction (by the barbarians) 
c. To leave was rude (of Emma) 
 
Difference (5c) picks up on the notion that might appear to be the dividing line 
between an event and a state. In fact, Davidson proposed the event argument, e, only in 
the analysis of action verbs (1967: 93). These can be characterised as verbs conveying 
some change. The event argument was defined as an entity that is mapped to space and 
time, i.e. it is spatio-temporal. Stative predicates required a different analysis. 
However, Maienborn (2005b, 2007) shows that the line between eventivity and 
stativity is not the notion of change. On the one hand, there are verbs (e.g. assassinate, 
break, push) that convey change and that are spatio-temporal, satisfying Davidson’s 
criteria. On the other, there are verbs (e.g. own, resemble, weigh) that do not convey 
change and that are temporal, but not spatial. This is the traditional characterisation of a 
stative predicate (i.e. simple states here), and it justifies the conclusion that not all verbs 
                                                                                                                                                                          
modification of this assumption, at the time of writing I believe that it will not invalidate the specific 
proposals that are the subject this thesis. 
Second, the appearance of the preposition of in the adjective example (6) and in nominalisations 
((i.a)) is traditionally proposed to be two manifestations of the same of-insertion operation (Chomsky 
1981). In contrast, I would like to propose that these two environments should not be unified under of-
insertion because of-insertion in the licensing of a complement in nominalisations is morphologically 
regular and clearly tied to nominalisation itself (cf. i.a, b), while adjectives take complements introduced 
by whatever preposition they select for (cf. (6), (i.c), (i.d)). So while both nominalisations and adjectives 
require prepositions to license a noun complement, it seems that of-insertion is restricted to 
nominalisation and is not involved in the licensing of an adjective’s complement. Additional data 
supporting this are provided in section 2.2.3.2. 
 
(i) a. The destruction of the city 
b. The rudeness of the response 
c. Emma was rude to Peter 
d. Victoria was angry at Peter 
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are eventive. Following the logic of the event argument, a state argument, s, can be 
defined as an entity that is mapped only to time. 
But Maienborn identifies verbs (e.g. shine, sleep, wait) that pass standard eventivity 
diagnostics (chapter 3) while otherwise providing consistent evidence that they are 
aspectually stative, i.e. they do not convey change (chapter 3). Maienborn’s finding 
establishes the three-way empirical pattern that I diagram in (11) between action spatio-
temporal verbs (Class 1), stative statio-temporal verbs (Class 2), and simple state verbs 
(Class 3). The top line in (11) tracks the aspectual nature of the predicate, and the 
bottom line tracks the mapping to space and/or time. 
 
(11) Eventivity versus Stativity versus Spatio-Temporality (Version 1 of 5) 
       ...         Stative 
 
       Action Eventive   Stative Eventive         Simple State 
    Verbs          Verbs      Verbs 
  (Class 1)        (Class 2)    (Class 3) 
 
       Spatio-Temporal     Temporal 
 
The properties of Class 2 make the eventive/stative distinction inconsistent. On the 
one hand, they show that the dividing line between stativity and eventivity is not related 
to the notion of change, because Class 2 is spatio-temporal but aspectually stative. This 
makes Class 1 aspectually undefined because eventivity is no longer the counterpoint to 
stativity. On the other hand, Class 2 shows that stativity cannot be defined by mapping 
to time because Class 2 is stative and spatio-temporal. 
Because Class 2 overlaps with both of the other classes, the empirical pattern in 
(11) cannot be accounted for by positing two primitive aspectual arguments, i.e. one for 
events and one for states.
6
 Three primitive types would have to be posited to cover the 
particular cluster of properties of each class. But then, there would be no explanation for 
the overlap in their properties. 
                                                          
6
 Maienborn maintains two primitive aspectual sorts, one for events and one for states, and posits that 
stative eventive verbs (her Davidsonian-States) are—together with action eventive verbs—a sub-type of 
concrete entity (cf. Davidson 1970), while simple states (her Kimian-States) are a sub-type of abstract 
entity (2005b: 303). Classifying simple states as abstract entities does not resolve the tension because its 
source is the spatio-temporal class that tests stative, i.e. Class 2. The conclusion here will be that only the 
state argument exists. 
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Assuming that the ontology should be kept as small as possible, something here has 
to be derived, and so something independent is needed to derive it. I will propose that 
that something is causation. 
Since it is intuitively true that there are verbs that denote simple states (Class 3) and 
states are simpler than events in that they are mapped only to time, let’s assume that a 
state argument, s, exists. 
Correspondingly, the properties of a Class 3 verb are accounted for by predicating it 
of a state argument. The state argument is mapped to time, so it is aspectually stative, 
and temporal. 
Turning to Class 2, let’s suppose that there is no primitive event argument defined 
by spatio-temporality. Rather, let’s suppose that two state arguments in a causative 
relation (i.e. cause-result) produce eventivity effects. A causative relation that takes only 
state arguments denotes in turn a stative relation, i.e. a relation that is mapped to time. 
Since space is not represented in the relation, when a causative predicate is 
modified by a locative, the locative is interpreted inferentially to the extent that the 
causative relation expressed by the predicate can be located in space (chapters 3 and 4). 
This means that the location is not a primitive property of the predicate itself, or an 
aspectual argument, i.e. statio-temporality is epiphenomenal.  
It also means that Class 2 is no longer a contradiction: it is aspectually stative 
because it contains only state arguments, and it tests positive for spatio-temporality 
because it is causative. So (11) becomes (12). Since spatio-temporality is derived, the 
stativity of Class 2 is now expected. 
 
(12) Eventivity versus Stativity versus Spatio-Temporality (Version 2 of 5) 
Stative 
 
        Action Eventive            Stative Eventive    Simple State 
   Verbs         Verbs          Verbs 
(Class 1)      (Class 2)        (Class 3) 
 
                Spatio-Temporal          Temporal 
 
However, adopting this line of reasoning also extends stativity to Class 1: the class 
of verbs that convey change—the one that originally motivated the event argument. The 
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temptation here is to posit another primitive aspectual entity. That is not viable 
however, because it either re-introduces the contradiction with Class 2, or it has to be a 
primitive entity that is not mapped to space or time. So, a primitive event argument 
appears untenable. 
Let’s update (12) to (13) to incorporate this line of argumentation. Now all the 
verbs denote states, but Classes 1 and 2 are stative causatives with a locative inference 
that is dependent on the localizability of the causative relation (marked in “[]” brackets). 
 
(13) Eventivity versus Stativity versus Spatio-Temporality (Version 3 of 5) 
Stative 
                   Action  
            Stative Causative        Stative Causative    Simple State 
       Verbs       Verbs          Verbs 
      (Class 1)     (Class 2)        (Class 3) 
  Causative:         Temporal 
      [Spatio-]Temporal 
 
The outstanding issue is the notion of change associated with Class 1. We have 
come this far with the assumptions that (i) there is no primitive event argument, (ii) the 
only primitive aspectual argument denotes a state, and (iii) eventivity effects derive 
from two state arguments in a causative relation. 
At this point it is important to dispel the intuition that a causative relation entails 
change. First, stative causation—a causative relation that does not convey change—is 
realised linguistically (cf. Dowty 1979; Kratzer 2000). Rappaport Hovav and Levin 
(RH&L) (2000: 288) use (14) to illustrate it. Here, Tony is the cause of the lack of 
change. 
 
(14) Tony kept the books on the table 
 
Second, formally it is not necessary to define causation it terms of change. For 
example, in Dowty’s (1979: 109, 141) aspectual calculus, CAUSE relates two 
propositions ((15a)), and the BECOME operator is responsible for change ((15b)). The 
Leferman  
10 
 
semantics of (15a) produces precisely stative causation, and the more complex (15c) is 
required to get causal change.
7
 
 
(15) a. CAUSE(α, β) 
b. BECOME(α) 
c. CAUSE(α, BECOME(β)) 
 
In this connection, RH&L (2000) investigate a sub-set of the Class 2 verbs analysed 
by Maienborn, namely, emission verbs such as glow, shine, and smell. On the one hand, 
RH&L (2000: 284) inspect these verbs and classify them as stative because they do not 
entail change and because inner-aspect diagnostics have them patterning with other 
statives (chapter 3). On the other hand, they also analyse them as causative because, 
among other indications, their subject is interpreted as a Causer. For example, in (16) 
the sun is the cause of the shining. Their conclusion is that these verbs are stative 
causatives. 
 
(16) The sun shone 
 
Taken together, Maienborn (2005b, 2007) and RH&L (2000) strongly support the 
present line of argumentation: they pick out the same class of verbs and classify them as 
eventive (Maienborn), stative (Maienborn and RH&L) and causative (RH&L). This 
shows that eventivity does co-occur with stative causation. In the present argument, the 
implication is that eventivity is epiphenomenal (chapter 3 and 4). 
The consequence for verbs that convey change (i.e. Class 1) is that the notion of 
change is independent of the event argument. This follows because their spatio-temporal 
properties—the properties that define eventivity—are accounted for in the same way 
that the spatio-temporal properties of stative causative Class 2’s are: state arguments in 
a causative relation. Since their spatio-temporality is accounted for without an event 
argument, the notion of change it was originally meant to convey has to lie elsewhere. 
                                                          
7
 In Dowty’s system states are the only primitive type. While BECOME produces a change-of-state, the 
predicate-modifier DO is required to distinguish states from activities: “[...] I am supposing that both 
stative and active verbs are constructed from the same homogeneous class of primitive stative predicates, 
thus the presence of DO is the only thing that distinguishes the meaning of a stative from that of an active 
verb” (1979: 113; emphasis Dowty’s). So, on its own (15a) is stative causative. 
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I would like to suggest that the notion of change is represented as conceptual 
knowledge associated with the predicate, and independent of the aspectual 
decomposition inner-aspect. This is why I have used the phrase convey the notion of 
change rather than entail change throughout this discussion. Importantly, this line of 
reasoning makes the properties of Classes 1, 2 and 3 logically consistent, and positing 
an event argument necessarily re-introduces the inconsistency.  
The present argument leads to (17). There is only one aspectual distinction stated 
over aspectual arguments: simple states versus stative causatives built out of state 
arguments. 
 
(17) Eventivity versus Stativity versus Spatio-Temporality (Version 4 of 5) 
Stative 
                     
     Stative Causative  Simple State 
                      Verbs        Verbs 
          (Classes 1 and 2)     (Class 3) 
      Causative:      Temporal 
[Spatio-]Temporal 
 
This argument in favour of the primitive state argument, and the epiphenomenal 
nature of eventivity began with the third and final difference between verbs and 
adjectives: adjectives do not convey a notion of change, whether spatial or 
temporal/physical. I have just argued that change is represented as conceptual 
knowledge, and not as part of the aspectual decomposition. This means that the category 
difference between verbs and adjectives is tracking a conceptual/morphological 
difference (i.e. that verbs can convey change and adjectives do not), and not a 
syntactic/LF one (i.e. an event argument). 
Importantly, the conclusion about the representation of inner-aspect was reached by 
looking at verbs. However, the adjective argument structures proposed in section 1.2 
represent the same aspectual distinction as in (17) ((18) repeated from (4)). Namely, 
adjectives are aspectually simple states (containing one state argument in (18b, c)) or 
stative causatives (containing two state arguments in (18a)). Therefore, (17) can be 
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generalised to (19), which now refers to predicates (i.e. adjective and verbs) rather than 
verbs. 
 
(18) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
(19) Eventivity versus Stativity versus Spatio-Temporality (Version 5 of 5) 
Stative 
                     
   Stative Causative  Simple State 
                  Predicates   Predicates 
        (Classes 1 and 2)     (Class 3) 
      Causative:      Temporal 
[Spatio-]Temporal 
 
Similarly, the adjective argument structures in (18) can be generalised to (20), 
where PP is the maximal projection of the predicate:
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 In chapter 4, one refinement will be made to type 2 simple state structures ((20c)). It will be proposed 
that there are type 2 simple state predicates that reverse the order of their state argument and DP with a 
corresponding interpretative difference. This is set aside until it becomes relevant. 
Chapter 1 
 
13 
 
(20) Generalised Argument Structures (Adjectives and Verbs) 
a. Lexical Causatives 
   PP 
             2 
         XP          P’ 
                     2 
                    s1          P’ 
                             2 
                           s2           P’ 
                                     2 
                                    P        XP 
b. Type 1 Simple States 
   PP 
               2 
            XP          P’ 
                        2 
                      s1            P’ 
                                 2 
                                P        XP 
c. Type 2 Simple States 
                    PP 
                 2 
              XP          P’ 
                         2 
                        P          s1 
 
This unification of verbs and adjectives leads to the proposal for the representation 
of inner-aspect decomposition that emerges from the analyses and evidence presented in 
this thesis: 
 
Auxiliary Proposals:  
(i) The only primitive aspectual argument denotes a state.  
(ii) CAUSE is the only aspectual relation.  
(iii) The only aspectual distinction stated over aspectual arguments is 
between simple states and stative causatives. 
 
The argument just given for the uniqueness of the state argument will be supported 
by theory-internal and theory-neutral evidence throughout the thesis. The first kind will 
emerge naturally from the analyses of the passive voice, the continuous aspect, 
existential there, and the present simple in chapter 4. 
Evidence of the second kind will be presented in chapters 3 and 4. By carefully 
applying event diagnostics to a range of predicate classes, we will see that the 
diagnostics are sensitive to the factors in (21). Importantly, since event diagnostics are 
supposed to be providing evidence for a primitive event argument, they should not be 
sensitive to these factors. The conclusion will be, again, that eventivity effects are 
parasitic on causation, but sensitive to the properties of the predication description and 
the conceptual knowledge associated with the predicate as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
Leferman  
14 
 
(21) Factors Affecting the Results of Eventivity Diagnostics 
a. Causative versus simple state 
b. The notion of change versus no change 
c. The physical versus the abstract quality of the predicate 
d. The animacy versus the inanimacy of the external argument 
 
So, verbs and adjectives have the same range of inner-aspect decompositions. This 
goes a long way to explaining why verbs and adjectives differ in only three ways, two 
morphological, the other conceptual ((5)).
9
 And, it validates the comparison of verbs 
and adjectives that is used in this thesis to argue for the causative alternation analysis of 
EAs. Indeed, since verbs and adjectives have parallel syntactic and LF representations 
of inner-aspect, the null hypothesis is that there should be adjectives that undergo the 
causative alternation. The proposal here is that EAs confirm it. 
In closing this section, we can foreshadow some of the consequences of this theory 
of inner-aspect. As mentioned in the introduction, the apparent aspectual ambiguity of 
EAs has led to many different analyses. These analyses invoke theoretical posits such 
as: 
 
(i) The Individual/Stage distinction     (Carlson 1977) 
(ii) The Vendlerian predicate classification   (Vendler 1967) 
(iii) “Active” be       (Partee 1977) 
(iv) The abstract aspectual predicates BECOME and DO  (Dowty 1979) 
(v) Thematic roles 
 
The development of the present theory of inner-aspect and EAs makes a strong case that 
are that these posits, like the event argument, are epiphenomenal. 
The CAUSE relation is the only relation that remains in aspectual decomposition 
and the state argument the only aspectual argument: the set of aspectual primitives is 
reduced to two members. Importantly, in addition to its reduced number of primitives, 
the proposal is compositional and predictive. Given the simplicity of states and the 
cognitive importance of causation, the theory has psychological plausibility and sheds 
                                                          
9
 If lexical category is considered a morphological property, the final difference is also morphological. I 
assume that this is the case. In this connection, since the nature of the differences between verbs and 
adjectives is morphological, this thesis supports Baker’s (2003: 77-88) conjecture that verbs and 
adjectives are the same underlying predicative category. 
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light on the computational structure of language. In this connection, let’s turn now to 
the representation of causation. 
 
 
1.2.2 The Lexical Representation of Causation 
Beginning with the syntax, in (22a) (repeated from (20a)) lexical causatives have an 
external argument, two state arguments, and a complement. The most important contrast 
with simple state structures is in the number of state arguments ((22b, c) repeated from 
(20b, c)): simple states have only one. 
 
(22) Generalised Argument Structures (Adjectives and Verbs) 
a. Lexical Causatives 
   PP 
             2 
         XP          P’ 
                     2 
                    s1          P’ 
                             2 
                           s2           P’ 
                                     2 
                                    P        XP 
b. Type 1 Simple States 
   PP 
               2 
            XP          P’ 
                        2 
                      s1            P’ 
                                 2 
                                P        XP 
c. Type 2 Simple States 
                    PP 
                 2 
              XP          P’ 
                         2 
                        P          s1 
 
Regarding interpretation, this thesis will argue that predicates have lexical entries 
that make reference to argument selection. In particular, they have a denotation that 
does this. The denotation is a proper part of a lexical entry, together with 
morphological, phonological, and conceptual information. 
In chapter 4 it will be argued that causation is a property of the lexical predicate’s 
denotation. The template denotation of a causative predicate is in (23a). The CAUSE 
relation partitions the predicate and its arguments into a causing-state description and a 
result-state description. The CAUSE relation is inside the predicate, and the predicate’s 
arguments map onto the binary-branching syntax in (22a). The denotations of simple 
state predicates also map onto their respective syntaxes ((23b, c), (22b, c)). 
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(23) a. Template Causative Denotation 
║P║= λyλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(P(x, s1), P(s2, y))] 
b. Template Type 1 Simple State Denotation 
║P║= λyλs1λx. [P(x, s1, y))] 
c. Template Type 2 Simple State Denotation 
║P║= λs1λx. [P(x, s1))] 
 
In support of this analysis of causation, chapter 4 provides evidence that the state 
arguments are realised in the syntax, as shown in (22). It will also be argued that 
CAUSE is not a functional head in the syntax, or an interpretation rule. 
Regarding EAs, the motivating proposal of this thesis is that their apparent 
aspectual ambiguity follows from the single stative causative denotation in (24). There 
is one particularity here. In chapter 2 we will see that EAs are factive, and so they 
presuppose that the content of their complement CP is true. This presupposition is 
represented in (24) with Beaver’s (1992) presupposition operator, ∂.10 
 
(24) Template EA Denotation  (Version 1 of 2) 
║EA║= λs2λs1λx. ∂ q [CAUSE(EA(x, s1), EA(s2, q))] 
 
In making use of denotations this thesis is Lexicalist, understood in the sense that 
lexical entries contain argument-related information. It is important to state that this is a 
research result and not an assumption. The development of this thesis supports the 
existence of denotations in that the theory that emerges both captures empirical 
generalisations and allows for the characterisation of phenomena as conceptual, 
syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, or morphological. In contrast, theories that do not posit 
argument-related information in the lexicon allow for variability in meaning that is not 
instantiated (cf. Marantz 1997; Borer 2005a, b, a.o.). 
EAs are useful in this regard because they are a prime example of apparent 
ambiguity. We will see however, that once conceptual knowledge and pragmatic 
inference are sifted out, they are syntactically and semantically constant. In contrast, 
                                                          
10
 In this thesis I do not analyse factivity itself. The factive presupposition is marked in the denotation in 
(24) for convenience: it visually reinforces that EAs are factive, while PAs and RAs are not. It is more 
likely that factivity is not recorded in the denotation but calculated at a different level (cf. Stalnaker 1974; 
Abrusan 2011a; Anand and Hacquard 2014). In chapter 5, when we turn to the derivations of the EA 
structures, the presupposition operator is removed from the final version of the denotation. 
Chapter 1 
 
17 
 
supposing that there is no reference to arguments in the lexicon allows for the 
possibility of variability in EA syntax and meaning that does not occur. 
So what exactly does the denotation do? Expanding on RH&L (2012), I propose 
that the function of a denotation is to encode a predicate’s argument-related entailments 
that are present on its every usage. So, the arguments listed in (24) are the arguments 
that EAs always entail. In other words, the role of the denotation in this thesis is to 
encode a predicate’s immutable argument-related entailments. I aim to show that EAs 
are always causative. Likewise, they always entail an individual external argument and 
a propositional complement. These are the properties that are encoded in the denotation 
in (24).
11
 
In conclusion, the focus of this thesis is an analysis that normalises EAs. A 
causative alternation approach is interesting because it requires the scrutiny of many 
standard assumptions. The result is a novel theory of inner-aspect that is simple, 
predictive, and compositional. 
 
 
1.3 Basic Data and Alternative Analyses 
Before embarking upon the detailed examination of EA argument structure and inner-
aspect in the following chapters, the final two sections here describe the EA paradigm in 
enough detail to review alternative analyses of EA argument structure. 
The overview minimises questions of technical implementation. It provides a 
general notion of how EA data have been analysed and draws attention to the 
fundamental differences between those approaches and the present one. In different 
ways, each of the alternatives posits multiple denotations and/or optionality in how EAs 
take their arguments. In contrast, the present proposal develops a unified analysis based 
on a causative structure, an animate external argument, and a factive CP complement. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Thus, this thesis positions itself opposite the proposals that (i) external arguments are not arguments of 
the predicate (Marantz 1984; Kratzer 1996; Alexiadou et al. 2015; cf. Horvath and Siloni 2002; Rothstein 
2004; Muller and Wechsler 2014), and that (ii) predicates do not specify their complements (Alexiadou 
2014; Borer 2014; cf. RH&L 2012). 
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1.3.1 Basic EA Syntax Data 
The proposal here is that the basic EA paradigm in (25) (repeated from (3)) is a 
particular manifestation of the causative alternation. 
 
(25) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative 
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition  
            + Passive 
 
The examples in (25a, b) show that the EA that-clause can occupy the subject 
position directly and that it can be extraposed. Although mention of EA that-clause data 
is found in the literature, the present study is the first to observe the general ability of 
EAs to predicate of that-clauses and incorporate them into the basic paradigm. For 
example, Bennis (2000) indicates that EAs do not take an animate argument and a that-
clause at the same time in Dutch ((26a)). 
 
(26) Dutch  
a. 
??
Jan  is gemeen [dat hij zo          over   dat onderwerp praat]   
 John is mean    that he like-that about that subject      talks   
(Bennis 2000: 42, ex. (41b)) 
b. Het is gemeen [dat Jan    over   dat onderwerp praat]  
      it    is mean     that John about that subject     talks              
  (Bennis 2000: 42, ex. (43b)) 
 
He also introduces an example of an EA taking a that-clause alone, but does not analyse 
it ((26b)). Chapter 2 will argue that EAs with a that-clause are unaccusatives: the that-
clause is a complement and the external argument is non-referential. This will account 
for the deviance of (26a). 
Moving on to the structures with an animate subject, example (27a) illustrates that 
EAs can appear with just an animate subject and that, in the present simple, they are 
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interpreted as describing a permanent property, i.e. the so-called Individual-Level (IL) 
reading (Carlson 1977). 
 
(27) a. Emma is rude  
 b. Emma was rude (to leave) 
 
Example (27b) shows that, in English, an infinitive can follow the adjective and that in 
the past simple, in addition to the IL reading, an existential reading becomes available, 
i.e. a Stage-Level (SL) reading. 
On this proposal the alternation between the EA that-clause and the infinitive tracks 
the presence of a referential external argument. In addition, both of the structures in (27) 
are analysed as transitive causatives; the difference being that the CP is interpreted 
implicitly when not overt. The IL/SL distinction is discussed in chapter 3. The 
availability of the infinitival structure in (27b) is a point of cross-linguistic variation that 
we take up in chapter 5. 
The examples in (28) show that the subject and infinitive of (27b) can appear in a 
passive-like structure, either by placing the infinitive directly in subject position ((28a)) 
or extraposing it ((28b)). The animate DP from (27b) can now appear in an optional PP. 
 
(28) a. To leave was rude (of Emma) 
b. It was rude (of Emma) to leave 
 
Lastly, (29) illustrates the ability of a sub-set of EAs to take a to-PP. 
 
(29) Peter was rude to Emma 
 
Throughout this thesis I treat the EA causative alternation paradigm in (25) as the core 
phenomenon, and the to-PP data ((29)) as peripheral. This is because, as we will see in 
chapter 3, EAs do not always entail a to-PP. 
With the EA data pattern in mind the properties of some alternative approaches to 
EA argument structure are presented in the next section. Semantic approaches are 
examined in chapter 3. 
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1.3.2 Alternative Syntactic Analyses 
In a seminal paper Stowell (1991) analyses EA argument structure and proposes that 
EAs can take two arguments: an animate mental property holder and an event (realised 
by the infinitive in our paradigm). When both arguments are realised, they are generated 
externally in the specifiers of Larsonian shells, with the animate argument occupying 
the inner-most shell and the event argument the outer one ((30)). 
 
(30) Stowell’s (1991) EA Argument Structures 
a. IL Reading ((27a)): 
A 
                                AP 
                         3 
                   SPEC             A’ 
                       g                    g    
                  John             stupid 
 
 
 
 
(cf. Stowell 1991: 122, ex. (32a)) 
b. SL Reading ((27b), (28)): 
                              AP 
                        3 
                     A’               Event 
             3      6 
          A                AP  to wash the car  
           g            3  
     stupidi   SPEC           A’ 
                       g                 g    
               (of) John          ti 
 
(cf. Stowell 1991: 128, ex. (56)) 
 
Stowell’s analysis invokes the Individual/Stage distinction. If the EA projects only 
the inner shell, with the animate DP in its specifier, the subject receives an IL property 
interpretation (e.g. John is stupid (30a)). If the optional additional infinitive AP-shell is 
projected, it is assigned the Event thematic role, inducing a SL interpretation (e.g. John 
was stupid to wash the car (30b)). 
Regarding the infinitive data, Stowell assumes that the infinitive in the upper AP-
shell does not intervene for case purposes. He further assumes that genitive case is 
optionally assigned to the animate external argument by the preposition of. Examples 
(27b) (e.g. John was stupid to wash the car) and (28) (e.g. To wash the case was stupid 
(of John)) follow from the raising of either external argument to Spec, IP: if the animate 
argument is assigned genitive case, then the infinitive raises; if the animate argument is 
not assigned genitive case, then it raises. 
Three notable aspects of Stowell’s analysis are (i) the conclusion that the EA 
animate argument tests like an external argument, (ii) the proposal that the infinitive 
data are derived from the same argument structure ((30b)), and (iii) the proposal that an 
IL interpretation versus a SL one is dependent on the absence/presence of the infinitive. 
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Bennis (2004) examines Dutch adjectives and also concludes that the EA animate 
argument is external. This is shown in the structures in (31). The head little a is 
proposed by Bennis to be conceptually parallel to little v—implying that adjectives and 
verbs project isomorphic argument structures—but differs in that little a is aspectually 
stative and unable to assign accusative case (Bennis 2004: 93). 
 
(31) Bennis’ (2004) EA Argument Structures 
a. Peter is nice (to me) 
                               aP 
                         3 
                 SPEC               a’ 
                 Peter         3       
                                 a               AP    
                                             3  
                                     SPEC              A’ 
                                   (to me)               g    
                                                            A 
 
(cf. Bennis 2004: 92, ex. (14b)) 
b. To say that is nice (of him) 
                    aP 
             3 
     SPEC                a’ 
         e              3       
                       a                 AP    
                                     3  
                             SPEC                A’ 
                                                3 
                                              A               CP 
 
(cf. Bennis 2004: 92, ex. (27a)) 
 
In terms of the derivations, Bennis analyses infinitive structures such as (31b) as 
analogous to the verbal passive, observing the intuitive parallel optionality of the EA of-
phrase and the passive by-phrase (cf. The window was broken (by Peter)). 
In the passive-like structure in (31b) the derivation has the following properties: (i) 
an empty category e occupies the canonical external argument position, (ii) the CP 
raises from complement position for case (cf. Stowell 1991), and (iii) the of-phrase is 
optionally realised as an adjunct (cf. Baker et al. 1989). The passive analogy thus 
accounts for the passive-like infinitive structures ((28)). 
The to-PP examples come from the active structure in (31a), where a referential 
external argument is generated in Spec, a (e.g. Peter is nice (to me)). To-PPs are 
assumed to be generated optionally in Spec, A. Notice that in (31b) Spec, A is left 
empty, while in (31a) there is no CP. 
Beginning with the empty Spec, A in (31b), it addresses a restriction first observed 
in English by Stowell (1991) that has since been found with EAs in every language 
tested. Namely, an EA cannot license its CP and PP simultaneously ((32)). I will refer to 
this as the CP/PP restriction. In (32), the demonstrative that stands in for the 
propositional content of a CP: 
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(32) *That was kind to me              (Stowell 1991: 129, ex. (60b)) 
 
For Bennis this CP/PP restriction follows from minimality: on the assumption that 
the CP needs to move for case purposes, the to-PP blocks the movement if it is present 
in Spec, A. So Spec, A must be empty for the derivation of the passive structure to 
converge ((31b)). This means that the CP and the PP cannot be licensed simultaneously, 
which captures (32). 
In section 2.3.3.2 we return to the CP/PP restriction paradigm at length. I argue that 
the explanation is not minimality, but that the CP and PP compete for a single 
complement position. Since they compete for the same position, they do not co-occur. 
Turning now to the absence of the CP in (31a), there is one point of notable 
difference between Stowell’s and Bennis’ analyses. Whereas Stowell derives (33a) 
(repeated from (27b)) and passive-like structures such as (33b) (repeated from (28b)) 
from the same base structure, Bennis does not. 
 
(33) a. Emma was rude (to leave) 
b. It was rude (of Emma) to leave 
 
Bennis observes that the structures in (33) behave differently with respect to 
adjunct extraction. In (34), (34a) corresponds to (33a), and (34b) to (33b). 
 
(34) Dutch 
a. *Warri is Jan gemeen [om PRO    zo      ti over te praten]?    
   where is John mean    for PRO like-that t about to talk 
(Bennis 2000: 42, ex. (41c)) 
b. 
?
Waar is het gemeen [om PRO t over te praten]? 
where is  it   mean     for PRO t about to talk  
        (Bennis 2000: 42, ex. (43c)) 
 
The difference in the acceptability of adjunct extraction leads Bennis to propose that the 
infinitive is a complement to the adjective in the passive-like structures ((34b)), but an 
adjunct when the animate argument is in subject position ((34a)). So, the CP is absent in 
(31a) because Bennis analyses it as an adjunct. 
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Key aspects of Bennis’ study are that (i) EAs in Dutch also introduce their animate 
argument externally, (ii) it capitalises on similarities with the verbal passive, and (iii) 
EAs optionally generate complement and adjunct infinitives.
12
 
Turning now to Landau (2009), this proposal returns to using IL/SL lexical entries 
to partition the data ((35a, b)). 
 
(35) Landau’s (2009) EA Argument Structures 
a. IL: ║√rudeI║ = 
                          λx.x is rude 
John is rude 
aP 
3 
John            a’ 
3 
a             √rudeI 
 
 
 
 
 
(cf. Landau 2009: 339, ex. (51a)) 
b. SL: ║√rudeS║ = 
  λyλxλe.x is rude to y in e 
John was rude to Mary 
           aP 
    3 
John             a’ 
              3 
            a            √rudeP 
                         3 
√rudeS           PP 
5 
to Mary 
(cf. Landau 2009: 339, ex.(51b)) 
c. SL+SAT+aR: 
 
That comment was rude 
                aP 
         3 
     DP                  a’ 
  5        3 
      t.c.       aR          SAT[√rudeS] 
 
 
 
 
 
(cf. Landau 2009: 340, ex. (52)) 
 
The IL lexical entry ((35a)) is a property predication, while the SL one ((35b)) 
minimally includes an event argument, which is not realised in the syntax.  
On Landau’s proposal, neither EA denotation makes reference to a CP. In order to 
derive the passive-like structures, two operations are proposed: SAT(uration) and 
REALIZE (aR). The former is a lexical operation that saturates all argument positions 
except the event argument. The latter is a syntactic operation that introduces a new 
external argument. When these operations apply to the SL entry in (35b), an infinitive 
or an event denoting nominal can be merged in Spec, a, and the of-phrase is optionally 
realised as an adjunct, returning (35c) (e.g. That comment was rude (of John)). 
In the examples where the animate argument appears in subject position (i.e. Emma 
was rude to leave), the infinitive is analysed as an adjunct to the structure in (35b). So, 
the infinitive is either an external argument or an adjunct, but never a complement. 
                                                          
12
 I do not discuss Bennis (2000) in order to simplify this summary of alternative analyses, but two points 
should be mentioned. First, to my knowledge, Bennis (2000; 2004) was the first to connect passivisation 
with EA alternation, and I will follow him in this, although the assumptions and implementation differ. 
Second, in place of Bennis’ (2004) little a, Bennis (2000) proposes that EAs project a head X. While 
settling on associating X with Cause, he is non-committal and suggests that X could be labelled Stage or 
Event (2000: 64, fn. 13). In that analysis, causation plays no distinguishing role. In contrast, in this thesis 
causation and the causative alternation are the necessary notions to understanding EAs’ global behaviour. 
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Key aspects of Landau’s proposal are that the animate DP is again external when 
introduced as an argument, and that there is some transformational relation between 
some of the structures. However, multiple denotations are posited (i.e. IL and SL) and 
the positions that arguments occupy vary. 
Kertz (2010) goes further still in disassociating the different structures. EAs are 
argued to be monadic IL predicates that introduce their sole argument in an external 
position; there is no derivational relation between the various configurations. Structures 
such as Emma was rude (to leave) are monadic with an animate subject and an adjunct 
infinitive. On the other hand, structures such as To leave was rude (of Emma) are also 
monadic, but with an infinitival subject and an adjunct of-PP. 
The only EAs that are taken to be ambiguous between a monadic IL reading and an 
eventive SL one are those that take a to-PP (i.e. Peter was rude to Emma). On Kertz’s 
proposal, an EA is eventive only when the to-PP is present; otherwise it is simply a 
monadic IL predicate. Therefore EAs are again always taken to generate their animate 
DP as an external argument, but EA ambiguity is also posited. 
This overview is summarised in (36), with the last column indicating how the 
present proposal will ultimately compare. 
 
(36) Summary of Points of Comparison  
 Stowell Bennis Landau Kertz Leferman 
EAs are dyadic S S S S A 
Animate DP is external A A  A A A 
of-PP is an adjunct N A A A N 
Analyses that-clause data N N N N Y 
Infinitive is external A N S S N 
Infinitive is an adjunct N S S S N 
Infinitive is a complement N S N N A 
to-PP is a complement A N A A A 
CP/PP restriction is structural
13
 N N N N Y 
IL/SL lexical entries Y N Y Y N 
Derivational relationships 
between structures 
A S S N A 
EAs are factive N N N N Y 
Key: Y: Yes; N: No; A: Always; S: Sometimes 
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 Here by structural I mean the CP and PP compete for the same syntactic base position.  
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This presentation of the alternative analyses has (i) introduced some of the 
empirical points that emerge (e.g. the external position of the animate DP, IL/SL 
readings, the optional character of both the animate argument and the CP depending on 
the structure, the CP/PP restriction, extraction violations), and (ii) provided some idea 
of the heterogeneity that has been proposed in order to account for EA syntax. 
This thesis explores a unified approach based on an unambiguous denotation and 
general derivational operations. We will see that analysing EAs as stative causative 
alternating predicates illuminates their character, and that extending the causative 
alternation to adjectives has interesting implications for the representation of inner-
aspect. 
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Chapter 2: 
EA Argument Structure 
 
2 Introduction 
This chapter surveys the syntactic properties of a variety of predicative adjective classes 
in order to make the case for a three-way syntactic classification between evaluative 
adjectives (EA) (e.g. nice, rude, wise), psychological experience adjectives (PA) (e.g. 
anxious, eager, willing), and relational/physical property adjectives (RA) (e.g. 
Canadian, old, tall). The argument structures that I propose for these classes are 
repeated from chapter 1 in (1). The structures illustrate the classes’ argument selection 
differences. In the process of surveying, I highlight parallels in the verbal domain in 
order to show that adjective argument structure complexity is comparable to that of 
verbs (cf. Bennis 2000, 2004). 
 
(1)  Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
All of the structures in (1) are stative, but the salient difference is that the EA 
argument structure contains two state arguments (i.e. s1 and s2), and the PA and RA 
structures contain one. I will argue that a predicate with two state arguments, as in (1a), 
is lexically specified as causative.
1
 So the argument structure in (1a) says that the inner-
aspect (i.e. lexical aspect) of EAs is stative causative. In contrast, PAs and RAs contain 
a single state argument and aspectually, they are simple states. 
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 We return to the issue of lexical specification in depth in chapter 4. 
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This chapter will provide initial evidence that EAs are distinguishable from other 
adjectives in being causative. Here I assume that EAs are always stative; chapter 3 
provides the evidence for a stative causative aspectual classification. Chapter 4 will 
argue for the stative content of the aspectual arguments in (1).
2
 For the moment, the 
central claim made by the argument structures in (1) is that EAs are causative, while 
PAs and RAs are not. 
In addition to being causative, this thesis proposes that EAs undergo the causative 
alternation. The causative alternation is a phenomenon in which a causative verb 
licenses its arguments in two configurations. Illustrating with break, one configuration 
is overtly transitive with a subject and direct object, interpreted as an Agent or Causer, 
and a Theme, respectively ((2a)). The other is apparently intransitive with the logical 
direct object, the Theme, being the only overt argument in the syntax ((2b)). 
 
(2) a. Peter broke the window 
b. The window broke 
 
The principle proposal here is that the causative alternation extends across lexical 
categories to include EAs, and so it is not limited to verbs. The EA data that are 
structurally parallel to (2) in the relevant respects are in (3). 
 
(3) a. Emma was rude to leave 
b. That Emma left was rude 
 
Looking at the syntax of (2) and (3), the verb break selects a DP direct object 
complement and the adjective rude selects a CP. We can attribute this difference—
specifically EAs selecting a CP—to the general inability of adjectives to assign 
accusative case to their complements (cf. Chomsky 1981; Stowell 1981). Example (4) 
shows that a preposition is required to case-mark an adjective’s complement DP. 
 
(4) Emma is proud *(of) Peter   (cf. Chomsky 1981: 49, ex. (4)) 
 
                                                          
2
 More precisely chapter 4 follows up on chapter 1 and argues that the state argument is the only primitive 
sort of aspectual argument, and that eventivity (represented in the form of a primitive Davidsonian spatio-
temporal event argument, e (Davidson 1967)), is epiphenomenal. 
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Looking at the complement category selection pattern in (2)-(4), the assumption 
that CPs do not require case accounts for adjectives’ ability to take a CP complement 
without a preposition’s intermediation.3 Therefore, this difference in complement 
category selection falls under a broader generalisation regarding case-marking, and does 
not bear on the causative nature of the predicate. 
Beyond this category difference (i.e. DP versus CP), in this chapter we will see that 
(2b) and (3b) share the property of unaccusativity—the referential argument in both 
examples originates in complement position. On the other hand, the overtly transitive 
examples (2a) and (3a) share the property of having two referential arguments ((1a)). 
With respect to meaning, the unaccusative examples in (2b) and (3b) make the 
same kind of assertion: they assert something about a result—an object being broken 
and a situation being rude—while responsibility for the result is backgrounded. The 
transitive examples in (2a) and (3a) go a step farther and include the individuals 
responsible for the broken object and the rude situation: the predicate now specifies the 
cause of the result. 
Looking ahead to one of the consequences of this EA causative alternation analysis, 
I propose that it exposes the source of their apparent stative/eventive ambiguity. It is 
well-documented that EAs produce agentive inferences in the continuous aspect ((5a)) 
or when modified by intention adverbials ((5b)) (cf. Lakoff 1966; Partee 1977; Dowty 
1979, a.o.). 
 
(5) a. Sam was being arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
b. Victoria was arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude on purpose 
 
In chapter 3 I show that EAs are uniformly stative on all their usages, and so EAs are 
not aspectually ambiguous between stative and non-stative instantiations. Rather, EAs’ 
animate external argument and their aspectual complexity—the causative component 
that other adjectives lack—combine to produce an agentive implicature in environments 
such as these.
4
 
                                                          
3
 Section 2.3 shows that the EA CP always originates in complement position. Section 4.2.1.3 discusses 
case-marking with the passive by-phrase, but otherwise, as mentioned in chapter 1, case theory falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
4
 An implicature is an aspect of meaning that is implied, but not entailed (Blackburn 1996; Chierchia and 
McConnell-Ginet 2000). The examples in (i) show that when an inference is entailed (i.e. someone’s 
death), negating it is contradictory ((i.b)), and repeating it is redundant ((i.c)). Implicature, in contrast, 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 introduces EAs as a class and a 
basic characterisation of the causative alternation, as well as some assumptions about 
argument structure interpretation. Section 2.2 compares EAs with four other adjective 
classes in order to flesh out the evidence for adjectival complexity. While discussing the 
basic syntactic facts I identify semantic differences between the various adjective 
classes, and further substantiate the proposal that EAs undergo the causative alternation. 
Section 2.3 shows that the EA CP always originates as a complement of the adjective. 
In 2.4 I argue that the building blocks of argument structure/inner-aspect are 
independent of lexical category. Thus lexical category is not a barrier to a causative 
alternation analysis of EAs. Lastly, section 2.5 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2.1 The EA Class, the Causative Alternation, and Causation 
Section 2.1.1 introduces EAs as a class, presents its causative alternation paradigm, and 
compares it with the corresponding verbal paradigm. Then, section 2.1.2 relates EAs to 
the basic properties of causative verbs and the causative alternation. 
 
 
2.1.1 The EA Class and Its Causative Alternation Paradigm 
The EA class is very large in English and other languages with a substantive adjective 
category.
5
 The list in (6) provides a sample.
6
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
does not create these conflicts. On its own, example (ii.a) can be understood to mean that Emma no 
longer swims. 
 
(i) a. Peter killed Philip 
b. #Peter killed Philip, but Philip didn’t die 
c. #Peter killed Philip, in fact Philip died 
(ii) a. Emma used to swim  (cf. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000: 22, ex. (23)) 
b. Emma used to swim, but she doesn’t now 
c. Emma used to swim, in fact she still does 
 
But examples (ii.b, c) show that repeating or denying that inference is coherent, and not contradictory or 
redundant. In chapter 3 we will see that EA agentive inferences are implicatures, and not entailments. 
5
 Some languages, in contrast, seem to lack adjectives, or to have so few that they are in the single digits. 
Dixon places the adjective classes labelled here as EA and PA in the semantic field of HUMAN 
PROPENSITY. He reports that, in a given language, “only when an adjective class is much bigger [...] is it 
likely to include terms referring to human propensity” (2004: 4). In contrast, RAs are amongst the first to 
appear. There is a temptation to see a correlation in the syntactic complexity of an adjective class’s 
argument structure (i.e. EAs and PAs versus RAs in (1)) and the broader hierarchy of semantic fields that 
Dixon identifies (2004, 2010), but the attempt to establish the correlation would require a different 
methodology than that of this thesis. It is interesting, however, to note that the typological literature 
supplies an adjective hierarchy that suggests a correlation with argument structure complexity. 
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(6) Evaluative Adjectives 
arrogant, bold, brave, careful, clever, clumsy, considerate, courteous, cowardly, 
crazy, cruel, cunning, dumb, farsighted, foolish, generous, greedy, hostile, 
humble, idiotic, impudent, intelligent, kind, loyal, mad, masochistic, mean, 
mischievous, modest, nice, noble, obedient, obnoxious, polite, prudent, rude, 
sadistic, selfish, silly, sincere, skilful, smart, stupid, thoughtful, wise, ... 
 
Since the proposal here is that EAs are causative, the fact that the group is large is a 
parallel to the verbal domain, where causative verbs are also numerically conspicuous. 
From the perspective of this thesis, causatives should be and are abundantly represented 
as verbs and adjectives. 
The EA causative alternation paradigm is in (7).
7
 In section 2.2.1 I argue that when 
an EA appears with a that-clause ((7a, b)), the structure is unaccusative. I also propose, 
with Alexiadou et al. (2015), Koontz-Garboden (2009), Kratzer (2005), and Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav (L&RH) (1995), among others, that the unaccusative structure of 
causative alternating predicates is aspectually causative.
8
 
 
(7) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition 
          + Passive 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6
 This list is modified from Fabregas et al. (2013). 
7
 English is used in (7) because it illustrates the complete paradigm. Chapter 5 presents paradigms from a 
number of Germanic and Romance languages, as well as Basque. Cross-linguistic paradigm differences 
are discussed there. 
8
 I use the term causative unaccusative ((7a, b)) because there are unaccusatives that are not aspectually 
causative, e.g. exist, seem. I eschew the term anti-causative in order to avoid confusion regarding the 
aspectual status of the superficially intransitive half of the causative alternation; in chapter 4 I provide 
theory-internal motivation for the position that the two configurations of the causative alternation are both 
aspectually causative. The sources just cited in the main text take the same position, but for independent 
reasons. Further, I do not use the term inchoative in order to avoid the inference that the syntax of the 
intransitive half of the causative alternation contains an abstract BECOME operator/predicate. A 
conclusion advanced from chapters 3 and 4 is that the abstract operators/predicates DO, CAUSE, 
BECOME do not exist in natural language syntax (cf. Dowty 1979). Lastly, since I am focussed the 
causative alternation, I will use unaccusative to mean causative unaccusative, unless specific 
disambiguation is necessary. 
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Sections 2.2 and 2.3 show that example (7c), with an animate DP and an infinitive, is a 
transitive structure. In chapter 3 I argue that the apparently monadic example (7d) 
contains an implicit CP variable, and is otherwise parallel to (7c). Chapter 5 presents the 
analysis of this. Lastly, examples (7e, f) are passives derived from the transitive 
causatives.
9
 
Organising the EA configurations into (7) reveals a special case of the verbal 
causative alternation paradigm shown in (8). 
 
(8) a. The window broke    = Causative Unaccusative 
b. Peter broke the window   = Transitive Causative 
c. The window was broken (by Peter)  = Transitive Causative + Passive 
 
The passive example (8c) is included in the paradigm for two reasons. First, the 
referential external argument in passives is an important counterpoint to unaccusatives. 
In connection with EAs, note that the passive by-phrase in (8c) has the same optional 
behaviour as the EA of-phrase in (7e, f). Second, as we will see in the next section and 
in Chapter 4 in more detail, passivisation is a general property of causative verbs. 
Let’s begin by contrasting the two paradigms. There are five differences: 
 
(i) Break selects a DP complement, and EAs a CP. This can be accounted for as an 
independent case-marking restriction as discussed in the introduction.  
(ii) CPs can extrapose, and since EAs select CPs, the EA paradigm has the 
corresponding additional data points ((7b, f)). Like case-marking, Extraposition is 
a phenomenon that is independent of the causative alternation itself, so it does not 
affect the relevant parallelism between the two paradigms. 
(iii) EAs allow a null complement ((7d)), where break does not: if (8b) is reduced to 
Peter broke, it has only a causative unaccusative interpretation along the lines of 
Peter broke (down) under the pressure (of the job). The formal conditions under 
which a predicate (class) allows a null complement are generally not well-
understood, so this difference between break and EAs does not flag a problem for 
                                                          
9 Section 2.2.2.2 presents evidence that EAs are factive whenever factivity is testable, i.e. when they 
appear with a CP. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970: 145) observe that Extraposition is optional with factive 
predicates, so the optionality of having the CP in subject position or extraposing it in (7a, b) and (7e, f) is 
a first piece of evidence that EAs are factive. 
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the proposal. As just mentioned, these apparently monadic examples are discussed 
in later chapters. 
(iv) In English, the verbal passive can appear with the external argument inside a by-
phrase ((8c)), but EAs appear with an of-phrase ((7e, f)). Chapter 5 provides 
examples of languages that use the same preposition in these cases (e.g. German, 
Spanish, Swedish), thus supporting the unification. I assume that when a language 
uses a different preposition (e.g. Dutch, English, Romanian), the difference is 
superficial, plausibly marking the category difference between verbs and 
adjectives. 
(v) In (8b, c) break bears tense and participle morphology, respectively, while in (7) 
EAs do not. These are independent facts about morphology: verbs carry temporal 
and aspectual morphology, and adjectives do not. Just as the passive appears in 
the nominal domain without participial morphology (e.g. The city’s destruction by 
the barbarians), I follow Bennis (2000, 2004) and Landau (2009) in applying the 
passive to EAs. The fact that adjectives do not manifest this kind of morphology 
is independent of the application of the passive as a syntactic operation.
10
 
 
So, all the differences between the paradigms in (7) and (8) plausibly follow from 
independent considerations. What remains is the parallelism between (7a) and (8a), (7c) 
and (8b), and (7e) and (8c), respectively. This is the first identification that I am aware 
of of the causative alternation applying outside of the verbal domain. In order to 
substantiate the identification further, let’s consider additional criteria that a causative 
alternation analysis of EAs must meet. 
 
 
2.1.2 Properties of Causatives and the Causative Alternation 
If a causative alternation analysis is to be viable for the pattern in (7), there are three 
conditions that must be satisfied: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 I incorporate Collins’s (2005) analysis of the passive in chapter 4. 
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(9) Properties of Causatives and the Causative Alternation 
a. Causative alternating verbs have a thematically underspecified external 
argument. 
b. Causative verbs passivise. 
c. Causative Unaccusatives lack referential external arguments. 
(cf. Martin and Schafer 2014) 
 
Beginning with (9a), the verbal causative alternation is very productive, but not 
every causative verb has both a transitive and an unaccusative structure. Comparing the 
causative verbs break and assassinate in (10) and (11), respectively, (10a) and (11a) 
show that both accept an Agent external argument. The (b) examples, however, show 
that only break accepts an external argument interpreted as a Causer. Likewise, the (c) 
examples show that only break has an unaccusative structure. 
 
(10) a. The terrorist broke the window  = Transitive Causative 
b. The explosion broke the window  = Transitive Causative 
c. The window broke    = Causative Unaccusative 
(cf. Martin and Schafer 2014: 211, ex. (5)) 
(11) a. The terrorist assassinated the senator = Transitive Causative 
b. *The explosion assassinated the senator = Transitive Causative 
c. *The senator assassinated   = Causative Unaccusative 
(cf. Martin and Schafer 2014: 211, ex. (3)) 
 
The generalisation regarding the interpretation of external arguments and the 
causative alternation is: 
 
(12) Underspecified External Argument Generalisation 
Only transitive verbs that do not restrict the Θ-role of their external argument to 
Agents enter the causative alternation. 
(cf. Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 7, ex. (12)) 
 
In positive terms, break’s pattern in (10) shows that the verbs that enter into the 
causative alternation allow a Causer external argument. 
Chapter 2 
 
35 
 
The next examples show that some alternating verbs impose an even stronger 
restriction. While unaccusative break is compatible with a situation in which it turns out 
that an Agent did the breaking, some verbs restrict to a Causer interpretation in their 
unaccusative form. For example, in (13a) the verb clear takes an Agent external 
argument, but the unaccusative structure based on this agentive interpretation is 
unavailable. So (13b) is ungrammatical in correspondence to the agentive scenario in 
(13a). 
 
(13) a. The waiter cleared the table 
b. *The table cleared 
(cf. Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2012: 157, ex. (8)) 
 
But the examples in (14) show that when clear takes a Causer external argument 
((14a)), the unaccusative can be used to describe this situation ((14b)). 
 
(14) a. The wind cleared the sky 
b. The sky cleared 
 
This contrast within clear shows that there are alternating verbs that restrict to a Causer 
interpretation in the unaccusative form. The verb narrow in (15) and (16) is like clear in 
this regard: 
 
(15) a. The seamstress narrowed the skirt 
b. *The skirt narrowed 
(16) a. I like how the band narrows the skirt a bit   
(Rappaport Hovav 2014: 14, ex. (28a)) 
b. The skirt narrows at the bottom 
(Rappaport Hovav 2014: 14, ex. (26b)) 
 
Example (16), however, makes an additional point that supports the present 
proposal. The verbs break and clear both involve a change-of-state. For example, in 
(17) (repeated from (2)) there is a transition from an unbroken window to a broken one. 
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(17) a. Peter broke the window 
b. The window broke 
 
Yet as Rappaport Hovov (2014: 14) observes, both sentences in (16) are stative.  
If we focus on verbs such as break or clear, it might seem that a change-of-state is 
constitutive of the causative alternation. But (16) shows that a change-of-state is not 
necessary, and that the causative alternation applies to stative relations, as well. What is 
more, the contrast between (15) and (16) shows that narrow is a case where the 
alternation occurs only on a stative interpretation. 
Crucially for our purposes here, this removes another barrier to a causative 
alternation analysis of EAs. Just as in (16), the transitive/unaccusative EAs pair in (18) 
(repeated from (3)) is stative. 
 
(18) a. Emma was rude to leave 
b. That Emma left was rude 
 
So, the lack of a change-of-state is not a problem for this causative alternation analysis 
of EAs; what matters is that the predicate allows its external argument to be interpreted 
as a Causer. 
In this connection, the difference between the stative causative alternation of 
narrow in (16) and EAs in (18) is that EAs select an animate external argument. In 
chapter 3 we will see that EAs are always stative. This means that their external 
argument can only be interpreted as a Causer, and so they meet this Causer criterion. In 
this regard, EAs fill out the empirical range of the causative alternation in an interesting 
way: moving from the interpretative properties of break, to clear and narrow, we find 
EAs, stative causative alternating adjectives with an animate Causer.
11
 
                                                          
11
 In section 4.4.3 I propose that thematic roles are derived from the restricted nature of this theory of 
inner-aspect, and the general cognitive function of establishing a figure and a ground (Talmy 2000). In 
the meantime I will use thematic role labels for descriptive purposes. It is worth mentioning now, 
however, that since causation is always stative on this theory (chapter 1), the semantic interpretation of a 
causative external argument is a Causer (descriptively speaking). An Agent interpretation of the external 
argument (i.e. an animate being that can produce change) is the result of conceptual enrichment because 
change is represented conceptually. This is taken up in section 4.4.3.  
The important result, however, is that EAs meet the causative alternation Causer generalisation 
((12)) in two ways: (i) they are always aspectually stative; and (ii) since they are adjectives, their lexical 
category tracks the fact that they do not imply change conceptually, and so their external argument is not 
conceptually enriched to an Agent interpretation, either. This means that EAs’ external argument is 
consistently interpreted as a Causer, and so EAs are actually freer to participate in the causative 
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The remaining general properties of causatives and the causative alternation are 
passivisation ((9b)), and the lack of a referential external argument in unaccusatives 
((9c)). Chapter 4 will show that passivisation is a general property of causative 
predicates. Passives contrast with unaccusatives in providing evidence for a referential 
external argument in the syntax. Example (19b) is the passive of (19a). In the passive 
the external argument can be realised in a by-phrase. 
 
(19) a. Peter/The explosion broke the window 
b. The window was broken by Peter/the explosion 
 
In this respect, passives contrast sharply with unaccusatives ((20)). Example (20b) 
shows that unaccusatives cannot license an external argument in the same way. 
 
(20) a. The window broke 
b. *The window broke by Peter/the explosion 
  
In chapter 5 we will see more data that contrasts passives and unaccusatives with 
respect to external arguments. Although unaccusatives do not licence a referential 
external argument, I will argue that they do entail some causer, and so an external 
argument is part of their lexical entry. In order to maintain a transparent syntax/LF 
mapping, I will present an argument that implicit arguments without pronominal 
properties are variables bound under Existential Closure.   
One alternative analysis that proposes that the external argument is present in the 
syntax is the reflexive analysis of the causative alternation. On a reflexive analysis, 
unaccusatives such as The window broke mean that the overt argument acts upon itself, 
i.e. the window caused itself to break (Koontz-Garboden 2009: 106; Schafer and 
Vivanco 2016: 4, fn. 5). This paraphrase illustrates that, on a reflexive analysis, the 
external argument is realised in the syntax in a reflexive relation. 
A further property of a reflexive analysis, however, is that there is no entailment 
relation between the transitive and unaccusative structures. For example, since (21b) is 
taken to mean the window caused itself to break, there is no external cause, and so a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
alternation than verbs are because the Agentive interpretations of verbs place intricate restrictions on the 
acceptability of their unaccusative structures ((13)-(17)) (cf. Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2012). In short, 
EAs’ dual satisfaction of the “Causer” criterion implies that they should enter freely into the causative 
alternation, and indeed, the whole class does. 
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transitive causative such as (21a) does not entail the unaccusative (21b) (cf. Koontz-
Garboden 2009: 106, fn. 25; Chierchia 2004: 53-59; Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 25). 
 
(21) a. Peter broke the glass 
b. The glass broke 
 
Instead of a reflexive analysis, I adopt the position that there is indeed an 
entailment relation in (21), specifically, that (a) entails (b). Further, I follow Schafer and 
Vivanco (2016) in indentifying unaccusatives as weak scalar expressions. Namely, the 
transitive and unaccusative structures in the causative alternation are ordered on a scale 
of informational strength. The transitive expression includes the external argument, so it 
is more specific and it makes a stronger assertion. In contrast, the unaccusative is less 
specific, and its use leads to the inference that a stronger assertion is not possible (Horn 
1985; Grice 1989). Reasons for this can be that the speaker cannot or will not identify 
the cause, or that the cause is irrelevant to the discourse (Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 11; 
Rappaport Hovav 2014; cf. RH&L 2012; Levin 2015). 
An implicature analysis accounts straightforwardly for the contrast in (22). 
Examples (22a, b) are felicitous. They begin with the unaccusative, and then enrich it 
with the more specific transitive continuation. 
 
(22) Spanish 
a. Se rompió el vaso. De hecho, Juan lo rompió 
SE broke the glass  of    fact    John it broke 
‘The glass broke. In fact, John broke it’ 
(Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 25, ex. (70)) 
b. Se rompió el vaso. De hecho, el terremoto    lo rompió 
SE  broke  the glass of   fact   the earthquake it broke 
‘The glass broke. In fact, the earthquake broke it’ 
(Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 25, ex. (71)) 
c. #Juan/el terremoto  rompió el vaso. De hecho, se rompió 
John/the earthquake broke the glass of   fact   SE broke 
#‘John/The earthquake broke the glass. In fact, it broke’ 
(cf. Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 25, fn. 30)) 
 
Chapter 2 
 
39 
 
Example (22c) flips the order of the two sentences, and is infelicitous. On the 
implicature account this is because the first sentence is more informative than the 
second, so the continuation is superfluous and confusing. I refer the reader to Schafer 
and Vivanco (2016) for detailed support of the implicature component of the causative 
alternation, as well as a detailed argument against a reflexive account.
12
 In chapter 5 I 
incorporate this implicature perspective. 
Regarding the three criteria of causative alternating predicates presented in this 
section, evidence presented throughout the thesis will show that EAs have an external 
argument that meets the Causer criterion, they passivise, and they have an unaccusative 
form. Importantly, the example of narrow ((16)) shows that the causative alternation 
can be necessarily unambiguously stative. So, a significant barrier to a causative 
alternation analysis of the EA paradigm in (23) (repeated from (7)) has been removed. 
 
(23) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition 
          + Passive 
 
 
2.2 EAs versus Other Adjective Classes 
This section surveys some of the syntactic and semantic features that distinguish EAs 
from other adjective classes that appear with an animate subject and/or a clause in order 
to justify the adjective argument structures in (1). 
In section 2.2.1 I examine EA that-clause data and argue that they are unaccusative. 
Section 2.2.2 compares the EAs with PAs (e.g. anxious, eager, willing), the class that 
will function as a minimal pair with EAs. In 2.2.3, EAs and PAs are shown to be 
distinguishable from raising adjectives (e.g. certain, likely). These three classes are then 
contrasted with two others that can appear either with a DP or a CP, but not both, 
namely (i) relational/physical property adjectives (RA) (e.g. Canadian, old, tall), and 
                                                          
12
 See also Martin and Schafer (2014) and Alexiadou et al. (2015) for arguments against an approach that 
assimilates unaccusatives and passives (cf. Kallulli 2007). 
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(ii) adjectives such as important and crucial (IA). The remainder of this thesis will be 
concerned only with a direct comparison between EAs, PAs and RAs, but I briefly 
discuss raising adjectives and IAs in order to show that a raising analysis is infeasible 
for EAs and PAs, and to illustrate the diversity that exists in adjective syntax. 
 
 
2.2.1 EA That-Clause Structures are Unaccusative  
This section presents evidence arguing that EA that-clause data do not license a 
referential CP-external subject, thus supporting an unaccusative analysis. The 
comparison between verbal active voice transitive sentences, their passives, and 
unaccusatives in (24) and (25) (repeated from (19) and (20), respectively) show that 
unaccusative structures bar the realisation of a referential external argument ((25b)). 
 
(24) a. Peter/The explosion broke the window 
b. The window was broken by Peter/the explosion 
(25) a. The window broke 
b. *The window broke by Peter/the explosion 
  
Since EAs can appear with an external argument and a CP ((26a-c) repeated from 
(7a-c)), I will compare EAs with manage, forget, and happy (i.e. predicates that also 
select an external argument and a CP) in order to show that EAs display a restriction on 
disjoint reference (section 2.2.1.1) and co-reference (section 2.2.1.2). This restriction is 
explained by an unaccusative analysis of EA that-clause data. 
 
(26) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative 
 
 
2.2.1.1 EA That-Clause Structures Reject Disjoint Reference  
The examples in (27) illustrate what happens when an EA external argument appears 
with a that-clause containing a disjoint subject. 
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(27) a. *That Emma left was rude (of Peter) 
b. *It was rude (of Peter) that Emma left 
c. *Peter was rude that Emma left 
 
The grammaticality of the examples in (26) versus the ungrammaticality of those in (27) 
is explained by the conclusion that a referential external argument is not licensed with 
an EA that-clause, just as it is not licensed in verbal unaccusatives. 
A comparison with predicates with similar selection properties to EAs justifies this 
conclusion. Examples (28)-(31) compare EAs with other predicates that take clausal 
complements. In section 2.2.2.3 we will see that EAs are Obligatory Control (OC) 
predicates in all their infinitival structures. In (28a), the implicit subject of the infinitive 
is interpreted as Peter. The verbs manage and forget, and the adjective happy are also 
OC when they take an infinitive, and the implicit subject of their infinitives in (29a), 
(30a), and (31a) is also Peter. 
 
(28) a. Peter was rude to leave 
b. *Peter was rude that Emma left  
c. That Emma left was rude 
(29) a. Peter managed to leave 
b. *Peter managed that Emma left 
c. *That Emma left managed 
(30) a. Peter forgot to leave 
b. Peter forgot that Emma left  
c. *That Emma left forgot 
(31) a. Peter was happy to leave 
b. Peter was happy that Emma left 
c. *That Emma left was happy 
 
The (b) and (c) examples show that these four OC predicates behave differently 
when the infinitive is exchanged for a that-clause containing a disjoint referent. The (b) 
examples are transitive that-clause structures. The EA example is ungrammatical 
((28b)), as is the example with manage ((29b)), but on the other hand, forget and happy 
allow disjoint reference ((30b), (31b)). 
Leferman 
 
42 
 
The (c) examples are intransitive. Now, EAs are grammatical ((28c)), but manage 
and forget are ungrammatical with an unaccusative verb form ((29c), (30c)), as is happy 
in (31c). Example (31c) highlights the uniqueness of the grammaticality of the EA in 
(28c) even among adjectives.
13
 
This comparison among OC predicates reveals a pattern that is explained by the 
conclusion that manage, forget, and happy are transitive, while EAs alternate between a 
transitive structure with an infinitive ((35a)) and an unaccusative structure with a that-
clause ((35b)). So, OC predicates behave differently with respect to an infinitive or a 
that-clause complement, but specifically the EA pattern is explained by a causative 
alternation analysis. 
This pattern of (un)grammaticality on the disjoint interpretation repeats itself cross-
linguistically. Examples (32)-(34) are representative. 
 
(32) Central Flemish 
a. Dat    Jan  weg  ging,    was grof 
       COMP John away go-PAST was rude 
‘That John left was rude’ 
b. Het was grof  dat   Jan  weg   ging 
it    was rude COMP John away go-PAST 
‘It was rude that John left’ 
c. *Dat   Jan  weg   ging,    was grof  van  Peter 
 COMP John away go-PAST, was rude from Peter 
‘That John left was rude of Peter’ 
d. *Het  was grof  van  Peter  dat   Jan  weg  ging 
  it     was rude from Peter COMP John away go-PAST 
‘It was rude of Peter that John left’ 
e. *Peter was grof  dat  Jan  weg   ging 
 Peter was rude COMP John away go-PAST 
‘Peter was rude that John left’ 
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 In (31c) happy is not naturally interpreted as fortunate, as it sometimes is in other environments (cf. 
Happily, Emma left). If happy is switched with fortunate in (31c), the example becomes grammatical. I 
have used happy in (31) in order to show that not all Control adjectives behave like EAs, while 
illustrating a minimal contrast with forget in (30). 
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(33) Spanish 
a. Que Juan  se marchara fue prudente 
COMP John SE leave-SUBJ was prudent 
‘That John left was prudent’ 
b. Fue prudente que Juan se marchara 
was prudent COMP John SE leave-SUBJ 
‘It was prudent that John left’ 
c. *Que Juan se marchara fue prudente por parte de Pedro 
 COMP John SE leave-SUBJ was prudent   by part   of Peter 
‘That John left was prudent on Peter’s part’ 
d. *Fue  prudente por parte de Pedro que Juan se marchara 
   was  prudent  by  part   of  Peter COMP John SE leave-SUBJ 
‘It was prudent on Peter’s part that John left’ 
e. *Pedro fue prudente que Juan se marchara 
 Peter was prudent  COMP John SE leave-SUBJ 
‘Peter was prudent that John left’ 
(34) Swedish 
a. Att  Johan    gick     var ohövligt  
COMP John leave-PAST was rude 
‘That John left was rude’ 
b. Det var   ohövligt att Johan gick 
it       was     rude  COMP John leave-PAST 
‘It was rude that John left’ 
c. *Att  Johan    gick      var ohövligt av Petter 
  COMP John leave-PAST was rude      by Peter 
‘That John left was rude of Peter’ 
d. *Det var ohövligt av Petter att  Johan gick 
   it   was rude      by Peter COMP John leave-PAST 
‘It was rude of Peter that John left’ 
e. *Petter var ohövlig att  Johan gick 
  Peter was   rude COMP John leave-PAST 
‘Peter was rude that John left’  
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Lastly, Italian provides independent verification of the non-licensing of a referential 
external argument with a that-clause. One characteristic of the Italian subjunctive is to 
allow for the possibility of the matrix and embedded subject to be disjoint. One 
difference between (35a) and (35b) is that the former, with the embedded infinitive, 
requires that the matrix subject and the subject of the infinitive be co-referential, i.e. it 
has to be Peter in both cases. In contrast in (35b), with the subjunctive in the embedded 
clause, the two subjects must be disjoint (cf. Giorgi 2009: 1841). 
 
(35) Italian 
a. Piero credeva  di aver risposto     
    Peter believed of have-INF answered 
    ‘Peter believed that he had answered’ 
b. Piero credeva  che (Emma)  avesse risposto    
    Peter believed COMP (Emma) have-SUBJ-PAST answered 
    ‘Peter believed that (Emma) had answered’ 
 
Yet, this is not possible with EA that-clause structures in Italian. The examples in 
(36) show that EA that-clause structures appear in subjunctive mood, but the 
ungrammaticality of (37) shows that a disjoint CP-external argument is blocked.  
 
(36) Italian 
a. Che (Emma) abbia             fatto quel commento è  stato maleducato                
    that (Emma) have-SUBJ-PRES made that comment  is  be-PART rude 
    ‘That Emma made that comment was rude’ 
b. È stato maleducato che (Emma) abbia             fatto quel commento  
    is be-PART  rude      that (Emma) have-SUBJ-PRES  made that comment  
    ‘It was rude that Emma made that comment’ 
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(37) Italian  
a. *Che (Emma) abbia            fatto quel commento è stato maleducato  
     that (Emma) have-SUBJ-PRES made that comment  is be-PART rude  
 da parte di Peter 
 by part of Peter 
    ‘That Emma made that comment was rude on Peter’s part’  
b. *È   stato maleducato da parte di Piero che (Emma) abbia     fatto  
      is be-PART    rude       by part  of Peter that (Emma) have-SUBJ-PRES made  
 quel commento 
 that comment  
    ‘It was rude on Peter’s part that Emma made that comment’14 
c. *Piero è stato maleducato che (Emma)     abbia         fatto quel commento    
 Peter is be-PART rude        that (Emma) have-SUBJ-PRES made that comment 
‘Peter was rude that Emma made that comment’ 
So while (35b) showed that when a referential external argument is licensed, 
disjoint reference is exactly what the subjunctive allows for in Italian, EAs still do not 
allow disjoint reference. The unavailability of a disjoint external argument in EA that-
cause structures and the contrast in this respect with other predicates that appear with 
complement that-clauses follow from this unaccusative analysis. 
 
 
2.2.1.2 EA That-Clause Structures Reject Co-Reference  
Considering co-referential data now, Stowell (1991: 114, ex. (23)) provides the EA that-
clause data in (38) and judges them to be degraded. Example (38a), with the external 
argument in subject position, is ungrammatical. With the external argument inside an 
of-PP, Stowell judges (38b) to be worse than (38c), but (38a) is the worst of the three. 
 
                                                          
14
 In (35b), the complementiser che is optional, but in (36b) and (37b,c) it would be obligatory. Section 
2.2.2.2 shows that EAs are factive wherever factivity is testable. The obligatory character of the 
complementiser in these examples is expected if EAs are factive because complementisers are generally 
obligatory with factive subjunctive embedding in Italian ((i)) (Giorgi 2009: 1853). Therefore, this 
represents another piece of evidence that EAs are factive. In (36a) and (37a) the complementiser is 
independently required with the CP in subject position. 
 
(i) Gianni rimpiage *(che)         sia                       partita 
‘Gianni regrets      that (she) has (PRES SUBJ) left’       (Italian; cf. Giorgi 2009: 1852, ex. (56))  
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(38) a. *Johni was cruel that hei shot Mary 
b. *That hei shot Mary was cruel of Johni 
c. 
??
It was cruel of Johni that hei shot Mary 
 
I add (39) because it goes in the same direction as (38), indicating a cline in 
degradation on the co-referential interpretation. 
 
(39) ?That Johni shot Mary was cruel of himi 
 
That (38a) is robustly ungrammatical points to the same violation observed with 
disjoint subjects above—a referential external argument is not licensed—and the 
strength of the violation is predicted on an unaccusative analysis of EA that-clauses. 
This serves to reinforce the contrast with other predicates that select a that-clause. 
In the previous section we saw that forget and happy both select a that-clause and allow 
a disjoint interpretation. Likewise, the examples in (40) show that both predicates have 
an unremarkable co-referential interpretation, as well. 
 
(40) a. Peteri forgot that hei left 
b. Peteri was happy that hei left 
 
The fact that EA that-clause data remain ungrammatical on the co-referential 
reading ((39a)) is important because it rules out the possible intuition that EAs disallow 
disjoint reference because there is a semantic/conceptual clash between disjoint 
reference and EA meaning, e.g. that no coherent relation can be established between 
rude, Peter, and Emma leaving in (28b), i.e. *Peter was rude that Emma left. If the 
problem were disjoint reference, then one would predict EA that-clauses to have a co-
referential reading that parallels forget and happy ((40)). However, an appeal to a 
conceptual clash sheds no light why the co-referential reading in Johni was cruel that 
hei shot Mary is also out. 
It is only once the external argument appears as an of-PP that we find relative 
acceptability ((38b, c), (39)). Each of these examples, however, is degraded and has an 
emphatic, if not redundant character. 
The relative deviance of just these co-referential of-PP that-clauses can be 
explained by considering the broader EA paradigm. EAs do license a referential 
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external argument inside an of-phrase in the passivised transitive EA infinitival 
structures, e.g. To leave rude of Emma ((7e)). The switch from a that-clause to an 
infinitive is plausibly tracking the syntactic presence of a referential external argument 
that acts as a Controller. Interestingly, these passivised infinitival structures do allow 
the of-PP to be co-referential with an overt subject of the infinitive, although it also 
comes with an emphatic feel:
15, 16 
 
(41) a. It was rude of him for him to hang up on me               (Internet) 
b. It is her money. As makeup is not a necessity, it is quite nice of her for her to 
buy you any at all.               (Internet) 
c. It would be stupid of them for them to just ignore it            (Internet) 
  
The explanation goes like this: to the extent that the of-phrase is available with EA 
that-clause structures, it must be co-referential with the subject of the CP because the of-
phrase is not licensed syntactically. More specifically, it is appended at the discourse 
level on analogy with data such as (41), picking up the referent of the that-clause 
subject for emphasis. If the of-phrase were licensed syntactically with an EA that-
clause, then the full range of disjoint and co-referential interpretations across the 
different structures should be natural and productive (cf. forget and happy), contrary to 
fact. 
So, the outright ungrammaticality of Peteri was cruel that hei shot Mary, with the 
animate argument in subject position, follows from the blunt unaccusativity of EA that-
clauses. On the other hand, the relative degradedness of That hei shot Mary was cruel of 
Peteri, with the animate argument marginalised inside a prepositional phrase, can be 
understood as discourse emphasis on an argument that is not licensed in the narrow 
syntax, but on analogy with superficially similar expressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 The data in (41) are discussed further in section 2.2.2.3. 
16
 This thesis employs authentic examples found in various on-line sources, such as chat rooms, social 
media, and edited publications including national newspapers, published books and peer reviewed 
academic journals. The appendix provides extended context, URLs, and references.  
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2.2.1.3 Summary of EA That-Clause Unaccusativity and Connections 
to the Causative Alternation Paradigm   
An unaccusative analysis of EA that-clause data accounts for the pattern we have seen. 
Namely, (i) disjoint reference is impossible cross-linguistically, (ii) co-reference is 
impossible with the animate argument in subject position, and (iii) co-reference is only 
marginally possible with an of-PP structure. 
Adopting this analysis, the absence of a referential external argument in the 
presence of an EA that-clause is parallel to the unaccusative half of causative 
alternating predicates ((42a)). 
 
(42) a. *The window broke by Peter 
b. Peter broke the window 
 
And if the switch from a that-clause to an infinitive correlates with the presence of a 
referential Causer/Controller, Emma was rude to leave ((7c)) is parallel to (42b).  
Regarding these infinitival data, we will see that EAs are OC predicates. A 
generalisation from the Control literature is that OC predicates control the null subject 
position in the embedded infinitive (i.e. PRO) locally (cf. Bhatt and Izvorski 1998; 
Landau 1999). The EA alternation between a that-clause and a controlled infinitive thus 
correlates with this proposal: there is no referential argument to Control with a that-
clause, there is one with the infinitive. 
Lastly, the EA infinitival examples with an of-PP (e.g. To leave was rude (of 
Emma) (7e, f)) are strongly reminiscent of passivisation: 
 
(43) The window was broken (by Peter) 
 
Bennis (2000; 2004) and Landau (2009) associate their analyses of these EA structures 
with the grammatical operations that produce verbal passives, though their proposals for 
how this is done are embedded in different assumptions. 
In intuitive support of a connection to passives, Bennis (2004) observes that, in 
Dutch as in English, the equivalent of the of-phrase that appears in these infinitival 
structures is interpreted implicitly if not present, just as the by-phrase of passives is. 
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The present analysis is unique in associating EAs with the causative alternation, 
and indeed, in it we have found strong theoretical support for Bennis’s passive intuition: 
one property of causative predicates is that they passivise (chapter 4). So as causatives, 
we correctly predict EAs to passivise, whereas alternative accounts lack independent 
motivation for the passivisation of just this class of adjective. In the following sections 
we shall see that EAs are the only adjectives to alternate in this way. 
 
 
2.2.2 EAs and PAs: an Initial Comparison 
This section contrasts EAs with psychological experience adjectives (PA) with a subject 
Experiencer, e.g. afraid, angry, anxious, eager, nervous, ready, reluctant, willing. We 
will see that these two classes share the properties of having an animate external 
argument and a complement CP: 
 
(44) a. Emma was rude to leave 
b. Emma was eager to leave 
 
However, the following sub-sections show that EAs appear in alternated structures, but 
PAs do not (section 2.2.2.1); EAs are factive, but PAs are not (section 2.2.2.2); and EAs 
have a Causer external argument, while PAs have an Experiencer (section 2.2.2.3). 
 
 
2.2.2.1 EAs Alternate, PAs Do Not 
Beginning with that-clauses, unlike EAs ((45)), PAs cannot appear with a that-clause 
alone ((46)), but they do allow for a disjoint CP-external subject to co-occur with a that-
clause ((47a) vs. (47b)). 
 
(45) a. That Emma left the party was rude 
b. It was rude that Emma left the party 
(46) a. *That Emma helped was eager 
b. *It was eager that Emma helped 
(47) a. Peter was eager that Emma should help 
b. *Peter was rude that Emma left/had left/should leave/would leave the party 
Leferman 
 
50 
 
The contrast in (47) is pertinent because, while modulation of the mood of the PA that-
clause makes the structure in (47a) grammatical, there is no change in mood that will 
save (47b). Lastly, the examples in (48) (repeated from (44)) show that EAs and PAs 
are alike in appearing with an animate subject and an infinitive. 
 
(48) a. Emma was rude to leave 
 b. Emma was eager to leave 
 
The pattern in (45)-(48) implies that PAs are necessarily transitive, while EAs have a 
causative unaccusative and a transitive causative form. 
Considering the infinitival data further, the EA examples in (49) (partially repeated 
from (7)) contrast with the PA data in (50). While EAs appear in passive-like structures, 
PAs do not. PAs take neither an infinitival ((50a)) nor an extraposed it subject ((50b)), 
nor do they allow their external argument to reappear as a PP. 
 
(49) a. To leave was rude (of Emma) 
b. It was rude (of Emma) (to leave) 
(50) a. *To help was eager (of Emma) 
b. *It was eager (of Emma) to help 
 
So, EAs and PAs share a structure with an animate external argument in subject position 
and a complement CP ((48)), but the rest of the EA paradigm is unique. 
 
 
2.2.2.2 EAs are Factive, PAs are Not 
These two groups of adjectives also establish different semantic relations with their CP. 
Beginning with EAs, they are factive: they presuppose the truth of their complement 
((51)), and they produce weak island violations (cf. (52) and (53)-(55)).
17, 18
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Following Stalnaker (1974) and Abrusan (2011a), among others, I take presuppositions to be a kind of 
entailment. 
18
 Examples with extraction from that-clause subjects are not included because they give rise to 
independent subject extraction violations, i.e. *Who was rude that __ ignored Mark?  
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(51) a. #It was rude that Peter left, but in the end he didn’t  
b. #Peter was rude to leave, but in the end he didn’t 
c. #It was rude of Peter to leave, but in the end he didn’t 
(52) a. Who do you regret that Peter invited _? 
b. 
??
When do you regret that Peter invited Mark _? 
(53) a. Who was it rude that Peter ignored _?  
b. 
??
When was it rude that Peter ignored Mark _? 
(54) a. Who was Peter rude to ignore _? 
b. 
??
When was Peter rude to ignore Mark _? 
(55) a. Who was it rude of Peter to ignore? 
b. 
??
When was it rude of Peter to ignore Mark  
 
The examples in (56) show that EAs are factive, and not implicative. A property of 
factive predicates is that the entailed truth of their complement is not affected by 
negation in the main clause. 
 
(56) a. It wasn’t rude that Peter left  Peter left 
b. Peter wasn’t rude to leave  Peter left 
c. It wasn’t rude of Peter to leave  Peter left 
 
In contrast, negation of a main clause implicative predicate, such as manage in (57), 
does entail the negation of its complement. So, the data in (56) confirm that EAs are 
factive whenever they appear with a CP.
19
 
                                                          
19
 Karttunen et al. (2014) study attested EA data that are meant to be implicative, and that a minority 
accepts on an implicative interpretation: 
 
(i) This was my first trip to Italy, so I was not brave to venture out alone 
(Karttunen et al. 2014: 234, ex. (5b)) 
 
I refer the reader to Karttunen et al. for details and discussion, but I would like to elaborate on one of their 
observations. 
They observe that an implicative interpretation is attested only in the NP was not EA to V structure 
((i)), and never in the It was EA (of NP) to V structure (2014: 235, fn. 1). In the latter structure, EAs are 
only factive. They also note that “many speakers of English’s determinedly factive majority of speakers 
profess that sentences like [(i)] are mistakes; the producer must have inadvertently omitted enough before 
the Adj” (2014: 247). 
In this connection I would like to add that, more generally, EAs are factive in all their CP structures 
((56)). What is interesting about the restriction of the implicative interpretation to the NP was not EA to V 
and the comment regarding enough is that enough is an element that introduces its own infinitive 
regardless of whether the predicate takes an infinitive itself. And, the enough structure itself is 
implicative: 
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(57) Peter didn’t manage to leave  Peter did not leave 
 
With respect to the representation of factivity, following Abrusan (2011b) I take 
examples such as (58) to show that weak island violations are an interpretative effect, 
and not syntactic. The contrast in (58) shows that weak island extraction violations can 
ameliorate in the presence of modals. 
 
(58) a. *How tall isn’t John?         (Abrusan 2011b, ex. (8a)) 
b. How tall isn’t John allowed to be?        (Abrusan 2011b, ex. (9a)) 
 
If the source of the violation in (58a) were syntactic, then the modal itself should make 
no difference with respect to the extraction from the adjunct. Throughout this thesis I 
will assume that factivity is a lexical property, and leave its formal treatment to future 
research.
20
 
In line with (58), the EA examples in (59) show that their extraction violations 
disappear under a modal with the infinitive data ((59b, c)). Although they remain with 
the that-cause ((59a)), an interpretative analysis can account for this. 
 
(59) a. ??When would it have been rude that Emma left? 
b. When would Emma have been rude to leave? 
c. When would it have been rude of Emma to leave? 
 
Considering PAs now, they neither presuppose the truth of the CP ((60)) nor 
produce extraction violations ((61)). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(ii)  Victoria is not tall enough to reach the top shelf  Victoria does not reach 
 
Further, the linear order of the NP was not EA to V structure is minimally different from the enough 
structure. From the perspective of the analysis of EA argument structure in this thesis, one difference 
between the NP was not EA to V structure and the It was EA (of NP) to V structure is that in the former 
the CP is interpreted in complement position, and in the latter it is interpreted in Spec, T (i.e. the pronoun 
it is bound to the CP). (Chapters 4 and 5.) I would like to suggest that a possible explanation for the 
restricted, minority status of the implicative interpretation is that interpreting the CP in Spec, T blocks a 
re-analysis along the lines of an enough structure. Lastly, the fact that the implicative interpretation is 
restricted in just this way supports a derivational analysis of EA structures because (a) EAs are otherwise 
consistently factive ((56)), and (b) a derivational analysis allows for an account of the blocking effect of a 
peripheral phenomenon. 
20
 See chapter 1 footnote 10 for qualifications on this statement. 
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(60) Emma was eager to help, but in the end she couldn’t 
(61) a. Who was Emma eager to help _? 
b. When was Emma eager to help _? 
   
Among other diagnostics, the lack of extraction violations in the case of PAs has 
fostered agreement that the PA infinitive is a complement of the adjective (cf. Stowell 
1991; Bennis 2000, 2004; Landau 2009; Kertz 2006, 2010). This is important because it 
independently establishes the existence of a class of transitive adjectives with an 
external argument and a complement infinitive. If we abstract away from the 
grammatical category of their complements, PAs are parallel to transitive subject 
Experiencer verbs, such as admire, fear, hate, and love. 
Regarding the factivity of EAs, there is corroborating morphological evidence. 
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (K&K) (1970: 144) observe that only factive predicates take 
The fact that-subjects ((62a)). In English, this is a possibility when the EA that-clause 
appears in subject position ((62b)). In Romanian, when the that-clause is in subject 
position, the DP the fact is obligatory ((63a) vs. (63b)). 
    
(62) a. The fact that the dog barked during the night bothers me 
b. The fact that Peter left was rude 
(63) Romanian 
a. Faptul cǎ  Maria  a     plecat      a  fost nepoliticos  
    fact  that Maria has leave-PART has be-PART rude 
   ‘The fact that Mary left was rude’ 
b. *Cǎ Maria  a      plecat     a  fost nepoliticos 
    that Maria has leave-PART has be-PART rude 
    ‘That Mary left was rude’ 
 
A second source of morphological evidence for factivity comes from Basque. In 
(64) and (65) we see the contrast between the non-factive and factive readings of 
remember, respectively. 
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(64) Etxera     joan    zela     gogoratzen duzu    (Basque) 
home-to go-INF was-that remember have-PRES-2  
(, baina agian oker  zaude) 
(, but maybe wrong be-PRES-2) 
‘You remember that he went home (, but maybe you are mistaken)’ 
(65) Hura etxera   joan     izana   gogoratzen duzu     (Basque) 
he   home-to go-INF be-INF-DET remember have-PRES-2  
(*, baina agian oker zaude) 
(, but maybe wrong be-PRES-2) 
‘You remember that he went home (, but maybe you are mistaken)’ 
 
Example (66) shows that the structure in (65) is factive and not implicative: 
 
(66) Ez      duzu   gogoratzen hura etxera   joan  izana   (Basque) 
NEG have-PRES-2 remember he  home-to go-INF be-INF-DET 
‘You don’t remember that he went home’  He went home 
 
On the non-factive reading ((64)), the embedded CP appears with the standard 
indicative that-complementiser, i.e.–ela, such as with the verbs esan ‘say’ and pentsatu 
‘think’. In (65) however, the –a appended to izana indicates that the going home is 
factive. This is the same morphology that necessarily surfaces when EAs take a CP in 
Basque, as shown by the contrast in (67) with –ela and (68) with –a. Example (69) 
confirms factivity. 
 
(67) *Berak alde egin zuela zakarra izan zen    (Basque) 
He-ERG side do-INF has-that rude be-INF was 
(68) Berak alde  egin  izana  zakarra izan zen    (Basque) 
He-ERG side do-INF be-INF-DET rude be-INF was 
(*, baina gelditu zen)  
(,   but    stay-INF was) 
‘That he left was rude (, but he stayed)’ 
(69) Ez  zen zakarra izan berak  alde egin izana    (Basque) 
NEG was rude    be-INF he-ERG side do-INF be-INF-DET 
‘That he left wasn’t rude’  He left 
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The factivity of EAs is an important empirical detail on this causative alternation 
analysis of EAs. (i) First, it accounts for the extraction violations observed in previous 
studies on EAs (section 1.3.2), while removing evidence that supports a non-
complement analysis of the CP: the standard assumption is that a factive predicate 
selects its complement (cf. K&K 1970; Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993; de Cuba and Urogdi 
2009; Abrusan 2011c) 
(ii) Second, since EAs are factive, they presuppose the truth of their CP, and this 
leads them to have what Barker (2002) calls existential commitment with respect to the 
content of the CP. In order to see this, let’s compare EAs with subject Experiencer 
predicates. 
Subject Experiencer verbs, such as fear, admire, and hate, do not entail the 
existence of their object. Carlson (1977: 188) observes this using the following 
examples: one can fear ghosts or admire unicorns whether or not these entities exist, and 
one can hate dogs without hating any particular dogs or even being acquainted with one. 
Similarly, we have seen that PAs, which have an Experiencer subject, do not entail 
the existence of the situation denoted by their complement CP. In (70), even if Emma 
was eager to leave, it is not entailed that she did. 
 
(70) Emma was eager to leave  Emma left 
 
However when comparing EAs with other adjectives, Barker (2002: 19) shows that 
EAs ((71b)) come with an existential commitment which is absent in PAs ((71a)). 
 
(71) a. Feynman was(n’t) eager/ready to talk to a student about it 
b. Feynman was(n’t) stupid/smart to talk to a student about it 
(cf. Barker 2002: 19, ex. (20))   
 
Only in (71b) is the existence of at least one student that Feynman actually talked to 
entailed, which follows from the existence of the talking situation denoted by the CP, 
which in turn follows from the factivity of EAs (cf. K&K 1970: 167). 
These cross-lexical category entailment parallelisms (e.g. eager/admire; 
stupid/break) are expected on the approach pursued here, where verbs and adjectives 
have parallel syntactic/semantic representations. But more specifically, the factivity of 
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EAs is crucial in providing the existential entailment that this causative alternation 
analysis requires. 
In the case of causative alternating verbs such as break, if it is the case that a 
window breaks, or that Peter breaks it, then there is the existential entailment that there 
is a window: the DP complement is existentially entailed. 
In the case of EAs, they are stative, and there is no change-of-state, but their 
factivity provides the entailment that the content of the CP complement exists—a 
parallel entailment to causative alternating verbs like break. Further, we have seen that 
EAs are uniformly factive whenever they appear with a CP. So, their factivity provides 
a crucial entailment for this causative alternation analysis. 
 
 
2.2.2.3 Infinitival Structure, the Responsibility Relation, and Control 
Another difference between EAs and PAs is the thematic role of their animate 
arguments. This becomes apparent when the empty subject position in the infinitive, i.e. 
PRO, is filled. The examples in (72) and (73) show that PAs and subject Experiencer 
verbs alike license an overt infinitival subject by way of the complementiser for. The 
appearance of the complementiser in these examples indicates that subject Experiencer 
predicates take an infinitive with a full clausal structure. 
 
(72) a. Peter was eager to leave 
b. Peter wanted to leave 
(73) a. Peter was eager for Emma to leave 
b. Peter wanted for Emma to leave 
 
Further, (74) shows that the overt embedded subject must receive a disjoint 
interpretation; a co-referential interpretation requires PRO ((72)).   
 
(74) a. *Peteri was eager for himi to leave 
b. *Peteri wanted for himi to leave 
 
In these examples, with both the adjective and verb, the matrix predicate expresses 
the psychological state that the CP-external argument experiences with respect to the 
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potential situation denoted by the CP. In other words, here the thematic role of the 
external argument is an Experiencer. 
When it comes to EAs, however, it is less clear what role their animate external 
argument has in (75a). With regards to an embedded subject, (75b) shows that EAs are 
like subject Experiencer predicates in requiring PRO for the co-referential reading ((72), 
(74)). 
 
(75) a. Peter was rude to leave 
b. *Peteri was rude for himi to leave 
c. *Peter was rude for Emma to leave 
 
But unlike subject Experiencer predicates ((73)), (75c) shows that EAs block disjoint 
reference with an overt infinitival subject. On its own (75c) is unproblematic because 
EAs are not alone in this regard: 
 
(76) a. John decided (*for Bill) to shave himself  (Manzini 1983: 431, ex. 65)) 
b. John tried (*for Mary) to win the game  (Landau 1999: 13, ex. (5a)) 
 
EAs are more interesting than this, however. We have already seen the 
Extraposition data in (41) (repeated as (77)), where EAs do allow co-reference with the 
infinitive:
21
 
 
(77) a. It was rude of him for him to hang up on me               (Internet) 
b. It is her money. As makeup is not a necessity, it is quite nice of her for her to 
buy you any at all.               (Internet) 
c. It would be stupid of them for them to just ignore it            (Internet) 
 
Furthermore, the examples in (78) show that disjoint reference is also possible in 
these structures where the infinitive is interpreted in subject position: 
                                                          
21
 Wilkinson includes (i) as part of his basic EA paradigm, where the object of of and the object of for are 
co-referential with an infinitive. He also notes that a that-clause and an of-phrase are ungrammatical on 
any combination ((ii)). These data and judgements independently support the discussion above that the of-
phrase is not licensed with a that-clause, but it is with the infinitive.  
 
(i) For John to have left early was wise (of him)      (Wilkinson 1976: 164, ex. (19a)) 
(ii) That John’s blow flattened Tom was silly/stupid (*of John/Tom/it) 
(cf. Wilkinson 1976: 167, ex. (27))        
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(78) a. It was thoughtless of Arthur for Agatha to be there when Desmond arrived 
(cf. Kertz 2010: 287, ex. (102)) 
b. For Agatha to be there when Desmond arrived was thoughtless of Arthur 
c. I'm so mad and I spoke to DH this morning but I don't want to offend him and 
run his parents down, but at the same time, I am NOT having this special time 
ruined because it's my last baby and the afterglow of my wedding was also 
ruined because they were all here then too so we all had to go away together 
after our wedding because we felt it was rude of us for his family and 
extended family to come all the way from England to New Zealand and have 
us disappear alone the day after our wedding for a honeymoon. 
(Internet) 
d. For his family and extended family to come all the way from England to New 
Zealand and have us disappear the day after our wedding for a honeymoon was 
rude of us. 
e. It would have been stupid of them for him to make an appearance, on a 
taping before Raw. Well at least they mentioned his appearance on Raw, and 
showed some footage of it. We'll see him at TLC.     
(Internet) 
f. For him to make an appearance would have been stupid of them. 
 
First, note that these examples show that, like PAs, EAs also take an infinitive with 
a full clausal structure. Second, filling the infinitival subject position clarifies the 
thematic role of the EA external argument: it is clear that the of-PP argument is 
considered responsible for the realisation of the situation denoted by the CP. In (78a, b), 
Arthur is responsible for Agatha’s presence; in (78c, d), the couple is responsible for the 
relatives having travelled all the way from New Zealand; and in (78e, f), the wrestler 
participated in a programme because someone scheduled it that way. 
There is, then, a responsibility component to the meaning of EAs that is not present 
in PAs. RH&L (2000) identify responsibility as the notion that captures all causative 
predicates in natural language (chapter 3). Crucially, responsibility is a notion that is 
independent of change. On the present analysis of EAs as causatives, this responsibility 
inference is both comprehensible and expected: the external argument of a causative 
structure—the Causer—is responsible for the result, i.e. the CP. PAs, as subject 
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Experiencer predicates, do not encode causation or a result, and there is no 
corresponding responsibility inference. 
Regarding why EAs allow an overt infinitival subject only when the infinitival is 
interpreted in subject position ((77), (78)), I offer a suggestion. Recall that in the EA 
paradigm the examples with the infinitive in subject position are passives (e.g. To leave 
was rude (of Emma)). Conversely, when the animate argument is in subject position 
(e.g. Emma was rude to leave), the sentence is in the active voice. 
I suggest that an overt subject is blocked in the active voice (cf. *Peter was rude for 
Emma to leave) because (i) EAs are causatives, (ii), as we will see immediately, EAs are 
Obligatory Control (OC) predicates, and (iii) when the animate argument is in subject 
position, it is the sentence topic. Since EAs are causative and OC, when the animate 
argument is the sentence topic, the topic-comment structure of the sentence is coherent 
when the topic OC Causer is the topic of the result, as well. For this to be the case the 
topic of the infinitive has to be the same, e.g. Peter was rude to leave. In other words, 
disjoint reference is incoherent because a conflicting topic is introduced. 
On the other hand, in the passive examples, the sentence topic is the infinitive, and 
the Causer is backgrounded, or possibly omitted or unknown (e.g. For John to have left 
early was wise). When the infinitive is the sentence topic, there is no longer a discourse 
coherence clash with the Causer. And since the infinitive is the topic, its content can be 
elaborated upon, and so an overt referent can be realised coherently.
22,
 
23
 
These considerations on the EA infinitival pattern extend to causative OC 
predicates such as decide. Example (76a) (repeated as (79)) showed that decide rejects 
an overt disjoint infinitival subject in the active voice. 
                                                          
22
 C-command plays an important role in the pattern, too. In the active structure the animate argument c-
commands into the infinitive (e.g. Emma was rude to leave). But in the passive structure, the infinitive is 
interpreted in Spec, T, and outside of the scope of the animate external argument (e.g. For John to have 
left early was wise (of Peter)). This lack of c-command makes the co-referential interpretation possible 
(e.g. For Johni to have left early was wise (of himi)). When c-command holds, the co-referential 
interpretation with an overt embedded subject is always blocked by the Control structure (i.e. *Peteri was 
rude for himi to leave; cf. (74)). 
However, the EA pattern cannot be reduced to c-command because there are Control predicates, 
such as subject Experiencer predicates, that allow an overt infinitival subject when c-command holds 
((73)); we return to this immediately in the main text. 
23
 A comparison between EA that-clause data and EA infinitival data is appropriate here. I concluded that 
the that-clause data are unaccusative because they showed no signs of transitivity with respect to disjoint 
and co-reference when compared with the pattern of other transitive that-clause selecting predicates.  
The infinitival data, however, are transitive. They have an animate external argument (this will be 
shown in the next section) and an infinitival complement (this will be shown at length in section 2.3). 
Further, with respect to disjoint and co-reference, they pattern with other OC predicates. So, the data 
strongly support the aspect of the present hypothesis that the presence of a that-clause or an infinitive is 
tracking unaccusativity versus transitivity, namely, the causative alternation. 
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(79) John decided (*for Bill) to shave himself  (Manzini 1983: 431, ex. 65)) 
 
However, passive voice examples with an overt infinitival subject that is interpreted 
either disjointly or co-referentially are easy to produce: 
 
(80) a. It was decided by the budgetary commission for a sub-committee to assess the 
accounts 
b. For the sub-committee to re-examine the whole range of possibilities was 
decided when it became clear that voter fraud may have influenced the result 
c. For John to sell his car was decided by him alone 
 
The Extraposition example in (80a) is the most natural; the other two examples are 
more natural with a discourse context to counter-balance the weight of the subject 
infinitive. These examples with decide show that the EA infinitival pattern is not 
exceptional. 
We are left with the case of subject Experiencer predicates. They do allow an overt 
disjoint infinitival subject with their external argument in subject position (e.g. Peter 
was eager for Emma to leave). Here I suggest that the crucial difference is that EAs 
(and decide) are causative. Namely, the causal relation between the animate external 
argument and the result CP places strong coherence restrictions on the topic-comment 
structure of an utterance. In contrast, the experiential relation established by, for 
example eager, does not impose these restrictions. Because of the conceptual nature of 
an experiential relation, disjoint reference with diverging matrix and embedded subjects 
is unproblematic. 
The possibility of an overt embedded subject, however, is independent of the 
Control relation that a predicate establishes with its infinitive (cf. Manzini 1983: 431; 
Landau 1999: 13): although EAs and PAs differ in a number of ways, both are OC 
predicates. 
OC is commonly taken to reflect a locality condition. Examples (81)-(83) illustrate 
that EAs and PAs display the following OC properties consistently: the (a) examples, 
show that when the controller c-commands PRO (at the appropriate level of 
representation), the embedded pronoun is bound; the (b) examples show that without c-
command, the pronoun is not bound; the (c) examples that a split antecedent with an 
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embedded reciprocal is degraded; and the (d) examples that only a sloppy interpretation 
is available under ellipsis. 
 
(81) a. Arthur was silly to nominate himself 
b. *Arthur’s sister was silly to nominate himself 
c. *Arthur thought Desmond was silly to vote for each other 
d. Arthur was silly to get arrested, and Desmond was as well  
(Kertz 2010: 276, ex. (39)-(42)) 
(82) a. It was silly of Arthur to nominate himself 
b. *It was silly of Arthur’s sister to nominate himself 
c. *Arthur thought it was silly of Desmond to vote for each other 
d. It was silly of Celine to get arrested, and it was of Desmond (to) as well 
(Kertz 2010: 277, ex. (43)-(46)) 
(83) a. Arthur was eager to nominate himself 
b. *Arthur’s sister was eager to nominate himself 
c. *Arthur thought Desmond was eager to vote for each other 
d. Arthur was eager to get arrested, and Desmond was as well 
 
The examples in (84) illustrate OC is distinguishable from non-OC. Example (84a) 
shows even with c-command, PRO and the pronoun are not necessarily bound by the 
external argument. Example (84b) shows that c-command is not necessary to bind PRO. 
In (84c) the reciprocal interpretation is fine. And lastly, in (84d) a strict interpretation 
under ellipsis is possible. 
 
(84) a. Clintoni believes that PROi/j keeping hisi/j sex life under control is necessary for 
electoral success  
b. Clinton’si campaign believes that PROi keeping his sex life under control is 
necessary for electoral success 
c. Johni told Maryj [that [[PROi+j washing each other] would be fun]] 
d. John thinks that PRO getting his resume in order is crucial and Bill does too 
(cf. Hornstein 1999: 73, ex. (6)) 
 
We take up the OC nature of EAs again in section 2.3.3.4 in order to show that the 
infinitive is a complement. In this section we have seen (i) that the EA infinitival data 
Leferman 
 
62 
 
have a responsibility interpretation that correlates with the notion of causation, (ii) that 
their overt infinitival subjects pattern with other causative predicates, and (iii) that they 
are OC. 
 
 
2.2.2.4 Summary of EA/PA Comparison 
In this sub-section I have shown that EAs and PAs differ along a number of dimensions, 
providing a substantive list of properties that characterise EAs as a class:  
 
(i) EAs do not allow disjoint subjects with that-clauses. 
(ii) Only EAs allow a CP in subject position (whether a that-clause or an infinitive).  
(iii) Only EAs are factive. 
(iv) Only EAs existentially entail the content of their complement. 
(v) The semantic relation between the external argument and the infinitive is one of 
responsibility with EAs, but psychological with PAs. 
(vi) PAs allow the subject gap in the infinitive to be filled with a disjoint individual 
directly, but EAs must have their infinitive interpreted in subject position to do so. 
 
The comparative differences ceased when we examined the Control relation itself. 
Here we found that the two groups patterned together as OC predicates, indicating that 
there is a very local structural relationship between the controller and the gap in the 
infinitive. The next section provides the evidence that EAs and PAs share another 
property: having a thematic external argument. In this they are distinguishable from 
other adjectives. 
 
 
2.2.3 EAs, PAs and Other Classes 
This section compares EAs and PAs with three other classes, namely raising adjectives, 
DP selecting relational/physical property adjectives (RA), such as Canadian and tall, 
and adjectives that select either a DP or CP, such as important (IA). 
Thus far EAs and PAs have overlapped in some ways, while still being clearly 
distinguishable. The primary objective of this section is to show that—in contrast with 
the other groups—they pattern together in selecting a thematic external argument. I 
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interpret this as an important indicator of argument structure. Although the thematic role 
of this argument is not the same—EAs have a Causer and PAs an Experiencer—having 
a thematic external argument sets them apart. 
 
 
2.2.3.1 EAs and PAs are Not Raising Predicates 
As a start point, in the case of EAs, it has been recognized since Wilkinson (1976) 
retracted his own (1970) analysis that they cannot be given a raising analysis (cf. Barker 
2002). Wilkinson (1976: 167) observes that a raising analysis would incorrectly predict 
synonymy between the examples in (85). But in (85a) Sam is only the Agent of help, 
and in (85b, c) Sam stands in a relation expressed by the adjective to the whole CP.  
 
(85) a. That Sam helped us was good/nice 
b. Helping us was good/nice of Sam 
c. Sam was good/nice to help us    
(cf. Wilkinson 1976: 167, ex. (26a-c))  
 
So in terms of thematic roles, only (85b, c) are synonymous. What we will see now is 
that both EAs and PAs fail standard tests for raising. 
Raising verbs select a CP complement as their sole argument ((86a)), and they do 
not assign an external thematic role. However in one construal, like EAs and PAs, they 
can appear with an animate subject and an infinitive ((86b)). 
 
(86) a. It never happens that John is punctual  (Cinque 1990a: 3, ex. (4b)) 
b. Johni never happens ti to be punctual  (Cinque 1990a: 4, ex. (4a)) 
 
In addition, Cinque (1990a) shows that raising adjectives exist, e.g. certain and 
likely. Comparing them with EAs and PAs shows that the latter are not raising 
predicates. Like the verb happen in (86), certain and likely alternate between an 
Extraposition structure ((87a)) and one with a DP subject and infinitive ((87b)). 
 
(87) a. It is certain/likely that John will win  (Cinque 1990a: 4, ex. (6b)) 
b. Johni is certain/likely ti to win   (Cinque 1990a: 4, ex. (6a)) 
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The DP subject in (86b) and (87b) is interpreted as an argument of the embedded 
predicate, and not the matrix one, and so the DP is not assigned a thematic role in the 
matrix clause. 
The lack of thematic role assignment in the matrix clause of raising predicates is 
shown by the combination of weather predicates ((88)), there-subjects ((89)), inanimate 
subjects ((90)-(92)). While raising predicates are grammatical in these environments, 
both EAs and PAs are not ((88a,b) vs. (88c, d); (89a, b) vs. (89c, d); (90) vs. (91), (92)). 
 
(88) a. It happens/seems to be raining  
b. It is certain/likely to be raining  
c. *It is stupid to be raining    (Barker 2002: 20, ex. (21a)) 
d. *It is eager to be raining 
(89) a. There happens/seems to be a party tomorrow 
b. There is certain/likely to be a party tomorrow 
c. *There is stupid to be a party tomorrow  (Barker 2002: 20, ex. (22a)) 
d. *There is eager to be a party tomorrow 
(90) a. It was certain/likely for the carpet to be cleaned right before the big party 
b. The carpet was certain/likely to be cleaned right before the big party 
(91) a. It was stupid for the carpet to be cleaned right before the big party 
b. #The carpet was stupid to be clean right before the big party  
(Barker 2002: 20, ex. (22)) 
(92) #The carpet was eager to be cleaned right before the big party 
 
Although EAs, PAs and raising adjectives all share the superficial property of 
appearing with an animate subject and a CP, when compared directly it is clear that the 
animate argument of EAs and PAs does not raise from the embedded CP. And so their 
animate arguments must receive their respective Cause and Experiencer roles 
externally. This supports the EA studies outlined in section 1.3.2, which all conclude 
that EAs’ animate argument is external. 
In the next two sub-sections we turn to the last two sets of adjectives. First, 
relational and physical property adjectives (RA) in (93), which take a DP subject, but in 
contrast with EAs, PAs and raising predicates, do not take a CP.  
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(93) a. Peter/the mural is Canadian/old/tall 
b. Peter/the mural was Canadian/old/tall 
 
Second, those in (94), that select for either a DP or a CP, but in the latter case do not 
allow for the subject to rise out of it. I will refer to these as “important” adjectives (IA). 
 
(94) a. Peter is crucial/important/necessary 
b. For Peter to come is crucial/important/necessary 
c. It is crucial/important/necessary for Peter to come 
 
 
2.2.3.2 RAs versus EAs and PAs 
Relational/physical property adjectives (RA) differ from EAs and PAs in three ways: 
 
(i)  They do not provide any evidence for possessing additional argument structure 
beyond simple stativity and the DP. The unacceptability of all the variations in 
(95) contrasts sharply with EAs, PAs and raising predicates. So, RAs are 
predicates that select a lone DP. 
 
(95) a. *It was Canadian/old/tall of Peter to bring a hockey stick  
b. *Peter was Canadian/old/tall to bring a hockey stick  
c. *It was Canadian/old/tall for Peter to bring a hockey stick 
d. *For Peter to bring a hockey stick was Canadian/old/tall 
 
(ii)  While EA and PA external arguments can be described as Causers or 
Experiencers, respectively, these labels do not seem appropriate for the RA DP. 
 
Section 4.4.3 discusses thematic roles. More specifically, it proposes that they can 
be derived from (i) the combination of the theory of the syntax of inner-aspect that 
emerges and (ii) the general cognitive function of establishing a figure and a ground 
(Talmy 2000). So, EAs, PAs, and RAs each having an external argument with a 
different thematic quality is not a problem for this theory.  
Leferman 
 
66 
 
With regard to the proposed external position of the RA DP, since RA argument 
structure is simple in comparison with predicates with more overt arguments, deducing 
the position of the RA DP requires an additional layer of abstraction (cf. Meltzer-
Asscher 2012). In section 4.2.2.5.2 I will propose an interpretative motivation. 
Setting aside for the time being specific motivation for the syntactic position of the 
RA DP, in addition to the thematic differences between EA, PA and RA DPs, a further 
difference between EAs and PAs on the one hand, and RAs on the other, is that RAs do 
not impose an animacy restriction. The examples in (93) show this (i.e. Peter/the mural 
is Canadian/old/tall). 
Although it is true that EAs appear with inanimate DP subjects, (96a) shows that if 
the DP is eventive, an of-phrase can be readily appended. Example (96b) illustrates the 
same fact in Spanish. If the DP is non-eventive ((96c)) special interpretative provisions 
must be made: either (i) the DP is metonymically associated with some situation for 
which someone is potentially responsible, or (ii) in the more extreme case, the DP must 
be anthropomorphised. 
 
(96) a. The answer was rude (of Emma) 
b. La respuesta fue  maleducada   (por parte de Emma)   (Spanish) 
     the answer    was     rude          (by   part of Emma) 
     ‘The answer was rude (on Emma’s part)’ 
c.  
(??)
The carpet was rude (of Emma) 
d. *La moqueta fue  maleducada (por parte de Emma)   (Spanish) 
      the carpet    was     rude        (by   part of Emma) 
    ‘The carpet was rude (on Emma’s part)’ 
e. Lo de la moqueta  fue   maleducado (por parte de Emma)   (Spanish) 
   it  of the carpet    was      rude       (by   part of Emma) 
   ‘The carpet thing/what happened with the carpet was rude (on Emma’s part)’ 
 
It seems reasonable to view provision (ii) as an extra-grammatical strategy, but Spanish 
provides evidence that provision (i) is a grammatical one: (96d) shows that direct EA 
predication of the non-eventive DP is ungrammatical. But (96e) shows that it becomes 
grammatical when embedded in a relative clause headed by the referential pronoun lo.
24
 
                                                          
24
 This observation is due to Javier Ormazabal (p.c.). 
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This pronoun is unambiguously interpreted as referring to some situation associated 
with the carpet.
25
 
PAs evidence an even more restricted pattern. All of the examples in (97) show that 
PAs are degraded with any non-animate DP in subject position, and that realising the 
animate in a prepositional phrase remains impossible. In English, if the eventive DP can 
be interpreted at all, it requires synecdoche ((97a)). Its Spanish counterpart is equally 
odd ((97b)). 
 
(97) a. ??The answer was anxious/eager/willing (*of Emma) 
b. 
??
La respuesta fue inquieta (*por parte de Emma)    (Spanish) 
      the answer  was anxious (by part of Emma) 
    ‘The answer was anxious/eager/willing (on Emma’s part)’   
c. 
??
The carpet was anxious/eager/willing (*of Emma) 
d. *La moqueta fue inquieta (*por parte de Emma)    (Spanish) 
      the carpet   was anxious (by part of Emma) 
   ‘The carpet was anxious (on Emma’s part)’ 
e. 
??
Lo de la moqueta fue inquieto (*por parte de Emma)   (Spanish) 
       it of the carpet   was anxious  (by side of Emma) 
   ‘The carpet thing/what happened with the carpet was anxious (on E’s part)’ 
 
In the case of predication of a non-eventive DP—in contrast to what was just observed 
with EAs in (96)—there is no provision that saves PAs ((97c-e)). 
So, examples (96) and (97) show that EAs and PAs maintain their argument 
structure characteristics: EAs accept inanimate DP subjects to the extent that we can 
associate them with a situation that substitutes for the that-clause or infinitive, while 
PAs do not accept inanimate DP subjects because PAs do not license a that-clause or 
infinitive in subject position. On the other hand, RAs simply do not restrict for animacy.  
 
(iii)  In the present simple RAs are interpreted generically ((98a)), and in the past 
simple they give rise to a so-called lifetime effect ((98b)). 
 
                                                          
25
 Importantly, these examples show that EAs license the situation-related nominal in Spec, T that is not 
licensed in complement position. This supports the proposal that EAs do not have a transitive causative 
form with a DP object that parallels break because adjectives do not assign case to their complement. 
Instead, EAs make use of a CP complement to license a transitive structure. 
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A lifetime effect is where, uttered out-of-the-blue, the sentence implies that the subject 
is dead or no longer exists (cf. Kratzer 1995; Musan 1997) ((98) repeated from (93)):  
 
(98) a. Peter/the mural is Canadian/old/tall  
b. Peter/the mural was Canadian/old/tall  
 
The examples in (99) provide an illustration of a verb described as behaving in 
parallel fashion. 
 
(99) a. Gregory resembles Jörg Bieberstein 
b. Gregory resembled Jörg Bieberstein  (Musan 1997: 271, ex. (1c)) 
 
While death is only an implicature, in the past simple the predicates in (98) and (99) 
do imply that the relation between the individual and the predicate was stable, but that 
that is no longer true. 
This contrasts with EAs and PAs, which easily have an existential reading in the 
past (i.e. Peter was rude/eager), as opposed to producing a lifetime effect.  
These three points show some ways in which RAs are distinguishable from EAs 
and PAs. In sections to come I continue to compare RAs with EAs and PAs because 
RAs represent relatively well-behaved Individual-Level predicates, which EAs are 
generally proposed to be (cf. Carlson 1977; Stowell 1991; Landau 2009; Kertz 2006; 
2010, a.o.). In chapter 3 I show that, aside from a few points of superficial overlap, EAs 
and RAs are distinct aspectual classes. Also, more generally, I argue that the 
individual/stage distinction is not a primitive binary grammatically encoded distinction, 
and so not even RAs are properly analysed formally as Individual-Level. Section 
4.2.2.5.3 addresses the representation of the individual/stage intuition in this theory. 
 
 
2.2.3.3 IAs versus EAs and PAs  
In this section we will see that “important” adjectives (IA) are different from the other 
classes because they select either a DP or a CP—but not both at the same time. Let’s 
begin by observing that the IA DP ((100a)) is thematically underspecified in a way that 
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seems to parallel the RA DP. Further, examples (100b-e) show that the CP can appear in 
subject position or extrapose. 
 
(100) a. Emma is crucial/important/necessary 
b. That Emma come/comes is crucial/important/necessary 
c. It is crucial/important/necessary that Emma come/comes 
d. For Peter to come is crucial/important/necessary 
e. It is crucial/important/necessary for Peter to come 
 
One way of diagnosing the IA CP as a complement is that the CP can appear in the 
subjunctive. We will see in section 2.3.3.1 that the basic structural fact regarding the 
subjunctive mood is that complementhood is necessary: subjunctive clauses are 
complements (cf. Giorgi 2009). Examples (100b, c) show that the subjective is optional 
in English with these predicates. Example (101) shows the same in Italian:      
 
(101) É necessario che  (Emma)             venga/viene   (Italian) 
is necessary COMP (Emma) come-PRES-SUBJ/come-PRES-IND 
‘It is necessary that Emma come/comes’ 
 
What distinguishes IAs from the other classes we have considered is that they treat 
their DPs and CPs as interchangeable. First, example (102a) is grammatical with either 
an animate or inanimate subject, which shows that, like RAs, IAs do not impose an 
animacy restriction. Example (101b) adds an infinitive to (102a), and (102c) adds an 
overt subject to (102b). In contrast with EAs, PAs, and raising predicates, in these 
examples the particles to and for must be interpreted as adverbial purpose clauses 
meaning in order to/for, and not as a complement infinitive. So together examples (100) 
and (102) show that IAs are intransitive. 
 
(102) a. Cecile/the carpet is crucial/important/necessary 
b. Cecile/the carpet is crucial/important/necessary to win 
c. Cecile/the carpet is crucial/important/necessary for Peter to win 
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The examples in (103) confirm an intransitive analysis. The ungrammaticality of 
(103a) shows that the DP and a that-clause cannot co-occur. And (103b, c) show that 
IAs do not have a passive-like structure as EAs do. 
 
(103) a. *Cecile is crucial/important/necessary that Peter wins 
b. *It is crucial/important/necessary of Cecile for Peter to win 
c. *It is crucial/important/necessary of Cecile to win 
 
Furthermore when IAs select a CP, they do not allow for the subject of the CP to 
move out of it ((104)), thus contrasting with one of the basic properties of raising 
predicates. 
 
(104) *Peter is crucial/important/necessary to come 
 
Considering this evidence, the conclusion is that IAs select a complement that is 
either a DP or a CP. Their inability license both simultaneously is accounted for on the 
assumption of binary branching in the syntax. Their similarity to RAs in the thematic 
interpretation of their DP will support the proposal in chapter 4 that thematic roles are 
epiphenomenal. In conclusion, IAs round out this comparison of adjective argument 
structure because they illustrate the existence of an adjective class that selects a CP 
while, having a different syntactic signature from EAs, PAs and raising adjectives. 
 
 
2.2.3.4 Interim Conclusions of Comparison    
This survey has shown that (i) each adjective class has its own set of syntactic and 
semantic characteristics; (ii) EAs are distinguishable from PAs; (iii) EAs and PAs are 
the only predicative adjective classes to appear with a thematic DP, and a CP; and (iv) 
EAs do not pattern with RAs, which is a first argument against an Individual-Level 
analysis of EAs. 
Furthermore, throughout this comparison we have seen that adjectives and verbs 
have many parallels. Just a few examples: both can be OC; both can be factive; both can 
be raising predicates; and both can have thematic external arguments. The conjunction 
of these facts strongly supports the conclusion that adjectives and verbs have parallel 
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syntactic/semantic representations (chapter 1). To hold the opposite entails designing a 
grammar where adjectives and verbs participate in the same phenomena, but those 
phenomena are defined over disjoint structural descriptions according to lexical 
category. 
In terms of the proposal that EAs are causative alternating adjectives, we have 
uncovered the following supporting points: 
 
(i) EA that-clause data are unaccusative. 
(ii) EA factivity provides the existential entailment of the complement. 
(iii) The responsibility relation holding between the EA external argument and the CP. 
(iv) The Causer interpretation of their animate argument. 
(v) EAs are OC predicates because their CP is a complement. 
(vi) EAs’ non-raising character is predicted. 
(vii) Their passive-like structures are predicted. 
 
Let’s take another look at the argument structures that were presented in the 
introduction, repeated here as (105). In chapter 1 we saw that there is general agreement 
among the alternative approaches to EA syntax that EAs introduce their animate 
argument externally. Here we have seen that both EAs and PAs do so. I have also 
proposed that RAs introduce their subject externally, but specific motivation for this is 
delayed until chapter 4. 
 
(105) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
The structure in (105a) with two state arguments, s, is causative. The Causer is 
merged above the causing state, and the result CP in complement position. With regard 
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to the empirical parallelisms between verbs and adjectives, one observation accounts for 
the lack of an Agent role with adjectives: the category difference between verbs and 
adjectives tracks the conceptual distinction that verbs can convey change, but adjectives 
cannot. So, adjectives are transparently stative, their external argument is never an 
Agent, and if they are causative, EAs show that they undergo the causative alternation. 
Turning to the structure in (105b), it contains only one state argument, and the 
Experiencer DP is introduced above it. This is in accordance with research on 
Experiencers, which associates the Experiencer role with the specifier of a projection 
lower than the projection that introduces a Causer (cf. Landau 2010b). We have found 
evidence that EAs and PAs have these syntactic and thematic properties. In the next 
section we turn to the location of their CPs. 
 
 
2.3 PA and EA CPs are Complements 
In the summary of the alternative views of EA argument structure in 1.3.2 we saw that 
there was unanimous agreement in treating the EA infinitive as a non-complement, 
Bennis’s being the only account that took the CP to be a complement in one structure.  
In this section I defend a uniform approach: EA CPs are always generated in 
complement position. We will see three types of evidence: (i) general considerations, 
(ii) evidence that undermines the claims to the contrary, and (iii) positive direct 
evidence. 
 
 
2.3.1 Conceptual Support for a CP-Complement Analysis 
There are two general points that support a CP complement analysis. The first, and 
obvious one in the present context, follows directly from the proposed causative 
alternation analysis. On this causative alternation analysis the pattern in (106) (repeated 
from (7)), is predicted, and it is natural for the CP to be a complement. This account 
also entails that the availability and distribution of the CP with EAs are not accidental, 
as they are on analyses where the CP is an adjunct or not a part of the EA lexical entry. 
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(106) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition 
          + Passive 
 
The second general observation is that, as mentioned above, as factives, EA 
extraction violations are expected. Therefore, contrasts observed by Stowell and Bennis 
between EAs ((107)) and PAs ((108)) (Stowell’s judgements) are accounted for: 
 
(107) a. %?Wheni was it stupid of John [to eat dinner ti]?   
b. %?Wheni was John stupid [to eat dinner ti]? 
(Stowell 1991: 123, ex. (34e, f)) 
(108) When was John eager [to eat dinner ti]?          (Stowell 1991: 123, ex. (33c)) 
 
Although weak islands have been analysed as syntactic adjuncts of a sort (cf. 
Cinque 1990b), the standard assumption is that factive predicates select their 
complements. Once EAs are recognised as factives, extraction violations are expected 
and the null position is that these CPs are complements. The factive nature of EAs thus 
becomes a strong argument in favour of locating the CP in complement position. 
 
 
2.3.2 Reconsidering Counter-Evidence to a Complement Analysis 
Let’s turn now to some of the empirical evidence that has been offered to argue against 
a complement analysis. I will look at two types: (i) as-clauses, and (ii) nominalisation 
patterns. In the first case, my suggestion is that the proposed test does not generalise, 
and therefore it is not a helpful test; and in the second, that the facts actually favour a 
complement analysis. 
Stowell (1991) uses as-clauses to argue against the complementhood of the EA CP. 
If an as-clause is grammatical, then the gap that it licences corresponds to a complement 
position. Example (109a) illustrates this with as licensing a gap in the position of the CP 
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complement of claim, in contrast to the ungrammaticality of the subject gap of prove in 
(109b). 
  
(109) a. John was a liar, as Bill had claimed _          (Stowell 1991: 123, ex. (35c)) 
b. *John is a liar, as _ proves him untrustworthy (cf. Stowell 1991: 124, ex. (36b)) 
 
In light of (109), the ungrammaticality of (110) seems to support the conclusion 
that the EA CP is not a complement: 
 
(110) a. ??John went home, as (_) was _ smart of him    
b. *John went home, as it was smart of him _ 
c. *John went home, as he was smart _ 
(Stowell 1991: 124, ex. (37)) 
 
What has not been noticed, however, is that PAs also fail to license the gap ((111)), and 
PAs are generally accepted infinitival complement selectors. It seems, therefore, that the 
as-clause test is uninformative here.
26, 27
 
 
(111) *John went home, as he was anxious/eager/willing _ 
                                                          
26
 K&K (1970: 171) note that among the conditions that as-clause gaps seem to be sensitive to is that the 
predicate be non-emotive. K&K characterise an emotive predicate as one that implies the speaker’s 
subjective evaluation (1970: 169). In K&K’s terms, both EAs and PAs would be classified as emotive, 
and this would account the ungrammaticality of (110) and (111) versus (109a). So, the grammaticality of 
as-clauses cannot be predicted solely on the basis of the syntactic position of the gap.  
27
 Another test that appears uninformative is complementiser omission in Dutch. In Dutch, the C° om is 
generally described as omissible when the CP is a complement, and obligatory otherwise. Bennis uses this 
to diagnose the status of EA and PA CPs. He claims that in (i) it is obligatory, but omissible in (ii) and 
(iii). On the one hand, this would support his adjunct analysis of the EA infinitive in not in subject 
position ((i)). On the other, it would also support a complement base-position analysis of the EA infinitive 
when the infinitive is interpreted in subject position ((ii)), and the PA infinitive ((iii)). 
 
(i) Jan is gemeen om zo           over  dat onderwerp te praten (Dutch) 
John is mean   for like-that about that subject     to talk 
(ii) Het is gemeen om over  dat onderwerp te praten  (Dutch) 
It    is mean     for about that subject      to talk 
(iii) Jan    is bang om over  dat onderwerp te praten 
John is afraid for about that subject to talk    (Dutch, cf. Bennis 2000: 42) 
 
I have consulted speakers and they coincide in judging om to be obligatory in each of the three 
structures. Since the complement status of PA infinitives is accepted, at this stage, this seems to be 
another case of a test which cannot be applied categorically. 
Another concern is that EAs are factive, and complementiser omission with factive predicates is 
restricted cross-linguistically (cf. K&K 1970 for English; Giorgi 2009 for Italian). In either case, it is not 
clear that the proposed om test provides direct support for any analysis. 
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Nominalisations have also been used to argue against EA CP complementhood. 
Kertz (2010) and Landau (2009) conclude from the contrast in (112) that the 
acceptability of the PA nominalisation with an infinitive shows that the infinitive is part 
of the adjective’s lexical entry and a complement ((112a)), while the proposed 
ungrammaticality of (112b) indicates that the infinitive is not part of the EAs lexical 
entry, and thus that when it does appear, it must be an adjunct (cf. Grimshaw 1990). 
 
(112) a. John’s eagerness to insult Mary          (cf. Landau 2009: 324, ex. (26b))   
b. Arthur’s stupidity (*to press the matter) was not at issue 
(cf. Kertz 2010: 288, ex. (104)) 
 
I would like to suggest instead that the contrast is only apparent and that this EA 
structure is available. The examples in (113) are taken from the Internet. Additionally, 
example (113b) shows that the extraposed nominalisation structures also appear with 
the infinitive. 
 
(113) a. I was appalled by her stupidity to scheme in such a dangerous way 
b. It was sheer stupidity to refuse at the price they were offering  
c. All this compounded by her stupidity to paint a RENTAL 
 
In consonance with (113), further support for a CP complement analysis can be 
garnered from EA nominalisations. Nouns have the ability to license their complements 
via of-insertion, as in the well-worn case of the city in (114). 
 
(114) The Roman’s destruction of the city 
 
The contrast in (115) illustrates what happens when the clausal argument is not a 
complement: since the relative clause is an adjunct in (115a), of-insertion fails in 
(115b). 
 
(115) a. I don’t believe the story that Edna left 
b. *I don’t believe the story of that 
(cf. Moulton 2013: 275, ex. (106))  
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Example (116) shows that PAs accept of-insertion, and the examples in (117), taken 
from the Internet, show that EAs do, as well. 
 
(116) the willingness/eagerness of the response 
(117) a. That they should afterwards, notwithstanding, request him to present their 
petitions, was to him a gratifying proof of their confidence in his sincerity of 
the desire he had expressed for peace 
b. It was through his generosity of the donation of the land the Union Senior 
Center became a reality 
c. Although Sharon was a great general he did not die as a hero because he 
botched his fame and name up at the end of his life with his stupidity of the 
expulsion to please the leftists 
 
The NP structure in (117) is somewhat repetitive, but it shows that both the external 
argument (licensed as a genitive pronoun) and the internal argument can co-occur inside 
an EA nominalisation. If we loosen this restraint, it is even easier to find examples of 
nominalised EAs taking of complements (e.g. Such is the astounding stupidity of 
optimism, Oscar Wilde). 
Considering the contrast in (115) more closely, it shows that nouns take adjunct 
clauses. On an adjunct analysis of the EA infinitive, it is unclear why the infinitive (or a 
that-clause) should not be able to adjoin to the nominalised EA in (112b), since 
adjunction is assumed to be free and the infinitive is otherwise ubiquitous in EA 
structures. 
It is true however, that compared to PA nominalisations, EA nominalisations seem 
heavier. One suggestion might be that this is another indication of the semantic 
differences between the two classes. EAs, being factive, presuppose their complement, 
and within the nominal the presupposition of the CP may be even stronger, thus creating 
sense of redundancy. On the other hand, the lack any such presupposition in PAs allows 
for a first impression of greater grammaticality. 
Although this is a matter that deserves more attention, when compared with other 
factive nominalisations ((118)), EAs seem to be of a similar order of complexity, but 
such examples are grammatical in context. 
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(118) The narrative reveals the regretfulness of the decision, the consolation that 
through the knowledge and experience gained by their participating scientists, 
Britain would be better able after the war to produce atomic weapons and energy 
plants         (Herbert Feis, Review of Britain and Atomic Energy) 
 
The conclusion that I offer from the combined nominal data is that both PAs and EAs 
are complement selecting predicates. We will return to the subject of EA 
nominalisations in chapter 5, maintaining this conclusion. 
 
 
2.3.3 Positive Direct Evidence for CP Complement Analysis 
Thus far, the arguments in support of a CP complement analysis have been a response 
to the counter-evidence. Now, I present four new arguments: (i) sequence of tense 
(SoT), (ii) the CP/PP co-occurrence restriction, (iii) VP ellipsis, and (iv) Control. The 
sum of all the arguments strongly supports the conclusion that the CP is a complement 
in all EA structures. 
 
 
2.3.3.1 EAs, Complementhood, and Sequence of Tense 
The first argument comes from the standard assumption for SoT phenomena. SoT is 
when the interpretation of the tense of the embedded clause is anchored to that of the 
matrix one. The essential characteristic of SoT is that it is established under 
complementhood (Hornstein 1990; Giorgi 2009; Higginbotham 2009).  
In this respect, compare the complement examples in (119) with the adjunct ones in 
(120). In (119a) the embedded past tense is interpreted with respect to the matrix past 
tense. The ungrammaticality of (119b) shows this with the inclusion of adverbials: it is 
ungrammatical because the interpretation of tense in the embedded clause is dependent 
on the matrix clause, and the adverbials are contradictory. 
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(119) Italian 
a. Gianni ha detto che Maria era malata 
‘John said that Mary was ill’  
b. *Due anni fa, Gianni ha detto che Maria era malata l’anno scorso 
‘Two years ago, John said that Mary was ill last year’ 
(Higginbotham 2009: 83-84, ex. (1), (5)) 
 
The object relative clause examples in (120), however, are both grammatical because of 
the lack of complementhood: in contrast with (119b), the adverbials are not 
contradictory in (120b) because the past tense in the relative clause, as an adjunct, is 
interpreted independently of the main clause tense.   
 
(120) Italian 
a. Gianni ha visto una donna che era malata 
‘John saw a woman who was ill’  
b. Due anni fa, Gianni ha visto una donna era malata l’anno scorso 
‘Two years ago, John saw a woman who was ill last year’ 
(Higginbotham 2009: 84, ex. (3), (4)) 
 
In this connection, subjunctive clauses are prototypical instances of SoT. The 
subjunctive examples in (121) show that the choice of present or past subjunctive tense 
morphology is determined by the matrix tense. 
 
(121) Italian 
a. Gianni crede che Maria sia/*fosse incinta 
    ‘Gianni believes that Maria is-PRES-SUBJ/*was-PAST-SUBJ pregnant’ 
b. Gianni credeva che Maria fosse/*sia incinta 
    ‘Gianni believed that Maria was-PAST-SUBJ/*is-PRES-SUBJ pregnant’ 
(Giorgi 2009: 1842, ex. (12), (13)) 
 
Now, consider that factives are the prototypical examples of obligatory subjunctive 
selecting SoT predicates: 
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(122) Gianni rimpiange che                       sia/*è partita   (Italian) 
John     regrets     that (she) be-PRES-SUBJ/*be-PRES-IND left 
‘John regrets that she left’ 
 
In some languages, when EAs appear with a that-clause, the subjunctive is 
required. This is the case of Italian and Spanish: 
 
(123) Italian 
a. Che (Emma)              abbia/*ha         fatto quel commento è stato maleducato  
    that (Emma) have-PRES-SUBJ/have-PRES-IND made that comment is be-PART impolite 
    ‘That Emma made that comment was impolite’  
b. È stato maleducato che (Emma)          abbia/*ha             fatto quel commento  
    is be-PART impolite that (Emma) have-SUBJ-PRES/have-PRES-IND made that comment  
  ‘It was impolite that Emma made that comment’ 
(124) Spanish 
a. Que (Ana) se               haya/*ha      marchado ha  sido    prudente  
    that (Ana) SE have -PRES-SUBJ/have-PRES-IND left   has be-PART prudent 
    ‘That Ana left was prudent’  
b. Ha sido      prudente     que (Ana) se               haya/*ha        marchado  
    has be-PART prudent       that (Ana) SE have-PRES-SUBJ/have-PRES-IND left  
  ‘It was prudent that Ana left’ 
 
These examples show that, on standard SoT assumptions, the appearance of the 
subjunctive in EA that-clauses is an unambiguous indication of (underlying) 
complementhood. Proposing the contrary requires modification of the basic assumption 
regarding the clause structure of SoT. So, the properties of EAs that-clauses support a 
complement analysis of the EA data argued to be unaccusative on the present proposal. 
 
 
2.3.3.2 The CP/PP Restriction 
The next argument comes from the CP/PP restriction introduced in section 1.3.2. 
Stowell (1991) observed that an EA that selects a to-PP can never co-occur with the CP 
in any structure. The examples in (125) illustrate the restriction and those in (126) show 
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that the restriction holds even in the absence of the animate argument. This shows that 
the source of the tension lies between the CP and PP.
28
 
 
(125) a. *It was kind of John to me to fix my car 
b. *It was kind to me of John to fix my car 
c. *That was kind of John to me 
d. *Fixing my car was kind to me of John 
e. *John was kind to me to fix my car 
(Stowell 1991: 129, ex. (59)) 
(126) a. *It was kind to me to fix my car 
b. *That was kind to me 
c. *Fixing my car was kind to me 
(Stowell 1991: 129, ex. (60)) 
 
Since Stowell first observed this restriction, it has been found to hold cross-
linguistically. Bennis (2000) provides data showing that both an argumental PP ((127)) 
and the dative clitic ((128)) result in ungrammaticality in combination with a 
demonstrative that stands in for the CP. Landau (2009) shows the same for Hebrew 
((129)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 In addition to the data presented in the main text, I have found confirmation of the restriction in each 
language I have been able to test (e.g. German, Italian, Romanian, Spanish, and Swedish). I have, 
however, found three counter-examples to the CP/PP restriction in English. Example (i), from the Coca 
Corpus, is representative. 
 
(i) Janice put up a bird feeder in the hemlock a few falls ago, even though Doris Kaufmann or some 
other busybody told her it was cruel to birds to put up a feeder when you weren't there in the 
winter, a plastic sphere tilted like Saturn, and he fills it with sunflower seed when he thinks of it. 
(John Updike, Rabbit at Rest) 
 
Each of the counter-examples involves Extraposition of an infinitive. This seems significant because the 
infinitive is plausibly not spelt-out in complement position, and this would leave a gap to insert the to-PP. 
Due to the strength of the restriction cross-linguistically, it does seem to be a real syntactic restriction, and 
counter-examples such as (i) are plausibly the product of discourse-level narrative construction, rather 
than narrow syntax. 
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(127) Dutch 
a. *Dat is gemeen tegen kinderen 
that is mean      to    children 
b. Jan is gemeen tegen kinderen 
John is mean    to     children 
(Bennis 2000: 37, ex. (27)) 
(128) Dutch 
a. *Dat   is   mij gehoorzaam 
That is me obedient 
b. Jan   is mij gehoorzaam  
John is me obedient 
(Bennis 2000: 37, ex. (28)) 
(129) Hebrew 
a. Gil haya nexmad el Rina 
Gil was   nice     to Rina 
‘Gil was nice to Rina’ 
b. *Ze haya nexmad el Rina (le’hacia la     tremp) 
it  was nice        to Rina (to.offer to.her ride) 
‘It was nice to Rina (to offer her a ride)’ 
(cf. Landau 2009: 321, ex. (16)) 
 
Landau also shows that the restriction appears in EA nominalisations: 
 
(130) a. The rudeness of the joke (*to Mary) 
b. The rudeness (*to Mary) of the joke 
c. The rudeness of your neighbour to Mary 
(Landau 2009: 330, ex. (33)) 
  
The next examples show that switching from an argument PP to an adjunct PP 
obviates the CP/PP restriction. This is illustrated with Hebrew (cf. (129), (131)) and 
Central Flemish ((132)): 
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(131) Hebrew 
a. Gil haya nexmad klapey Rina 
Gil was   nice     towards Rina 
‘Gil was nice towards Rina’ 
b. Ze haya nexmad klapey Rina (le’hacia la     tremp) 
it  was      nice   towards Rina (to.offer to.her ride) 
‘It was nice towards Rina (to offer her a ride)’ 
(cf. Landau 2009: 321, ex. (16)) 
(132) Central Flemish 
a. Jan   was grof tegen Marie 
John was rude to     Mary  
‘John was rude to Mary’ 
b. Het was grof van Jan (tegenover/*tegen Marie) van te vertrekken 
it    was rude from John (with-regards-to/*to Mary) for to leave 
‘It was rude of John (with regards to/*to Mary) to leave’ 
 
The strength of the restriction is reflected in how native speakers of languages that 
allow for this minor change instinctively produce the adjunct version, and immediately 
find the argument version ungrammatical when prompted. 
Looking now at changes in the form of the CP, the apparently minor shift from an 
infinitive to an in-adverbial also obviates the restriction: 
 
(133) Celine was rude to Mary in leaving 
 
In the discussion of Control data to come below we will see data showing that in-
adverbials adjoin higher than the base position of EA infinitives. This leads us to expect 
that in-adverbials should to be able to adjoin in (133), and this expectation is met. The 
sum of these facts indicates that the CP/PP restriction is a very narrow restriction.  
While alternative approaches accept that the to-PP is an argument and generated as 
a complement to the adjective (with the exception of Bennis 2004), they cannot analyse 
this co-occurrence restriction as competition for a structural position. This is because 
they either propose different argument structures depending on the sentence type or 
because the CP is never a complement. 
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Having established the strength of the restriction, the central point here is that, as 
Stowell shows with (125) and (126), it runs through the whole paradigm. 
The solution offered here is that, on the assumption of binary branching, the CP and 
the PP do compete for the same syntactic position: the complement of the adjective. 
Since the evidence presented here also supports the conclusion that the EA CP is always 
generated in complement position, we expect the restriction to run through the whole 
paradigm. 
In support of a base position competition account, the data in (134) show that the 
same restriction appears with other complement selecting adjectives. The adjective 
proud is standardly taken to select a complement of-PP ((134a)). However, proud can 
also select a that-clause complement ((134b, c)). 
 
(134) a. I am proud of them 
b. I am proud that my parents rose from homelessness, oppression, and poverty to 
    achieve their American dream.      (Internet) 
c. I am proud of that 
d. *I am proud of my parents that they rose from homelessness [...] 
 
But (134d) shows that combining the of-PP and the that-clause is unacceptable in a way 
that seems parallel to the EA CP/PP data. So, new evidence from the case of proud 
provides direct evidence for a competition account of the CP/PP restriction, and the 
complement position of the EA CP. 
We will take up this restriction again in chapter 3 when discussing EA entailments. 
For the moment I would like to underscore that (i) from the perspective of this thesis, 
changes in form are expected to correlate with a change in structure and affect the 
restriction ((131)-(133)); and (ii) this restriction is straightforwardly predicted by the 
combination of the argument structure proposed here and conservative assumptions 
about where to-PPs of this sort are generated (cf. Ramchand 2008; Landau 2009, a.o.). 
On the other hand, an analysis assuming adjunction of the CP neither predicts 
restrictions nor explains why uncontroversial adjuncts do not give rise to them (i.e. in-
adverbials). A complement analysis of the CP picks out just this pattern. 
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2.3.3.3 EAs, Complementhood, and Ellipsis 
The next argument comes from the fact that EAs undergo VP-ellipsis. In (135) we see 
that the infinitive can elide as long as it is not interpreted in subject position ((135d)). 
This is exactly the pattern one would predict if the infinitive were a complement. 
  
(135) a. She thought how she should take more care of her appearance, like Lola. It 
was childish not to.     (Ian McEwan, Atonement)  
b. It was childish to 
c. She was childish to 
d. *To was childish  
 
A fundamental observation with regard to VP-ellipsis is that the particle to needs to 
be in a certain proximal structural relation with a c-commanding lexical item. Exactly 
how this relation is ultimately to be stated is beyond our concerns here (cf. Johnson 
2001). What is relevant is that the lack of complementhood blocks the establishment of 
any such relationship. Example (136) shows that, as the infinitive is the complement of 
want, ellipsis proceeds.
29
 
     
(136) Mag Wildwood wants to read Fred’s story, and I also want to ▲ 
(Johnson 2001: 440, ex. (5d)) 
 
In contrast, (137) shows that ellipsis fails when the infinitive is within a purpose 
adjunct. 
 
(137) *Mag Wildwood came to read Fred’s story, and I also came to ▲ 
(Johnson 2001: 440, ex. (8)) 
 
With respect to (135a-c), this shows that the EA infinitive cannot be an adjunct. 
Furthermore, the contrast in (138) shows that ellipsis of an infinitive that is realised in 
Spec, T ((138b)) is always bad. This general observation means that the 
ungrammaticality of (135d) is an independent fact that does not say anything about the 
argument structure of EAs. 
                                                          
29
 The symbol “▲” marks the ellipsis site. 
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(138) a. You shouldn’t play with rifles because it’s dangerous to ▲ 
b. *You shouldn’t play with rifles because to ▲ is dangerous 
(Johnson 2001: 442, ex. (11)) 
 
Crucially, the EA infinitive cannot originate as an external argument because VP-
ellipsis in these cases is not licensed either. In (139a), we have an object Experiencer 
verb that can take an infinitive that is generated thematically as the Causer argument. 
Example (139b) shows that the infinitive can extrapose. Yet, example (139c) indicates 
that VP-ellipsis is not possible even with Extraposition (cf. (137a)), although TP-ellipsis 
and do so anaphora are fine ((139d, e)). 
 
(139) a. To perjure himself/that would damage John  
b. It would damage John to perjure himself 
c. *Mary didn’t want to perjure herself because it damaged John to ▲ 
d. Mary didn’t want to perjure herself because it damaged John ▲ 
e. Mary didn’t want to perjure herself because it damaged John to do so  
 
The conclusion that this set of facts unequivocally implicates is that the EA 
infinitive is never generated as an external argument because otherwise, we would 
incorrectly predict (135b) (It was childish to) to be ungrammatical. In short, if the EA 
infinitive were generated anywhere but complement position, VP-ellipsis should fail, 
contrary to fact. 
 
 
2.3.3.4 EAs, Complementhood, and Obligatory Control     
The final argument comes from Control. We saw above that EAs are OC predicates 
(examples repeated here as (140) and (141)). I suggest that this is a property of Control 
predicates that take infinitival complements, and not infinitival external arguments. 
 
(140) a. Arthur was silly to nominate himself 
b. *Arthur’s sister was silly to nominate himself 
c. *Arthur thought Desmond was silly to vote for each other 
d. Arthur was silly to get arrested, and Desmond was as well  
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(141) a. It was silly of Arthur to nominate himself 
b. *It was silly of Arthur’s sister to nominate himself 
c. *Arthur thought it was silly of Desmond to vote for each other 
d. It was silly of Celine to get arrested, and it was of Desmond (to) as well 
 
Before turning to the Control data that show that the EA infinitive patterns with 
complements and not external arguments, I present data that rule out possible adjunction 
analyses of the infinitive. 
Since EAs only appear with an external argument and a CP but no intervening 
direct object, it does not seem possible to test directly the variability that adjunct 
Control gives rise to. A standard illustration of this variability is given in (142). 
 
(142) Italian 
a. La mamma mi ha sgridato con tanta furia [da pentirsi/*mi subito] 
    ‘Mother scolded me so furiously that she/*I immediately felt remorseful’ 
b. Io sono stato sgridato dalla mamma con tanta furia [da pentirmi/*si subito] 
    ‘I was scolded by mother so furiously that I/*she immediately felt remorseful’ 
(cf. Landau 2010b: 92, ex. (170a, b)) 
 
Example (142a) is in the active voice and only the subject, i.e. la mamma, can control 
the infinitive in the adjunct clause headed by da. Example (142b) shows that, upon 
passivisation, the Control relation flips: only the logical object, now in subject position, 
i.e. io, is a possible controller. This pair of examples illustrates the variability of adjunct 
Control. 
In order to test for adjunct Control, however, another potential controller must be 
available in the structure, such as a direct object, which is what EAs do not have. So, in 
order for the argument for complementhood from Control to have force, I will first 
show that the EA infinitive does not pattern with other types of adjuncts, and then show 
that it patterns exactly like OC infinitival complements. This combination of facts 
strongly supports a complement analysis of the EA infinitive. 
Two types of adjunct Control that could be at issue are those of rationale clauses 
((143a)) and purpose clauses ((143b)). One of the properties that distinguishes them 
from each other is that the inclusion of the full in order to connector is only 
grammatical in rational clauses. 
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(143) a. Sam brought the camera to the party [(in order) PRO to take pictures] 
b. Sam brought Kim to the party [PRO to take pictures] 
(Overfelt 2011: 2, ex. (1), (2)) 
 
Example (144a) shows that inclusion of the connector is not possible with EAs, so a 
rationale adjunct analysis is ruled out. On the other hand, example (144b) (repeated 
from (137)) shows that VP-ellipsis from a purpose adjunct is generally bad. 
 
(144) a. *Emma was rude in order to leave the party 
b. *Mag Wildwood came to read Fred’s story, and I also came to ▲ 
 
We have already seen that VP-ellipsis is possible with EAs ((135)), so the empirical 
facts also argue against a purpose adjunct analysis. Therefore, the EA infinitive cannot 
be analysed as adjunction of these kinds. 
Above, when discussing the CP/PP restriction, it was mentioned that there is 
evidence showing that the EA infinitive and in-adverbials occupy different positions in 
the syntax. Landau (2009), in contrast, proposes that the EA infinitive is an underlying 
in+gerund adjunct: 
 
(145) a. John was stupid [AdvP Ø[PRO to leave town]] (Landau 2009: 324, ex. (23)) 
b. John was stupid [in leaving town]    (Landau 2009: 324, ex. (24)) 
 
Kertz (2006, 2010) shows independently that this is not the correct analysis because, 
among other effects, the two types of phrases can co-occur and their relative order 
effects interpretation: 
 
(146) a. Spencer was rude to offend Agatha in recounting the story at dinner  
(Kertz 2010: 282, ex. (78)) 
b. Spencer was rude in recounting the story at dinner to offend Agatha 
 
(Kertz 2010: 282, ex. (79)) 
 
When adjacent to the adjective ((146a)), the infinitive has the canonical complement 
interpretation we have been focussing on. In (146b), with the gerund adjacent to the 
adjective and the infinitive last, the infinitive can only have a purpose interpretation. 
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In addition to undermining an adjunction account, the interpretive difference 
between (146a) and (146b) makes another crucial point: it shows that the infinitive is 
closer to the adjective than other adjuncts. This is because, when the infinitive as 
adjacent to the adjective, it has a neutral “complement” interpretation, but as soon as 
there is an intervening adjunct (such as the in-adverbial), the infinitive is 
unambiguously interpreted as a purpose clause. Therefore, when the EA infinitive is 
truly an infinitive (and not a larger connector such as in order to), it seems to be as close 
to the adjective as it can get. 
If the absence of any direct evidence for an adjunct analysis is combined with the 
evidence pointing toward a complement analysis, then the contrast in (146) also 
supports a complement analysis. Given that we have been unable to identify what sort 
of adjunct the EA infinitive could be, I take the following Control data, which show the 
EA infinitive to pattern with infinitival complements, and not external arguments, to be 
another strong argument for a complement analysis. 
Returning now to the properties of OC, the binding facts in (147) show that in all 
structures, the EA infinitive is obligatorily controlled by its local controller (i.e. John). 
This is true whether the infinitive is in subject position ((147a)), extraposed ((147b)), or 
immediately following the adjective ((147c)). 
 
(147) a. Mary knew that [PRO to perjure himself/*herself] was foolish of John 
b. Mary knew that it was foolish of John [PRO to perjure himself/*herself] 
c. Mary knew that John was foolish [PRO to perjure himself/*herself] 
 
As mentioned above in the discussion of the ellipsis facts, object Experiencer verbs 
such as damage can take infinitives as their Causer external argument. These verbs 
display different Control properties. The binding facts in (148) show that these 
infinitives allow either the matrix subject or the embedded object to control, 
independently of the position of the infinitive.
30
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 Not all Causer-infinitive selecting verbs display exactly this binding pattern: psychological object-
experiencer verbs selecting a Causer infinitive, such as disturb, evidence only a sub-set of the damage 
pattern (cf. Landau 1999), but both sub-classes nevertheless have a signature which is completely 
different from OC complement selecting predicates. Since EAs are neither psychological nor experiencer 
predicates, and do not otherwise pattern with object Experiencer predicates in any way, I use damage for 
comparison because the empirical ground requires less qualification. 
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(148) a. Mary knew that [PRO to perjure himself/herself] would damage John 
b. Mary knew that it would damage John [PRO perjure himself/herself] 
 (cf. Landau 1999: 20, ex. (20)) 
 
These object Experiencer verbs also allow an impersonal oneself anaphor in either 
position ((149)), again in contrast to EAs ((150)). 
 
(149) a. Mary knew that [PRO to perjure oneself] would damage John 
b. Mary knew that it would damage John [PRO perjure oneself] 
(150) a. *Mary knew that [PRO to perjure oneself] was foolish of John 
b. *Mary knew that it was foolish of John [PRO to perjure oneself] 
c. *Mary knew that John was foolish [PRO to perjure oneself] 
 
If the EA infinitive were introduced as an external argument, the null hypothesis would 
be that it behave like other predicates selecting infinitival external arguments, contrary 
to fact. 
If we instead compare EAs with Control verbs that select an external argument 
controller and a CP complement, and alternate (as EAs do) such as decide, demand, 
accept, or refuse, we find that the EA profile is not exceptional, but parallel. In (151) the 
paradigm is illustrated with decide. The blocks of examples in (152) and (153) show 
that—just like EAs—Control is local and cannot be impersonal. 
 
(151) a. The committee decided [PRO to investigate itself] 
b. It was decided by the committee [PRO to investigate itself] 
c. [PRO to investigate itself] was decided by the committee 
(152) a. Mary knew that the committee decided [PRO to investigate itself/*herself] 
b. Mary knew that it was decided by the committee [PRO to investigate 
itself/*herself] 
c. Mary knew that [PRO to investigate itself/*herself] was decided by the 
committee   
(153) a. *Mary knew that the committee decided [PRO to investigate oneself] 
b. *Mary knew that it was decided by the committee [PRO to investigate oneself] 
c. *Mary knew that [PRO to investigate oneself] was decided by the committee 
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Now, the data in (154) and (155) might seem undermine this parallelism because 
when the embedded external argument is suppressed, non-local ((154)) and impersonal 
((155)) Control become possible. 
 
(154) a. Mary knew that [PRO to perjure herself] was foolish 
b. Mary knew that it was foolish [PRO to perjure herself] 
(155) a. Mary knew that [PRO to perjure oneself] was foolish  
b. Mary knew that it was foolish [PRO to perjure oneself] 
 
What this indicates, rather, is that when the local controller is suppressed, it still 
controls implicitly. Thus, binding of the reflexive is possible in (154) because Mary is 
understood as the object of an implicit of-phrase which in turn locally binds PRO. 
Likewise, the impersonal reflexive in (155) is accounted for on the assumption of a null 
impersonal of-phrase. 
It is common to analyse cases of otherwise exceptional long-distance or arbitrary 
Control as implicit local Control (cf. Bhatt and Izvorski 1998; Landau 1999, 2010a). 
This has been proposed for interrogative infinitives such as (156) and generics such as 
(157), which otherwise bear the hallmarks of OC. 
 
(156) a. Johni said where to leave himi a message 
a’. Johni said to-x [where PROx+ to leave himi a message] 
(cf. Landau 1999: 54, ex. (37a), (38a)) 
(157) a. It is fun for John to play baseball 
a’. It is fun for Johni [PROi to play baseball] 
b. It is fun to play baseball 
b’. It is fun for-x [PROx to play baseball] 
(cf. Epstein 1984) 
 
EAs fit naturally here. Something along the lines of (158b) captures all the EA 
Control properties we have been discussing. 
 
(158) a. Mary knew that it was foolish to perjure herself/oneself 
b. Maryi knew that it was foolish of-i/j [PROi/j to perjure herselfi/oneselfj]  
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In fact, since Stowell (1991: 112) it is has been acknowledged that the EA external 
argument is always present in the infinitival structures—even if implicit—just like the 
external arguments of passives. 
In conclusion, this last argument compared EA Control with the properties of 
infinitives that are merged as external arguments and we have found that EAs behave 
like other complement selecting OC predicates with external arguments that control 
locally even when implicit. 
 
 
2.3.4 Summary of EA CP Complement Arguments 
In this section three different kinds of argument (i.e. general conceptual considerations, 
reanalysed counter-evidence, and new direct evidence) showed that the EA CP is 
always generated as in complement position. Overall, the evidence is strong and 
mutually consistent. This consistency with respect to all the phenomena we have seen 
so far weights heavily against an analysis which posits multiple lexical entries and 
various forms of EA argument realisation. On the other hand, it supports this causative 
alternation analysis because the CP is exactly where it needs to be for the causative 
alternation to proceed. 
 
 
2.4 Alternative Theories of Verbal and Adjectival Predication 
Two points that have been belaboured throughout this chapter are that (i) adjective 
syntax is complex and, (ii) adjectives assign external Causer and Experiencer roles. 
Once one makes allowance for the stativity of adjectives—thus barring the Agent 
role with adjectives—it becomes clear that adjectives are assigning thematic roles that 
are associated with the standard external positions. 
When we take a closer look at the adjective classes that assign the Causer and 
Experiencer roles, namely EAs and PAs, we find numerous further syntactic 
differences; for example, EAs passivise, PAs do not; EAs bear many signs of causation, 
PAs none. The present approach to capturing this posits the same structural relations in 
adjective syntax as in verb syntax. Indeed, chapter 1 presented a semantic argument for 
parallelism of verb and adjective inner-aspect. 
Leferman 
 
92 
 
We will look now at two alternative accounts of argument structure in order to 
illustrate that this is not the standard view: it is more common to analyse verbal 
predications as rich and adjectival predications as poor. 
Ramchand (2008) provides inner-aspectual structure with a syntactic representation 
that splits the traditional verb phrase up into three projections: initP, procP and resP 
((159a)) (cf. Borer 1994). The head of the init phrase is parallel to little v. It introduces 
an argument which is underspecified as either Agent or Causer: essentially any 
individual that can be conceptualised as the initiator of a cause. The proc phrase is the 
locus of change through time. The argument in its specifier is the Undergoer of change. 
Lastly, the res phrase represents the result-state of lexically telic verbs such as break.
31
 
The argument in resP’s specifier is the holder of that state. Additionally, each head 
introduces its own aspectual variable. This variable is the argument of one of the two 
basic predicates of events that Ramchand assumes: state and process. Init and res 
denote states, and proc a process. 
 
(159) Ramchand’s Syntactisation of Aspectual Structure 
a. Maximal Extension of Traditional VP: break 
initP (causing projection) 
2 
DP3 init’ 
subj of ‘cause’ 2 
init           procP (process projection) 
  State(e) 2 
DP2 proc’ 
subj of ‘process’ 2 
proc resP (result projection) 
 Process(e) 2 
DP1   res’ 
subj of ‘result’ 2 
res XP 
  State(e) 4 
 … 
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 39, 44) 
 
 
                                                          
31
 As opposed to verb phrases that are compositionally bounded, e.g. Victoria pushed the cart (to the end 
of the aisle). We return to telicity in chapter 4. In this section it is mentioned simply in order to emphasise 
the representational divergence between verbs and adjectives.   
Chapter 2 
 
93 
 
b. Stative Predications: Alex is happy/fears nightmares 
           initP 
2 
Alex init’ 
2 
init AP/DP 
be/fear  5 
happy/nightmares 
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 106) 
  
Two consequences of the structure in (159a) are that (i) only dynamic verbal 
predications are given complex internal structure, and (ii) only dynamic verbal 
predications associate their thematic roles with mutually exclusive positions. 
Both of these points can be brought into focus by a comparison with the structure 
posited for stative predications in (159b). First, statives—in contrast to dynamic verbs—
are uniformly analysed as internally simple: there is only one aspectual head in (159b). 
Second, the subject arguments of stative predicates are introduced in the specifier of that 
head. So when it comes to states, no thematic distinctions are made in the syntax. The 
generalisations regarding the organisation of the thematic roles of dynamic predicates, 
and the differences between adjective classes that have been illustrated in this chapter 
argue against these positions that statives are both uniform and uniformly simple. 
While Ramchand (2008) separates dynamic predicates from stative predicates 
(stative verbs and adjectives), Baker (2003) draws the distinction between verbs and 
adjectives. In his theory of lexical categories, Baker reduces verbs to underlying 
adjectives, as in (160a). A verb is proposed to be an adjective that is originally a 
complement to the standard VP structure. It then conflates with the verbal heads. The 
morphological output of conflation is a verb. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leferman 
 
94 
 
(160) Baker’s Representations of Verbs and Adjectives 
a. Verbs: I donated books to the library 
vP 
2 
  I v’ 
(Agent) 2 
v  VP 
(CAUSE) 2 
books V’ 
(Theme) 2  
V AP 
  (BE) 3 
A PP 
 g  5 
DONATE to the library 
(Goal) 
 
(cf. Baker 2003: 81, ex. (122)) 
b. Adjectives: Chris is hungry 
PredP 
  2 
Chris Pred’ <Th> 
2 
Pred AP 
g 
hungry 
(cf. Baker 2003: 35, ex. (31b)) 
 
Once again, in (160a) verbs are associated with an extended structure that assigns 
thematic roles in particular structural positions: Agent in Spec, v, Theme in Spec, V, 
and Goal in Comp, V. 
This is not the case with adjectives ((160b)). Adjectives are proposed to combine 
with their argument via Pred, which following Chierchia (1985) and Bowers (1993), is a 
function from entities to propositions. 
Unlike verbs, the thematic role assigned to the argument of the adjective is not a 
function of syntactic structure, but of the lexical meaning of the adjective. Thus, the 
angled brackets at the level of Pred’, i.e. <Th(eme)>, indicate that the lexical semantics 
of the adjective hungry transmit the Theme role to the argument in Spec, Pred. Baker 
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speculates that the Agent role is also assigned in this same structural configuration if the 
adjective produces agentive inferences (2003: 36). In other words, the role assigned to 
Spec, Pred is determined directly by lexical semantics—not syntactic structure. So, once 
again, we see the assumptions that the argument structure of verbs is potentially 
complex and thematic roles are associated with specific configurations, while adjectives 
are simple and their thematic roles are syntax independent. 
This divergence, however, is at odds with the motivations that led Baker (2003:77-
88) to reduce verbs to underlying adjectives in the first place. It is well-known that 
many natural languages realise adjectives as stative verbs, e.g. Japanese, Korean, 
Mohawk (cf. Dixon 2004, 2010). The division between the two lexical categories in 
predicative structures seems to be one of morphology rather than syntax, and our results 
thus far support for this conclusion. 
In this connection, the structures proposed by Ramchand in (159a) and Baker in 
(160a) share two characteristics that merit further reflection: (i) they are supposed be 
verbal (Ramchand 2008: 39) and (ii) the meaning of these verbal heads is associated 
with aspectual structure. With respect to this last point, Ramchand associates each head 
with an aspectual predicate and argument, and Baker includes the annotations of 
CAUSE and BE under the syntactic labels. 
Since I am arguing that adjectives have the same range of complexity as verbs, a 
consequence is that the building blocks of argument structure or inner-aspect cannot be, 
strictly speaking, verbal—they have to be general enough that they can apply to both 
verbs and adjectives. Or said differently, in consonance with Ramchand and Baker, in 
(161) I associate these heads directly with the aspectual arguments in (161). But under 
my analysis, these aspectual arguments are unambiguously independent of lexical 
category. 
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(161) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
Thus, building on chapter 1, I am going a step farther than standard assumptions in 
explicitly dissociating lexical category information from inner-aspectual structure. The 
structures in (162) are repeated from chapter 1, where it was independently argued that 
verbs and adjectives have the same range of inner-aspectual complexity.  This line of 
argumentation will be confirmed once more in chapters 3 and 4 where the content of 
these structures is argued to be stative, and not eventive. 
 
(162) Generalised Argument Structures (Adjectives and Verbs) 
a. Lexical Causatives 
   PP 
             2 
         XP          P’ 
                     2 
                    s1          P’ 
                             2 
                           s2           P’ 
                                     2 
                                    P        XP 
b. Type 1 Simple States 
   PP 
               2 
            XP          P’ 
                        2 
                      s1            P’ 
                                 2 
                                P        XP 
c. Type 2 Simple States 
                    PP 
                 2 
              XP          P’ 
                         2 
                        P          s1 
 
This final section presented two proposals that, in different ways, analyse the 
syntax of predicative adjectives as aspectually simpler than that of verbs. In contrast, the 
present proposal is that the complexity illustrated by adjectives parallels that of verbal 
predications. A consequence of this proposed parallelism is that the building blocks of 
argument structure as aspectual structure can no longer be seen as verb specific, but 
category neutral. The syntactic results thus support the semantic argument for the 
parallelism of verbs and adjectives in chapter 1. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I presented data from different predicative adjective classes in order to 
make the case that adjectival structures are of comparable richness to those of verbs, 
and to highlight that in many cases these adjectival structures have verbal correlates.  
Along the way, I have been substantiating my proposal that EAs are stative 
causatives that undergo the causative alternation. We have seen that this hypothesis 
automatically captures a number of syntactic and interpretative facts. Strong evidence 
comes from the cross-linguistic unaccusative nature of EA that-clause data, their 
passive-like structures, their Causer external argument, and the responsibility relation 
holding between the external argument and the CP.  
The principle conclusion that this line of argumentation leads to is that the syntactic 
representation of aspectual structure is category neutral. In the next chapter we turn 
specifically to the diagnosis of adjective inner-aspect. 
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Chapter 3: 
EA Inner-Aspect 
 
3 Introduction 
This chapter continues with the comparison began in chapter 2, now with an eye to the 
aspectual properties of the three adjective classes that take animate subjects, i.e. 
evaluative adjectives (EA), psychological experience adjectives (PA), and 
relational/physical property adjectives (RA). The comparison provides evidence from 
inner-aspect (i.e. lexical aspect) for the three-way split represented by the three 
respective argument structures in (1). 
 
(1) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
Most importantly, this chapter amasses a range of arguments that supports three 
conclusions: EAs are (i) uniformly causative, (ii) uniformly stative, and (iii) they 
uniformly entail the content of a CP—whether it is overt or not. These are crucial 
components to the broader proposal that EAs have the single denotation in (2) and that 
they undergo the causative alternation. The denotation in (2) says that an EA is 
aspectually stative causative. The causal relation partitions the predicate and its 
arguments into a causing-state description and a result-state description. Beaver’s 
(1992) presupposition operator ∂ is included in this version in order to emphasise that 
EAs are factive and therefore entail their CP complement. 
 
(2) Template EA Denotation  (Version 1 of 2) 
║EA║= λs2λs1λx. ∂ q [CAUSE(EA(x, s1), EA(s2, q))] 
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With respect to the uniformity of the denotation and the causative alternation, this 
chapter focuses on this propositional entailment. The status of the external argument in 
unaccusatives is left for chapter 5. 
In chapter 1 we saw that some alternative approaches to EAs invoke the Individual-
Level (IL)/Stage-Level (SL) distinction when analysing (3a) and (3b), respectively. 
 
(3) a. Emma is rude 
b. Emma was rude to leave 
 
The IL/SL distinction is meant to capture a division between transient properties and 
stable ones. And intuitively, it seems to apply to the pair in (3). This chapter will show, 
however, that the IL/SL distinction fundamentally mischaracterises the EA data pattern. 
Section 3.1 introduces some standard diagnostics that classify EAs as IL predicates, 
and provides initial conceptual and empirical arguments that undermine the existence of 
the IL/SL distinction as a formal distinction in the grammar.  
Section 3.2 discusses the notion of temporal dependence as the dividing line 
between IL and SL predicates. Temporal dependency is traditionally represented as the 
existential reading that SL predicates have and IL predicates lack. This section shows 
that EAs are temporally dependent in every tense but the present simple. 
Section 3.3 presents the Davidsonian conception of a spatio-temporal argument, 
and we see that EAs are the only adjective class that qualifies. This is an obstacle both 
for approaches that associate stage-levelhood with an event argument, and for 
approaches that uniformly assign an event argument to all predicates. This is the first 
indication that a deeper investigation of the content of aspectual arguments is needed to 
account for the empirical patterns. 
Section 3.4 shows that—even though EAs pass eventivity tests—they also classify 
unambiguously as states on all their usages. This argues against the position that EAs 
are activities on their temporally dependent, existential reading.
1
 
Two reasons why an activity analysis seems justified are the acceptability of EAs in 
the continuous aspect ((4a)) and their compatibility with intention adverbials ((4b)). 
 
                                                          
1
 In aspectual terms, states are characterised as atelic and durative eventualities, while activities, in 
addition to being atelic and durative, are also dynamic, i.e. they convey a notion of change (e.g. draw, eat, 
push, walk; cf. Kearns 2011: 157-158). Section 3.4 compares states and activities at length. 
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(4) a. Emma was being arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
b. Sam was arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude on purpose 
 
Both of these environments are commonly assumed to entail non-stativity because they 
give rise to an agentive inference with regard to the animate subject. Intuitions aside, we 
will see that non-stativity is not an entailment in either of these cases, and that the 
agentive inference is an implicature. Further, it is shown that agentive inferences cannot 
be used to diagnose inner-aspect. 
Throughout this chapter data will show that agentive inferences can appear with all 
predicate classes that take an animate subject, so EAs are not special in this regard. 
Specifically in the case of EAs however, I suggest that the ubiquity of their agentive 
inference is due to the interaction of two independent factors: a causative structure and 
an animate external argument. 
Section 3.5 begins to make sense of the tension between the results that EAs pass 
both eventivity and stativity tests. I will show that, aspectually, EAs pattern with verbs 
independently classified as stative causative, e.g. gleam, glow, shine, sleep, wait (cf. 
Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2000; Maienborn 2005b).  
Section 3.6 offers alternative explanations for why EAs pattern with IL predicates 
in some environments. These alternatives make use of properties that EAs have 
independently, such as factive presuppositions and a causative structure. With these 
explanations in hand, the argument against EAs as IL predicates, as well as the very 
existence of the IL/SL distinction as a formal distinction, is strong.  
Section 3.7 provides arguments for a single EA denotation that contains a CP 
internal argument ((2)). It also provides arguments against the two other ways of 
approaching the exceptional behaviour of EAs: coercion and “active” be. Once these 
arguments are given, we will have seen far reaching arguments against all available 
alternative EA inner-aspect analyses: (i) against IL/SL/activity ambiguity, (ii) against an 
approach that posits an IL denotation plus a defined coercion operation, and (iii) against 
placing the ambiguity in the copula rather than the adjective, i.e. “active” be. The 
section closes with the positive arguments for a single EA denotation. 
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With a stative causative classification of EAs the evidence for ambiguity dissolves. 
A unified analysis of EAs’ syntactic and aspectual properties is simpler, more 
explanatory, and has greater empirical coverage.
2
 
 
 
3.1 The Individual/Stage Distinction: Initial Concerns  
The IL/SL distinction is commonly conceived of as marking the divide between 
permanent, inherent or otherwise non-accidental properties, on the one hand, and 
temporary ones on the other. EAs are often offered as standard examples of IL 
predicates, and in chapter 1 we saw that it is common to maintain this position, while 
recognising that EAs’ more global behaviour necessitates a SL instantiation, as well.  
In the following sub-sections I first introduce the traditional conception of the 
IL/SL distinction and discuss some of the motivations for giving EAs multiple 
denotations (section 3.1.1). Second, I introduce some traditional diagnostics that 
substantiate the existence of the IL/SL distinction and indicate how they apply to EAs, 
PAs and RAs (section 3.1.2). Third, I discuss a range of general empirical and 
conceptual concerns that belie the distinction itself and constitute a strong argument 
against its existence (section 3.1.3). Section 3.1.4 summarises these preliminary 
conclusions. 
Taken together, these sections make up the first part of an extended sub-argument, 
to be developed throughout this chapter, against the adequacy of the IL/SL distinction 
as a grammatical primitive. Alternative analyses of the data that support an IL analysis 
of EAs in 3.1.2 are given in section 3.6. 
 
 
3.1.1 The Individual/Stage Distinction and Multiple EA Denotations 
Carlson (1977) represents the IL/SL distinction as the difference between predicates that 
contain a stage argument in their lexical entry and those that do not. Examples (5a) and 
(6a) illustrate the contrast between IL and SL predicates with an EA and a PA, 
respectively. The IL denotation in (5b) denotes a set of individuals. The lack of any 
                                                          
2
 Chapter 2 often presented full paradigms in order to show just how uniform EAs are with respect to 
certain phenomena, e.g. factivity, Obligatory Control. In this chapter, in order to build counter-arguments 
against alternative approaches and arguments for the present one, I will focus on the relevant data and set 
aside the presentation of full paradigms. In particular, I set aside EA that-clause data until section 3.3.3, 
where I do return to discussing full paradigms. 
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spatial, temporal or aspectual variable reflects the intuition that IL predicates say 
something about a stable property that an individual generally possesses. 
 
(5) IL Predicate 
a. Mark is stupid 
b. ║stupid║ = λx.stupid(x)   (cf. Carlson 1977: 130, ex. (38a)) 
 
The interpretation of (6a) is different because its most salient reading is not generic, 
but existential, i.e. a relation between the property and an individual at some time. The 
SL entry in (6b) captures this intuition with the addition of the existentially quantified 
stage variable, y. 
 
(6) SL Predicate 
a. Mark is eager 
b. ║eager║ = λ                       (cf. Carlson 1977: 130, ex. (38b)) 
 
A stage is conceived of as a spatially and temporally bound manifestation of 
something (Carlson 1977: 115). The formula in (6b) states that there is a stage y that 
realises an individual x, and that that stage y is a member of set denoted by the 
predicate. SL predicates, then, denote sets of stages.
3
 
In the case of the analysis of EAs, in section 1.3.2 we saw that Stowell (1991) and 
Landau (2009) provide explicit analyses of IL and SL variants, with the SL one framed 
in Davidsonian terms. Their IL representations are repeated in (7a, b) and (8a, b), 
respectively. These representations maintain the idea that the IL variant is a predicate 
denoting a set of individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The more general conception of a stage as a spatially and temporally bound manifestation has been 
assimilated to the Davidsonian statio-temporal event argument (cf. Davidson 1967; Chierchia 1995). This 
is the case even though a Carlsonian stage is not necessarily equivalent to a Davidsonian event argument 
(cf. Kratzer 1995; Higginbotham and Ramchand 1997). For the purpose of direct comparison, I follow the 
standard assumption that the former can be translated into the latter, and discuss it in Davidsonian terms. 
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(7) Stowell’s (1991) EA Argument Structures 
a. John is stupid 
b. IL: [AP John [A’ [A stupid]]] 
c. John was stupid to wash the car 
d. SL: [AP [A’ [EA stupid][AP John [A’ tEA]]] [EVENT to wash the car]] 
(8) Landau’s (2009) EA Denotations 
a. John is rude 
b. IL: ║√rudeI║ = λx.x is rude 
c. John was rude to Mary 
d. SL: ║√rudeS║ = λyλxλe.x is rude to y in e 
 
The (c) examples, however, illustrate that EAs also have natural existential 
interpretations. In order to capture this, the SL variants in (7d) and (8d) include an event 
argument e (which replaces Carlson’s stage variable y). Neither author diagnoses what 
sort of eventuality this event argument introduces. 
Although primarily syntactic, these analyses resonate with the long tradition of 
treating EAs as aspectually polyvalent. The primary motivation for aspectual 
polyvalence is not just that EAs apparently alternate between a generic reading and an 
existential one, but that EAs give rise to agentive inferences. This has led to the 
postulation that, in certain contexts, EAs shift from an IL state to a SL/event usage, 
specifically from an IL state to an activity (cf. Dowty 1979; Fernald 1999; Maienborn 
2005b; Arche 2006, a.o.). So, when it comes to EAs, conclusions reached from syntactic 
and aspectual perspectives point in a similar direction. 
 
 
3.1.2 EAs as Individual-Level Predicates    
While EAs are recognised to have special properties, such as switching from an IL to 
SL reading, or having a subject that seems to be an Agent, there are specific tests that 
motivate an IL analysis. The interpretation of the present simple in English generally 
underwrites our intuitions about how a given adjective should behave with respect to the 
IL/SL distinction. For instance, the predicates in (9) only lend themselves to a generic 
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interpretation in the present simple, and this creates the expectation that they will be IL 
predicates.
4
 
 
(9) Emma is brave/Canadian/tall   (* /Gen) 
 
In comparison those in (10) have both an existential reading on which Emma is 
available, eager or sick now, as well as a generic reading whereby Emma is generally 
available or eager, or chronically ill, and they are expected to test like SL ones. 
 
(10) Emma is available/eager to help/sick  ( /Gen) 
 
Example (9) shows that EAs pattern with relational adjectives and physical properties of 
the RA class, and that they are intuitively read as reflecting IL properties, while (10) 
shows that PAs are naturally classified as SL. 
Three tests that are commonly evoked to support the existence of the IL/SL 
distinction are bare plural subjects, there-insertion, and depictives. These tests make the 
same cut as the present simple. 
The examples of bare plural subjects in (11) show the same interpretative pattern as 
in (9) and (10): SLs have both readings and ILs are restricted to a generic one.   
 
(11) a. UN Peacekeepers are brave/Canadian/tall    (* /Gen) 
b. UN Peacekeepers are available/eager to help/sick  ( /Gen) 
 
In connection with bare plural subjects, Milsark (1974, 1977) observed that the 
operation of there-insertion seems to be dependent on the type of predicate ((12)). 
There-sentences are interpreted existentially and so the expectation is that IL predicates 
will be unacceptable in this environment because they lack a temporally dependent 
reading. SL predicates, in contrast, should be acceptable precisely because they are 
compatible. Taking (11) as the baseline, (12) shows that these expectations are borne 
out: only SL predicates remain grammatical once there occupies the subject position 
((12b)). 
                                                          
4
 The notations to the right of the examples follow common practice in distinguishing SL and IL readings. 
The existential quantifier   is used for the SL reading that follows from existential quantification over the 
stage variable y in a SL denotation ((6b)). The generic quantifier Gen is used as a notational convenience 
to indicate the IL reading that the property is stable or generally true of the holder.   
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(12) a. *There are UN Peacekeepers brave/Canadian/tall 
b. There are UN Peacekeepers available/eager to help/sick 
 
Since IL predicates lack an existential reading, they are correctly predicted to be banned 
from this context, and the resulting sentence is ungrammatical ((12a)). Once again, EAs 
and RAs look like good IL predicates. 
Depictives are another environment that imposes a temporal requirement on the 
interpretation. 
 
(13) a. *Emma arrived brave/Canadian/tall 
b. Emma arrived available/eager to help/sick 
 
The immediate intuition with these structures is that the property denoted by the 
adjoined adjective is interpreted as holding specifically at the time when the main event 
described by the verb occurs. In other words, it must support an existential 
interpretation. Hence, ILs are expected to be ungrammatical and SLs acceptable, as is 
indeed the case in (13). 
Data such as these support the intuition that the conceptual distinction between a 
stable state-of-affairs and a transitory one is grammaticalised. They are also 
representative of the traditional grounds for classifying EAs as IL. In the following 
sections however, we will see conceptual and empirical concerns with this broad binary 
distinction, as well as with the adequacy of an IL classification of EAs. 
 
 
3.1.3 General Concerns with the Distinction 
A first conceptual difficulty with IL predicates is exactly how to define the notion of 
“stable” with respect to intuitions and linguistic diagnostics. For instance, Carlson 
(1977: 122-123) discusses the fact that a door can be open for as long as a balloon is 
big, but open tests like a SL predicate and big like an IL one ((14)).
5
 
                                                          
5
 It should be emphasised that the problem with the notion of stability is a conceptual rather than a 
technical problem for Carlson because IL predicates are defined not with respect to the concepts of 
stability, inherency, or permanency, but simple set membership, as Carlson himself points out (1977: 127; 
131). I am discussing the problems with the conceptual notions of stability versus statio-temporality 
because the IL/SL distinction is consistently framed in these terms and guided by these intuitions. For this 
reason, it is worth indicating these conceptual obstacles now, as even greater empirical problems are 
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(14) a. Ellen saw the door open 
b. *Ellen saw the balloon big 
 
A stronger version of this problem arises when pre-theoretic intuitions about the 
classification of a predicate as IL or SL and the results of the linguistic diagnostics point 
in different directions. In (15) we have an example with predicates denoting relatively 
stable and/or permanent states such as alive and dead that pass the SL test of there-
insertion. 
 
(15) There were five people alive/dead  (cf. Carlson 1977: 122, ex. (80)) 
 
Jager (2001) uses the pair in (16) to make the same point with depictives. Although 
a lifespan tends to last longer than youth, the IL/SL diagnostic has alive and young 
patterning the opposite way round with respect to pre-theoretic expectations. 
 
(16) a. We saw John alive 
b. *We saw John young 
(Jager 2001: 94, ex. (31)) 
 
Data like these show that IL/SL concepts and diagnostics can be both indeterminate and 
at odds. 
McNally (1998) presents another problem in the behaviour of SL predicates. When 
introducing the bare plural data above ((11)), I set aside one detail crucial to the original 
empirical motivation for the IL/SL distinction and what the bare plural subject 
diagnostic is meant to show. In particular, with a SL predicate, rather than just allowing 
an existential interpretation of the sentence as a whole (as I described it above, e.g. UN 
Peacekeepers are available), the bare plural subject is predicted to have a weak 
existential interpretation along the lines of its there-inserted counterpart (i.e. There were 
(some) UN peacekeepers available). As McNally shows with the examples in (17), it 
turns out that SL predicates are not generally so well-behaved with respect to the 
interpretation of their subject. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
introduced throughout this chapter, problems that undermine the idea that a binary lexical distinction is 
sufficient or straightforwardly relevant to the data offered to support it. 
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(17) a. Committee members were bored until the Dean suddenly showed up 
b. Today, people in the office were in a good mood 
(McNally 1998: 298, ex. (8c, d))  
 
While both of the predicates in (17) intuitively denote transitory states and the sentences 
both have existential readings, the bare plural subjects in these examples are not 
interpreted as weakly existential, but rather as referring to all the committee members 
and all the people in the office, respectively. Examples such as these undermine the 
generalisation that originally motivated the IL/SL distinction. 
Furthermore, I add the data in (18) to show that both sentences in (17), while 
seemingly lacking a weak existential subject interpretation, nevertheless undergo there-
insertion. 
 
(18) a. There were committee members bored until the Dean suddenly showed up 
b. Today, there were people in the office in a good mood 
 
These data, together with (15) (e.g. There were five people alive/dead), show that there-
insertion is not directly dependent on either a weak existential interpretation of a bare 
plural subject, or a stable versus transitory intuition about the predicate. 
Facts like those reviewed thus far indicate that something more than a binary 
aspectual classification of predicates is needed to account for the data. A further 
consequence is that the behaviour of EAs and RAs with bare plurals, there-insertion and 
depictives is independent of the distinction, as well.
6
 
Kertz (2006) provided evidence of this for EAs. Stowell (1991) and Landau (2009) 
proposed that EAs come with IL and SL variants. One contrast the variants are designed 
to cover is that of IL intransitive property predication (e.g. Peter is rude) versus the 
cases including a CP, where a SL reading becomes available (e.g. Peter was rude to 
leave). 
Kertz (2006) noticed that this set-up makes clear predictions with respect to 
standard IL/SL diagnostics that are not met. The examples in (19) and (20) show that 
                                                          
6
 In addition to what follows immediately in the main text, section 3.6 partially reproduces Jager’s (2001) 
argument that IL/SL effects cannot be derived solely from the position of the subject (Diesing 1992; 
Kratzer 1995). With this in mind, the focus of this section is the predictions made by the original 
definition of the IL/SL distinction. 
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even when EAs are relativised to the event denoted by the infinitive, they continue to 
pattern with their IL usage ((19a, b) vs. (19c), and (20a, b) vs. (20c)). 
 
(19) a. American consumers are smart    (* /Gen) 
b. American consumers are smart to buy foreign goods  (* /Gen) 
c. American consumers are eager to buy foreign goods ( /Gen) 
(Kertz 2006: 230, ex. (3)-(5)) 
(20) a. *There were lawmakers smart 
b. *There were lawmakers smart to endorse the proposal 
c. There were lawmakers eager to endorse the proposal 
(Kertz 2006: 230, ex. (6)-(8)) 
 
This is a first illustration of multiple denotations not generalising as might be expected: 
whatever is behind EAs alternating between generic and existential interpretations is not 
captured by the standard IL/SL distinction. 
Invoking the distinction is undermined further by the evidence that, more generally, 
the diagnostics appealed to in its support do not pick out unified phenomena. Jager 
(2001) takes three criteria that are supposed to distinguish IL predicates from SL 
predicates, namely (i) allowing a weak existential subject ([±weak subject]), (ii) 
grammaticality in perception reports ([±perception report]) (this diagnostic is discussed 
in more detail in 3.3 below), and (iii) classifying the predicate as stable or transitory 
([±transitory]). This creates eight logical combinations to characterise aspectual 
differences. However, if the IL/SL distinction were a real primitive, predicates should 
pattern uniformly as either IL or SL, meaning that only two of the eight combinations 
should be realised. 
Instead, Jager finds predicates to exemplify each of the eight. Examples (21) and 
(22) illustrate two of them. These two examples show how predicates that should 
pattern together as SL fail to do so. 
 
(21) a. People shouted    (weak existential reading possible) 
b. We heard people shout 
c. After the victory, the fans shouted 
(cf. Jager 2001: 97, ex. (36)) 
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(22) a. Firemen are present    (weak existential reading possible) 
b. *We saw Peter (be) present 
c. Peter was present yesterday 
       (cf. Jager 2001: 97, ex. (40)) 
 
Examples (21a) and (22a) have the predicted [+weak subject] reading and they both 
satisfy intuitions that they be [+transitory] ((21c), (22c)). Yet, they are also expected to 
both be [+perception report], but only (21b) is grammatical. 
The fact that predicates can be found for each of the eight combinations shows that 
the diagnostics are logically independent of each other. So, they do not provide support 
for the existence of the IL/SL distinction. 
 
 
3.1.4 Interim Conclusions  
This section first presented the original conception of the IL/SL distinction and 
examples of analyses that give EAs multiple denotations. Then we saw data that 
supported the traditional classification of EAs as IL. In those contexts, EAs patterned 
with RAs, which denote rather stable properties and are clearly distinguishable from SL 
predicates. I then illustrated the interrelation of general conceptual obstacles and data 
that undermine the explanatory power of the IL/SL distinction.  
What we found was that (i) the diagnostics that motivated the original distinction 
are independent of each other and that (ii) positing IL and SL lexical entries for EAs 
makes the wrong empirical predictions. This combination makes both the general case 
against the IL/SL distinction as a formal distinction, and the specific case against IL/SL 
EA denotations strong. 
Throughout this chapter we will see more detailed evidence against the adequacy of 
the distinction. Even though I am arguing against the formal existence of the distinction, 
the next sections will show that EAs generally do meet the basic criterion for stage-
levelhood: having temporally dependent readings. This is the first step in undermining 
an IL analysis of them. 
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3.2 Predicative Adjectives and Temporal Dependence 
The classic characterisation of the IL/SL distinction is in terms of sets of individuals 
versus sets of spatio-temporal units. The fundamental characteristic that distinguishes 
the two categories is that SL predicates, as manifestations of spatio-temporal units, 
consume time in a way that properties of individuals (i.e. IL predicates) do not (cf. 
Carlson 1977: 115, 427; Kertz 2010: 281). 
Interpreting the examples in (23) on an existential reading brings the intuition into 
focus. Example (23a), with a traditional SL predicate such as sick, has an immediate 
existential reading. 
 
(23) a. Peter was sick 
b. Peter has been sick 
 
In (23b), when the tense is changed to the present perfect, sick straightforwardly 
supports a reading on which the property is interpreted as holding for a restricted length 
of time, and in this sense occupies it or consumes it. A predicate’s ability to do so is the 
hallmark of the SL intuition. 
The examples in (24) illustrate how IL predicates fail in this regard.
7
 Example (24a) 
is most naturally interpreted generically (i.e. not with respect to a single spatio-temporal 
occurrence). In contrast to (23a), the simple past is frequently described as giving rise to 
a lifetime effect. The lifetime effect is an implicature that arises in a past tense: since a 
past tense is used, the IL property no longer holds of the subject and therefore, the 
subject must be dead (cf. Krazter 1995; Musan 1997). While this is indeed only an 
implicature in (24a), its prominence marks a difference with (23a), which does not give 
rise to a lifetime effect in a neutral context. 
 
(24) a. Emma was tall 
b. #Emma has been tall 
 
                                                          
7
 Throughout tall is used for illustrative purposes in this aspectual comparison because it behaves as an IL 
predicate should, which keeps the comparison as clear as possible. It is true that other IL predicates 
denoting physical attributes give rise to intuitions that may not be exactly like tall (cf. fat, skinny). This 
will ultimately be unimportant because the IL/SL distinction is epiphenomenal in the theory that this 
thesis builds up. Chapter 4 returns to the intuition behind the distinction.
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In consonance with the lifetime effect intuition, example (24b) shows that the present 
perfect is pragmatically marked. What is lacking here is precisely a restricted existential 
reading. 
Note that example (24b) is possible in a setting that supports a quantitative reading 
such as “there have been contexts in which Peter has qualified as tall”, e.g. Peter has 
been tall on many occasions. But when compared with (23b), we see that what is 
missing is the intuition of temporal duration with respect to a stage. 
Of course, sick can also give rise to a lifetime effect in the proper context, and it can 
also have a quantitative reading (e.g. Emma has been sick on many occasions); the point 
illustrated by the contrast between (23) and (24) is rather that IL predicates do not lend 
themselves to temporal dependency. 
Turning to EAs, although the classic tests introduced in section 3.1.2 support their 
classification as IL predicates, it is nevertheless the case that EAs are easily interpreted 
as temporally restricted in many contexts, parallel to sick above.  
Martin (2008) illustrates for French that EAs are naturally understood to hold only 
for a restricted period of time in tenses other than the present simple. In (25a), the 
property of being selfish is understood to hold with respect to the music playing, just as 
the SL predicate drunk is in (25b), while IL predicates ((25c)) are infelicitous when 
interpreted temporally with respect to an event.
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Martin (2008: 114) makes the point that in French intelligent has no difficulty in getting temporal 
interpretations ((i), (ii)). This could be viewed as controversial because intelligent is often used as the 
paradigmatic example of an IL predicate. The line of argumentation I am pursuing supports Martin’s 
observation. In section 3.7.4.2 I discuss intelligent and its place in the EA class.    
 
(i) Jenny a joué de la musique klezmer hier. Elle a été intelligente  (cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (4)) 
(ii) Quand Jenny est intelligente, elle est vraiment intelligente (cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (9)) 
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(25) French 
a. Jenny n’a joué que du Fauré hier. Elle a été égoïste 
    ‘Jenny didn’t play anything but Fauré yesterday. She was selfish’ 
(cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (5)) 
b. Jenny a joué de la musique klezmer hier. Elle était saoule. 
    ‘Jenny played Klezmer music yesterday. She was drunk’ 
(cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (4)) 
c. #Jenny a joué de la musique klezmer hier. Elle était/a été talentueuse 
     ‘Jenny played Klezmer music yesterday. She was talented’ 
(cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (6)) 
 
English shows the same pattern. In (26a, b), superficially intransitive predications 
of EAs and PAs behave like the SL predicate sick in allowing a temporally restricted 
existential reading in a variety of tenses. 
 
(26) a. Peter was/has been/will be brave/rude/selfish  ( ) 
b. Peter was/has been/will be eager/sick/willing  ( ) 
c. Peter was/has been/will be Canadian/old/tall  ((#) ) 
 
In the case of the RAs ((26c)), this interpretation is not so evident, as discussed above. 
This simple test of temporal duration speaks directly against an IL analysis of these 
monadic EA predications. 
The EA existential reading is brought out again in the examples in (27), drawn from 
a variety of on-line sources. They demonstrate, in a way similar to Martin’s in (25), that 
this reading is apparent when a situation is provided by way of an overt infinitive. In 
these examples the property denoted by the adjective is understood as holding in time in 
relation to the embedded infinitive.
9
 
                                                          
9
 I have found direct independent spontaneous judgements that support this temporal duration intuition in 
comments from an on-line language forum. The thread begins with a question from a foreign speaker 
about the possibility of using the present perfect continuous with an adjective; specifically I have been 
being rude. The thread devolves into a discussion about the relative frequency of the tense itself. This 
causes the user Kalamazoo, a self-identified native English speaker, to make the comments below. These 
comments explicitly state that the tense is grammatical with EAs and that it has the meaning of temporal 
duration. Since the discussion uses examples with EAs, there can be little doubt that EAs do have 
temporally dependent readings. 
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(27) a. Danielle has been stupid to trust him after everything he has done to her 
b. I agree Afellay has been silly to stay there though             
c. She has been foolish to believe the tittle-tattle that has reached her—very 
foolish to oblige me to give you this annoyance            
d. If Peking has known that outside support was crucial to fomenting insurgency, 
then it has been foolish to voice so much endorsement while supplying so little 
support 
e. Part of the strategy is to try to enable amplified usage of the capacity, so it has 
been intelligent to bring prices down by at least 80% since the market 
combined            
f. she has seen enough in her lifetime and has been brave to just hang on as long 
as she has.....         
 
The parallelism between the intransitive example in (26a) and the transitive examples in 
(27) shows that the presence of the infinitive is irrelevant to a temporally dependent 
interpretation of EAs (cf. Stowell 1991; Landau 2009). 
Now, this EA existential reading and its implications for classifying EAs as IL 
predicates has been noticed when considering sentences such as (28a) (cf. Dowty 1979). 
This example does not produce the logical contradiction that a property analysis of IL 
predicates predicts. Cross-linguistically ((29), (30)), EAs pattern with SL predicates 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(i) Kalamazoo: I don't see any problem with "I have been being rude" - sitting here and just talking 
about myself and not helping you/by not paying any attention to your other guests/by ignoring 
your requests/blah blah - "and I apologize." 
(ii) K: Again, I think "I have been being rude" is perfectly fine and something I would definitely say if 
I felt I had been being rude to someone all afternoon (not of course, that I am ever that rude :-)). 
But I think it is perfectly okay to say in normal conversation. 
(iii) K: Not to beat a dead horse, but I would say "I have been sitting here all afternoon and just 
realized that I have been being rude, because I have just been talking about myself and ignoring 
you" All three "have been ...ing" are the same to me. 
(iv) K: These are perfectly normal English tenses and I don't see why [another user] rejects them, as 
they are not infrequently used. "I realized that I had been being too stubborn" is different from "I 
had been too stubborn" in that it suggests that I was repeatedly too stubborn or too stubborn over a 
longer period of time, as opposed to one occasion. 
Here's something from Google that shows this is a perfectly normal idiomatic usage: 
My ex bf and I 19 & 20 had been together 7 years, 2 of which we were engaged. ... But we talked 
about it and he changed his mind, or so he told me. Now up until he had decided to stay, I had 
been being overly clingy. 
(v) K: The use of "have been being X" specifically implies that you were not X at just one time but 
that you were X over a longer period of time or repeatedly. That's the point of the construction! 
How do I indicate that I was being rude repeatedly for several hours, days, weeks or months, as 
opposed to one rude action or statement? This is the construction. It's perfectly idiomatic and not 
that infrequent. 
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((28b)) in allowing a restricted temporal reading that obviates the straightforward 
contraction of the form (P(j) & ¬P(j)). 
 
(28) a. Peter isn’t brave, but he was brave last night 
b. Peter isn’t available (to work)/eager to help/sick (now), but he was last night 
c. #Peter isn’t Canadian/old/tall, but he was Canadian/old/tall last night 
(29) Basque  
Jon ez da barregarria, baina barregarri dago         
  ‘John is not funny, but he is being funny’    
(30) Spanish 
Pablo no es nada gracioso, pero está muy gracioso 
Pablo not ser-PRES at-all funny, but estar-PRES very funny 
‘Paul is not funny, but he is being funny’ 
(cf. Arche 2006: 20, ex. (52)) 
 
RAs, in (28c), are noticeably different from EAs, PAs, and SL predicates more 
generally, because they do behave as an individual-property analysis of IL predicates 
predicts in giving rise to the expected contradiction. For instance, if one’s nationality is 
a matter of where one was born or one’s heritage/identity, then it does not change from 
one moment to the next (or ever), hence the contradiction.
10
 
As for physical attribute predicates such as tall, if it is felicitous in (28c), it is on a 
reading where what is being adjusted is the relevant comparison class and contextual 
threshold for height. Example (28c) does not mean that a state of tallness/degree of 
height suddenly held of Peter for a delimited period of time—it is the standard that has 
changed, not his height. 
This is different from the interpretation in (28a, b), where a state of bravery, 
eagerness, and availability are read temporally: the standards for bravery, eagerness, and 
availability are held constant, but the relevant situation with respect to which the 
property holds comes and goes. Thus with tall as well, either we have our contradiction, 
or we play with a parameter of the meaning of the predicate, but that parameter is not 
related to the consumption of time. 
                                                          
10
 There is another possible reading of the nationality predicate in (28c) on which citizenship is addressed 
as a legal matter, and one’s status can change in time. In this case, though, holding a citizenship is still not 
spatio-temporal because it is a property defined over a stretch of time, and not a location. 
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Two additional environments that have been proposed to pick up on the distinction 
between SL predicates as temporally dependent versus IL predicates as properties of 
individuals are when-clauses and episodic adverbs. EAs again group with PAs and other 
SLs ((31a, b)), to the exclusion of RAs ((31c)). This pattern has been presented 
independently by Arche (2006) for Spanish ((32)) and Martin (2008) for French ((33)). 
 
(31) a. When Peter is cruel, he is really cruel  
b. When Peter is eager/sick, he is really eager/sick  
c. #When Peter is Canadian/old/tall, he is really Canadian/old/tall 
(32) Spanish 
a. Siempre que Juan es cruel, se arrepiente después 
    whenever Juan ser-PRES cruel, he regrets right-after 
    ‘Whenever John is cruel, he regrets it right after’ 
(cf. Arche 2006: 30, ex. (78)) 
b. Siempre que Juan está descontento con su trabajo, se enfada 
    whenever Juan estar-PRES dissatisfied with his work, gets angry 
    ‘Whenever John is dissatisfied with his work, he gets angry’      
(cf. Arche 2006: 30, ex. (79)) 
c. #Siempre que Juan es esquimal…11 
    whenever Juan ser-PRES Eskimo… 
    ‘Whenever John is Eskimo…’    (cf. Arche 2006: 30, ex. (88)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Arche notes that, when the appropriate context is supplied, RAs/ILs can appear in when-clauses ((i)). 
The kind of scenario that is required, however, only highlights the differences between the classes of 
adjective and emphasises the lifetime effect intuition. EAs and PAs/SLs have straightforward temporally 
dependent readings ((32a, b)). But (i) shows that this is not the case for RAs/ILs: they require contextual 
information to accommodate exceptional or longer stretches of time. 
 
(i) (En todas sus reencarnaciones,) siempre que Juan es esquimal, lleva una vida llena de dificultades 
y penurias 
‘(In all of his reincarnations,) whenever John is Eskimo, he bears a life full of difficulties and 
shortages’       (Spanish, cf. Arche 2006: 30, ex. (89)  
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(33) French 
a. Quand Jenny est égoïste, je ne l’aime pas 
    ‘When Jenny is selfish, I don’t like her’          (cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (8)) 
b. Quand Jenny est saoule, je ne l’aime pas 
    ‘When Jenny is drunk, I don’t like her’         (cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (8)) 
c. #Quand Jenny est talentueuse, elle est énervante 
    ‘When Jenny is talented, she is annoying’         (cf. Martin 2008: 113, ex. (10)) 
 
The infelicity of IL predicates in when-clauses is proposed to follow from the 
combination of a spatio-temporal versus a property analysis of SL and IL predicates, 
respectively, together with a ban on vacuous quantification (cf. Kratzer 1995).  
The examples in (34) and (35) mirror the adjectival ones above ((31)-(33)). On 
Kratzer’s analysis, speak, as a SL predicate, introduces a spatio-temporal variable l for 
the quantificational force of when (represented by always in (34b)) to bind. 
 
(34) a. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well 
b. Alwaysl[speaks(Mary, French, l)] [speaks-well(Mary, French, l)] 
(Kratzer 1995: 129-130, ex. (15d), (15’d)) 
 
IL predicates ((35)), as properties of individuals, do not introduce a spatio-temporal 
variable, and if there is no other variable available in the scope of when, 
ungrammaticality results because when has been applied vacuously. 
 
(35) a. *When Mary knows French, she knows it well 
b. *Alwaysl[knows(Mary, French)] [knows-well(Mary, French)] 
(Kratzer 1995: 129-130, ex. (15a), (15’a)) 
 
By this measure, the data in (31)-(33) are consistent with all the data presented in this 
section in making EAs perfectly good SL predicates. 
This analysis of when-clauses creates the expectation that the overt use of episodic 
adverbs such as always, often and sometimes should produce the same SL effects. The 
examples in (36) show that these adverbs do seem to separate predicates with existential 
realisations from properties. But once more, EAs fall with SL predicates ((36a, b)), to 
the detriment of an IL classification ((36c)). 
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(36) a. Peter is always/often/sometimes brave/cruel/nice  
b. Peter is always/often/sometimes available/eager to help/sick 
c. #Peter is always/often/sometimes Canadian/old/tall 
 
Temporal dependency is the proposed dividing line between IL and SL predicates. 
In this section we have seen that cross-linguistically, contrary to expectations, EAs 
consistently pattern with PAs in having temporally restricted existential readings and in 
not producing lifetime effects. RAs, on the other hand, are representative of how IL 
predicates are expected to behave. The regularity of the EA temporal reading casts 
serious doubt on the usefulness and the generality of an IL classification. 
One further reason for this is that, as argued above in section 3.1.3, it is far from 
clear that, as diagnostics, the traditional IL/SL tests (i.e. bare plurals, there-insertion, 
depictives) form a natural class that is sensitive to precisely this distinction. In contrast, 
diagnosing temporal dependency can be done without introducing confounding factors 
related to the semantic properties of subjects (i.e. bare plurals, there-insertion) or 
secondary predication (i.e. depictives). 
The conclusions offered from this section are (i) RAs are aspectually 
distinguishable from EAs and PAs, and (ii) EAs and PAs meet the criteria for temporal 
dependency. By the original characterisation of the IL/SL distinction this means that 
both EAs and PAs are SL predicates. In the next section I scrutinise the definition of SL 
as “spatio-temporal”. It will be shown that only EAs meet this two pronged standard, 
while PAs are only temporal. 
Once this aspectual distinction between EAs and PAs is made, we are in a position 
to see a three-way classification that I will propose is reflected in the three argument 
structures defended in chapter 2, repeated here in (37): (seemingly) spatio-temporal (i.e. 
eventive) adjectives ((37a)), temporally restricted adjectives ((37b)), and temporally 
unrestricted adjectives ((37c)). 
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(37) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
 
3.3 EAs and Eventivity 
Since Davidson (1967) proposed that action denoting sentences such as Jones buttered 
the toast come with an extra argument position for a spatio-temporal event variable, the 
assumption of sub-atomic predicate structure is a common one. This assumption is often 
extended beyond Davidson’s original conception to include stative predicates. 
Maienborn (2005b, 2007, a. o.) argues that, in the case of statives, this extension is not 
always justified by the facts: while some statives do satisfy the criteria for eventivity, 
others only provide evidence for being defined temporally, but not spatially. So, not 
every predicate can be innocuously given a Davidsonian analysis. 
The Davidsonian event argument, as a spatio-temporal entity, is associated with 
diagnostics that support its existence. A Davidsonian analysis supposes that the 
eventuality described by the predicate is perceptible, located in both space and time, and 
that it can vary in the way it is manifested (Maienborn 2005b, 2007). The standard 
diagnostics are the following: 
 
(38) Linguistic Diagnostics for Eventualities  
a. Eventuality expressions can serve as infinitival complements of perception 
verbs. 
b. Eventuality expressions combine with locative and temporal modifiers. 
c. Eventuality expressions combine with manner adverbials, instrumentals, 
comitatives, etc. 
(Maienborn 2005b: 280, ex. (3)) 
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These diagnostics provide fundamental support for the presence of an event 
argument in dynamic predicates. But as Maienborn shows for verbs, statives do not 
behave uniformly: there are stative verbs that test positive for eventivity and statives 
that do not. Maienborn calls this latter group Kimian-States: 
 
(39) K(imian)-States 
K-States are abstract objects for the exemplification of a property at a holder x 
and at a time t.     (Maienborn 2007: 113, ex. (7)) 
 
In my view, Maienborn correctly argues that generalising a Davidsonian analysis to 
predicates that fail to be located in space nullifies the definition of an event argument 
and the relevance of the supporting diagnostics. We will see below that some of the 
received paradigmatic SL predicates such as sick and available only satisfy the 
requirements of a Kimian-State. Furthermore, PAs are immediately identifiable as 
Kimian-States, while EAs are the only class that meet the spatio-temporal threshold. 
Overall, this shows two things: 
 
(i) EAs do not behave as either RAs/IL predicates or PAs.  
(ii) The Carlsonian definition of a SL predicate needs refining.  
 
The second point addresses the fact that diagnostics for the Carlsonian stage do not 
target spatio-temporality specifically—in contrast with the tests developed to support a 
Davidsonian analysis, which arguably do. 
 
 
3.3.1 Stative Verbs and Eventivity 
First, let’s see how different stative verbs fare with respect to event diagnostics. The 
examples in (40) illustrate a three-way split in the perception report test. In (40a), the 
eventuality described by the verb gleam passes the test in German and English,
12
 but a 
psychological verb, such as hate ((40b)), and an IL one, such as resemble ((40c)), do 
not. 
 
                                                          
12
 Other verbs classified with gleam are lie, sit, sleep, stand, and wait. Stative eventivity is derived from 
stative causation in chapter 1 and in section 3.5. 
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(40) German 
a. Ich sah die Schuhe glänzen 
    ‘I saw the shoes gleam’   (Maienborn 2007: 110, ex. (4c)) 
b. 
??
Ich    sah Peter die Schuhe hassen 
        I     saw Peter the shoes   hate-INF 
    ‘I saw Peter hate the shoes’ 
c. *Ich sah meine Tante Romy Schneider ähneln 
     ‘I saw my aunt resemble Romy Schneider’ (cf. Maienborn 2007: 110, ex. (4g)) 
 
Some comments on the data are in order. First, in this section I follow Maienborn in 
concluding verbs such as gleam to be stative eventive. In section 3.5 arguments are 
presented supporting this position. For the moment it is assumed that the three-way 
comparison in (40) is between stative predicates. So, example (40a) shows that there is 
a class of stative verbs that passes the perception report test because it is defined both 
spatially and temporally. 
Second, in (40b) I am only interested in the experiencer reading of hate, not one 
that attributes actions to Peter that are indicative of hatred. On an experiencer reading, 
(40b) is odd in both German and English. This clarification is relevant because this 
psychological verb is meant to be comparable with stative PA/SL adjectives, such as 
eager, hungry, nervous or sick, which primarily describe experiences or feelings, but 
can also imply demeanors or actions that betray those states. I take it that predicates 
such as these denote experiencer-states and any associated agentive-events are 
implicatures. 
Third, in (40c) the IL predicate resemble is ungrammatical because the resemblance 
relation holding between Romy and the aunt is not something that holds only at the time 
of the seeing event. Therefore, stative SL verbs such as hate fail the test because they 
refer to internal psychological properties that are not directly accessible to perception; 
and IL verbs such as resemble fail it because, although clearly perceptible in many 
cases, they last longer than the temporal contour of an occasion of perceiving 
something, and thus are not event denoting. 
The second test using locative modifiers confirms the three-way classification. The 
verb gleam is once again fine ((41a)), but hate ((41b)) and weigh ((41c)), in the sense 
incumbent upon a Davidsonian event, are not. The gleaming event is understood to 
occur in a time and place which individuate a particular instance of such an occurrence. 
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(41) German 
a. Die Perlen glänzen in ihrem Haar 
   ‘The pearls gleam in her hair’  (Maienborn 2007: 110, ex. (5a)) 
b. 
??
Peter   hasst die Perlen in seinem Büro  
       Peter hates  the pearls  in   his    office 
    ‘Peter hates the pearls in his office’ 
c. *Die Tomaten wiegen neben den Paprikas 1 Kg. 
    ‘The tomatoes weigh 1 kg. beside the paprikas’ 
(cf. Maienborn 2007: 111, ex. (5f)) 
 
In (41b), we are only interested in the reading on which hate is modified by the 
locative PP, and not in the locative modification of the pearls (which is, of course, 
grammatical). The predicate hate fails the test because the predicate is not defined 
spatially, and so the locative cannot restrict it in this way. If anything, what (41b) says is 
that there is some overlap between a slice of time in which Peter hated the pearls and 
one in which he is in his office, but these space/time dimensions are not meaningfully 
linked. 
This point is made clearer by a direct comparison of (41a) with (41b). Only the 
former meets the requirements of a Davidsonian event. The occurrence of a gleam is 
identified by the interconnection of its space-time coordinates. This is exactly what it 
means to possess a Davidsonian event variable. Experiencing a state of hatred, however, 
does not make any spatial demands, although the time that the state holds overlaps with 
wherever the subject happens to be located. In this sense, the locative modifier in (41b) 
is not properly individuating the state of hatred, and thus the verb fails the test for 
Davidsonian eventivity.
13
 In turn, (41c) is odd because the weight of the tomatoes is not 
generally defined or determined by their location. 
                                                          
13
 Concerning examples such as Leonard (always) worries at the hospital, where it seems that the 
worrying is localised by the PP, it is not doing so in a Davidsonian fashion. Its interpretation is something 
like ‘the hospital provokes a state of worry in Leonard’ or ‘whenever Leonard is at the hospital, he 
worries’. A Davidsonian locative, e.g. Julia ate an apple in the kitchen, clearly is not (necessarily) 
interpreted as ‘the kitchen provoked an event of eating an apple in Julia’ or ‘whenever Julia is in the 
kitchen, she eats an apple’. The failure of the locative to individuate the occurrence of the state (but 
instead imply other interpretations) supports the conclusion that predicates of psychological experience 
are not Davidsonian.  
More generally, when testing inner-aspect it is important test on an existential interpretation because 
generic/universal quantification introduces a broader restrictor over times that allows for the expression of 
generalisations that may involve locations, e.g. Leonard always worries at the hospital, but this does not 
make inner-aspect of the predicate itself spatio-temporal (section 4.2.2.5.2).
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The examples in (42) show that the same three-way classification reveals itself in 
the results of adding event modifiers such as manner adverbs. Since only (42a) passes 
the test, it is the only one that supports a Davidsonian analysis. 
(42) German 
a. Die Perlen glänzen matt/rötlich/feucht 
    ‘The pearls gleam dully/reddishly/moistly’       (Maienborn 2007: 112, ex. (6c)) 
b. 
??
Peter hasst die Perlen wütend/intelligent 
      Peter hates the pearls furious/intelligent  
    ‘Peter hates the pearls angrily/intelligently’ 
c. *Bardo besitzt sparsam/spendable viel Geld 
    ‘Bardo owns thriftily/generously much money’  
(Maienborn 2007: 112, ex. (6g)) 
 
In conclusion, these three tests show that among verbs, there is evidence for three 
different types of statives, and only one of them is properly analysed as Davidsonian. 
 
 
3.3.2 Adjectives and Eventivity 
I replicate last section’s three-way classification in adjectives in the way we might 
expect by now: only EAs pass the eventivity tests. 
 
 
3.3.2.1 EAs and Perception Reports 
In (43), only EAs appear naturally with a bare infinitive.   
   
(43) a. Mary saw/heard Jane be polite   (cf. Rothstein 1999: 351, ex. (13b)) 
b. *I saw Emma be eager/nervous/available/sick 
c. *I saw Emma be Canadian/tall 
 
It is important to recall that the proper test for an event argument here has traditionally 
been a bare infinitive ((44a) vs. (44b)) (cf. Higginbotham 1983).  
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(44) a. Emma saw Peter cry 
b. *Emma saw Peter to cry 
 
When it comes to adjectives, I follow Katz (2000) and Maienborn (2005b) in 
viewing the bare adjective structures in (45a) and (46a) as correctly analysed as 
depictives. Therefore, the ungrammaticality of (45a) is not an argument against the 
eventivity of EAs, and the grammaticality of (46a) is not an argument in favour of the 
spatio-temporality of SL predicates such as naked. 
 
(45) a. *Mary saw/heard Jane polite 
b. *Mary saw/heard Jane to be polite  (cf. Rothstein 1999: 351, ex. (13)) 
(46) a. Emma saw Peter naked 
b. *Emma saw Peter be naked 
 
Rather, the ungrammaticality of (45a) follows from the general ungrammaticality of 
EAs in depictives (section 3.1.2), and the grammaticality of (46a) follows from the 
general grammaticality of the adjective naked as a depictive. Following the reasoning 
here, the true test for eventivity is (46b)—where the bare infinitive is overt—and its 
ungrammaticality confirms that naked is not spatio-temporal.
14
 
                                                          
14 To mention just one empirical point that supports a depictive analysis of naked in (46a), notice that in 
(i) sad can be interpreted as modifying either the subject or the object. 
 
(i) a. Johnj left Mary sadj 
b. John left Marym sadm 
(Geuder 2004: 131, ex. (1)) 
 
This is not true of genuine complement structures, but it is the case with depictives when either 
interpretation is plausible. 
Furthermore, the ungrammaticality of (45b) (i.e *Mary saw/heard Jane to be polite) parallels (44b) 
(i.e. *Emma saw Peter to cry), where the inclusion of the particle to signals a structure larger than a bare 
infinitive, and plausibly violates the selection requirements of the perception predicate. 
On the other hand, the appearance of be in (43a) (i.e. Mary saw/heard Jane be polite) can be 
analysed as the spell-out of the aspectual structure above the adjective when the extended projection of 
the adjective is in complement position, as it is in a perception report. 
The difference between complement position and adjunct position generally affects the 
materialisation of be. Be cannot appear in depictives, and depictives are adjuncts; but bare be, or the full 
infinitive to be appear only when the adjective is in complement position. Perception reports are an 
example of the matrix predicate selecting bare be; the verbs allow and cause are examples of verbs that 
select a full infinitive, e.g. Mary caused/allowed Jane to be polite (cf. Rothstein 1999). We return to the 
spell-out of be in section 4.2.2.5.1. 
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This shows that EAs are the only adjective class to appear grammatically with just a 
bare infinitive, parallel to (44a) (i.e. Emma saw Peter cry), and against the other 
combinations in (45)-(46). Therefore, EAs are the only adjective class to pass the 
perception report test for eventivity. 
 
 
3.3.2.2 EAs and Locative Modifiers  
The locative test follows the same pattern as (43). In (47a), the EAs are meaningfully 
individuated by the locative, but this is not the case with PAs/SLs ((47b)) or RAs/ILs 
((47c)). 
 
(47) a. Peter was arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude (to his father) in the kitchen 
b. #Peter was eager/nervous/available/sick in the bathroom 
c. #Peter was Canadian/old/tall in the garden 
 
 
3.3.2.3 EAs and Manner Adverbs 
Lastly, EAs are the only adjectives that can be modified by manner adverbs on a spatio-
temporal interpretation without a shift in meaning: 
 
(48) a. Peter was elegantly modest at the reception last night, but Felix was abrasively 
arrogant  
b. [A]nd afterward she had only pretended to be eagerly obedient to her mother’s 
command by running up to her room [...]  (Ian McEwan, Atonement)  
c. The captain did as he was asked, and Carr thanked him politely—Carr had been 
annoyingly polite throughout the entire discussion—then hung up 
(Jeff Rovin, Tempest Down) 
 
With other adjectives this is not the case. In (49a), if a felicitous reading can be 
given to the various PAs/SL predicates, they are no longer interpreted as psychological 
or as an experiential state. Rather, they are supplemented with an agentive inference 
regarding the subject’s behavior. This is however, an inference induced by the manner 
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adverb, and not a inherent interpretative property of the adjectives themselves (cf. 
discussion of hate in section 3.3.1). 
 
(49) a. #Emma was elegantly eager/nervous/available/sick 
b. #Peter was elegantly Canadian/old/tall 
 
On the other hand in (49b), as discussed above, if a reading can be given to the modified 
RAs, it is not one that identifies a spatio-temporal occurrence of the property. For 
example, someone might be described as elegantly tall, but what is being referred to is 
the individual’s proportions, stature, or posture—not an elegant event of height. So once 
again, EAs alone pass the test for spatio-temporality. 
 
 
3.3.2.4 Interim Conclusions 
In the preceding sub-sections I have taken the strict conception of a Davidsonian event 
and applied it to the three classes of adjective that we have been comparing and found 
evidence for the same three-way split that is present in verbs. The important result is 
that EAs—and only EAs—meet the criteria for eventivity. 
Consequences of these findings are that the Carlsonian stage is too broad because it 
does not distinguish between the spatio-temporal and the temporal. Likewise, a 
straightforward Davidsonian interpretation of the IL/SL distinction fails to properly 
characterise the facts. Positing that standard SL adjectives such as sick and available 
possess their existential properties because of a spatio-temporal argument is too strong: 
these predicates are only defined temporally, and consistently underspecified for 
location. In this regard, sick, available, and PAs pattern like Kimian-States. 
EAs, however, do qualify for Davidsonian eventivity. Adding this result to the 
evidence for their having temporal duration and the list of causative properties brought 
forth in chapter 2, EAs are distinguishable from other adjectives. 
And we now have a clear three-way aspectual classification between EAs (spatio-
temporal adjectives), PAs (temporally restricted adjectives), and RAs (temporally 
unrestricted adjectives). 
Having established that EAs are unique in passing tests for eventivity, section 3.4 
shows EAs are always stative, and that they never alternate between stative and activity 
Chapter 3 
127 
 
readings. Then in section 3.5, we will move to the topic of stative causation and resolve 
this conceptual tension by deriving eventivity. But first, some comments on noise in the 
data pattern are in order. 
 
 
3.3.3 EAs: the Need for an Indirect Proof of a Single Denotation 
In chapter 2 I frequently presented full paradigms of EA data to show that EA behaviour 
is best accounted for with a single denotation. Since the behaviour of EAs was uniform 
across whole syntactic paradigms, an extensional presentation of the data was effective. 
Examples of EA cross-paradigm uniformity are factivity, Obligatory Control, and the 
complement status of the CP. 
In this chapter, I have broken with the model of presenting full paradigms. There 
are two reasons for this. The first is that it is possible to present counter-evidence 
against alternative analyses that posit multiple denotations without full paradigms. 
The second reason is that an extensional presentation of paradigms no longer gives 
transparent results. A closer look at EA manner adverb data provides an example. The 
manner adverb data in (47) are intransitive with an animate subject (repeated as the (a) 
examples in (50)-(52)). These data support a spatio-temporal analysis.  
The additional examples in (50)-(52) complete the EA manner adverb paradigm. 
The (b) and (c) examples have overt infinitives, and they parallel the intransitive (a) 
examples in passing the manner adverb test. The (d) examples however, have that-
clauses and they are deviant to different degrees. This judgement cline seems to argue 
against a unified EA denotation because sometimes EAs behave like they are eventive, 
other times it seems they do not. 
 
(50) a. Why should I have consulted you, when you were being obnoxiously stubborn 
   about the issue?    (Barbara Pierce, Sinful between the Sheets)  
b. He was obnoxiously stubborn to refuse 
c. It was obnoxiously stubborn (of him) to refuse 
d. 
??
It was obnoxiously stubborn that he refused 
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(51) a. She is viciously arrogant in her treatment to her inferiors […]  (Internet) 
b. If it had an impact, surely A[ir] F[rance] would be silly and viciously arrogant 
to think they can do nothing and expect it to go away.   (cf. Internet) 
c.  It would be viciously arrogant of AF to think they can do nothing and expect it 
to go away. 
d. 
?
It was viciously arrogant that AF thought that they could do nothing and 
expect it to go away. 
(52) a. They will be deviously careful and will use EVERY advantage  (Internet) 
b. […] business consortiums are deviously careful not to mention E-Verify […] 
(cf. Internet) 
c. It is deviously careful of business consortiums not to mention E-Verify. 
d. *It is deviously careful that business consortiums do not mention E-Verify. 
 
In section 3.7.3.3, I address judgment variability (including these data) in detail. 
For now, we can note that, rather than providing evidence against a unified analysis, 
variability shows that (i) each lexical item introduces different conceptual knowledge, 
and (ii) each syntactic structure introduces different constraints (e.g. infinitives vs. that-
clauses); it is inefficient (if not impossible) to try to control for them all. 
The argument against EA polysemy is outlined in below. We have already seen 
points (i) and (ii). 
 
(i) Giving EAs IL and SL denotations makes the wrong empirical predictions. 
(ii) More generally, the argument against the existence of the IL/SL distinction is 
strong. 
(iii) Alternative analyses for the diagnostics that have EAs behaving like IL predicates 
are available. 
(iv) EAs fail to pattern with activities. 
(v) Both a coercion analysis and an “active” be analysis are untenable.  
(vi) So, there is no alternative analysis for the content of any additional denotation or 
coercion operation. 
 
We have already seen two examples of the wrong predictions made by positing IL 
and SL lexical entries in examples (20) and (21), repeated here as (53) and (54). 
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(53) a. American consumers are smart     (* /Gen) 
b. American consumers are smart to buy foreign goods   (* /Gen) 
c. American consumers are eager to buy foreign goods  ( /Gen) 
(54) a. *There were lawmakers smart 
b. *There were lawmakers smart to endorse the proposal 
c. There were lawmakers eager to endorse the proposal 
 
In these two blocks, the theories that give EAs IL and SL entries expect the (a) and the 
(b) examples to pattern differently. On a unified approach, their patterning together 
follows automatically. 
Even though arguing for a unified denotation directly is too tortuous to be effective, 
the idea is that the global behaviour of EAs is coherent: they are stative causative 
predicates that undergo the causative alternation. What can be shown directly is that 
splitting this behaviour up into different denotations makes the wrong predictions and 
fails to shed light on the whole, while a single denotation does the opposite. 
 
 
3.4 EAs are Stative 
We have seen that it is often concluded that EAs require multiple denotations. Syntactic 
approaches limit themselves with providing IL and SL variants without examining the 
aspectual properties of the SL entry (cf. Stowell 1991; Landau 2009; Kertz 2006, 2010). 
When examined, the SL usages of EAs are frequently classified as activities (cf. Dowty 
1979; Arche 2006, a.o.). The activity denotation addresses Lakoff’s (1966) observations 
that, for instance, EAs are the adjective class that takes the continuous aspect ((55)) and 
accepts intention adverbials ((56)). 
 
(55) a. Philip was being arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
b. #Sam was being eager/nervous/available/sick 
c. #Sam was being Canadian/old/tall 
(56) a. Sam was arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude on purpose 
b. #Sam was eager/nervous/available/sick on purpose 
c. #Sam was Canadian/old/tall on purpose 
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In these environments EAs are intuitively agentive, implying some kind of dynamicity. 
This is the foundation of the EA activity denotation. 
Continuing the presentation began in section 3.1, here I argue that polysemy is not 
a necessary consequence of data such as (55a) and (56a), and that tests targeting inner-
aspect show EAs to be consistently stative. In order to argue that EAs are stative, it will 
be important to use diagnostics that target inner-aspect alone, and factor out secondary 
inferences. For the moment, I set these data aside (returning to the intentional adverb 
data in section 3.4.2, and the continuous at various points in this chapter and the next). 
We begin by looking at data that undermine one’s confidence in an activity analysis. 
 
 
3.4.1 EAs Do Not Pattern with Activities 
The for-PP/in-PP test separates states and activities ((57a, b)) from accomplishments 
and achievements ((57c, b)).
15
 This test picks up on the (a)telicity of the predicate. Since 
states and activities are atelic they accept a for-PP, which indicates that the eventuality 
lasts for some time without a definite end-point. On the other hand, accomplishments 
and achievements are telic and they accept an in-PP indicating the amount of time 
before the eventuality reaches its end. 
 
(57) a. Emma owned a typewriter for years/#in years   
b. Emma walked in the park for years/#in years   
c. Emma made her key in a few minutes/#for a few minutes 
d. Emma found her key in a few minutes/#for a few minutes 
 
Since EAs are only natural with for-phrases, they are states or activities: 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Accomplishments (e.g. build, break, make) are characterised as dynamic, durative, and telic, while 
achievements (e.g. find, realise, win) are dynamic and telic, but not durative. Kearns (2011: 158, ex. (5)) 
provides the chart below to distinguish the Vendlerian aspectual classes. 
 
 Dynamism Duration Telos 
State — + — 
Achievement + — + 
Activity/Process + + — 
Accomplishment + + + 
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(58) a. Emma was rude for a few minutes 
b. #Emma was rude in a few minutes 
 
Arche (2006) submits Spanish EAs to a thorough aspectual examination and 
concludes that they can be classified as activities when agentive. A comparison of 
activity verbs with EAs, however, shows that they do not pattern together. All the 
diagnostics in (59)-(62) show that EAs do not evoke the same grammaticality 
judgements as either uncontroversial states or uncontroversial activities: states are 
ungrammatical ((a) examples), activities are grammatical ((b) examples), but EAs are 
odd ((c) examples).
16
 
 
(59) Complement of parar ‘stop’ (Spanish) 
a. *Pablo paró de amar a María 
    ‘Pablo stopped loving Maria’   (Arche 2006: 48, ex. (17a)) 
b. Pablo paró de pasear 
    ‘Pablo stopped walking’    (Arche 2006: 48, ex. (17c)) 
c. 
?
Juan paró de ser cruel con su adversario 
  ‘Juan stopped being cruel to his opponent’  (Arche 2006: 65, ex. (49c)) 
(60) Modification with casi ‘almost’ (Spanish) 
 a. *Juan casi fue eskimal 
    ‘Juan almost was an Eskimo’   (Arche 2006: 66, ex. (53c)) 
b. Pablo casi caminaba con ocho meses 
          ‘Pablo almost walked when he was eight months’ (Arche 2006: 50, ex. (21a)) 
 c. 
?
Juan casi fue cruel con su adversario 
    ‘Juan almost was cruel to his opponent’  (Arche 2006: 66, ex. (53a)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 As mentioned in chapter 1, I have not systematically dealt with the fact that a sub-set of EAs can select 
a to-PP. In section 3.7 I argue that the EA to-PP is a peripheral phenomenon, and not part of the EA 
denotation. For now I use to-PP examples because they give rise to some of the clearest intuitions for 
agentivity/dynamism. It will be shown that, even with a to-PP, EAs are stative. 
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(61) Pseudocleft with hacer ‘do’ (Spanish) 
 a. *Lo que hizo fue estar enfermo 
    ‘What he did was be sick’    (Arche 2006: 51, ex. (23a)) 
 b. Lo que hizo fue pasear 
     ‘What he did was walk’    (Arche 2006: 51, ex. (23c)) 
 c. 
?
Lo que hizo Juan fue ser cruel con su adversario 
    ‘What Juan did was be cruel to his opponent’ (Arche 2006: 68, ex. (61c)) 
(62) Pseudoclefts with suceder ‘happen’ (Spanish) 
 a. *Lo que sucedió fue que Juan era alto 
     ‘What happened was that Juan was tall’  (Arche 2006: 44, ex. (10a)) 
 b. Lo que sucedió fue que Juan paseó 
    ‘What happened was that John walked’  (Arche 2006: 44, ex. (10c)) 
 c. 
?
Lo que sucedió fue que Juan fue muy cruel con su adversario 
    ‘What happened was that Juan was very cruel to his opponent’  
(Arche 2006: 62, ex. (44c))   
 
With respect to the What X did was... test, Martin (2008) (who also proposes that 
EAs are always stative) reports a similar level of unacceptability with EAs in French:
 
 
(63) ??Ce qu’il a fait, c’est être bruyant/bavard/adroit 
‘What he did was be noisy/talkative/clever’  
(French, Martin 2008: 117, ex. (36))  
 
Parallel English examples such as (64) are the type of data that traditionally support 
the activity analysis. Yet, these examples are also less than fully acceptable. 
 
(64) a. ?What Peter did was be modest 
b. 
??
What happened was Julia was kind 
 
Tellingly, Dowty twice implied that not all English speakers accept these structures 
when he wrote “[f]or speakers who accept the various kinds of do-sentences with 
agentive adjectives (for example, What I did then was be as polite to Mary as possible) 
[...]” (1975: 581; 1979: 164 ff.). 
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Building on Dowty’s suggestion, notice that when an overt infinitive or to-PP is 
added to the examples in (64), as in shown in (65), they worsen significantly—the 
opposite of what an activity analysis predicts. 
 
(65) a. *What Peter did was be modest to accept the award 
b. *
/??
What happened was Julia was kind to her mother 
 
I draw two conclusions from the reported judgements. (i) First, an activity analysis 
does not fit the facts. If EAs were activities, the judgements should be parallel. I take 
the lack of parallelism to be an important indicator. (ii) Second, the three-way 
judgement pattern in (59)-(62) shows that in the aspectual classification of predicates, 
there is a class that lies between simple states and activities. I argue that it is the stative 
causative class. 
Before turning to diagnostics that show EAs to be stative, I return to the intention 
adverbial data (e.g. Sam was arrogant on purpose) in order to give an example of a 
pseudo-agentivity diagnostic. 
 
 
3.4.2 Agentivity, Intentionality, and EAs 
Traditionally, in the discussion of thematic Agents, it is not uncommon for the 
philosophical conception of agency to be transferred in an overly strict sense to 
grammatical arguments interpreted as Agents. By “overly strict” I mean that thematic 
Agents are assumed to entail that the action they perform is performed on purpose (cf. 
Rothmayr 2009: 48-49, a.o.). There certainly are agentive verbs that entail 
intentionality, such as assassinate, listen, manage, try, and watch. But in cases where 
intentionality is entailed by the verb itself, qualifying it with an intention adverbial is 
either contradictory or redundant: 
 
(66) a. #The terrorist assassinated the politician on accident/on purpose 
b. #Peter managed/tried to break the window on accident/on purpose 
c. #Peter listened to/watched the conversation on accident/on purpose 
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This pattern supports the conclusion the intentionality of the Agent is entailed, but not 
all predicates show it: more often than not, intentionality is only an implicature.  
The implicature status of intentionality with uncontroversial agentive lexical verbs 
is shown by the examples in (67). The adverbials in (67a) indicate that intentionality 
with respect to thematic Agents is both reinforceable and defeasible. 
 
(67) a. Paul broke the chair on accident/on purpose when he sat down 
b. I would ask if he [S. Schnyder] is OK. I mean I feel for him. I don’t believe that 
his intention was to hurt him. I don’t believe it ever is, but it’s becoming such a 
statement that is heard way too often. You know, it’s not my intention to hurt 
someone, it wasn’t my intention to cut his leg, it wasn’t my intention to knock 
his teeth out. But, this is a statement that’s being heard much too often in our 
sport. 
Scott Beattie, Olten Team Coach on CBC Radio As It Happens, 8 Mar. 2013 
c. I don’t know if he intentionally set out to victimise me. I don’t think that he did. 
Leslie Mogan Steiner, CBC Radio Ideas, “The Violence within Us”,  
4 Feb. 2014 
 
Example (67b) confirms that the implicature is common. The example is taken from a 
radio interview after defender Ronny Keller of the 2
nd
 division Swiss hockey team Olten 
was left paralysed from a body-check by opposing player Stefan Schnyder. In this 
quote, the coach is commenting on how the player who inflicted the injury must feel. 
Verbs related to or appearing in this passage are paralyse, hurt (physically), transitive 
cut and knock out. These are all verbs that take animate subjects that are uncontroversial 
thematic Agents. But, there is explicit denial of intention and explicit acceptance of the 
potential non-intentionality of the perpetrator. The next example ((67c)) is an even 
clearer illustration of the implicature. 
Intentionality can more often be shown not to be an entailed property of thematic 
Agents. Thus the concepts of philosophical agency and thematic Agents cannot be 
combined and interpreted to mean that every thematic Agent necessarily initiates an 
event e on purpose. When intentionality is not entailed, the question becomes one of 
understanding under what conditions intention adverbials are felicitous.  
This has a consequence. Although intention adverbials are invoked as indicators of 
non-stativity—however seemingly intuitive the distribution of intention adverbials may 
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be—it does not follow that they are a reliable indicator of inner-aspect. This is a simple 
result of the lack of logical entailment and the implicature status of these modifiers 
when felicitous. Without entailment, there is no argument for inner-aspect, and 
therefore, these adverbials do not force a non-stative analysis of the verb. 
Returning to EAs, we see that the verb facts carry over. Dowty (1975, 1979) first 
discussed that interpreting the unmodified EA animate subject (e.g. Sam was arrogant) 
as an agent acting on purpose (i.e. the “overly strict” interpretation of thematic agency 
described above) is incorrect because there is no such entailment. This is demonstrated 
by the non-redundancy of (68a) (repeated from (56a)) and the non-contradictoriness of 
(68b). 
 
(68) a. Sam was arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude on purpose  
b. Sam was unintentionally arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
 
Just as with the verbal examples above, at the level of the predicate itself, intentionality 
is an implicature.
17
 
Although data such as these first led Lakoff and Dowty to give EAs an additional 
non-state analysis, following the reasoning above, this is not a necessary conclusion. 
Since intentionality is not a semantic property of the predicate, exactly what the felicity 
of intention adverbials indicates is an open question. 
The explanation here has to meet the requirements of making EAs compatible with 
intention adverbials, while maintaining that EAs are aspectually stative. The ingredients 
of this explanation have already been partially introduced above and recur below, so the 
discussion of intention adverbials is a good opportunity to illustrate another way in 
which the different properties that this analysis attributes to EAs interact. 
The proposal is that intention adverbials are felicitous with EAs and other 
predicates that do not entail intentionality because of the combination of (i) a causative 
argument structure and (ii) having an animate subject capable of having intentions. The 
combination of these two independent criteria is necessary to make an intention 
adverbial felicitous. 
                                                          
17
 Example (i) illustrates a case of real spontaneous speech where exactly these notions are expressed. 
 
(i) He’s cruel by default… default isn’t the right word. He’s not intentionally cruel, it’s just that it’s a 
consequence of his poor decision making. I realised that people don’t do things to be intentionally 
mean or cruel, they just have that consequence. 
Gourmet Pizza Restaurant, 133 Roncesvalles, Toronto ON, 9 Mar. 2013 
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No reference to the details of inner-aspect or thematic agentivity is necessary for an 
intention adverbial to be felicitous; therefore the stativity of EAs is irrelevant. This 
makes the licensing conditions of intention adverbials more general than explicit 
reference to an aspectual classification. But, this explanation simultaneously captures 
three properties: 
 
(i) It captures the redundancy of intention adverbials when intentionality is in fact 
entailed by the predicate. 
(ii) It captures the implicature nature of the inference when intentionality is not 
entailed by the predicate: the argument modified by the adverbial merely has to be 
capable of holding intentions. The adverbial then contributes non-redundant 
content. 
(iii) It captures examples (56b, c) with the predicates eager, nervous, Canadian, old 
and tall, where intention adverbials are infelicitous. Here the infelicity is due to 
the fact that there is no causative structure. 
 
The intuitive notion that intention adverbials are licensed based directly on inner-
aspect and agentivity cannot capture the difference between when these adverbials are 
felicitous and when they are redundant. 
On the other hand, this explanation is based on the interaction of a causative 
structure and an animate subject: at times they interact and give the impression that EAs 
require a non-stative counterpart. But each time they do, non-stativity is not in fact an 
entailment of the diagnostic but an implicature, and thematic agentivity is nothing more 
than a rough first impression. 
To sum up, the licensing of intention adverbs is a good example of what could be 
called a “pseudo-agentivity effect”, rather than an aspectual diagnostic. In determining 
EAs’ aspectual status, tests that do not interact with implicatures relating to the 
properties of the subject must be used.
18
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Section 4.4.3 addresses the defining properties of external argument thematic roles, what distinguishes 
a Causer from an Agent, and the place of intentionality in Agents. 
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3.4.3 EAs Pattern with States 
We saw in (58) (repeated as (69)) that on their existential usages, EAs are either states 
or activities because they only take for-phrases. 
 
(69) a. Emma was rude for a few minutes 
b. *Emma was rude in a few minutes 
 
However the data in section 3.4.1 showed that cross-linguistically, EAs do not pattern 
with activities. This section introduces three diagnostics that target inner-aspect and 
unambiguously categorise EAs as states: the take-time test, velocity adverbs, and the 
This happened while… test. 
With atelic eventualities, the take-time test is only felicitous with states and it 
measures the amount of time before the on-set of a state ((70a)). Activity predicates are 
odd in this environment, as illustrated by (70b): it is strange on the reading that the 
participants did not begin walking for half an hour. 
 
(70) a. It took five years for Jones to know him well     (Kearns 2011: 162, ex. (19c)) 
b. #It took half an hour for them to walk in the park 
(Kearns 2011: 162, ex. (20a)) 
In (71), we see that EAs fall neatly with states: 
 
(71) It took 2 minutes for James to be rude 
 
This example deserves further attention because it picks up on the discussion of 
pseudo-agentivity from the last section. Example (71) is an EA predication with an 
overt subject within the CP infinitive. It produces a clear agentive inference. This is 
exactly the kind of inference that motives non-stative EA denotations. And yet, the test 
targets inner-aspect and returns the unambiguous result: the predicate patterns with 
states. Like the illusion created by intention adverbs, this is another illustration of why 
diagnostics that filter out subject effects and speak to inner-aspect are needed. 
Velocity adverbs are a second test. If EAs did have an activity reading, we would 
expect them to be compatible with adverbs measuring the activity’s progression, such as 
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quickly, slowly, little by little. Activity verbs do so naturally ((72)), but stative 
predicates do not ((73a)). Example (73b) shows that EAs again fall squarely with states.  
 
(72) Julia ate her breakfast slowly/quickly/little by little 
(73) a. #Peter was eager/available/sick/Canadian/old/tall slowly/quickly/little by little 
b. #Peter was rude slowly/quickly/little by little 
(cf. Fabregas et al. 2013: 250, ex. (60)) 
   
Section 3.4.1 showed that in Spanish, French, and English, it has been 
independently reported that EAs in the traditional What happened was… test are less 
than perfect. Maienborn (2005b) proposes a variation on this test that does a better job 
distinguishing between activities and states: the This happened while… test (cf. Asher 
1993). The combination of the words happened while seems to target the 
presence/absence of a process, which is the defining property of activities. The 
uncontroversial activity verb in (74a) takes the continuation naturally and the state verb 
in (74b) does not. 
 
(74) German 
a. Eva spielte Klavier. Das geschah während ... 
    ‘Eva played the piano. This happened while…’  
(Maienborn 2005b: 285, ex. (11a)) 
b. *Eva ähnelte ihrer Mutter. Das geschah während ... 
    ‘Eva resembled her mother. This happened while …’  
(Maienborn 2005b: 286, ex. (13c)) 
 
Once again, EAs pattern with states: 
 
(75) *Peter was brave/nice/rude (to leave). This happened while… 
 
All of these tests indicate that EAs never entail a process. 
In her presentation of aspectual classes, Kearns (2011: 158) describes the difference 
between activities and states noting that the former have internal texture and that they 
tend to involve movements or changes in position (e.g. walking around the park in 
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(70b)), while states do not. EAs quite clearly—even when they produce an agentive 
inference—do not involve movement or changes in position. 
Similarly, it is often noted that activities are composed of sub-parts that, 
individually, do not constitute the whole. In comparison, states do not have 
distinguishable sub-parts. For example, there are motions involved in the activity of 
walking that, alone, do not qualify as walking (e.g. bending a knee or moving a foot), 
and if the whole process does not come together, then it does not qualify: if I begin to 
take a step by lifting my foot, but then change my mind and put my foot down again on 
the same spot without moving my other leg, I have not walked.  
But with states, each sub-part is equal. When we say that someone is sick, there is 
no meaningful way to identify sub-parts of the state such that they do not individually 
entail sickness. Equally, when it comes to the existential usages of EAs, when we say 
that someone was nice or obnoxious or rude, there are no distinguishable sub-parts.          
This is intimately related to the Sub-Interval Property ((76)). The Sub-Interval 
Property says that the description of a verb phrase is true if and only if it is true at each 
moment of time. It was originally meant to distinguish states and activities from 
accomplishments and achievements (cf. Filip 1999; Kearns 2011). 
 
(76) SUBINTERVAL verb phrases have the property that if they are the main verb 
phrase of a sentence which is true at some interval I, then the sentence is true at 
every subinterval of I including every moment of time in I. Examples of 
subinterval verb phrases are: walk, breathe, walk in the park, push the cart 
(Bennett and Partee 2004: 72) 
 
Although Bennett and Partee give activities as examples in their description in (76), 
it has long been noted that the Sub-Interval Property is too strong in the case of 
activities because, as stated in (76), it does not allow for any temporal gaps, and 
evaluation at a single moment is insufficient to determine their truth (cf. Dowty 1979; 
Filip 1999). 
There are at least two ways that this is intuitively clear (both examples are inspired 
by Dowty 1979). First, if someone says that she read from noon to three o’clock, we do 
not generally judge the statement false if she stared out the window for two minutes, 
took a coffee break, or went to the bathroom in that time. So activities allow for interval 
gaps (i.e. stops and starts) where the Sub-Interval Property does not. Second, if a ball is 
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said to be rolling, according to Newtonian physics, more than one moment is needed to 
infer movement. Since activities generally involve movement, more than a single 
moment is needed to evaluate them. 
The ban on interval gaps is probably too strict for states, as well. If we say that 
someone has been sick for a year, it seems severe to judge the sentence false if that 
person was not literally sick for each moment of that twelve-month span. So, interval 
gaps may be generally irrelevant to an aspectual calculus. 
Nevertheless, identification at individual moments does distinguish activities from 
states. We need more than one moment to infer that a process is ongoing or that a 
change occurred, but there is indeed the strong intuition that, when we say that someone 
or something is sick, nice, obnoxious or rude, the statement can be true at single 
moments. For example, any moment of sickness qualifies as sickness, and any moment 
of rudeness qualifies as rudeness. And this seems to be true of every EA usage. This 
means that EAs are never activities, and always states. 
 
 
3.4.4 Interim Conclusions 
This section began with the presentation of cross-linguistic data showing that EAs do 
not pattern with activities or simple states. We then saw that EA compatibility with 
intention adverbs is not proof of an activity usage, and I proposed an alternative 
explanation for why these adverbials are felicitous with EAs. This explanation made use 
of properties that are basic to this analysis of EAs: a causative structure and an animate 
external argument. Intention adverbials are a good example of a pseudo-aspect 
diagnostic and highlight the importance of using diagnostics that target inner-aspect 
alone. Up to this point we had no direct evidence supporting an activity analysis. 
Then we saw three tests that showed EAs patterning exactly like states, i.e. the 
take-time test, velocity adverbs, and the This happened while … test. Even though the 
first test gives rise to agentive intuitions, each test unambiguously classifies EAs as 
stative. We then embarked on a detailed discussion of the relevance of the Sub-Interval 
Property and its application to states. The conclusion was that EAs always qualify as 
states. 
So, we now have aspectual evidence for the three different sorts of stative 
predication in the argument structures proposed in this thesis: 
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(77) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
Having seen that EAs are not activities or simple states, the next section introduces 
the stative causative class. 
 
 
3.5 Stative Causatives 
We saw in section 3.3.1 that Maienborn (2005b; 2007) draws a distinction between 
stative verbs that pass the tests for spatio-temporality versus stative verbs that are only 
defined temporally. She calls the former Davidsonian-States and the latter Kimian-
States. Some of the verbs classified as Davidsonian-States are gleam, sleep, and wait. 
Maienborn has three reasons that justify this classification of these verbs: 
 
(i) They pass the standard event diagnostics discussed above. Therefore, they are 
spatio-temporal. 
(ii) They satisfy the Sub-Interval Property in that each moment of a gleam, or 
sleeping, or waiting, classifies as gleaming, sleeping or waiting. Therefore they 
are states. 
(iii) The This happened while... test clearly has them patterning with Kimian-States 
((78a, b)), and not with activities ((78c)). Therefore there is empirical evidence 
that they are a kind of state. 
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(78) German 
a. *Eva besaß ein Haus. Das geschah während… 
    ‘Eva owned a house. This happened while...’ 
(Maienborn 2005b: 286, ex. (13a)) 
b. *Eva wartete auf den Bus. Das geschah während… 
    ‘Eva waited for the bus. This happened while...’ 
(Maienborn 2005b: 285, ex. (12d)) 
c. Eva spielte Klavier. Das geschah während… 
    ‘Eva played the piano. This happened while...’ 
(Maienborn 2005b: 285, ex. (11a)) 
 
Positing that different types of stative verbs exist is not new. For example, Bach 
(1986) divides states into dynamic states and static states. In the domain of verbs, 
Maienborn shows that the use of the word “dynamic” is misleading: these so-called 
“dynamic” states are spatio-temporal, but there is no process. Static states, on the other 
hand, are only temporal. 
The new conclusions I have drawn are that (i) these findings carry over to 
adjectives—the word “dynamic” being just as misleading—and that (ii) they are directly 
relevant to understanding EAs. 
Interestingly, Rappaport Hovav and Levin (RH&L) (2000) discuss a sub-set of 
Maienborn’s verbs. They discuss emission verbs such as gleam, glow, shine, and stink 
and, rather than diagnosing them for eventivity, they conclude that they are stative 
causatives. 
Following up on the argument against the event argument from chapter 1, I would 
like to propose that the common denominator in these two discussions is causation: 
Maienborn’s Davidsonian-States test positive for spatio-temporality because they are 
causative. In support of this proposal, in the remainder of this chapter we will see 
evidence that the source of eventivity effects is not a primitive spatio-temporal 
argument. Rather, intuitions of eventivity are parasitic on causation. Chapter 4 develops 
the argument explicitly that only state arguments are primitive.  
In their discussion of stative causation, RH&L (2000) stress that when diagnosing 
inner-aspect it is important to use tests that do not interact with the animacy of the 
subject. Since emission verbs take inanimate arguments (e.g. The pearls gleamed), 
misleading agentive inferences are controlled for. RH&L identify the What X did ... and 
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the What happened was ... tests as tests that avoid agentive confounds because, as (79) 
shows, activity verbs with inanimate subjects are acceptable in these contexts. 
 
(79) What the boulder did was roll down the mountain 
(RH&L 2000: 284, ex. (47b)) 
 
But when they submit emission verbs to these tests, the results are marginal: 
 
(80) a. ??What the spotlight did was shine on the parking lot 
b. 
??What Mary’s face did was glow with excitement 
c. 
??
What the garbage did was stink 
(RH&L 2000: 284, ex. (48a)) 
(81) a. ??What happened was the spotlight shone on the parking lot 
b. 
??What happened was Mary’s face glowed with excitement  
c. 
??
What happened was the garbage stank  
(RH&L 2000: 284, ex. (49b)) 
 
These are the same judgements we found independently with EAs in these 
environments (section 3.4.1). Here, the inanimacy of the subject makes the judgements 
even clearer. RH&L take these judgements to show that these verbs are statives, rather 
than activities. 
One characterisation of what separates non-states from states is that the former 
involve some kind of a change (RH&L 2000: 284; Dowty 1979; Kearns 2011). For 
example, with an activity verb like walk, certain movements are involved. With a 
causative verb like break, an object goes from being unbroken to be being broken. But 
emission verbs like shine and gleam are atelic and potentially internally homogeneous, 
so they satisfy the Sub-Interval Property in the way discussed above: since there is no 
change involved, these verbs denote states, just like EAs. 
Now, a comparison of the subject arguments of action verbs and emission verbs 
points to an underlying similarity. The external argument of an activity, 
accomplishment, or achievement verb can be an Agent or a Causer ((82a)). The sole 
argument of the stative emission verb in (83b) could be called a Source. 
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(82) a. Peter/The storm broke the window 
b. The sun shone 
 
The common denominator in all these cases is causation. All of these eventuality 
types are caused in some way. In (82a) the cause is an external force of one sort or 
another. In (82b), it is an integral property of the thing deemed responsible for the 
occurrence of the eventuality.
19
 
Moreover, RH&L (2000) propose that the notion of responsibility captures all of 
these external arguments: in each case, the external argument is attributed responsibility 
for the eventuality. 
Since RH&L (2000), it is often accepted that (i) activities, accomplishments, 
achievements, and emission verbs are all causatives, (ii) the general notion of a Causer 
adequately describes the range external arguments with causative verbs, and (iii) 
regardless of the name given to the syntactic head that introduces the Causer, all Causer 
arguments have the same syntactic base position (Alexiadou and Schafer 2006; Folli 
and Harley 2008; Ramchand 2008). 
With respect to stativity and causation, RH&L (2000: 288) use (83) to show that a 
change-of-state and causation are independent of each other. In this example, Tony is 
the cause of the absence of physical change. 
 
(83) Tony kept the books on the table 
 
More generally, RH&L (2000) argue that stativity is irrelevant to the representation of 
causation. 
In chapter 1 we saw that Dowty (1979) also recognised that a change-of-state is 
irrelevant to causation, and that causatives could be stative. This is why his CAUSE 
operator is defined as taking two propositions (i.e. CAUSE(α, β)), while the BECOME 
operator contributes the change-of-state entailment (i.e. BECOME(α)). This allows 
causation to involve a change (e.g. CAUSE(α, BECOME(β)) or be stative (e.g. 
CAUSE(α,β)), and capture the difference between Peter broke the book and Peter kept 
the book on the table, respectively. 
                                                          
19
 Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) and RH&L (2000) treat these as two separate sorts of causation: 
external and internal. In more recent work, the distinction has been rejected as a grammatical distinction, 
and irrelevant to the causative alternation (RH&L 2012; Rappaport Hovav 2014, 2016). 
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In support of this conclusion, in chapter 2 we saw the example of narrow, repeated 
in (84). This is a case where the causative alternation occurs only when the verb is 
interpreted as stative. 
 
(84) a. I like how the band narrows the skirt a bit   
(Rappaport Hovav 2014: 14, ex. (28a)) 
b. The skirt narrows at the bottom 
(Rappaport Hovav 2014: 14, ex. (26b)) 
 
So important barriers to the present analysis are removed: 
 
(i) There is empirical evidence for stative causation that is independent of EAs and 
emission verbs. 
(ii) There is no formal obstacle to stative causation. 
(iii) A change-of-state is not necessary for the causative alternation. 
 
What seems to be crucial to the linguistic representation of causation is a 
responsibility relation between a Causer and a result. In chapter 2, we saw that EAs are 
factive, and so even though they are stative, the factive presupposition entails the 
existence of a result.
20
 We also saw that their external argument produces a clear 
responsibility inference when the PRO position in the CP is filled: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Factivity and causation are, however, independent phenomena. There are factive predicates that are not 
causative, e.g. matter, significant, tragic. The factivity of EAs is important for this analysis because it 
provides EAs with existential entailment of their complement, strengthening the parallel with causative 
alternating verbs. 
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(85) a. It was thoughtless of Arthur for Agatha to be there when Desmond arrived 
(cf. Kertz 2010: 287, ex. (102)) 
b. I'm so mad and I spoke to DH this morning but I don't want to offend him and 
run his parents down, but at the same time, I am NOT having this special time 
ruined because it's my last baby and the afterglow of my wedding was also 
ruined because they were all here then too so we all had to go away together 
after our wedding because we felt it was rude of us for his family and extended 
family to come all the way from England to New Zealand and have us 
disappear alone the day after our wedding for a honeymoon. 
(Internet) 
c. It would have been stupid of them for him to make an appearance, on a taping 
before Raw. Well at least they mentioned his appearance on Raw, and showed 
some footage of it. We'll see him at TLC.     
(Internet) 
 
This discussion and these examples show that the linguistic representation of causation 
is not about a change-of-state, but the expression of responsibility, as RH&L (2000) 
independently concluded. 
This brings the conceptual meaning of EAs into focus. Why do we consider 
somebody intelligent, nice, or rude? Viewing EAs as causatives provides a plausible 
characterisation: an individual is responsible for a situation. So, the causative relation 
expresses responsibility for a result, and an EA qualifies this relation as intelligent, nice, 
or rude, etc. 
Now, if we say Emma was rude to leave, and it turns out that Emma didn’t leave, 
then in this instance, she wasn’t rude. More generally, if an individual cannot be 
associated with intelligent, nice, or rude results, then it is very difficult to justify saying 
that the individual is intelligent, nice or rude. The statement would be vacuous. 
We attribute these properties to people because we think we have evidence for them 
having demonstrated them in things they are responsible for. The relation that the EA 
denotes, is nevertheless abstract and immaterial, and thus stative; but in order to 
attribute it, we make connections between sources and results. This is represented 
linguistically as a causative. 
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In this section I have proposed that Maienborn’s Davidsonian-States coincide with 
RH&L’s stative causatives. I laid out RH&L’s independent motivations for the 
existence of stative causation in a sub-set of the same verbs as Maienborn. We saw that 
Maienborn and RH&L independently invoke related data. 
The overarching argument is that EAs fit into this broad category: they pass 
eventivity tests, they are stative, their animate argument is a Causer, and it bears a 
responsibility relation to the result. Since the notion of change-of-state is irrelevant to 
the linguistic representation of causation, all the EA evidence we have accumulated is 
coherent, and a causative alternation analysis is explanatory. 
 
 
3.6 Alternative Perspectives on IL/SL Diagnostics  
Now that we have seen arguments for an EA stative causative analysis, we return to the 
three tests introduced in section 3.1.2 that are traditionally used in support of the IL/SL 
distinction, namely bare plural subjects, there-insertion and depictives. In this section I 
sketch alternative explanations that do not depend upon the existence of the IL/SL 
distinction. These explanations imply that the IL/SL distinction does not reflect the 
correct generalisation for EAs. They complement the variety of empirical and 
conceptual counter-evidence discussed throughout this chapter, and together make a 
strong case against the reality of the distinction.21  
Here, I am largely concerned with suggesting alternative explanations for the EA 
data. Even though we have seen that RAs pattern with EAs in these environments, RAs 
will require separate explanations with their own qualifications. This is consistent with 
the view espoused here because EAs and RAs are separate aspectual classes, but it is not 
explored in detail because it is tangential to present purposes.
22
  
Jager (2001) proposes a solution to the existential interpretations of bare plural 
subjects that does not rely a binary lexical classification. His generalisation is that the 
subjects of predicates that do not allow a weak existential interpretation are interpreted 
as topics. More specifically, they are presupposed. 
                                                          
21
 In this section, I continue to make use of Jager (2001), which also argues extensively against the 
existence of the IL/SL distinction. See Higginbotham and Ramchand (1997) for further arguments against 
the distinction in conjunction with reanalyses of various diagnostics. See also Roy (2013) for an extended 
argument against the utility of the distinction in nominal predications.
 
22
 Section 4.2.2.5.2 discusses the status of the core IL/SL intuition within the present theory. 
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Before summarising Jager’s observations, a clarification on the EA bare plural data 
is in order. In (86) (repeated from (9), (11a) and (19b), respectively) the EA examples 
are characterised as being limited to a generic interpretation, and lacking both an 
existential interpretation of the whole sentence and a weak existential interpretation of 
the subject. 
 
(86) a. Emma is brave/Canadian/tall    (* /Gen) 
b. UN Peacekeepers are brave/Canadian/tall    (* /Gen) 
c. American consumers are smart to buy foreign goods (* /Gen) 
 
Notice that each of these examples is in the present simple. I would like to point out that 
there are two variables in play here: (i) tense and (ii) whatever it is that explains the 
interpretation of the subject. In section 3.2 we saw that outside of the present simple 
EAs do generally have an existential interpretation. In this they contrast with RAs (cf. 
(86a, b)), which do not have one. The EA example (87) shows that in the simple past, 
the sentence as a whole has a natural existential interpretation, even though the subject 
is not weakly existential. 
 
(87) American consumers were smart to buy foreign goods yesterday 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the lack of a sentence-level existential interpretation of 
EAs in (86) is due to the present simple, because varying the tense of an EA sentence 
from present ((86)) to past ((87)) produces a change in the availability of a sentence-
level existential interpretation, and the lack of a weak existential subject remains 
constant. Of course, many verbs in English also illustrate this present/past 
generic/existential correlation: eventive verbs ((88a) vs. (88b)). 
 
(88) a. Victoria eats/plays/sleeps/waits     (* /Gen) 
b. Victoria ate/played/slept/waited  ( /Gen) 
 
I have shown that EAs pass eventivity tests. This parallelism in the interpretation of 
tense between EAs and eventive verbs is another clear indication that EAs are always 
classify as eventive: with respect to the interpretation of tense, EAs pattern with 
eventive predicates. 
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The purpose of this digression has been to qualify the original application of the 
bare plural test in the case of EAs. Once tense is controlled for, EAs do have a natural 
existential interpretation. What they do not have is a weak existential subject. Jager’s 
(2001) proposal speaks only to this latter point and we turn to it now. 
German word order has been employed to provide overt syntactic evidence for the 
IL/SL distinction (cf. Diesing 1992; Krazter 1995). The examples in (89) illustrate how 
adverbials can be used to disambiguate the existential ((89a)) and generic ((89b)) 
readings of a bare plural subject with a SL predicate. 
 
(89) German 
a. (weil)      angeblich Feuerwehrmänner verfügbar sind  ( , *Gen) 
    (because) allegedly     firemen              available  are 
    ‘(Because) allegedly, firemen are available’  
b. (weil)   Feuerwehrmänner angeblich verfügbar sind  (* , Gen) 
    (because)      firemen        allegedly  available  are 
    ‘(Because) firemen are allegedly available’   
(Jager 2001: 86, ex. (7)) 
 
As in English, SL predicates can have both readings, but when focus and scope 
inducing items are controlled for, the availability of each reading can be narrowed down 
to a particular area of the clause: the existential reading is generally restricted to the 
region below sentence-level adverbs and particles ((89a)), and the generic one above 
them ((89b)). 
In the case of IL predicates, this word order correspondence makes the correct 
prediction: only the word order that supports the generic reading is grammatical ((90b) 
vs. (90a)). 
 
(90) German 
a. *(weil)     angeblich Feuerwehrmänner selbstlos sind 
      (because) allegedly        firemen         altruistic are 
b. (weil) Feuerwehrmänner angeblich selbstlos sind 
    (because)      firemen      allegedly  altruistic are 
    ‘(Because) firemen are allegedly altruistic’ 
(Jager 2001: 86, ex. (8))  
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While the word orders seem to provide neat evidence for the distinction, a first, 
wider, problem that Jager points out is that the standard IL/SL distinction is meant to 
distinguish bare plurals ((91)) from other types of indefinites. Nevertheless, the same 
facts repeat themselves with indefinite singular subjects ((92)) and weak quantifiers 
((93)).
23
 
 
(91) a. Firemen are available   ( , Gen) 
b. Firemen are altruistic   (* , Gen) 
(Jager 2001: 103, ex. (55)) 
(92) a. John claims that a fireman is available ( ,  !, Gen) 
b. John claims that a fireman is altruistic (* ,  !, Gen) 
(Jager 2001: 103, ex. (56)) 
(93) a. Many firemen are available   ( , Partitive) 
b. Many firemen are altruistic   (* , Partitive) 
(Jager 2001: 103, ex. (57))  
   
Examples (91)-(93) show more generally that IL predicates have a variety of strong 
readings (i.e. generic ((91b)), definite existential ((92b)), and partitive ((93b))) with any 
sort of indefinite subject, but systematically lack a weak existential reading. On the 
other hand, SL predicates have all of these strong readings in addition to a weak 
existential one ((91a), (92a), (93a)). This shows that the bare plural test is missing a 
generalisation that the original IL/SL distinction cannot capture because it was meant 
precisely to distinguish bare plurals from other indefinites. 
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 See Jager (2001) for arguments that the IL/SL distinction cannot be directly tied to differences in the 
syntactic base position of the subject (cf. Diesing 1992; Kratzer 1995). Jager also shows that the German 
word order facts are quite independent of the IL/SL distinction because focus and scope can subvert them. 
The pair in (i) shows that with both IL and SL predicates, strong quantifiers appear (and in fact are 
preferred in both cases) in the low position. The pair in (ii) shows that focus blocks scrambling even with 
an IL predicate. 
 
(i) German 
a. weil      ja   alle Studenten Englisch können 
 because PRT  all   students    English   know   (Jager 2001: 105, ex. (61a)) 
b. weil     ja   alle  Studenten English sprechen 
 because PRT all   students    English  speak   (Jager 2001: 105, ex. (62a)) 
(ii) German 
a. weil      ja   sogar FEUERWEHRMÄNNER selbstlos sind 
   because PRT even           FIREMEN                altruistic are 
b. 
??
weil FEUERWEHRMÄNNER ja sogar selbstlos sind 
      because             firemen             PRT even altruistic are    
(Jager 2001: 111, ex. (78)) 
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Returning to German, it turns out that the word order facts repeat themselves 
regardless of whether or not the subject is indefinite or definite. Just as in (91) above, 
the examples in (94) show that, with an IL predicate, the word order that correlates with 
the existential reading remains ungrammatical ((94b)). And, the order that correlated 
with a generic reading is still grammatical ((94a)). This suggests that the German word 
order facts are independent of the interpretation of indefinites, which effectively 
uncouples them from any direct relevance to the IL/SL distinction. 
 
(94) German 
a. (weil)      der Präsident  ja    intelligent ist 
    (because) the president PRT intelligent is 
    ‘(Because) the president is intelligent’ 
b. *(weil)      ja   der Präsident intelligent ist 
      (because) PRT the president  intelligent is 
(Jager 2001: 104, ex. (59))  
 
Thus far we have seen that, more generally, there is something about indefinite 
subjects that goes beyond bare plurals that affects the availability of a weak existential 
interpretation. We have also seen that the German word order phenomena are 
independent of the IL/SL distinction because they are unrelated to bare plurals and 
indefinites. 
At this point, Jager makes the following observation. Setting indefinites aside, the 
word order patterns correspond to an interpretative difference: only in (95a)—the order 
that corresponds to strong readings—is the subject presupposed. 
 
(95) German 
a. (weil)       die   Berge     ja  sichtbar sind 
    (because) the mountains PRT visible  are 
b. (weil)       ja  die   Berge   sichtbar sind 
    (because) PRT the mountains visible are 
    ‘(Because) the mountains are visible’ 
(Jager 2001: 104, ex. (60) 
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Jager’s generalisation, then, is that being presuppositional blocks a weak existential 
interpretation. In other words, a weak existential reading (which essentially requires no 
discourse knowledge of a referent) is unavailable when that argument is presupposed.  
This is congenial to the approach that we are developing here and it illustrates one way 
of understanding the behaviour of EAs that obviates the need for the IL/SL distinction.  
We saw above that what EAs do not allow is a weak existential interpretation of 
their bare plural subjects ((86a)). In chapter 2 it was shown that EAs are factive and as 
such, they presuppose. The data blocks in (96) and (97) provide the P-family confirming 
that EA presuppositions project in all the standard contexts, i.e. in each example it is 
implied that Feynman did dance on the table. 
 
(96) a. Feynman was stupid to dance on the table 
b. Feynman wasn’t stupid to dance on the table        (negation) 
(cf. Barker 2002: 18, ex. (18)) 
(97) a. Wasn’t Feynman stupid to dance on the table?        (yes/no question) 
b. Who was stupid to dance on the table?    (wh-question) 
c. Perhaps Feynman was stupid to dance on the table      (possibility) 
d. If Feynman was stupid to dance on the table, then tell him   (conditional) 
(cf. Barker 2002: 19, ex. (19)) 
 
Recall that I am defending the position that the CP is always part of the EA 
denotation, just as it is in the case of PAs. PAs, however, do not presuppose the truth of 
their complement: 
 
(98) a. Emma was eager to help ⇏ Emma helped 
b. Emma wasn’t eager to help ⇏Emma helped 
c. Wasn’t Emma eager to help? ⇏ Emma helped 
d. Who was eager to help ⇏ Someone helped 
e. Perhaps Emma was eager to help ⇏ Emma helped 
f. If Emma was eager to help, then you should have asked her to  
 
We also saw in chapter 2 that both EAs and PAs are Obligatory Control (OC) 
predicates. 
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My proposal is that combining these empirical facts and extending Jager’s core 
observation captures the behaviour of indefinite subjects of both EAs and PAs. 
If it is granted that the referent of the external argument of an OC predicate is 
included inside the CP via the PRO position, it follows that the behaviour of the 
argument external to the CP is predictable based on that CP’s presuppositional status. In 
the case of PAs this means that, since they do not presuppose their CP, they would be 
expected to allow a weak existential interpretation of their subject, as is the case ((99c) 
repeated from (19c)). This follows from the PA being an OC predicate and the CP itself 
not being presupposed by the adjective. 
 
(99) a. American consumers are smart     (* /Gen) 
b. American consumers are smart to buy foreign goods   (* /Gen) 
c. American consumers are eager to buy foreign goods  ( /Gen) 
(Kertz 2006: 230, ex. (3)-(5)) 
 
EAs on the other hand, are also OC predicates, but as factives, they presuppose their 
CP. Correspondingly, a weak existential interpretation is absent whether or not the CP is 
overt ((99a, b) repeated from (19a, b)).  
This captures the contrast between PAs and EAs in (99), and illustrates one way 
that it is possible to address the bare plural subject data, as well as weak existential 
interpretations more generally, without the IL/SL distinction. It also supports the 
approach being developed here because on the present approach the CP is always part of 
the EA denotation, and therefore it is predicted that the interpretation of the subject will 
be the same regardless of whether the CP is spelled-out. Therefore, on the present 
approach the parallelism in (99a, b) is expected.  
In contrast, any approach that posits EA IL/SL denotations predicts a pattern in 
these data that we do not find: it predicts (99a) to be potentially ambiguous (depending 
on whether or not the CP is implicit), and it predicts (99b) to be unambiguously SL. The 
actual pattern is correctly predicted only on the present approach.  
Turning to there-insertion data, the examples in (100) (repeated from (20)) show 
that there-insertion is unacceptable with EAs ((100a, b)), but unobjectionable with PAs 
((100c)). 
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(100) a. *There were lawmakers smart 
b. *There were lawmakers smart to endorse the proposal 
c. There were lawmakers eager to endorse the proposal 
 
An explanation based on the IL/SL distinction hinges on the existentiality of there-
sentences: EAs are out because they are properties of individuals, while PAs are in 
because they predicate of stages. 
While the pattern in (100) mirrors the bare plural subject pattern in (99), the 
presupposition explanation does not carry over. This is because in other contexts, such 
as the continuous aspect in (101), there-insertion with EAs is fine:  
 
(101) There were people being nice/polite/rude/stupid 
 
Since the factive presupposition remains constant, and EAs allow there-insertion in the 
continuous, the ungrammaticality of (100a, b) must come from somewhere else. 
I suggest instead to focus on the sort of assertion that there involves. A closer look 
at there-sentences shows that there picks out a temporally restricted state. The examples 
in (102) illustrate there relating to a simple state (i.e. being at the park; being on the 
shelf). 
 
(102) a. There were kids at the park 
b. There were books on the shelf 
 
The examples in (103) illustrate the contrast between an eventive predicate in the 
continuous aspect ((103a)) versus other tenses and aspects ((103b)). 
 
(103) a. There were people singing 
b. *There sing/sang/have sung/will sing people 
 
In this connection, Vlach (1981) first observed that the continuous aspect induces 
the temporal properties of simple states on eventive predicates. Suppose that taken 
together, the examples in (102) and (103) show that what the continuous aspect does is 
take an eventive predicate (e.g. sing) and give it the interpretation of a temporally 
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restricted simple state predicate.
24
 This allows existential there to pick out the 
temporally restricted state that it requires. 
This view of there-sentences and the continuous aspect accounts for the 
grammaticality of  (100c), (102), and (103a)—to the exclusion of (103b)—because in 
the grammatical examples, there associates with a temporally restricted simple state. It 
also extends to explain why EAs pattern with eventive verbs (e.g. sing) with respect to 
there-insertion and the continuous versus other tenses and outer-aspects: 
 
(104) a. There were people being nice/polite/rude/stupid 
b. *There are/were/have been/will be people nice/polite/rude/stupid 
 
Example (104a) foreshadows the fact that EAs are the adjective class that generally 
takes the continuous aspect. The parallel between (103) and (104) is also another 
argument that EAs pattern with spatio-temporal predicates. 
We have seen that EAs classify as spatio-temporal and as stative causatives. 
Therefore, even though EAs are stative—as causatives—they are internally complex 
and thus they are not simple states. Since there only associates with temporally 
restricted simple states, the ungrammaticality of EAs in cases like (104b) is expected, 
just as it is in (100a, b), whether or not the CP is overt (i.e. *There were lawmakers 
smart (to endorse the proposal)). So the ungrammaticality of EA there-insertion data 
receives a principled explanation without the IL/SL distinction—data that an ambiguity 
account does not capture. 
Lastly, building on this explanation of the there-insertion data, an account for the 
depictive data presents itself. The interpretation of depictive structures ((105)) can be 
described as expressing a relation of incidental temporal overlap between two 
temporally restricted eventualities, where the time that the state denoted by the adjective 
holds merely coincides with that of the main predication (cf. Geuder 2004). 
 
(105) Philip arrived sick 
     
The depictive data in (106) (repeated from (13)) receives an explanation similar to 
that offered for there-insertion. The predicates that work naturally as depictives are 
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 This characterisation is a simplification for the present context. Both the continuous aspect and 
existential there are given a formal analysis in chapter 4.  
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temporally restricted simple states. So, PAs and predicates like available and sick 
((106b)) are the only types of predicate that work naturally. Since they are temporally 
restricted, they can be meaningfully interpreted as overlapping with the main predicate. 
 
(106) a. *Emma arrived brave/Canadian/tall  
b. Emma arrived available/eager to help/sick 
 
In contrast, RAs like Canadian and tall in (106a) are simple states that certainly do 
overlap with many events, but because they are not restricted, using them as a depictive 
is uninformative. 
As for EAs, such as brave in (106a), they do not work because they are causatives, 
and not simple states. Just as with there, predicates interpreted as restricted simple states 
work most naturally as depictives. Only with such predicates ((106b)) is it the case that 
(i) the overlap condition is met and (ii) the overlap is informative.
25
 
In this section I have sketched alternative characterisations of the behaviour of EAs 
with respect to bare plural subjects, there-insertion and depictives that do not reduce to 
the IL/SL distinction. These alternatives make use of properties of EAs that the present 
proposal has referred to many times: EAs are factive and therefore trigger 
presuppositions; they are causative, and therefore the interpretation of their internal 
structure is complex. In this regard, the analysis sketches provided do not require any ad 
hoc assumptions to cover these three environments. 
We also saw that positing a single EA denotation that always includes the CP 
correctly predicts intransitive and transitive EA structures to behave unambiguously in 
parallel with respect to the diagnostics, where accounts that posit an IL/SL ambiguity 
predict an unrealised pattern. In addition, we account for the behaviour of EAs in the 
present simple with the finding that they are causative. At this point, an IL EA 
denotation is superfluous. Also, if the arguments against the IL/SL distinction are 
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 Geuder (2004) describes in more detail that an interpretative property of depictive structures is that 
there is no meaningful connection between the main event and the state denoted by the adjective. In other 
words: there is only coincidental overlap. So in Victoria arrived hungry, the arrival and the hunger only 
overlap coincidently—any inference of causal interconnection between the two eventualities is not 
entailed. This reinforces the generalisation that the adjectives that are naturally accepted in depictives 
denote temporally restricted simple states: a causative adjective, like an EA, might force an implication of 
a meaningful connection between the two predicates, and this would also violate the basic interpretative 
properties of depictives. 
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conjoined with the alternatives offered, the conclusion that the distinction does not exist 
is strongly supported.
26
 Section 4.2.2 returns to the continuous aspect technical detail. 
 
 
3.7 EAs: a Unified Pattern 
In this section the data presented throughout this chapter and chapter 2 are gathered to 
make the case that EAs have a single denotation that is stative causative. But before 
concluding the chapter on that note (section 3.7.4), the two other methods that are 
invoked to account for EAs are addressed: coercion (section 3.7.1) and “active” be 
(section 3.7.3). Arguments against these approaches are presented. 
When this has been done, I will have completed my attempt to refute (i) accounts 
that attribute EAs’ special properties to an ambiguity in the adjective (i.e. invoking the 
IL/SL distinction, or an IL denotation and an activity one), (ii) accounts that posit one 
denotation and a coercion operation, and (iii) accounts that place the ambiguity not in 
the adjective but in the copula (i.e. “active” be). In section 3.7.2 the evidence that EAs 
are the only adjective class to take the continuous aspect is given. 
 
 
3.7.1 Evidential Coercion 
Rather than positing multiple denotations for EAs, some approaches take them to have a 
single IL denotation and account for their existential and agentive properties with a 
coercion operation. Fernald (1999) is the only study that I am aware of that formulates 
such an operation explicitly. 
Fernald proposes that EAs and RAs are IL predicates, but that, in some contexts, 
such as the continuous ((107)), they are coerced into a non-state that implies 
behavioural evidence, or a manner of acting that implies that an individual has a 
property for a limited time. He calls this operation Evidential Coercion. 
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 The most important result here is the argument against an EA IL denotation. But it is worth 
emphasising that the more general argument against the very existence of the IL/SL distinction is relevant 
in two ways. First, the notion of SL is too general to make meaningful distinctions between predicate 
classes that have temporally dependent readings. Second, it means that not even RAs are correctly 
analysed as IL in a strict sense (chapter 4 returns to this). Although I will continue in this chapter to make 
reference to the distinction in order to reinforce some remaining points, it is no longer harmless to 
describe data in terms of it because the distinction is not formally relevant. 
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(107) a. Katherine is being brave/nice/obnoxious 
b. Katherine is being French 
 
Setting aside all the argumentation in this chapter that EAs are not IL predicates, 
that they are always stative, and that the agentive inference they produce is an 
implicature, Fernald (1999) provides the opportunity to show that, once a specific 
coercion operation on IL predicates is proposed, it is inconsistent. We will consider 
three difficulties with this approach. 
First, the most general problem is that coercion is not predictive. Why the 
continuous aspect in (107) should be context for coercing IL predicates, but not the 
present simple (e.g. Katherine is nice/French) or any other random environment has no 
principled response. 
The second problem is more specific. Evidential Coercion is a defined operation 
that takes IL predicates as input and returns a non-state that implies that an individual 
behaved as if having the property denoted by the adjective. In other words, we have a 
proposed operation that takes a uniform input, the operation applies, and we should 
expect a uniform output, but this is not the case. 
In (108), applying the continuous aspect to an EA entails that the property held of 
the subject. 
 
(108) Katherine was being brave/nice/obnoxious  
  Katherine was brave/nice/obnoxious  
 
In contrast in (109), applying to the continuous to a RA nationality predicate does 
not entail that Katherine was of French nationality, but merely that she was behaving as 
if she were French.
27
 This shows that the output of the proposed operation is 
semantically inconsistent in its entailments. 
 
(109) Katherine was being French 
⇏ Katherine was French  
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 This observation is owed to Agustin Vicente (p.c.). 
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The third argument follows up on the second, but again it shows that defining a 
coercion process over IL predicates produces inconsistent results. Notice that the felicity 
of (107b) (i.e. Katherine is being French) requires a contextually shared stereotype of 
how the French behave; otherwise the utterance is infelicitous (cf. Fernald 1999: 55). 
Switching the nationality to one that fails to conjure a stereotype makes the utterance 
essentially meaningless, e.g. 
??
Katherine is being Tuvaluan.  
A similar thing happens with other non-nationality RAs: 
??
Katherine is being 
fat/old/short/skinny/tall. If such an utterance means anything, some stereotype is 
needed, but it is far from clear what it would be outside of a specific context with 
discourse participants with the necessary shared background. 
However, none of this is required for the felicitous use of an EA in the continuous: 
each person can be brave, nice or obnoxious in different ways in different contexts and 
cultures, and the use of the continuous is meaningful. So, once again, the output of the 
proposed coercion operation is not producing uniformity, which is unexplained if its 
application is restricted by uniformity of the input. 
On the proposal of this thesis, EAs take the continuous aspect because they are 
causative, and causative predicates generally take the continuous. Furthermore, EAs in 
the continuous are behaving just like a natural, causative continuous does. In general, 
the use of the continuous entails that the property is truly ascribed to the subject, and no 
discourse salient stereotype is needed to make it felicitous. 
 
(110) a. Katherine was walking  
  Katherine walked 
b. Katherine was being brave 
  Katherine was brave 
 
Of course, then there is the Imperfective Paradox ((111)), on which it is not entailed 
that the eventuality reached completion. We return to this in section 4.2.2.4. 
 
(111) Katherine was crossing the street 
⇏ Katherine crossed the street 
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For the moment, notice that, even with accomplishments such as cross, it is entailed that 
some of the process took place and that it held of the subject: 
 
(112) a. #Katherine was crossing the street but she didn’t start 
b. Katherine was crossing the street  
  Katherine crossed some part of the street 
 
What is semantically different about (109) (i.e. Katherine was being French) is that 
there is no entailment that the property is true of the subject. Thus (113) is not a 
contradiction. 
 
(113) Katherine was being French but she wasn’t French 
 
A coercion analysis of EAs misses the fact that EAs take the continuous aspect with 
standard entailment properties. The disparity between the semantics of EAs in the 
continuous versus RAs in the continuous is another argument that they are not of the 
same aspectual class. We have seen that there are many syntactic, aspectual, and 
semantic differences between the two classes. Since EAs take a normal continuous—
just like other causative predicates—the conclusion is that the continuous aspect applies 
to EAs as a syntactic/semantic operation. 
However, it is clear that RAs in the continuous are something different. They are 
grammatically marked, they are not always felicitous, and context plays an important 
role. I conclude that RAs do indeed undergo a kind of coercion; but because we are 
talking about felicity and a lack of entailment, I propose that this operation on RAs is 
discourse-based. 
So, the continuous is a context for coercion. But when coercion takes place in the 
continuous, it is a discourse-level process that relies on stereotypes. In section 4.2.2, 
where the continuous as a syntactic/semantic operation is analysed, I discuss why the 
continuous is a context for coercion. However, proposing a coercion analysis for EAs 
does not shed any light on the facts or differences that have emerged in this section. 
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3.7.2 EAs and the Continuous Aspect 
It is time to show that EAs are the only class to take the continuous naturally.
28
 In (114) 
there are examples from English, Basque, and Spanish that speak to the cross-linguistic 
generality of EAs in the continuous. Example (114a) highlights the conspicuity of EAs 
in the continuous, as it is from an advanced English grammar for foreigners where EAs 
are the only adjective class that is mentioned as taking the continuous. 
 
(114) a. She’s being rather obstinate at the moment  (Side and Wellman 2002: 26)  
b. Jon ausarta izaten  ari da    (Basque) 
    Jon brave   be-LOC ari is 
    ‘John is being brave’  
c. Juan estaba siendo muy cruel con el entrevistador 
    Juan  was ser-CONT very cruel to the interviewer 
    ‘John was being very cruel to the interviewer’ 
(Spanish, cf. Arche 2006: 27, ex. (80)) 
 
In the examples in (115) and (116), however, we see that neither SLs nor ILs are 
grammatical (modulo the comments made above in the discussion of Evidential 
Coercion). 
 
(115) a. *Peter is being anxious/nervous/sick/ready/willing 
b. *Jon gogotsu/gaixo/prest izaten ari da   (Basque) 
    ‘John is being eager/sick/ready’ 
c. *Pedro está siendo ansioso/enfermo/listo   (Spanish) 
    ‘Peter is being sick/ready’ 
(116) a. *Peter is being Canadian/tall 
b. *Jon altua izaten ari da     (Basque) 
    ‘John is being tall’ 
c. *Pedro está siendo alto     (Spanish) 
    ‘Peter is being tall’ 
 
                                                          
28
 Section 3.7.3.2 qualifies this statement: it discusses sound emission adjectives such as noisy, which are 
another class that takes the continuous aspect. Crucially, like EAs, they are stative causatives, so they 
pattern together. On another note, “tough” predicates are the last class that takes the continuous, but they 
fall outside the scope of this study. 
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The Spanish data help to reinforce the point that only EAs take the continuous 
because this language has two copulas. Ser is the general purpose, default copula 
((117a)), and estar adds a meaning of temporal restriction ((117b)). So in (117b) estar is 
marking that enfermo ‘sick’ is interpreted as temporally restricted. 
 
(117) Spanish 
a. Juan es alto   
     Juan ser-PRES tall 
     ‘John is tall’ 
b. Juan está enfermo    
    Juan estar-PRES sick 
    ‘John is sick’ 
 
The distribution of the two copulas is heavily researched and it has been noted that 
with the corresponding changes in meaning, almost any adjective can appear with either 
copula (Maienborn 2005a). In (118) we have examples with an EA appearing with both 
copulas. The (a) example is interpreted generically and the (b) example with respect to a 
specific time. 
 
(118) Spanish 
a. Juan es cauteloso 
    Juan ser-PRES careful 
    ‘John is careful’ 
b. Juan está cauteloso 
    Juan estar-PRES careful 
      ‘John is careful’ 
 
Likewise, in (119) we have the RA gordo ‘fat’ taking both copulas, the (a) example 
interpreted generically and the (b) example implying that John’s current state of fatness 
is relevant to the discourse. These examples illustrate the interchangeability of the two 
copulas. 
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(119) Spanish 
a. Juan es gordo 
Juan ser-PRES fat 
‘John is fat’ 
b. Juan está gordo 
Juan estar-PRES fat 
‘John is fat’ 
 
Now let’s take a closer look at the morphology of the Spanish continuous. It is built 
with estar bearing tense, and ser bearing the gerund morphology. Example (120a) 
shows an EA taking the continuous with está (the present tense form of estar), and 
siendo (the gerund form of ser). This EA example is grammatical, but PAs/SL 
predicates and RAs are not ((120b, c) respectively). 
 
(120) Spanish 
a. Juan      está    siendo   cauteloso 
John estar-PRES ser-CONT careful 
‘John is being careful’ 
b. *Juan está siendo ansioso/enfermo 
‘John is being anxious/sick’ 
c. *Juan está siendo gordo 
‘John is being fat’ 
 
These data show that flexible copula selection should not be confused with the 
continuous aspect. EAs are still the only adjective class that take the continuous. 
Whenever an EA appears with estar bearing tense, the gerund siendo can be added 
freely to complete the continuous form (cf. Juan está cauteloso (118b)). But this is not 
the case with the other adjective classes. PAs/SL predicates and RAs can appear with 
both copulas ((118), (119)), but they do not accept full continuous aspect morphology 
((120b, c)). So even if a language has different copulas and their distribution is flexible, 
it is still the case that EAs are only adjective class that takes the continuous. 
One last data point highlights that an IL analysis does not capture EAs. The data 
presented so far in this chapter have shown that, in English, EAs have an existential 
interpretation in every tense but the present simple. Interestingly, in languages that lack 
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a morphological continuous aspect, like Romanian and Swedish, the present simple 
behaves differently. 
In these languages, in the present simple, EAs are ambiguous between the 
existential and the generic readings ((121a), (122a)). Yet, PAs/SL predicates ((121b), 
(122b)) and RAs ((121c), (122c)) continue to behave as they are typically described in 
English. 
 
(121) Romanian 
a. Ion e  obraznic  ( /Gen)  
    ‘John is rude’  
b. Ion e bolnav   ( /Gen)  
     ‘John is sick’ 
c. Ion e înalt   (* /Gen)  
    ‘John is tall’ 
(122) Swedish 
a. John är ohövlig   ( /Gen) 
    ‘John is rude’ 
b. John är sjuk    ( /Gen) 
    ‘John is sick’ 
c. John är lång    (* /Gen) 
    ‘John is tall’ 
 
This supports the conclusion that EAs lack an existential reading in the present simple 
in English (among other languages) because of the properties of the interpretation of 
this tense in English—not because it indicates that they are IL predicates. 
Now we have seen that cross-linguistically in languages with a productive 
continuous, EAs are the class that takes it, just like causative predicates generally do. 
Lastly, evidence from languages lacking a morphological continuous confirms that EAs 
generally have an existential interpretation. 
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3.7.3 Against “Active” be 
“Active” be is the final way that the agentive inferences that EAs produce have been 
analysed. In contrast to a coercion operation, “active” be is an independent lexical item 
in the grammar: a non-stative copula. 
 
 
3.7.3.1 “Active” be: General Concerns   
“Active” be is motivated by the agentive inferences produced by adjectives in the 
continuous aspect. In (123) we have an EA example. 
 
(123) John is being foolish 
 
“Active” be is based on two assumptions that are not sustainable: (i) that agentive 
inferences entail non-stativity, and (ii) that the continuous is an indication of non-
stativity. This chapter has shown that (i) is false. Chapter 4 will show that (ii) is, as well. 
To foreshadow, chapter 4 will show that the continuous entails that the predicate is 
causative, but not that it is not stative. So from the perspective of the present proposal, 
(123) does not motivate a non-stative copula in the first place. 
Another general problem is that cross-linguistically, different languages do have 
different copulas for different kinds of predictions. For example, Spanish has ser and 
estar, and Basque izan and egon. Each of these copulas is aspectually stative. If “active” 
be were a real grammatical formative, we should expect some language to realise it in a 
way that it is unambiguously distinct from stative copulas. To my knowledge, no such 
copula exists. 
At the theoretical level, however, something similar has been proposed. The 
immediate intuition in (123) is that John is doing something (Partee 1977: 307). For 
Partee, “active” be is a copula in addition to the stative one. Dowty (1979), in turn, 
formalises “active” be as the morphological spell-out of the abstract predicate DO.  
In Dowty’s aspectual calculus, the predicate modifier DO produces the activity 
aspectual class: with verbs, DO spells out as do, and with adjectives, as be. Once 
“active” be is the equivalent of do that surfaces as be with adjectives for morphological 
reasons, it raises a question: why does do still appear with adjectives sometimes? The 
contrast in (124) shows that in pseudo-clefts, do is still mandatory with an adjective. 
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(124) a. ?What John did was be rude 
b. *What John was was be rude 
 
If do and be are semantically equivalent here, with an adjective downstairs, one might 
expect a sort of morphological concord between the two tensed verbs, but it is 
categorically impossible ((124b)). 
In this connection, the pair in (125) shows that in a minimally different structure, be 
and do can alternate, but the sentences mean very different things; if be and do were 
related on some level, why these sentences mean such different things is hard to 
explain. 
 
(125) a. What John was was rude 
b. What John did was rude 
 
Furthermore, example (126) shows that the inclusion of an overt infinitive—
something that John actually did do—makes the structure ungrammatical. This is also 
difficult to explain on any theory of “active” be. 
 
(126) *What John did was be rude to leave 
 
In contrast, the present proposal can capture difference between (126) and (124a) 
(
?
What John did was be rude) with a pragmatic analysis. Example (124a) is felicitous 
because the adjective contains a causative structure and an animate external argument. 
When the CP is left implicit, the abstract, stative relation that the adjective establishes 
between the external argument and the CP is underspecified. I propose that this 
underspecification leaves enough discourse space for the pseudo-cleft structure to 
generate an agentive implicature. 
Even though do implies an action, it takes advantage of the underspecification in 
(124a): it picks up on the causative structure and the animate argument in order to imply 
intentionality on the Causer’s part, thus the agentive implicature.  
This use of do in (124a) meets two out of the three criteria for a pseudo-cleft 
structure to be completely felicitous; namely, that the predicate be causative with an 
external argument. The missing criterion is that the predicate truly imply an action. 
Recall that in section 3.4.1, cross-linguistically, we saw that (124a) is less than perfect. 
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Now, what (126) shows is that, as soon as the abstract relation denoted by the EA is 
specified with an overt CP, the lack of action can no longer be modulated, the 
implicature is blocked, and the combination with do produces a contradiction that 
cannot be avoided at either the semantic or the pragmatic level. 
This discussion has an important consequence for the existence of the Dowtyan 
predicate modifier DO. Dowty qualified it by stating that it depended on the correct 
analysis of EAs as agentive/non-stative. Otherwise, there is no compelling evidence that 
it is needed in the aspectual calculus (1979: 119; 166). We have seen that EAs are 
stative, and that their agentivity is an implicature. We can therefore conclude that DO 
does not exist because it is not empirically motivated. 
Returning to “active” be, the last general problem is raised by Rothstein (1999). 
The distribution of “active” be is restricted by a [+Active] feature on the adjective. 
Without some such a mechanism, it over-generates massively: every copular sentence 
would be predicted to be ambiguous.  Furthermore, “active” be is supposed to account 
for agentive inferences. So, EAs are acceptable in a structure like (127), which gives 
rise to an agentive inference, because “active” be appears with an adjective marked 
[+Active]. 
 
(127) I made Jane be polite   (Rothstein 1999: 350, ex. (8a)) 
 
Note that the agentive inference cannot be said to be due to make alone, because not 
all predicates are equally acceptable in this structure. In (128) we see that simple state 
predicates do not work very well. 
 
(128) a. #I made Jane own the typewriter 
b. #I made Jane know the answer 
c. #I made Jane be tall 
 
Therefore, once “active” be is admitted in the grammar, the prediction is that 
wherever there is an agentive inference in an adjectival predication, “active” be is 
responsible. Rothstein shows that this is not borne out. In (129), examples (a) and (c) 
are fine and there is an agentive inference, but examples (b) and (d) show that these 
adjectives are deviant in the continuous aspect. 
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(129) a. I made the children be ready at three 
b. #The children are being ready at three 
c. I made Jane be awake for the visit 
d. #Jane is being awake for the visit 
(Rothstein 1999: 361, ex. (46a-d)) 
 
“Active” be predicts grammaticality across predicate classes and contexts that produce 
agentive inferences, and so all the examples in (129) should be equally acceptable. 
Instead, they show that “active” be is based on the wrong generalisation.29 
 
 
3.7.3.2 “Active” be: Specific Properties and an Alternative Perspective 
The sum of these general problems is enough to cast serious doubt on the existence of 
“active” be. Partee (1977) proposes it only out of apparent necessity. However, 
untangling the data that appear to motivate it is worth the effort because it reveals an 
important connection to the properties of EAs.  
There are two specific motivations for “active” be. Both are related to the 
observation that the continuous with adjectives seems to impose restrictions that the 
continuous with verbs does not: that the subject be (i) volitional and (ii) animate. We’ll 
discuss each in turn. 
First, (130) provides an example with sound emission adjectives. As mentioned 
above in footnote 28, these adjectives also take the continuous aspect. Although they 
generally fall outside scope of this thesis, they are the adjectives that originally 
motivated the specific properties of “active” be in Partee’s analysis. 
 
(130) John is being loud/noisy/quiet 
 
Partee observed the contrast in (131) and suggested that the deviance of the latter 
example is accounted for if the continuous with adjectives requires volition. 
 
                                                          
29
 This argument is valid for coercion accounts in general. It shows that the appearance of an agentive 
inference in one context is not predictive of grammaticality in another—even if the second context also 
produces an agentive inference. 
However, Rothstein’s examples are not a problem for Fernald (1999) in particular because the input 
to Evidential Coercion is restricted to IL predicates and Rothstein’s examples use SL predicates. The 
important point, though, is simply that agentive inferences are not trustworthy guides. 
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(131) a. The children are being quiet right now because they want a story 
(Partee 1977: 306, ex. (59)) 
b. 
(?)
The children are being quiet right now because they’re asleep 
(Partee 1977: 306, ex. (58)) 
 
In section 3.4.2 we saw that volition is only an implicature with EAs, and (132) 
shows that the same is true of sound emission adjectives: 
 
(132) The children are being quiet on purpose/unintentionally 
 
So volition is not an entailed property and does not support the existence of “active” be. 
In the case of this particular contrast, I would like to offer a simple explanation. 
The continuous aspect is the natural choice when highlighting the relevance of the 
simultaneous instantiation and incompleteness of the eventuality a specific moment; 
hence the use of right now in (131). In this respect, the continuous contrasts with other 
tense/aspect combinations that induce a temporal sequence that in turn implies a 
temporal span. The present perfect in English is an example (e.g. The children have 
been quiet for the last hour). So, if the continuous aspect is used there is the expectation 
that it convey something informative about the instantiation of the predicate at a specific 
moment. 
In (131a), the content of the two clauses is non-trivial: the children wanting a story 
explains the children’s sound production at a moment referred to by the continuous. On 
the other hand, all else being equal, the content of the two clauses in (131b) is not 
particularly illuminating: if the children are asleep, they probably are quiet. And yet, the 
continuous creates the expectation of something more informative, something more 
worthy of mention. Therefore, all else being equal, the mild contrast in (131) does not 
reflect volition, but informativeness with respect to the use of the continuous. 
In support of this explanation note that as soon as all is not equal, any deviance 
disappears. For instance, focussing asleep in (133) makes the sentence perfect. This 
would be appropriate in a context where the addressee is unaware that the children are 
asleep, so being told this constitutes new information and it is an explanation for the 
children’s soundlessness. 
 
(133) The children are being quiet right now because they’re ASLEEP 
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The last property “active” be is said to have is an animacy restriction. Sound 
emission adjectives are intransitive, and in the present simple, they take animate and 
inanimate arguments ((134a, c)) equally well. So in general, sound emission adjectives 
do not have an animacy restriction. When it comes to the continuous, however, there is 
a contrast: only animate arguments seem acceptable ((134b) vs. (134d)). 
 
(134) a. John is noisy 
b. John is being noisy 
c. The river is noisy 
d. *The river is being noisy 
 (Partee 1977: 306, ex. (50)-(53)) 
 
Comparing (134) with (135) shows that the continuous aspect itself does not have an 
animacy restriction: 
 
(135) a. John makes a lot of noise 
b. John is making a lot of noise 
c. The river makes a lot of noise 
d. The river is making a lot of noise 
(Partee 1977: 306, ex. (54)-(57)) 
 
Thus the conclusion that “active” be imposes an animacy restriction. 
I would like to suggest that the conclusion drawn from the contrast in (134) (i.e. 
that the continuous with adjectives has an animacy restriction) is the incorrect empirical 
generalisation. The data in (136) show that inanimates are, in fact, natural with sound 
emission adjectives in the continuous. 
 
(136) a. If you add anti-vibration mounts and you still find your computer is being 
noisy, you may want to take a closer look at the fan and fan filter (Internet) 
b. If the packet loss or jitter seems to be coming from inside your own network, 
check your connections yet again and try switching out equipment on your 
network to see if something on your LAN is being noisy        (Internet) 
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c. Being regular may also be one of the reasons why gas can occur more  
frequently in the mornings, although for most, that is hardly a bad thing. 
  WebMD mentions that contractions from the small intestine can actually 
  cause gassiness and a noisy tummy, which most people refer to as a growling 
  stomach. The stomach however is being quiet and the noises heard and 
  excessive stomach gas that can result are simply a product of contracting 
  muscles as they move air about through the digestive tract during regular 
  morning bowel movements     (Internet) 
d. I added in two Corsair Air Series 120mm Fans in case the radiator is being 
loud       (Internet) 
 
Therefore, there is no paradigm contrast between (134) and (135). Rather, something 
has to be said about (134d) (i.e. *The river is being noisy) in particular, and I address it 
presently. 
But let’s pause for a moment to collect the conclusions from what has been said so 
far. At this point, “active” be is left without distinguishing formal features. All the 
theoretical and empirical points given in these two sections on “active” be illustrate that 
it does not offer a promising general solution to agentive inferences or the behaviour of 
EAs. For these reasons, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is no non-stative 
copula in the grammar. 
With regard to the contrast in (134), we have now seen that there is another 
adjective class, in addition to EAs, that takes the continuous. The examples in (134) are 
interesting for two reasons: (i) they are emission predicates, and (ii) there seems to be 
variability in their acceptability in the continuous ((134d)). We turn to the first point 
immediately. The second is addressed in section 3.7.3.3. 
I have argued that EAs are stative causatives. In order to make the case, I drew a 
parallel with the verbs that RH&L (2000) identified as such (section 3.5). These verbs 
were, specifically, verbs of emission: sound emission (e.g. hum); light emission (e.g. 
gleam); smell emission (e.g. stink); substance emission (e.g. bubble). These verbs are 
stative causatives that pass eventivity tests. The fact that sound emission adjectives 
turnout to take the continuous aspect and give rise to agentive inferences is not a 
problem, but an indication that we are making the right cross-category connections. 
Sound emission adjectives such as loud, noisy and quiet clearly satisfy the Sub-
Interval Property in that they are true at atomic moments. This makes them states, not 
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activities. This makes the comparison between the paradigms in (134) and (135) 
misleading because it was intended as a parallel comparison between two non-stative 
verbs: “active” be and make. The parallel breaks down once (134) is reclassified as 
stative causative. 
As a stative causative predicate, we expect a different pattern. We now expect noisy 
to produce agentive inferences in pseudo-clefts when the subject is animate ((137a)), 
just like EAs ((137b)): 
 
(137) a. ?What John did was be loud 
b. 
?
What John did was be rude 
 
But since noisy is an emission predicate, we expect deviance in pseudo-clefts when the 
subject is inanimate ((138a)), just as was the case with emission verbs ((138b)): 
 
(138) a. ??What the computer did was be noisy 
b. 
??
What the garbage did was stink   (RH&L 2000: 284, ex. (48c)) 
 
In all these cases, the subject is interpreted as the Causer of the noisiness, the 
rudeness, or the stench. And in all these cases the predicates are stative causative. The 
difference in the acceptability between (137) and (138) is due to one variable: the 
animacy of the subject. In (137) animacy and the causative structure combine to 
produce an agentive inference that masks the stativity of the adjective. But once 
animacy is subtracted, the stativity of the predicate makes its degradedness in this 
context even more apparent ((138)). 
The first general conclusion about sound emission adjectives is that we are finding 
cross-category regularity with emission verbs. The second is that the connection drawn 
between EAs and emission verbs as members of the same overarching aspectual class 
receives independent support from the emergence of the parallel behaviour of emission 
adjectives. These are predicates of the same class, even though there are individual 
differences among the members. 
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3.7.3.3 On the Variability of Sound Emission Adjective Judgements  
This brings us to the question of the apparent unacceptability of The river is being noisy 
((134d)). I will start by stating that I do not take this example to be ungrammatical. 
Example (136a) shows that with a different inanimate subject, i.e. your computer, noisy 
is perfectly capable of taking the continuous aspect. 
The question is rather why (134d) seems less acceptable. In order to answer this 
question, we have to breach the more general topic of variation in acceptability among 
members of the same lexical class. The answer comes in two parts: (i) there is a scale of 
stativity within the class of stative causatives, and (ii) the properties of the subject 
always influence acceptability. 
In their discussion of emission verbs, RH&L (2000) posit a continuum of stativity. 
They are led to this because the different types of emission verbs vary with respect to 
how stative they may appear. They identify the following scale: 
 
(139) Continuum of Emission Verb Stativity (RH&L 2000: 283) 
Most Stative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most Process-Like 
Smell Emission   Light Emission Sound/Substance Emission 
(stink)       (gleam)   (hum/bubble) 
 
So, there is variability within the same class: the more stative a predicate is, the less 
causative it seems, and on the present proposal, this directly affects how “eventive” it 
appears. 
This picks up on the argument against a primitive event argument from chapter 1: 
on this proposal, a predicate tests positive for spatio-temporality because of its causative 
structure. The suggestion is simply that a causative relation can be individuated in space 
and time. In contrast, simple states, i.e. non-causatives, hold in time but are not 
restricted in space. 
Now, in the specific case of stative causatives, it seems reasonable to posit that the 
more stative the concept associated with a given stative causative predicate is—the less 
it is associated with movements, actions, or changes—the less causative it will appear. 
Correspondingly, the more stative it is, the less spatio-temporal it will appear respect to 
eventivity tests. 
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Traditionally, the continuous aspect is taken to be a diagnostic for non-stativity. On 
the present proposal, the continuous has a different value: the ability of a predicate to 
appear naturally in the continuous is an indication that the input to the continuous is a 
causative predicate. In other words, here the continuous is an eventivity diagnostic. 
Noisy is a stative causative. Therefore, it should be able to take the continuous 
aspect, and it does. But, there is variation in its acceptability depending on the 
properties of its subject, as seen in (134). 
The first step in addressing this variability is understanding where emission 
adjectives fall on the scale in (139): if they are very stative, they are expected to have 
difficulty with eventivity diagnostics such as the continuous. I will show that this is part 
of the explanation. 
If we compare sound emission adjectives with sound emission verbs in the 
continuous aspect, there is an immediate difference in acceptability. The former are 
marked in some sense ((140a)), but the latter are run-of-the-mill ((140b)). 
 
(140) a. ??The river is being noisy 
b. The wind/engine is humming 
 
But, sound emission verbs are on the high end of the stativity scale: if it weren’t for the 
fact that they satisfy the Sub-Interval Property, they would seem like processes. So 
(140b) is an illustration of a stative causative on the high end of the scale 
correspondingly passing an eventivity test with flying colours. 
Sound emission verbs also have a particular characteristic: they are onomatopoeic. 
They immediately call to mind a very specific type of sound: buzz, hum, rumble, 
screech. This gives them a clear texture. 
Now, compare them with sound emission adjectives: loud, noisy, quiet. Sound 
emission adjectives convey the vaguest possible notions of sound. They have no 
identifiable texture—only a context dependent standard.30 If the concepts of sound 
emission verbs are almost processes in that they convey a sound that has an identifiable 
                                                          
30
 See chapter 4 footnote 13 for psycholinguistic evidence that the phonological form of nonce verbs 
affects eventivity judgements. 
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internal pattern, the concepts of sound emission adjectives are the opposite. So, sound 
emission adjectives are different from sound emission verbs.
31
 
In fact, they seem most comparable with smell emission verbs, such as stink. Smell 
emission verbs don’t convey any particular smell, and smells do not have an identifiable 
internal pattern. Smell emission verbs are the most stative and least process-like on the 
scale in (139). 
Following this reasoning, sound emission adjectives could be expected to pattern 
like smell emission verbs. And as the least process-like, we expect them to have trouble 
with eventivity diagnostics. The judgements for the smell emission verb pair in (141) 
show that this is borne out. Furthermore, if compared with the sound emission 
predicates in (140), we see that the properties of the subject affect the judgements. 
 
(141) a. ??The couch is stinking 
b. 
?
The garbage is stinking 
 
Example (141b) illustrates that the verb stink certainly can take the continuous with an 
inanimate subject, especially when that subject is obvious in some sense. With a less 
obvious subject, however, the sentence requires something more to support it. I propose 
that this is part of what is happening with emission adjectives in the contrast in (142): 
 
(142) a. ??The river is being noisy 
b. The computer is being noisy 
  
Summarising the important points from the discussion of variability so far: 
 
(i) Stative causatives lie on a continuum of stativity.  
(ii) Even though all members are test positive for eventivity, the higher a member is 
on the continuum, the better it will fare with event diagnostics, and the lower a 
member is, the more difficulty it can have. 
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 In chapter 1 it was argued that the category distinction between verbs and adjectives tracks a conceptual 
aspectual difference: verbs can convey change, but adjectives cannot. This makes adjectives transparently 
stative. Taking this to be the case, adjectives can be expected to be shifted down the stative continuum 
with respect to verbs. Specifically, sound emission predicates appear as both verbs and adjectives, but we 
have seen that sound emission verbs are higher on the continuum. Since the verbal category can denote 
change, the category itself is conceptually more eventive than the adjective category. Correspondingly, 
verbs rank higher on the conceptual continuum in a direct comparison with adjectives. 
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(iii) The continuous aspect is an eventivity diagnostic. 
(iv) Sound emission verbs are high on the scale and the take the continuous naturally 
regardless of animacy. 
(v) Sound emission adjectives and smell emission verbs are lowest on the scale. 
(vi) Depending on the type of subject, their apparent behaviour in the continuous 
varies. 
 
Yet the stative continuum is only part of the answer. The other part concerns the 
properties of the subject directly. 
In discussing RH&L (2000) in section 3.5, responsibility became central to 
causation and being a Causer argument. For an emission verb, its external argument is 
conceived of as a Causer because it produces the effect it does due to its own internal 
composition. So, when a lamp shines, the light produced is due to the integral properties 
of the lamp: the conjunction of the properties of the lamp cause the shining. 
In this connection—specifically in the case of stative causatives—we might expect 
the abstractness of the composition of the Causer to have an effect on the interpretation 
of the sentence with respect to eventivity tests. Namely, the more abstract its 
composition, the more difficult it is to conceive of its internal structure. The weaker our 
conception of the Causer’s internal structure, the weaker the conception of the cause. 
Since these predicates are already stative, if the conception of the cause is too weak, the 
result of an eventivity diagnostic will be degraded. 
This seems to be what we find in the contrast with noisy and inanimates in the 
continuous aspect: 
 
(143) a. ??The river is being noisy 
b. The computer/fan/radiator is being noisy 
 
When the subject is a device with internal parts that do something, we find real 
examples of sound emission adjectives in the continuous with inanimates ((136), 
(143b)). Just like with the lamp above, it is easier to have a conception of a mechanism 
producing a result. 
But when we move to a natural force like a river, how it is that a river produces 
sound is a very abstract thing with no tangible parts. Example (143a) certainly is a 
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possible utterance—the continuous with noisy is produced by the grammar—but as an 
utterance, it needs contextual support of some kind. 
The stative continuum and the properties of the subject complement each other. The 
higher a predicate is on the continuum (i.e. the more process-like it is), the less the 
properties of the subject interfere with eventivity tests. Sound emission verbs are 
highest on the continuum and the properties of the subject do not seem to affect it: 
 
(144) a. The engine is humming 
b. The wind is humming 
 
But if a predicate is low on the continuum, and in consequence, it independently has 
trouble with eventive contexts, an abstract Causer does not help solidify the cause. So, 
sound emission adjectives with abstract subjects can produce marked judgements. We 
will come back to this in section 4.2.3. In the next section, I will appeal to the 
continuum again in order to address variability among EAs with respect to eventivity 
diagnostics. 
In closing this section it is worth underlining an important implication of the 
variation discussed here. This section has identified parameters of variability with 
respect to eventivity diagnostics. The implication is that there is no primitive event 
argument: if the event argument were a semantic primitive, independent factors such as 
a conceptual scale and the properties of the subject should not influence it. On the other 
hand, if eventivity is an inference dependent on the description of a causal relation, 
variation is expected. This is what we find. So in this section we have seen the further 
empirical indications that eventivity is not primitive. In chapter 4 this argued at length. 
 
 
3.7.4 EAs: the Elements of Unification 
At this point, the arguments against the possible alternative approaches to EAs have 
been given. Approaches that account for their behaviour by positing an ambiguity in the 
adjective (i.e. IL/SL/activity denotations), or by positing a single denotation and a 
coercion operation, or by positing an ambiguity in the copula itself, raise serious doubts 
both at general and specific levels. 
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In this section, the positive evidence for a unified account is pulled together. First, 
the data pattern characterising EAs is presented (section 3.7.4.1). Second, variability in 
EA data is discussed in light of the stative continuum (section 3.7.4.2). Lastly, 
arguments are given to show that there is no EA predication without an entailed CP. 
 
 
3.7.4.1 The EA Data Pattern 
In chapter 2 extensive arguments were presented to substantiate the causative 
alternation paradigm in (145). Syntactically, it was shown that (i) the EA CP always 
originates in complement position, (ii) there is no external argument in the that-clause 
data and (iii) the animate argument in the other forms always behaves like an external 
argument. Syntactically, EA argument structure is consistent.   
 
(145) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition  
            + Passive 
 
We also saw that they are uniformly factive wherever testable: 
 
(146) #Emma was brave to resist but she didn’t resist 
 
This chapter has shown that EAs have the temporal properties of eventive 
predicates. Just like eventive predicates in English in general, in the present simple EAs 
are interpreted generically ((147a)). But, in other tenses, an existential reading appears 
((147b)). EAs also take the continuous aspect naturally ((147c)) and they can be 
interpreted as having temporal duration ((147d)). 
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(147) a. Emma is brave   (* /Gen) 
b. Emma was brave   ( /Gen) 
c Emma is being brave 
d. Emma has been brave 
 
EAs pass the eventivity diagnostics of perception reports ((148a)), locative 
modification ((148b)), and manner modification ((148c)). Example (148c) is a 
dictionary entry taken from a vocabulary building guide written by a former editor of 
The New York Times.
32
 
 
(148) a. I saw Emma be brave 
b. Emma was brave in the kitchen 
c. Intrepid: this adjective is a synonym for resolute. Someone who is intrepid is 
   fearlessly brave      (Fiske et al. 2006: 59) 
 
Despite the evidence for eventivity and producing agentive inferences, diagnostics 
that target inner-aspect alone show that EAs are always stative. In (149a) EAs pass the 
take-time test, which in general, only statives do. Example (149b) shows that EAs do 
not have a process to measure. And the unacceptability of (149c) confirms this. Lastly, 
as only statives do, EAs always have the Sub-Interval Property: they are true of atomic 
moments on all their usages. 
 
(149) a. It took Emma five minutes to be brave 
b. 
??
Emma was slowly/quickly/little by little brave 
c. *Emma was brave. This happened while the police confronted the students 
 
Aspectually, this seems like an odd set of properties. But we found that the 
existence of stative causatives has been independently identified (RH&L 2000; cf. 
Maienborn 2005b)) and EAs fit the same pattern. If a class of stative causatives that 
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 In case it is suspected that modifying adjectives with adverbs is a recent development, here is an 
example published in Appendix to the Congressional Globe, edited by United States Congress (June 
1838: 492). 
 
(i) Capt.—was fearlessly brave, and although severely wounded, continued to head his company in 
the most gallant manner, until he received another severe wound, when he was taken from the 
field. 
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undergoes the causative alternation were to exist, these are the properties it should 
have—and EAs have them.33 
The two outstanding issues are (i) variability of judgements with respect to different 
EAs in different eventivity diagnostics (section 3.7.4.2), and (ii) an argument that the 
EA CP is always present even when it is null (section 3.7.4.3). 
 
 
3.7.4.2 EA Variability and the Stative Continuum  
Section 3.7.3.3 introduced the continuum of stative causatives that RH&L (2000) found 
in their study of emission verbs ((150), repeated from (139)) and I extended it to sound 
emission adjectives. 
 
(150) Continuum of Emission Verb Stativity (RH&L 2000: 283) 
Most Stative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most Process-Like 
Smell Emission  Light Emission  Sound/Substance Emission 
(stink)   (gleam)   (hum/bubble) 
 
                                                          
33
 Now that we have seen that EAs have a consistent set of properties, an argument against approaches 
that eliminate syntactic/semantic information from lexical entries can be formulated (cf. Marantz 1984, 
1997; Borer 2005a, b, a.o.).  
The present theory of inner-aspect makes a single distinction between stative causatives and simple 
states. The two classes can be distinguished quite simply. For example, causatives pass eventivity tests 
((148)), they lack an existential reading in the present simple that they have in the past simple, and the 
take the continuous aspect ((147)).  
On the other hand, simple states do not pass eventivity tests, they have an existential reading in the 
present and past simple, and they do not take the continuous aspect. The only way to capture the 
consistency of these properties is to mark a predicate in the lexicon as causative or not causative. 
Otherwise, the individual properties would be predicted to appear randomly.  
In this connection, approaches that eliminate lexical information posit that interpretation is restricted 
by discourse context and conceptual knowledge alone. But the principled distinction between causatives 
and simple states suggests that that is too weak. For example, compare (i) and (ii), a causative and a 
simple state, respectively. It seems possible to imagine a discourse context in which (i) could be 
interpreted along the lines of (ii). Namely, the speaker wants to convey that the subject in (i) is an 
Experiencer, i.e. Emma felt rude in leaving, just as in (ii), Emma felt eager to leave. 
 
(i) Emma was rude to leave 
(ii) Emma was eager to leave 
 
There seems to be no reason why such an interpretation would be discursively or conceptually 
impossible. But that interpretation of (i) is not available. And more generally, EAs do not pattern with 
PAs. This argues that there has to be a principled formal distinction encoded somewhere. Encoding it 
lexically is the only way to block the unobserved malleability that the absence of lexical information 
allows for. 
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The same continuum can be adapted and applied to EAs. EAs are a big class, and 
within it, some reflect concepts that are more abstract, others more palpable. The 
adjectives intelligent—that prototypical IL predicate—and rude seem to mark the two 
respective ends of scale. Indeed intelligent, in most contexts, does feel very stative, and 
in the continuous aspect (e.g. Peter is being intelligent) without contextual support, it 
may seem less than perfect.  
On the other hand, substituting rude for brave in the eventivity diagnostics in (148) 
produces even firmer judgements than brave does. In this connection, Kertz (2010) 
concludes that intelligent is only IL, but rude is genuinely ambiguous. She proposes that 
only EAs that select a to-PP are ambiguous: rude does so, intelligent does not. 
Yet, I maintain that any member of the EA class can be substituted into the blocks 
of characterising environments in (145)-(149). In fact, when it comes to pure syntactic 
facts such as the causative alternation paradigm ((145)), pure semantic facts such as 
factivity ((146)), the interpretation of tense ((147) (with qualification for the 
continuous), or pure stativity diagnostics ((149)), intelligent and rude behave exactly the 
same. Multiple denotations would be missing significant commonalities. We only find 
judgement variability when it comes to eventivity diagnostics. 
But then, it is relatively easy to find examples of intelligent being used in these 
eventive environments ((151b)), and explicit claims that it is fine in the continuous 
((151a)). The acceptability of intelligent in these environments is part of what makes IL 
coercion analyses necessary if one assumes the IL/SL distinction. 
 
(151) a. Max is being intelligent   (Fernald 1999: 54, ex. (37d)) 
b. Our grandfather, Calvin Whitt, was a practical, kind man, in addition to being  
    shrewdly intelligent    (James Sizemore, Dearest Cousin) 
c. 
??
I saw John be intelligent 
 
When intelligent is less acceptable, such as in perception reports ((151c)), we now 
have tools to understand why. On the one hand, the verb see entails perception, but 
intelligence is a very abstract property; on the other, we have the stativity continuum 
that places intelligent on the lowest end. Thus, the high stativity of this abstract property 
sheds light on its deviance in perception reports. Nevertheless, intelligent does work in 
eventivity environments—just as it should on this stative causative analysis. 
Leferman 
182 
 
Comparing intelligent and rude with respect to RH&L’s stative continuum captures 
the intuitions that these adjectives are still different in some way. Smell emission verbs 
and sound emission adjectives are the most stative. These are the stative causatives that 
have the least identifiable internal texture. As a cognitive property, this seems to be true 
of intelligent. 
On the other end of the scale, sound emission verbs are the most process-like. 
Verbs like hum can be associated with a particular, rhythmic sound. Rude is similar in 
that it is vivid. Compared with intelligent, it is easy to imagine how rudeness can have a 
target. In fact, this seems to condition the availability of a to-PP: if an EA is high on the 
continuum in terms of seeming process-like and the property it denotes can be directed 
at people, then the EA expresses this as a to-PP (e.g. generous, nice, rude). Since 
intelligent is low on the continuum and the characteristic it denotes is not easily 
conceived of as targeting an individual, it does not license a to-PP: Peter was intelligent 
to Philip can only mean “in Philip’s opinion, Peter was intelligent”. 
But even in the case of an EA as vivid as rude, it is clear that it is stative: example 
(152a) has the state on-set reading (recall that activities are unacceptable in this context, 
e.g. #It took them 30 minutes to walk in the park); (152b) does not measure the speed of 
the process like an activity (e.g. I ate my lunch slowly); and (152c) is deviant.  
 
(152) a. It took Peter two minutes to be rude to Philip 
b. #Peter was slowly/quickly/little by little rude to Philip 
c. *Peter was rude to Philip. This happened while I was talking to Emma  
 
So, both intelligent and rude are members of the stative causative class—they just fall 
on different ends of the spectrum.
34
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 In her appraisal of EA to-PP data, Arche (2006: 96-98) concludes that the argument is a Goal rather 
than an affected argument because an affected argument is the undergoer of change, and there is no 
change in this case. I would like to add that this is also an indication that these data are stative. In 
connection to Arche’s observation, note that with to-PPs there is no entailment that the object is truly 
affected by the EA property. For example in Peter was rude to Emma, there is no way of knowing if 
Emma perceived the rudeness. 
Since affectedness mischaracterises the data, in the main text I used the words “target” and “directed 
at” to describe the object of the EA to-PP. I would like to stress, however, that there is no entailment of 
motion here, and the stativity of the data is beyond doubt. To see this, let’s compare EAs with PAs. In (i) 
the PA denotes a simple state. Example (ii) shows that even PAs can select a complement PP. This PP is 
interpreted as the target of Victoria’s anger. Yet, the inner-aspect of the predicate remains constant in (i) 
and (ii): it is the same predicate and it is stative. So, mental states can have target. With EAs in (iii), the 
same thing happens. The tests in (152) show that these EAs to-PP data are just as stative. Furthermore, 
examples (iv) and (v) show that Spanish uses the same preposition in these cases. 
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Before moving on to the last kind of EA variability that we will consider, it is worth 
pointing out that combining the different kinds of stative causative predicates with the 
What X did ... test illustrates the scale. We have seen that this test is not reliable because 
it is fuzzy: it is skewed both by the animacy of the subject and the presence of 
causation, while not necessarily distinguishing clearly between states and non-states. 
Thus, we have the partial scale in (153). An activity verb is fine irrespective of 
animacy ((153a, b)). A stative causative denoting a physical state is mildly deviant 
((153c)). An EA high on the scale is similarly deviant ((153d)), and an EA lower on the 
scale is slightly more so ((153e)). 
 
(153) a. What John did was roll down the hill  
b. What the boulder did was roll down the hill 
c. 
(?)
What Peter did was sleep 
d. 
(?)
What Peter did was be rude 
e. 
?
What Peter did was be intelligent 
f. What Emma did was hum 
g. 
??
What the computer did was hum 
h. 
?
What Philip did was be noisy 
i. 
??
What the computer did was be noisy 
j. *What Hugo did was be sick/tall 
k. *What the pole did was be tall 
 
A sound emission verb (i.e. high on the scale) with an animate subject is fine ((153f)), 
but switched with an inanimate, it worsens ((153g)). A sound emission adjective (i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(i) Victoria was angry 
(ii) Victoria was angry at Peter 
(iii) Peter was rude (to Emma) 
(iv) Pedro    estuvo  enfadado con María  (Spanish) 
Peter  estar-PAST angry   with Mary 
‘Peter was angry with Mary’ 
(v) María    fue      cruel con Pedro  (Spanish) 
Mary ser-PAST cruel with Peter 
‘Mary was cruel to Peter’ 
 
These data show that the presence of an argument PP and the intuitive meaning of the preposition do 
not affect the inner-aspect of the predication. All of these examples are stative. I have chosen the words 
“target” and “directed at”—instead of Arche’s Goal—in order to avoid terminology that implies that 
motion is involved here. These data show that states can have targets, and since no change is involved, 
stativity is constant. Lastly, the difficulty in finding unambiguous, innocuous labels for thematic roles is 
an indication that thematic roles are not primitives. Section 4.4.3 proposes to derive them.  
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low on the scale) with an animate subject is slightly deviant ((153h)), and again it gets 
worse with an inanimate (((153i)). Lastly, (153j) drops off the stative causative scale 
into the realm of static states, which get progressively worse with respect to the animacy 
of the subject ((153k)). This shows that this test does not distinguish any one thing. 
As for stative causatives, they are relatively acceptable in this test, and they are 
consistently better if the external argument is animate. This is important because it 
shows that animacy and agentive inferences improve things across the board. 
Specifically for our purposes, it means that EA agentive inferences do not require an 
explicit explanation. Agentive inferences arise across categories, in many different 
contexts, and they even appear in order to make non-causative predicates seem better: 
the only way of making sense of (153j) is to interpret Hugo as intentionally making 
himself sick or tall. But there is no coherent supporting syntactic or semantic evidence 
that motivates a causative analysis of sick or tall. Correspondingly, (153k) is 
impossible. We have found other invariable syntactic and semantic reasons to analyse 
EAs as stative causative alternating predicates (section 3.7.4.1), but agentivity 
inferences are a red herring. 
Let’s turn now to a final specific case where there is variability in EA acceptability: 
EA CP manner adverb data. Combining a causative alternation analysis with the 
understanding that EAs vary in the degree of their stativity sheds light on the pattern. 
The grammatical examples are repeated in (154)-(156). 
 
(154) a. Why should I have consulted you, when you were being obnoxiously stubborn 
   about the issue?      
b. He was obnoxiously stubborn to refuse 
c. It was obnoxiously stubborn (of him) to refuse 
(155) a. She is viciously arrogant in her treatment to her inferiors […]   
b. If it had an impact, surely A[ir] F[rance] would be silly and viciously arrogant 
to think they can do nothing and expect it to go away    
c.  It would be viciously arrogant of AF to think they can do nothing and expect it 
to go away 
(156) a. They will be deviously careful and will use EVERY advantage   
b. […] business consortiums are deviously careful not to mention E-Verify […] 
c. It is deviously careful of business consortiums not to mention E-Verify 
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On the present theory, this is exactly as it should be if these are causative transitive 
active and passive structures. The examples in (157) show that causative alternating 
verbs behave the same way with comparable manner adverbs. 
  
(157) a. Hugo broke the chair carefully 
b. The chair was carefully broken (by Hugo) 
 
However, when it comes to the EA that-clause structures, there is relative 
acceptability. On the present theory, these structures are unaccusatives: 
 
(158) a. ??It was obnoxiously stubborn that he refused  
b. 
?
It was viciously arrogant that AF thought that they could do nothing and  
    expect it to go away. 
c. *It is deviously careful that business consortiums do not mention E-Verify. 
 
Example (158c) is ungrammatical, (158b) is somewhat deviant, and (158a) is noticeably 
more deviant. 
Now, note that manner adverbs are ungrammatical in unaccusatives: 
 
(159) *The chair broke carefully 
 
We can understand the deviance of (158a, b) and the ungrammaticality of (158c), as 
well as the grammatical examples in (154)-(156), on a causative alternation analysis, 
once they are qualified by the stative continuum. 
First, the grammatical examples in (154)-(156) follow automatically from the 
parallelism with (157). 
But, the parallelism breaks down with the unaccusative data. There is, however, one 
obvious difference between (159) and (158): the former only has a DP Theme argument, 
but the latter has a full CP that contains the argument that would become the Causer 
upon insertion of an external argument. In (154)-(156), we see that as soon as that 
happens, the sentences become completely grammatical. 
Putting all these elements together, the explanation for the whole EA manner 
adverb paradigm is straightforward: the reason why we find deviance just with a that-
clause is because it is unaccusative and manner adverbs are not licensed here, just as in 
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(159). The additional complication is that within the that-clause lies a potentially 
understood Causer. Yet, if the adjective is low on the stative continuum, the sentence 
remains totally ungrammatical: careful denotes a very abstract property that is not 
directed at others, and (158c) is highly marked.  
In contrast, as the adjective moves up the scale, it is able to pick up on the referent 
of the embedded subject with the corresponding degree of success: arrogance is a vivid 
concept and it does quite well, but stubbornness is more obscure and it does worse. 
The explanation is intuitive and it makes sense once a continuum is admitted. In 
sum, the overall paradigm, the fact that the deviance only appears where it does, and 
that it is gradient are all understood by combining the causative alternation analysis and 
the continuum. 
I have discussed the existence of judgment variability at a few points throughout 
this chapter. I have done so because the qualifications flesh out the proposal and 
indicate how the deviance of some data points can be handled. We have seen how 
pragmatics and conceptual knowledge interact with the syntax and semantics in 
reasonable ways. 
 
 
3.7.4.3 The EA CP is Always Entailed 
The overarching reason for concluding that EAs always entail a CP, even when the CP 
is implicit, is that EAs uniformly fit the pattern of a causative alternating predicate. 
The conceptual reasons to suspect that the CP is always there are: 
 
(i) Chapter 2 showed that when overt, the CP always patterned with a complement 
base-position; if it had been the case that there was variability in the base-position 
of the CP, it would be a strong argument against the omnipresence of the CP—
instead we found uniformity.  
(ii) Important points of EA uniformity were the animate argument is external, the CP 
in complement position, it is always aspectually stative, and it is always factive. 
(iii) Once EAs are diagnosed as causative, not even the generic interpretation in the 
present simple (e.g. Peter is intelligent) supports the intuitive need for an IL 
denotation, because all causative predicates are interpreted generically in this 
tense in English. 
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Empirical evidence comes from the diagnostics that have EAs with and without the 
CP patterning together. This was the case with bare plurals and there-insertion repeated 
here as (160)-(161).  
 
(160) a. American consumers are smart    (* /Gen) 
b. American consumers are smart to buy foreign goods  (* /Gen) 
c. American consumers are eager to buy foreign goods ( /Gen) 
(Kertz 2006: 230, ex. (3)-(5)) 
(161) a. *There were lawmakers smart 
b. *There were lawmakers smart to endorse the proposal 
c. There were lawmakers eager to endorse the proposal 
(Kertz 2006: 230, ex. (6)-(8)) 
 
On an ambiguity account this is not expected because the presence of the CP signals a 
shift from an IL predicate to a SL level one. On a uniform account of EAs, they are 
correctly expected pattern together, whether or not the CP is overt.   
Likewise, EAs behave the same with respect to the interpretation of tense ((162)) 
and the acceptability of manner adverbs ((163)): 
 
(162) Emma is/was/has been/will be brave (to resist) 
(163) a. They will be deviously careful and will use EVERY advantage  
b. […] business consortiums are deviously careful not to mention E-Verify […] 
 
Turning now specifically to entailment patterns, in chapter 2 we saw that when the 
EA CP is overt, it is always entailed: 
 
(164) a. #It was rude that Peter left, but in the end he didn’t  
b. #Peter was rude to leave, but in the end he didn’t  
c. #It was rude of Peter to leave, but in the end he didn’t 
 
Example (165) attempts to show the same thing with a ball-park paraphrase of what 
EAs express on this stative causative analysis. It is an attempt to circumvent the fact 
that we are testing for a null element. In the first clause the EA predicates of an 
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individual, and in the second, the EA explicitly modifies a negative polarity item 
substituting for a CP. 
 
(165) #Peter is rude, but he has never been responsible for anything rude     
 
If there were two EA denotations, one with and one without a CP, there should be a 
reading of (165) on which the two clauses are not contradictory. Instead, to utter (165) 
is to deny any evidence of Peter’s rudeness, and therefore stating that Peter is rude is a 
vacuous claim. Since we are testing for a null element, (165) is indirect evidence for the 
presence of the CP in examples that are apparently monadic, such as Peter is rude. The 
contradiction follows from including the CP in the EA denotation, in parallel to (164).
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The fixity of the CP entailment is reinforced by a comparison with EA to-PP data. 
Stowell (1991: 129) observed that an EA with a to-PP implies a situation in which the 
property is instantiated ((166b)), while an EA with a CP does not necessarily imply a to-
PP  ((166a)). In confirmation of Stowell’s judgements, it has been noted that EAs have a 
deontic component to their meaning (cf. Jackendoff 1972; Rawlins 2008). This means 
that what qualifies as, e.g. rude, can be established by a set of rules, or convention. One 
such setting is a royal court. The rules of the court establish when it is appropriate to 
speak, and when it is not. In such a setting (166a) can be true via a rule book, even 
though no one in particular was the target of the rudeness. 
 
(166) a. Katherine was rude to speak 
  ⇏ Katherine was rude to the court/to the queen 
b. Katherine was rude to Emma 
     Katherine was rude to Emma in some situation 
 
However in (166b), when someone is the target of rudeness, some situation necessarily 
accompanies it. So it seems that EAs always entail a CP denoting some situation, but 
they don’t always entail a to-PP. 
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 In support of this, let’s compare EAs with RAs. Example (165) is vacuous, but the paraphrase used is 
comprehensible ((i)). In contrast, using the same paraphrase with RAs is simply inappropriate ((ii)). This 
contrast in propriety shows that the paraphrase in (165) is helpful in targeting the properties of EAs 
because it supports the meaning difference between the two classes (i.e. EAs are transitive causatives and 
RAs are intransitive simple states). 
 
(i) Peter is rude, and he has been responsible for many rude situations 
(ii) ###Peter is tall but he has never been responsible for anything tall 
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In their recent discussion of optionality in argument realisation, RH&L “suggest 
that the components of meaning that a verb lexicalises are precisely those elements of 
meaning that are entailed in all its uses” (2012: 175). I propose extending this 
suggestion from verbs to predicates in general in order to hold for adjectives, as well. In 
the terms of the present proposal RH&L’s proposal can be rephrased as follow: the only 
arguments included a predicate’s denotation are those that are entailed in all its usages.  
We have seen that whenever the EA CP is overt EAs are factive, so the CP is 
entailed in these cases ((164)). When the CP is absent, (165)-(166) argue that the CP is 
also entailed. Therefore conceptual motivation and empirical fact support the conclusion 
that the CP is always part of the EA denotation that I propose in (167). This denotation 
is the only EA denotation, and the CP entailment is captured by the inclusion of the 
propositional variable, q. This argument is additionally codified as existentially 
presupposed with Beaver’s (1992) presupposition operator ∂ because EAs are factive. 
 
(167) Template EA Denotation  (Version 1 of 2) 
║EA║= λs2λs1λx. ∂ q [CAUSE(EA(x, s1), EA(s2, q))] 
 
In contrast, the EA to-PP is not mentioned in the denotation because the to-PP is 
not always entailed. 
Thus far, I have not addressed these to-PPs systematically. Not all EAs select these 
PPs. In section 3.7.4.2, I proposed that there is a correlation between an EA’s place on 
the stative continuum and the appearance of the PP: the more process-like the adjective, 
the more likely it is to have a to-PP. 
Importantly, data in that same section showed that EAs’ inner-aspect remains 
stative with a to-PP, so a separate a denotation for the PP data is not motivated on 
aspectual grounds. For these reasons, I conclude the to-PP is not part of any EA 
denotation, but a peripheral phenomenon. I leave the interesting question of how to best 
account for this argument selection variability to future research. 
The central conclusion from this section is that the overall EA pattern supports the 
conclusion that they always entail a CP, even if that CP is implicit. 
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3.8 Conclusions 
This chapter continued to argue for the viability of a stative causative, causative 
alternation analysis of EAs. It did so by showing that 
 
(i) EAs are aspectually distinguishable from other adjective classes in that they pass 
eventivity tests. 
(ii) EAs are consistently stative. 
(iii) EA argument structure is uniform with the CP in complement position (and the to-
PP is not part of the denotation). 
(iv) Alternative approaches that appeal to the IL/SL distinction, IL/activity denotation, 
coercion, or “active” be face many difficulties. 
 
At this point, the inner-aspect of the three adjective classes that we are comparing 
has been examined in some detail. The principle aspectual contrast is between 
causatives and simple states: 
 
(168) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
The next step is to substantiate conclusion that the causative versus simple state 
distinction makes the right aspectual cut. Chapter 4 focuses on the epiphenomenal 
nature of eventivity, the primitive nature of the state argument, and the nature of the 
representation of causation. These findings lead to the aspectual calculus outlined in 
chapter 1, and set the stage for the derivations of the EA paradigm in chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: 
The Theory of Inner-Aspect and Mapping to the IP Domain 
 
4 Introduction 
This chapter argues three main points: 
(i) The only primitive aspectual argument in natural language denotes a state. 
Building on the discussion thus far, it will be argued that there is no primitive 
event argument, and that eventivity effects are derivative of the causative nature 
of the predicate. So, eventivity is epiphenomenal. 
(ii) The only inner-aspectual distinction represented in the aspectual decomposition of 
a predicate is between stative causatives and simple states. This distinction can be 
seen in the adjective argument structures in (1a) versus (1b, c). 
 
(1) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
(iii) Lastly, (2) is the correct analysis of causation in lexical predicates. The 
generalised denotation in (2a) introduces the causal relation as a lexical property. 
The CAUSE relation partitions the predicate and its arguments into a causing-
state description and a result-state description. So, (2a) says the predicate and its 
arguments stand in a stative causative relation. 
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(2) Generalised Representation of Lexical Causation 
a. ║P║ = λPλyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(P(x, s1), P(s2, y))  
b.    PP 
    2 
  XP1      P’ 
2 
 s1         P’ 
2 
s2          P’ 
2 
P         XP2 
 
The arguments in a causative predicate’s denotation map onto the binary 
branching syntactic structure in (2b). This chapter will argue that causation is a 
lexical property and that a causal relation is built on state arguments in adjectives 
and verbs. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents the connections between 
the representation of the event argument and the decomposition of inner-aspect. Section 
4.2 makes four arguments for the state argument, and against a primitive event 
argument. In doing so, analyses of the active and passive voices, the continuous aspect, 
and existential there are presented. This will involve mapping the inner-aspect of the 
predicate to the inflectional domain of the clause (i.e. the IP domain). Section 4.3 
collects the evidence for the syntactic representation of state arguments and the 
decomposition of inner-aspect. Section 4.4 argues from Japanese morphology that 
causation is not represented by a functional head, and that causation is a lexical 
property, as shown in (2a). Section 4.5 presents the analysis of spatio-temporal 
modification within this proposal. Lastly, section 4.6 provides an overview of aspectual 
system that emerges. 
 
 
4.1 Basic Event Structure Notions 
This section introduces the original motivation for the event argument and subsequent 
implementations. Section 4.1.1 presents the event argument’s basic semantic properties. 
Section 4.1.2 presents the connection between eventivity and the decomposition of 
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inner-aspect. Section 4.1.3 outlines the novel prediction of this thesis that eventivity is 
the derivative effect of state arguments in a causative relation. 
 
 
4.1.1 The Primitive Event Argument 
Davidson (1967) argued for the existence of a spatio-temporal event argument using 
action
1
 sentences such as Jones buttered the toast. Action verbs like butter offer 
evidence for an event argument with these properties because an action can be modified 
spatially and temporally. In addition, a pronoun can refer to the event argument directly. 
Thus, one can continue by saying it happened in the bathroom at midnight: it refers to 
the event of the buttering, and that event is located in space and time by adverbials. 
Davidsonian representations for these respective expressions are given in (3). 
 
(3) a. ( e) (Butter(Jones, the toast, e)) 
b. ( e) (Butter(Jones, the toast, e) & In(the bathroom, e) & At(midnight, e)) 
(cf. Davidson 1967: 93, ex. (19), (20)) 
 
The representation in (3a) shows that on Davidson’s analysis the verb butter has an 
event argument as a third argument. The representation in (3b) shows that it is this 
argument that is modified by the adverbials (rather than the verb or the other 
arguments). In both representations the argument is existentially quantified, making it 
an extensional entity that can be referred to by the pronoun it. These basic facts 
motivate the existence of the event argument and its properties. 
At the same time, Davidson noted that this analysis was not for all predicates 
(1967: 93). Not all predicates satisfy these criteria. In particular, in chapter 3 we saw 
that simple state predicates do not accept eventive locative modification ((4a)) or 
resumptive eventive pronominal reference ((4b)). 
 
(4) a. #Emma owned the typewriter in the office 
b. Emma owned the typewriter. #It happened in the office at midday 
 
                                                          
1
 In this chapter I use Davidson’s (1967) terms action sentences/verbs in order to avoid confusion with 
stative causative predicates—which also satisfy eventivity diagnostics. The term action makes it clearer 
that stative causatives are not part of the standard discussion of eventivity.  
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Even though this distinction between action and simple state expressions is clear, in 
linguistic appropriations of the event argument it is common to assume that every 
predicate nevertheless has one. Once it is assumed that every predicate has an event 
argument, two strategies are available: either (i) the distinction between action and 
stative predications is left unanalysed (Higginbotham and Ramchand 1997: 54; cf. Katz 
2000; Maienborn 2007), or (ii) it is assumed that the argument comes in two sorts, i.e. 
eventive and stative (cf. Parsons 1990; Ramchand 2008). 
However, both of these strategies obfuscate Davidson’s original point about the 
evidence for the event argument and its theoretical value. Maienborn (2005b, 2007) 
highlights exactly this when showing that the stative predicates that do not satisfy 
Davidsonian event criteria systematically lack a spatial dimension: they are interpreted 
only temporally ((5) vs. ((4a)). She calls statives of this latter type Kimian-States. 
 
(5) Emma owned the typewriter for years 
 
Maienborn makes this state-of-affairs even more pressing because she shows that 
the division does not lie between actions and states: there are also stative verbs that 
satisfy Davidsonian criteria (chapter 3). This leads Maienborn to posit two primitive 
types of aspectual argument: one that is mapped to space and time (i.e. a Davidsonian 
event argument), and another that is mapped only to time (i.e. a Kimian-State). 
Yet, Maienborn’s results raise foundational questions. First, there is a sub-set 
relation between the two aspectual arguments’ properties (i.e. spatio-temporal, 
temporal): is the sub-set relation between two primitive entities, or can one be derived 
from the other? Second, what makes a stative event predicate different from an action 
event predicate? Building on chapter 1, these are questions that this thesis proposes to 
answer by deriving eventivity from state arguments in a causative relation. 
 
 
4.1.2 Event Decomposition 
The representations in (3) above show that the event argument addresses spatio-
temporality, but not the details of inner-aspect. Theories of inner-aspect often 
decompose lexical predicates and associate them with more than a single aspectual 
argument. For example, the syntax and semantics of action verbs are given a bipartite 
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aspectual structure that corresponds to the cause and the result in a causal relation. In (6) 
we see Parson’s (simplified) event decomposition representation of an atelic causative 
verb such as push ((6a)). In (6b) CAUSE relates the two Davidsonian sub-events e and 
e’, the respective cause and the result of the pushing. 
 
(6) Parsons’s (1990) Analysis of Atelic Causation 
a. Victoria pushed the cart 
b. (  )[Agent(e, Victoria) & (  ’)[Pushing(e’) & Theme(e’, the cart) & 
CAUSE(e, e’)]] 
  (cf. Parsons 1990: 109) 
 
Example (7a) shows a syntactic representation that aligns with Parson’s Neo-
Davidsonian analysis in (6b). Hale and Keyser (1993) posit that the two verbal heads in 
(7a) correspond to the interpretative rule in (7b), where one sub-event causally 
implicates the second. 
 
(7) Syntactic Representations of Causation with Associated Event Decompositions 
a. Traditional Representation 
                        VP1 
                  3 
               V1                VP2 
                            3 
                          V2               ... 
b. e1 → e2 
(cf. Hale and Keyser 1993: 69) 
c. Contemporary Representation 
                       initP 
                  3 
               init           procP 
                           3 
                       proc             ... 
d. s → e 
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 61) 
 
Ramchand’s more detailed syntax in (7c) has the same geometric relations, but in 
this case, the c-commanding causing head, init(iation), is posited to denote a state (cf. 
Dowty 1979: 118), while the c-commanded head, proc(ess), denotes an event ((7d)). 
Ramchand adopts Hale and Keyser’s proposal that a causal implication relation between 
the aspectual arguments is read off the syntactic structure by interpretative rule.
2
  
                                                          
2
 The representation in (7d) is a simplification of Ramchand’s interpretation of (7c). Ramchand assumes 
that the event variable is an argument of the two primitive aspectual predicates in (i) that determine the 
variable’s interpretation. 
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Now, Parsons’s and Ramchand’s decompositions with two aspectual arguments in 
(6) and (7c), respectively, are only meant to capture atelic causatives. In contrast telic 
causatives, such as break, are often analysed as containing three aspectual arguments; 
the third one adds the specification of a result-state. So for an expression such as (8a), 
Parsons (1990) gives the (simplified) representation in (8b). In addition to having two 
event arguments in a causal relation, a telic verb has a third aspectual component, s, that 
stands in a change-of-state relation to the result-event of the causal relation: 
 
(8) Parsons’s (1990) Analysis of Telic Causation 
a. Peter broke the chair 
b. ( e)[Agent(e, Peter) & ( e’)[Theme(e’, the chair) & CAUSE(e, e’) & 
    [being-broken(s) & Theme(s, the chair) & BECOME(e’, s)]]] 
(cf. Parsons 1990: 120) 
 
Similarly, Ramchand (2008) represents the telic result-state with the syntactic 
projection resP. The sequence of aspectual heads in (9) is interpreted by the causal 
implication rule as an initiating state leading to an eventive process leading to a 
resultant state: s → e → s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(i) a. State(e): e is a state 
b. Process(e): e is an eventuality that contains internal change 
(Ramchand 2008: 44, ex. (6)) 
 
In Ramchand’s notation the interpretation of (7c) as the aspectual structure of Victoria pushed the 
cart is (ii). (Ramchand proposes that the Process predicate introduces a Path relation with a variable y that 
is determined contextually (i.e. Yc).) The causal implication rule that relates the aspectual arguments is    
e = e1 → e2. I have conflated this with Ramchand’s aspectual predicates in (7d) for simplicity. 
 
(ii) ║Victoria push the cart║= λe e1, e2 [[Path(Yc, e2) & push(e2) & Process(e2)  
& Subject(the cart, e2)] & push(e1) & State(e1) & e = e1 → e2  
& Subject(Victoria, e1)]  
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 61, ex. (38)) 
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(9) Ramchand’s (2008) Syntax of Telic Verbs 
                                                initP 
                                            3 
                                         init            procP 
                                                       3 
                                                   proc           resP 
                                                                 3 
                                                               res             … 
 
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 39, ex. (1)) 
 
Event decomposition highlights two important points. First, the assumption of an 
ontological distinction between events and states surfaces again. Second, semantic and 
syntactic approaches represent the aspectual decomposition of causatives two different 
ways: atelic causatives with a two aspectual arguments and telic causatives with three. 
This chapter will defend a different approach in arguing (i) that only state arguments 
exist, (ii) that aspectual decomposition contains maximally two aspectual arguments—
two state arguments in a CAUSE relation—and not three, and (iii) that causation is a 
lexical property—not an interpretation rule or a syntactic head. 
 
 
4.1.3 The Event Argument and Eventivity 
Before turning to the evidence for state arguments, I would like to highlight the curious 
empirical scene that this thesis presents. 
Davidson posited an atomic event argument with specific semantic properties. Once 
aspectual decomposition is posited, establishing the eventive or stative content of the 
parts is an incumbent task. 
Considering the argument structures proposed here, the adjective classes in (10) 
(repeated from (1)) represent different sorts of stative predications. EAs in (10a) are 
more complex in that they contain two state arguments. 
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(10) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
In chapter 3 we saw that EAs are always stative, and they are the only adjectives to pass 
eventivity diagnostics. In this connection, we saw that a corresponding class of verbs 
exists (Maienborn 2005b, 2007). Maienborn then allowed us to see that when spatio-
temporality fails, predicates test like simple states. Chapter 3 also showed that EAs, PAs 
and RAs fit this pattern, PAs and RAs testing like simple states. Correspondingly, the 
PA and RA structures in (10) contain only one state argument. The question is: what is 
the eventivity of EAs—and stative causatives more generally—telling us about 
eventivity? 
The argument presented in chapter 1 proposed that it indicates that there is no 
primitive linguistic distinction between events and states. Rather, there is a distinction 
between stative causatives and simple states, with eventivity effects reducing to a signal 
of causation. 
I diagram the eventuality continuum in (11a). Here causation marks the divide with 
respect to eventivity effects, a divide that corresponds with aspectual structure 
complexity in the argument structures in (10). Note that the continuum (11a) is just 
another way of illustrating (11b) from chapter 1, which was arrived at through an 
analysis of the semantic properties of primitive aspectual entities.  
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(11) a. Only Causative Predicates Test Positive for Eventivity 
 
     Simple Aspectual Structure                     Complex Aspectual Structure 
 
RAs   >>>> PAs   >>>> Stative Causatives    >>>> Action Causatives 
 
    Not Eventive           Eventive 
 
b. Eventivity versus Stativity versus Spatio-Temporality  (Version 5 of 5) 
Stative 
                     
   Stative Causative  Simple State 
                  Predicates   Predicates 
        (Classes 1 and 2)     (Class 3) 
      Causative:      Temporal 
[Spatio-]Temporal 
 
An important consequence is that—because of the derivative nature of eventivity—the 
notion of change is not represented in the aspectual decomposition of predicates. 
Building on the arguments from previous chapters, we will collect more evidence that 
change is represented conceptually. 
To this effect, this chapter will provide specific arguments that only the state 
argument exists, and that stative causation produces eventivity effects. Once this is 
established, the clear implication is that the eventuality continuum in (11a) from RAs to 
Action Causatives is sensitive to (i) where DP/CP arguments are generated in a 
predicate’s argument structure (e.g. externally or internally), (ii) the specific properties 
of those arguments (e.g. animate or inanimate, concrete or abstract), and (iii) enriching 
the interpretation of these structures with conceptual knowledge of a given predicate 
and discourse-based inferences. In consequence, Davidsonian eventivity, the notion of 
change, rich aspectual classifications (cf. Vendler 1967), and the Individual/Stage 
distinction are epiphenomenal with respect to the aspectual decomposition of predicates. 
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4.2 Evidence for State Arguments 
This section argues for state arguments, and against a primitive event argument. Section 
4.2.1 discusses and analyses of the derivation of the passive voice. Section 4.2.2 does 
the same with the continuous aspect. Section 4.2.3 provides theory-neutral evidence 
against the event argument with unexpected variability across event diagnostics. Section 
4.2.4 summarises the results. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Passive 
This section presents the passive voice from the perspective of this thesis. Section 
4.2.1.1 introduces Collins’ (2005) syntax of the passive. Section 4.2.1.2 establishes the 
semantic import of the passive. Section 4.2.1.3 introduces the basic concepts of the IP 
domain. Section 4.2.1.4 introduces Gerhke and Grillo’s (2009) proposal that Collins’ 
syntax be reinterpreted as an operation on inner-aspectual structure. Section 4.2.1.5 
provides the analysis of the syntax and semantics of the passive. Finally, section 4.2.1.6 
pulls the details together to provide arguments from the passive for a state argument, 
and against a primitive Davidsonian event argument and the three-part aspectual 
decomposition of telic verbs. 
 
 
4.2.1.1 The Syntax of the Passive 
Collins’ (2005) analysis of the syntax of the passive generates the predicate’s arguments 
in the same positions as in the active. Example (12) illustrates a VP-shell representation 
of the argument structure of an active transitive sentence. The Agent is generated in the 
Spec, V1 and moves to Spec, T, and the Theme is generated in Comp, V2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
201 
 
(12) Julia wrote the book 
                                             TP 
                                       3 
                                 Juliaj              T’ 
                                                 3 
                                               T               VP1        
                                                            3 
                                                           tj                V1’ 
                                                                       3 
                                                                  wroteV             VP2 
                                                                                 3  
                                                                                    tV          the book 
 
(cf. Collins 2005: 90, ex. (23a)) 
 
Collins proposes the structure in (13) for a passive voice expression. This syntax 
differs from the active in two ways: (i) the presence of PartP (to form the participle), 
and (ii) the presence of VoiceP (to attract PartP) (Collins 2005: 91). Once PartP moves 
to Spec, Voice, the direct object the book is closest to T
0
, and it is now attracted to Spec, 
T.
3
 
 
(13) The book was written by Julia 
           TP 
                                       3 
                          The booki              T’ 
                                                 3 
                                               T             VoiceP        
                                                g            3 
                                             was   PartPp          Voice’ 
                                                        1           3 
                                                      ti   Part’   Voice           VP1 
                                                        2      g            3  
                                                   Part       VP2  by     Julia              V1’ 
                                                   1       1                         3 
                                           writev  -en    tv      ti                       V1              tp 
 
(cf. Collins 2005: 95, ex. (30)) 
 
                                                          
3
 I delay the technical details until section 4.2.1.5, where I reinterpret Collins’ syntax.   
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The alternative to Collins’ analysis is one where the argument structures of the 
active and passive voice are different. The structures in (14) illustrate an analysis of an 
active/passive pair that disassociates argument structure in the two voices. The active 
structure in (14a) is the same as (12), with the Agent argument generated in Spec, V1. 
The passive in (14b), however, does not generate the VP-shell associated with the 
external argument. Instead, the optionality of the by-phrase is captured by generating it 
as a VP adjunct (cf. Chomsky 1981, 2001; Jaeggli 1986; Baker et al. 1989). In this 
sense, the argument structures of actives and passives are disassociated. 
 
(14) A Disassociation Analysis of Active/Passive Pairs 
a. Julia wrote the book 
 
            TP 
      3 
   Juliaj            T’ 
               3 
              T              VP1 
                        3 
                       tj               V1’ 
                                 3  
                         wrotev            VP2 
                                         3 
                                        tv          the book 
b. The book was written (by Julia) 
 
                       TP 
                 3 
     The booki             T’ 
                           3 
                        T               (VP) 
                         g           3 
                      was     VP              PP 
                           3  6 
                          V               ti    by Julia 
                  3 
             write           -en 
(cf. Collins 2005: 82, ex. (4)) 
 
Generating the arguments in the passive in the same positions as in the active has 
four benefits when compared with an analysis of the passive that generates the by-
phrase as an adjunct. The first advantage to Collins’s approach is that generating the 
arguments in the same way in the active and the passive foreshadows the fact that the 
external argument can be realised in the passive. Middles and unaccusatives differ from 
passives in that the external argument cannot be realised at all. Examples (15) and (16) 
illustrate. The (a) examples provide the baseline transitive sentences. The (b) examples 
show that passives allow an optional by-phrase. The (c) examples show that middles 
and unaccusatives do not allow the by-phrase. 
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(15) a. Super PACs bribed politicians easily 
b. Politicians are bribed easily (by Super PACs)  
c. Politicians bribed easily (*by Super PACs) 
(16) a. The enemy sank the ship   
b. The ship was sunk (by the enemy) 
c. The ship sank (*by the enemy) 
 
While analysing the passive by-phrase as an adjunct captures its optionality, it does 
not explain why the external argument from the active voice expression should be able 
to reappear in a by-phrase, or why passives are different from other structures lacking 
their canonical external argument, such as middles and unaccusatives. In contrast, 
generating the arguments in the same positions leads us to expect the parallelism in 
(15a, b) and (16a, b). 
The second, related, advantage is that it predicts that the external argument will be 
syntactically active even when the by-phrase is not overt. Agent-oriented adverbs are 
one illustration of illustrate this. The adverb willingly in (17) requires an Agent to 
modify. In active voice expressions the Agent is overt ((17a)). In parallel, passive voice 
expressions are grammatical even when the Agent is implicit ((17b)). In contrast, 
unaccusatives are ungrammatical ((17c)). 
 
(17) a. They decreased the price willingly 
b. The price was decreased willingly 
c. *The price decreased willingly 
 (Jaeggli 1986: 611, ex. (53)) 
 
So, the second advantage to generating the external argument in the same position in the 
passive is that it predicts that passives will pattern with actives in environments that 
require an Agent. An adjunct analysis, on the other hand, has to explain why the 
implicit by-phrase is different from adjuncts that are truly optional.
4
 
The third advantage concerns the thematic interpretation of the by-phrase. Collins 
emphasises that, if active and passive voice expressions generate their arguments in 
                                                          
4
 On Jaeggli’s (1986) analysis, this is done through the operation of Theta Transmission, which makes 
reference to the predicate’s lexical entry. For approaches on which the external argument is not an 
argument of the predicate (Kratzer 1996), reference to the external argument cannot be picked up through 
predicate/lexical entry, so something else is needed to explain the character of the passive by-phrase. 
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different ways, then multiple thematic role interpretation mechanisms are required. On a 
disassociation analysis, in the active voice an external role is assigned to an argument 
position, and in the passive it is assigned to an adjunct. There is no other grammatical 
phenomenon with this property; the passive is unique in this way. So, generating 
arguments in different positions and maintaining their interpretation requires 
introducing an ad hoc mechanism into the grammar. But generating the external 
argument in the same position in the active and the passive requires no interpretive 
complications. 
In this connection, the last advantage is the parallel Collins draws between the 
passive by-phrase and the complementiser for. On Collins’ analysis in (13) by assigns 
accusative case to the stranded external argument. He suggests that it does so with the 
same case assigning mechanism that allows the complementiser for in C
0
 to assign 
accusative case to the overt subject of an infinitive in Spec, T, as in (18a): 
 
(18) a. Laura wanted for him to win 
b. Laura wanted to win 
 
So, rather than introducing by as an adjunct, it spells out Voice
0
, and just like for, by 
licenses a c-commanded argument that is syntactically active, but otherwise be null (cf. 
PRO ((18b)).
5
 
In sum, Collins’ passive syntax captures many of the external argument’s properties 
without the complications that follow from analysing the by-phrase as an adjunct, or 
generating the external argument in different positions. Yet, motivation for the passive, 
or an understanding of what the passive is, is still lacking. The next section attempts to 
provide it. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 The Meaning of the Passive 
Analyses of the passive usually focus on rearranging the verb’s arguments: finding a 
way to allow the logical object to appear in subject position, and the logical subject 
within a by-phrase. But, answering the question of why the grammar should be 
                                                          
5
 See Collins (2005: 107-110) for evidence from coordination, ellipsis and adverb modification that there 
is always a full VP structure whenever there is a passive by-phrase. See also Mahajan (1995) and Goodall 
(1997) for cross-linguistic evidence that the by-phrase behaves like a syntactic argument, rather than an 
adjunct. 
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interested in this generally lies beyond their intent. In this section I will introduce 
Gehrke and Grillo’s (G&G) (2009) proposal regarding the meaning of the passive. They 
propose that the passive is an operation on the inner-aspectual structure of the predicate, 
and that the active and passive voices are, in fact, not synonymous (cf. Beedham 1987). 
Let’s begin by elaborating on their motivations. 
First, existential passives such as (19) show that the purpose of the passive cannot 
be to make the logical object the subject, because the logical object does not necessarily 
end up in subject position. 
 
(19) There was a Swabian killed (by police)         (cf. G&G 2009: 243, ex. (20a)) 
 
Further, viewing the passive as an operation on subjects and objects creates the 
impression that every transitive verb will have active and passive forms. Chomsky’s 
(1957) passive phrase structure rule illustrates this. The rule in (20) states that if the 
active voice expression is grammatical, then the passive is, too: 
 
(20) If S1 is a grammatical sentence of the form 
NP1 – Aux – V – NP2, 
then the corresponding string of the form 
  NP2 – Aux+be+en – V – by – NP1 
is also a grammatical sentence. 
(Chomsky 1957: 43, ex. (34)) 
 
The grammaticality condition on the active expression captures the contrast in (21) and 
(22): the (un)grammaticality of the active is predictive of the (un)grammaticality of the 
passive. But, there are no additional requirements. 
 
(21) a. Sincerity frightens John 
b. John is frightened by sincerity 
(Chomsky 1957: 42-43) 
(22) a. *John frightens sincerity 
b. *Sincerity is frightened by John 
(Chomsky 1957: 42-43) 
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Yet, the ungrammatical examples in (23)-(25) show that there is a further restriction 
on the passive that (20) does not capture. Aspectually, all these predicates are simple 
states. This implies that the passive is restricted by the interpretation of the inner-aspect 
of the predicate, and this is the core of G&G’s proposal. 
 
(23) a. The new suit fit John 
b. *John was fit by the new suit 
c. The hedgehog resembles Mary 
d. * Mary is resembled by that hedgehog 
(Maratsos et al. 1985: 168) 
 
(24) a. Ed wanted a new CD player       (Aarts 2001: 250, ex. (49)) 
b. ?*A new CD player was wanted by Ed     (Aarts 2001: 250, ex. (50)) 
c. Tony likes films with lots of gratuitous violence  
d. ?*Films with lots of gratuitous violence are liked (by Tony) 
(Aarts 2011: 93, ex. (57)) 
e. That beret does not suit you, you know 
f. *You are not suited by that beret, you know 
(Aarts 2011: 93, ex. (58))  
(25) a. John has three bicycles 
b. *Three bicycles are had by John 
c. Tiny weighs 210 pounds 
d. *210 pounds are weighed by Tiny 
e. The coming decade will see many changes 
f. *Many changes will be seen by the coming decade 
g. This bottle contains a deadly poison 
h. *A deadly poison is contained by this bottle 
(Pinker et al. 1987: 197, ex. (2)) 
 
In this connection, a closer look at the passive reveals that a essential difference 
between the active voice and the passive voice is that they take two different 
perspectives on an eventuality (cf. Beedham 1987; Pinker et al. 1987: 249-258; 
Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2012: 153; Pinker 2014: 55-56), and the positions of the 
arguments in the two voices are not sufficient to explain it. 
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In order to see this, consider the examples in (26). Example (26a) is a transitive 
active voice expression. Example (26b) is unaccusative, meaning that only the logical 
object is realised in the syntax, and it is promoted to Spec, T. Foreshadowing the 
analysis of unaccusatives such as (26b) to be presented in chapter 5, I propose that (26a) 
and (26b) are both in the same active voice, and differ only in the content of their 
external arguments, i.e. it is referential in (26a) and a variable in (26b). For the moment, 
I will assume this analysis. Lastly, (26c, d) are in the passive voice. 
 
(26) a. Peter broke a window   = Transitive Active Voice 
b. A window broke    = Unaccusative Active Voice 
c. A window was broken (by Peter)  = Transitive Passive Voice 
d. There was a window broken (by Peter) = Existential Passive 
 
Regarding the observation that the active and passive voices take different 
perspectives on an eventuality, take first (26a) and (26c). There is the intuition that the 
active voice is about the cause of the breaking and the passive is about the result. This 
does not follow merely from the thematic properties of the argument that ends up in 
subject position, i.e. a Causer or a Theme, respectively. For example, the existential 
passive in (26d) keeps the logical object out of subject position and it sharpens the 
intuition that the passive voice says something about the result-state.
6
 Most 
interestingly, in the unaccusative in (26b) the logical object is in subject position, yet it 
also says something about the cause of the breaking, just like (26a).
7
 These examples 
show that the active and passive voices provide a perspective on the eventuality, and 
that this is not dependent on the position of the DPs.
8
 
                                                          
6
 The fact that a telic verb is used in these examples does not affect the intuition. Atelic verbs behave the 
same way ((i)-(iii)). The verb break is used in (26) because it has an unaccusative form that provides a 
relevant contrast. 
 
(i) Julia wrote a book 
(ii) A book was written (by Julia) 
(iii) There was a book written (by Julia) 
7
 As discussed in chapter 2, and as will be discussed further in chapter 5, unaccusatives are understood 
here to be weak scalar expressions to the effect that the speaker does not specify the cause, either due to 
ignorance of it, or deliberate obfuscation, or discourse irrelevance (cf. Schafer and Vivanco 2016; 
Rappaport Hovav 2014). Notice that even this characterisation of the unaccusative emphasises the cause, 
rather than the result. 
8
 In this connection, if the passive were about promoting the logical object, we might expect it to be like 
topicalisation. See Keenan and Dryer (2007: 325-328) on why the passive is not like topicalisation. 
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G&G’s (2009) insight is to re-interpret Collins’ syntax to capture these properties 
of the passive. They propose that what drives the passive is the interpretation of the 
predicate’s inner-aspectual structure by the IP domain of the clause—the domain of 
tense, outer-aspect (i.e. viewpoint aspect), and voice. Now that tense and outer-aspect 
have been mentioned, the next section introduces the basic concepts. 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Basic Concepts of the IP Domain 
Reichenbach (1947: §51) proposes that the range of natural language temporal 
meanings requires the ordering of three time points: an event time (E), a reference time 
(R), and a speech time (S). The first picks out the time that the eventuality described by 
the predicate holds; the second, a reference time determined by the context of speech; 
and the third, the time the speaker speaks. 
The motivation for three times becomes clear when simple and complex tenses are 
compared. In a present simple example such as (27a), the times coincide, the speech 
time providing the value for all three. In (27b), the arrow represents the direction of 
time, and simultaneity is represented with the comma. 
 
(27) a. I see John 
b.  
           E, R, S 
 
The interpretation of the past perfect in (28a) shows that the three points can be 
teased apart. Here the time of seeing (i.e. the event time) is before an implicit reference 
time, R, that is also before the time of speech.  
 
(28) a. I had seen John 
b.                    
      E     R     S 
 
In a sentence such as I had seen John before he went to the store, R is made explicit by 
the temporal adjunct: R is the time John went to the store, which is after the seeing, but 
before the time of speech. This order is represented in (28b). So, complex tenses show 
that natural language orders three times. Following Reichenbach (1947), Hornstein 
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(1990), Giorgi and Pianesi (1997), and Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria (D&U-E) 
(2000), among others, I will assume that the three times are present in all tenses (cf. 
Stowell 1996). 
The syntactic implementations of this approach to temporal interpretation just cited 
associate these three times with specific projections. In D&U-E’s (2000) model the 
event time is an argument of VP (D&U-E’s EV-T), the reference time is an argument of 
AspP (their Assertion-Time (AST-T)), and the speech time an argument of TP (their 
Utterance-Time (UT-T)). The structure in (29) illustrates this. I adopt D&U-E’s phrase 
structure of time arguments in the derivations below with a crucial modification of the 
representation of EV-T that will be discussed presently. 
 
(29) D&U-E’s (2000) Syntax of Time Arguments 
                                        TP 
                                  3 
                             UT-T               T’ 
                                            3 
                                          T             AspP 
                                                      3 
                                               AST-T              Asp’ 
                                                                3  
                                                           Asp              VP 
                                                                          3 
                                                                     EV-T              VP 
(D&U-E 2000: 163, ex. (8)) 
 
In (29) the event time, EV-T, is associated directly with VP. There are two reasons 
to refine this. (i) Ramchand (2004) highlights the importance of the ontological 
distinction between aspectual arguments and temporal arguments. Once it is assumed 
that the VP is the domain of the representation of stativity and eventivity, the VP can no 
longer be assumed to represent time directly. Thus, Ramchand proposes that a higher 
head is responsible for mapping an aspectual argument to time, and the out-put of this 
head provides EV-T. (ii) G&G observe that once inner-aspect decomposition is 
assumed, it becomes possible to ask which aspectual argument within VP provides the 
in-put to the head that returns EV-T. This, G&G propose, is the key to capturing the 
distinction between the active and passive voices. 
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4.2.1.4 Passive as an Operation on Inner-Aspectual Structure 
In contrast with Collins, and motivated by the interpretation of inner-aspect, G&G 
propose that Voice
0
 is present in both active and passive voice expressions because it 
establishes EV-T. The difference between active and passive expressions becomes the 
difference between which aspectual argument in the VP gets mapped to EV-T by Voice
0
 
in the IP domain of the clause. Thus on G&G’s approach, the syntax of active and 
passive expressions is along the lines of (30) (cf. (12), (13)):
9
 
 
(30) Uniform IP Field in Active and Passive Sentences 
a. Julia wrote the book 
TP 
 2 
Juliaj     T’ 
2 
UT-T        T’ 
2 
T        AspP 
2 
AST-T         Asp’ 
2 
Asp     VoiceP 
2 
EV-T        Voice’ 
2 
Voice    VP1 
2 
tj        V1’ 
2 
wrotev      VP2 
2 
tv       the  
      book 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 In (30) and the syntactic structures that follow, moved constituents are placed above the time arguments 
for the sake of consistency across the representations; in the present context nothing hangs on their 
relative order. 
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b. The book was written by Julia                    
TP 
 2 
The booki     T’ 
2 
UT-T        T’ 
2 
T        AspP 
   g         2 
was  AST-T        Asp’ 
2 
Asp     VoiceP 
3                                           
PartPp            Voice’ 
2  2 
 ti       Part’     EV-T        Voice’ 
 2         2 
Part   VP2    Voice      VP1 
    1        1        g     2            
writev   -en     tv   ti             by Julia       V1’ 
2 
V1 tp 
      
The intuitive idea is that in the active voice ((30a)) the aspectual argument in V1 is 
mapped to EV-T, and so the eventuality is viewed from that perspective. Notice that 
both structures in (30) contain two VP-shells—the structure that has been represented as 
causative throughout this thesis (cf. Hale and Keyser 1993; Ramchand 2004; G&G 
2009; Travis 2010, a.o.). Thus in an active voice expression with a causative predicate, 
Voice
0
 maps the causing sub-event to EV-T. This accounts for the intuition that an 
active voice causative expression is about the causing sub-part of an eventuality. 
In the passive voice in (30b), the aspectual argument in V2—the result part of the 
causative relation—is mapped to EV-T, and now the eventuality is viewed from the 
perspective of the result. This accounts for the intuition that a passive expression is 
about the result sub-part of an eventuality. So on this proposal, the perspective contrast 
between the active and passive voices of a causative predicate follows from using either 
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the causing sub-part or the result sub-part of the predicate description as the basis of the 
Event-Time.
10
 
Since the passive is about mapping the result sub-part to time, the lack of object 
movement to Spec, T in existential passives (A Swabian was killed vs. There was a 
Swabian killed) is just a sub-case of satisfaction of the EPP. The EPP can be satisfied 
either by movement of a DP to Spec, T, or by merging another element that meets T
0’s 
category requirements. The remaining issue is the transitive verbs that do not passivise. 
The implication of G&G’s proposal regarding the meaning of the passive is that 
predicates without a complex aspectual structure should not passivise. In the argument 
structures proposed in this thesis, the only aspectual distinction that is represented in the 
syntax is between causatives (with two state arguments) and simple states (with only 
one argument) ((1)). Recall that the examples of transitive verbs with ungrammatical 
passives in (23)-(25) are simple states. The ungrammaticality of simple states in the 
passive is also noted in traditional grammars. Longman English Grammar uses (31) to 
illustrate this restriction (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 162-163). 
 
(31) a. I love beans on toast 
b. *Beans on toast is/are loved by me 
(Alexander 1988: 242) 
 
At this point a comment on aspectual decomposition is in order.  G&G frame their 
proposal in two different ways. Syntactically, they follow Collins’ bipartite 
representation, i.e. the syntactic representation of lexical causation on the present 
proposal. Semantically, they assume that a result-state is produced by the BECOME 
operator (Dowty 1979), and that predicates without it will not passivise. 
The semantic characterisation based on the presence of BECOME makes the wrong 
empirical predictions. The examples in (32) show that activities, accomplishments, 
achievements, and stative causatives, respectively, all passivise. So, the distribution of 
the passive is not sensitive to a change-of-state produced by BECOME. 
 
                                                          
10
 At this point, G&G’s approach to the passive is still being discussed intuitively. Based on this 
discussion, it may seem that PartP movement in (30b) is motivated by the interpretive contrast. But in 
formal terms, there is no predictive, restrained way to motivate movement (cf. Chomsky 1993). So, in the 
analysis I develop below, the movement is done brute-force with an EPP feature (Chomsky 2000), and 
the meaning contrast is captured in the denotations of the active and passive voice heads.  
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(32) a. The cart was pushed by Victoria 
b. Willistead Manor was built by Hiram Walker 
c. The race was won by Katherine 
d. The books were kept on the table by Tony 
 
On the other hand, on the present proposal all of these verbs are causatives. The 
empirical generalisation is that causative predicates passivise, and simple states do 
not—as G&G predict on their syntactic characterisation. This means that two aspectual 
arguments in a causal relation are sufficient to account for the distribution of the 
passive. On the other hand, an aspectual structure with one state argument is a simple 
state, and simple states do not passivise because they do not contain a result sub-part for 
the passive to target. 
In this connection, an additional empirical fact corroborates the proposal that the 
passive voice operates on causatives. Some verbs, such as touch, are ambiguous in the 
active voice between an action interpretation and a static interpretation. For example 
(33a) is ambiguous between a reading on which John moves and touches the wall, and 
one on which John and the wall are in constant contact. When passivised, however, the 
action reading is salient ((33b)) (Jackendoff 1972: 44; Pinker et al. 1987: 224; 
Alexander 1988: 242). 
 
(33) a. John is touching the wall    (Action ; Static ) 
b. The wall is being touched by John   (Action ; Static #)  
(cf. Pinker et al. 1987: 224, ex. (5)) 
  
The fact that the passive marginalises the static reading and highlights the action 
one is understandable if the passive is targeting a result-state: the action interpretation is 
preferred in the passive because there is a discernible result, whereas on the static 
reading, nothing happens, and so the action reading is more informative.
11
 
The combination of the ungrammatical examples and this interpretative preference 
motivates the conclusion that passivisation is an operation on causative predicates. 
                                                          
11
 Pinker et al. (1987: 244) observe that the strength of the contrast in (33) is dependent on the 
(in)animacy of the external argument. Sections 4.2.3 and 4.5 show that animacy generally affects the 
perception of eventivity, so this variation is predicted on the present theory. 
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Inversely, these same two facts imply that simple states are an invalid input to the 
passive because they do not have a result sub-part.
12, 13
 
Importantly for the interests of this thesis, this extends automatically to account for 
the fact the EAs, as stative causatives, alternate in a passive-like fashion ((34)), while 
PAs, as simple states, do not ((35)): 
 
(34) a. Emma was rude to leave 
b. To leave was rude (of Emma) 
c. It was rude (of Emma) to leave 
 
 
                                                          
12
 There remains the issue of passives of simple state predicates that seem acceptable, e.g. The risk was 
known by the Government. The existence of such data does not disconfirm the conclusion that only 
causative predicates produce a passive composed by the narrow syntax/LF. There are two compelling 
reasons why this is so. (a) It is a surprising, yet repeatedly confirmed finding in psycholinguistics that 
agrammatics, children, and adults do not comprehend, produce, or judge apparently grammatical simple 
state verb passives as they do causative verb passives—to the significant detriment of the former (cf. 
Maratsos et al. 1985; Pinker et al. 1987; Pinker 1989; Grodzinsky 1995; Fox and Grodzinsky 1998; 
Ambridge et al. 2016, a.o.). (b) Putting such examples in context confirms that causation is at the core of 
the passive. For instance, the example in (i) transparently embeds the passive of know in a discourse that 
expresses a causal relation: the Government knew about the risk because they had been briefed. 
 
(i)  The risk that drinking water in Sussex could be contaminated by fracking chemicals was known by 
the Government more than a year ago, previously secret documents reveal.  
Ministers were privately briefed by the Environment Agency (EA) that fracking near aquifers—
underground rocks which contain water—should not be permitted.                (Internet) 
 
More examples showing simple state passives occur in discourses that imply causal relations can be easily 
produced (cf. Pinker et al. 1987: 255 on the meaning shift of own in the passive; Ambridge et al. 2016: 
1455 on discourse repairing mildly infelicitous simple state passives). 
So, the prediction is not that simple state passives are impossible at every level of analysis, but that a 
causal relation is always involved at the relevant level of analysis. The difference found in the 
psycholinguistics literature between causative and simple state verbs implies that causative verbs 
passivise via grammatical rule, while simple state passives can be felicitous at the discourse-level when 
the context conveys a causal relation that goes beyond the narrow meaning of the predicate. 
13
 Coincidently, Maratsos et al. (1985) contains suggestive evidence that bears on proposals made in 
section 3.7.3.3. There, I argued that the phonological shape of stative causative predicates plays a role in 
their behaviour with respect to the Stative Causative Continuum (Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2000) and 
their behaviour with respect to eventivity diagnostics. In this connection, Maratsos et al. (1985: 173-174) 
included four nonce verbs in their first study on children’s comprehension action and simple state 
passives: zick, catter, bemode, mell. They found that children treated the first two more like action verbs 
(i.e. causatives in our terms), and the latter two like experiencer-subject verbs (i.e. simple states in our 
terms). The authors urge that the phonological shape is determining this. In fact, because the first two 
items were treated like action verbs, overall, the children understood the passives of the set of nonce verbs 
better than the passives of experiencer-subject verbs (47% vs. 40%). This supports the position taken in 
Chapter 3 that phonology interacts with eventivity intuitions. 
Lastly, in the same study, they included the verb smell as an intermediate between action verbs and 
experiencer verbs. In Chapter 3 we saw that smell is a stative causative. Maratsos et al. (1985: 173) report 
that children understand its active and passive forms like an action verb, and not an experiencer-subject 
verb. This is exactly what a stative causative analysis predicts.
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(35) a. Emma was eager/willing to help 
b. *To help was eager/willing (of Emma) 
c. *It was eager/willing (of Emma) to help 
 
Summing up, G&G’s proposal shifts the focus from an operation on arguments to 
the operation of mapping inner-aspect to time. Doing so anticipates the passive’s 
semantic restriction and accounts for its meaning. In turn, we are now in a position to 
extend the passive to adjectives: there is nothing in the meaning of the passive that 
refers to lexical category. Thus, the intuition that EAs passivise (cf. Bennis 2000, 2004; 
Landau 2009) is well-founded—but by analysing EAs as causatives we now have an 
explanation for why they passivise, and other adjectives do not. The next section 
develops an explicit implementation of the G&G approach to the passive. 
 
 
4.2.1.5 Derivations of the Active and Passive 
This section is divided into three parts. (i) First, I outline my assumptions about syntax 
and interpretation. (ii) Then we run through the derivation and interpretation of an 
active voice expression in the past simple. (iii) Finally, we compare it with the passive. 
 
 
4.2.1.5.1 Basic Assumptions and Outlook 
A. Assumptions about Syntax: 
I adopt a version of the Minimalist Program of the type broadly outlined in Chomsky 
(1995, 2000, 2001). In the derivations below the Agree operation values formal features, 
and an EPP feature triggers overt displacement. 
 
(i) The Agree operation is characterised in (36). 
 
(36) Agree 
(I) An unvalued feature F (a probe) on a head H scans its c-command domain for 
another instance of F (a goal) with which to agree. 
(II) If the goal has a value, its value is assigned as the value of the probe. 
(cf. Pesetsky and Torrego 2007: 265, ex. (2)) 
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(ii) Following Pesetsky and Torrego (2007) formal features come in four types: 
uninterpretable and valued ((37a)), uninterpretable and unvalued ((37b)), 
interpretable and valued ((37c)), and interpretable and unvalued ((37d)). 
 
(37) a. uF [val] 
b. uF [  ] 
c. iF [val] 
d. iF [  ] 
(cf. Pesetsky and Torrego 2007: 269, ex. (9)) 
 
It is unvalued features that drive Agree and act as probes. On the standard view, 
options (37a, d) do not exist (cf. Chomsky 2000, 2001). 
(iii) Following Chomsky (2001: 6, 16), Case is not a formal feature, but a reflex of an 
Agree relation. 
(iv) The Copy theory of movement (Chomsky 1995). For ease of representation in the 
syntactic structures below copies are represented as a trace, t. 
(v) Bare phrase structure (Chomsky 1994, 1995). 
(vi) Head-movement is a morpho-phonological operation, rather than a syntactic one 
(Chomsky 1995, 2001; Schoorlemmer and Temmerman 2012; Platzack 2013). For 
this reason, head-movement is not represented in the trees below. 
(vi) D&U-E’s (2000) phrase structure of tense and outer-aspect, with its concomitant 
assumption that there are time arguments in the syntax. However, since I am 
arguing that the event argument does not exist, I will refer to the Event-Time as 
the State-Time (ST-T). 
Further, in the trees below the time arguments that are mapped to the State-Time, 
Assertion-Time and the Utterance-Time, i.e. tST-T, tAST-T, tUT-T, are represented as 
ST-T, AST-T, and UT-T in order to avoid notational confusion with copies left by 
movement (cf. (iv)). 
B. Assumptions about Interpretation: 
(vii) Lexical entries contain argument selection information. 
(viii) The only type of primitive aspectual argument denotes a state—a proposal that, 
building on chapter 1, will be substantiated in this chapter. 
(ix) As discussed above, if a predicate is causative, it is recorded in its denotation 
((2)). Support for this analysis will emerge below. 
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(x) Thematic roles are epiphenomenal. We return to this in section 4.4.3. 
(xi) The tense head T0 and the outer-aspect head Asp0 are binary temporal ordering 
relations (cf. Reichenbach 1947, §51; Hornstein 1990; Stowell 1996; Giorgi and 
Pianesi 1997; D&U-E 2000, 2004, 2005 a.o.): Asp
0
 orders the State-Time and the 
Assertion-Time with respect to each other, and T
0
 orders the Assertion-Time and 
the Utterance-Time. 
I will assume that the available ordering relations for times and states include 
after (>), before (<), simultaneous (,), and in ( ).  
(xii) ST-T, AST-T, and UT-T are each unique: there is only one of each in the syntax 
and LF interpretation. 
(xiii) Lastly, Existential Closure applies over the interpretation of the predicate at the 
discourse level (cf. Heim 1982). 
 
Before moving on to the derivations below, some delimiting remarks are in order. 
With regard to the ordering of times, I assume the standard Reichenbachian analyses. 
For an overview of the analyses of all tenses and aspects, I refer the reader to 
Reichenbach (1947: §51), Hornstein (1990: 109), Giorgi and Pianesi (1997: 29), and 
D&U-E (2000; 2004; 2005). In the derivations, I will analyse examples using simple 
tenses/aspects because the properties of complex ones go beyond the scope of this 
thesis, and beyond the present purpose. 
The central innovation to a standard implementation of the Reichenbachian 
approach that is explored here is the proposal that the function of a Voice head is to map 
an aspectual argument to the State-Time and provide a perspective on the eventuality. In 
this connection, it is the Voice head that introduces the temporal trace function τ (Krifka 
1992) and marks the compositional separation between the aspectual and the temporal 
domains of the clause. This will have consequences for syntax/LF mapping that are 
explored only to the extent that is directly relevant; many issues are inevitably left to 
future research. 
The principle objective here is to motivate the theory of inner-aspect composition—
specifically one in which the event argument is not a primitive. This has the effect of 
ruling out the representation change in the aspectual decomposition of the predicate. In 
this connection, the one complex aspect that is analysed here is the continuous. It is of 
interest for two reasons: (i) EAs take the continuous, and (ii) the properties of the 
continuous will be argued to support this theory of inner-aspect. So, the purpose of this 
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excursion into the IP domain is to bring arguments to bear on the content of inner-
aspect. With the exception of the continuous, I will stick to simple tenses/aspects in 
order to control the number of variables involved in the argumentation.  
It is worth noting now that the analysis of the continuous offered here differs from 
standard views of it. On the one hand, it is argued that the continuous is not eventive 
and it does not involve a process. Rather, following Vlach (1981), a continuous 
expression is argued to be aspectually stative, and its atelic properties follow from there.  
On the other, the continuous is often characterised as an outer-aspect. However, 
since a compositional distinction between aspectual arguments and temporal ones is 
being pursued here, the status of the continuous has to be reconsidered.  
In particular, like Voice, the continuous will be proposed to be a head involved in 
the mapping of a state argument to the State-Time, rather than a temporal ordering head 
(cf. D&U-E 2000) or a modal operator (cf. Dowty 1979; Higginbotham 2009). So in 
essence, the active and passive voices, and the continuous are argued to be operations 
on inner-aspect, rather than varieties of outer-aspect (cf. Laca 2004; Garcia del Real 
Marco 2009). With these considerations in mind, let’s turn to the derivations. 
 
 
4.2.1.5.2 Derivation of the Active Voice 
This section compares the active voice derivations of the simple state verb own and the 
causative verb push in the past simple in order to illustrate how the discussion so far 
comes together.  
Example (38) provides the relevant elements of the lexical entry for own. The 
function in (38a) represents the denotation included in the predicate’s lexical entry that 
records the arguments the predicate entails. It says that own is a simple state that takes 
two DP arguments. As for formal features, in (38b) I propose that each state argument, 
s, has a valued interpretable morphological state feature. It is interpretable because it 
contributes to the aspectual interpretation of the predicate, and valued because it is 
inherent to the state argument itself. Below I will propose that it is this state feature that 
is realised as auxiliaries and the copula be when required by IP domain morphology. 
 
(38) a. ║own║ = λyλs1λx. own(x, s1, y) 
b. Formal feature on a state argument: iS [s] 
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The structure in (39) is constructed through successive applications of Merge. Since 
the structure satisfies (38a), this segment of the derivation is well-formed when 
interpreted at LF. 
 
(39) Argument Structure of Emma owned the typewriter 
own 
2 
Emma     own 
2 
s1        own 
iS [s]     2 
own        the 
typewriter 
 
This structure illustrates my implementation of Baker’s conjecture that verbs and 
adjectives are the same predicative category: the predicate own will remain low in its 
base-position in the syntax just as adjectives do. It is realised morphologically as a verb 
because it head-raises in PF (cf. Baker 2003: 77-88). 
Example (40) provides the denotation of the active Voice head and its formal 
features. 
 
(40) a. ║Voiceactive║ = λpλtST-T.  s1 [p & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
(cf. Ramchand 2004: 333-334) 
b. Formal feature on Voiceactive: iS [  ] 
 
Building on G&G’s refinement of Ramchand (2004), the denotation of Voiceactive in 
(40a) does two things: 
 
(i) Voiceactive combines with a predicate with a saturated argument structure, p, and a 
time, t, and returns the State-Time ST-T, which is the time that the state s holds 
provided by the temporal trace function τ (Krifka 1992).14  
(ii) The existential quantifier selectively binds the highest state argument of the 
predicate, s1. I will assume that this selective binding property of Voice is related 
                                                          
14
 I will use p, q, r (of type <t>) as place-holders for the semantic values of complements in the 
denotations. In (40a), p stands for the interpretation of the argument structure of own.  
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to the focalisation of the state argument it targets (cf. Wold 1996). The asterisk is 
meant to track this property of Voice. In (40a), it can be read as: “the State-Time 
focalises s1”. The intuitive connection is that this focalisation of a specific state 
argument by Voice accounts for voice contrasts. This will become clearer when 
we turn to passive voice, which will selectively bind the result-state, s2. 
Turning to (40b), I propose that Voiceactive has an unvalued interpretable state 
feature. It is interpretable because the voice head maps a state argument to time, so it 
interprets it. Since this feature is unvalued, upon entering the derivation it probes its c-
command domain to value it. The structure in (41) continues the derivation.
15
 
 
(41) Voiceactive + Emma own the typewriter 
  Voice
4
       
2 
 ST-T     Voice 
2 
Voiceactive
3
  own
2 
iS [s]          2 
   Emma      own 
 2  
                                 s1           own 
           AAgree         iS [s]      2 
      own
1
     the 
   typewriter 
 
Upon merging Voiceactive, its unvalued interpretable feature iS [ ] probes for a 
value. It finds s1—the only state argument in the structure—and copies its value through 
the Agree relation. This copies the stative morphological properties of the state 
argument into the IP domain. 
The translation in (42) provides the interpretation of the structure. Line (42d) says: 
Emma’s ownership of the typewriter is a state that is focalised by the State-Time. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 The superscripts in the syntactic structures correspond to the semantic derivations that follow.  
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(42) Interpretation of (41) 
a.║1║= λyλs1λx. own(x, s1, y) 
b.║2║= own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) 
c.║3║= λpλtST-T.  s1 [p & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
d.║4║=  s1 [own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
 
In the case of a simple state like own, the selective binding of Voiceactive is 
interpretatively trivial because there is only one state argument to map. The effect of 
Voiceactive becomes non-trivial with the aspectual complexity of causatives, which we 
will turn to after completing this derivation of own. 
The derivation continues with the merger of Asp
0
, T
0
, and their time arguments. 
The denotations in (43a) and (44a) combine to produce the past simple. The outer-
aspect head in (43a) binds the ST-T that is free in (42d), and says that the Assertion-
Time is simultaneous to the State-Time, making it a temporal ordering head.
16
 Its 
semantic function is thus distinct from the function of the voice head, which focalises an 
inner-aspect argument as it maps it to the State-Time. 
 
(43) a.║Asp║ = λpλtAST-T.  tST-T [p & tAST-T, tST-T] 
b. Formal feature on Aspneutral: uS [  ] 
(44) a.║Tpast║ = λpλtUT-T.  tAST-T [p & tUT-T > tAST-T]  
b. Formal feature on Tpast: uS [  ] 
 
The past tense head in (44a) similarly binds the Assertion-Time argument, and says 
that the Utterance-Time is after the Assertion-Time. So like the outer-aspect head, this 
head is also a temporal ordering function: it operates on times, not inner-aspect 
arguments. Both of these heads come with an uninterpretable morphological state 
feature ((43b), (44b)). They are uninterpretable because these are temporal heads and 
the state arguments are not interpreted by them. 
The tree in (45) completes the relevant aspects of the syntactic derivation. 
                                                          
16
 Simultaneity between the Reference-Time and Event-Time is the standard analysis of outer-aspect in 
the past simple in a Reichenbachian model. I have formalised it as a temporal ordering function in (43a) 
for consistency with the model’s basic approach to temporal interpretation, even though there is debate 
over how to analyse simultaneity in this morphologically null aspect (cf. Hornstein 1990; Giorgi and 
Pianesi 1997; D&U-E 2005). I have chosen to represent it as a temporal ordering function in order to 
emphasise the proposed functional contrast between outer-aspect and tense heads, on the one hand, and 
voice heads and the continuous, on the other. 
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(45) Emma owned the typewriter 
T
8 
2 
Emmae      T
 
2 
 UT-T       T 
2 
Tpast
7
      Asp
6
 
uS [s]       2 
AST-T      Asp 
2 
Asp
5
     Voice
4
 
uS [s]   2 
ST-T           Voice 
2 
Voiceactive
3
   own
2
 
iS [s]         2 
te        own 
2 
s1    own 
iS [s]      2 
own
1
    the  
typewriter 
 
The interpretation of (45) is in (46). All the elements in this derivation compose 
straightforwardly. The remaining unbound argument in (46h) is the Utterance-Time 
argument. I will assume that this is one of the functions of the complementiser (not 
shown in (45)). Line in (46h) reads that Emma’s ownership of the typewriter is a state 
that is focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-Time is after the simultaneous to 
the Assertion- and State-Times. 
 
(46) Interpretation of (45) 
a.║1║= λyλs1λx. own(x, s1, y) 
b.║2║= own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) 
c.║3║= λpλtST-T.  s1 [p & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
d.║4║=  s1 [own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
e.║5║= λqλtAST-T.  tST-T [q & tAST-T, tST-T] 
f.║6║=  tST-T  s1 [own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) & tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T] 
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g.║7║= λrλtUT-T.  tAST-T [r & tUT-T > tAST-T ] 
h.║8║=  tAST-T tST-T  s1 [own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) & tST-T   τ(s1)*  
& tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
 
Now that we have seen the general function of Voiceactive, let’s consider the 
derivation of a causative predication. The relevant elements of the lexical entry for push 
are in (47). The function in (47a) says that push is a stative causative predicate, where 
the causal relation partitions the predicate and its arguments into a causing-state 
description and a result-state description. Each of the state arguments in push comes 
with its own state valued interpretable morphological state feature ((47b)). 
 
(47) a. ║push║ = λyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(push(x, s1), push(s2, y)) 
b. Formal feature on a state argument: iS [s] 
 
The tree in (48) picks up the derivation of Victoria pushed the cart at the merger of 
Voiceactive. It again probes for a value for its unvalued interpretable feature iS [ ].  It 
finds the closest s, which is on s1. As for the selective binding, in contrast with the 
derivation of a simple state predicate, such as own, because the aspectual structure of 
push is complex the state argument that gets mapped to the State-Time is a causing-state 
in push. 
 
(48) Voiceactive + Victoria push the cart  
  Voice
4
       
2 
ST-T      Voice 
  2 
Voiceactive
3
  push
2 
iS [s]          2 
Victoria      push 
2  
 s1          push 
           AAgree        iS [s]    2 
s2       push 
iS [s]     2 
push
1  
   the 
 cart 
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The interpretation in (49) of the structure brings the contrast out. Line (49d) reads: 
Victoria’s pushing of the cart is a stative causative relation whose causing-state is 
focalised by the State-Time. Since the State-Time focalises a causing-state, the intuition 
that active voice causative expressions are about the causing part of the eventuality is 
captured. 
 
(49) Interpretation of (48) 
a.║1║= λyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(push(x, s1), push(s2, y)) 
b.║2║= CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart)) 
c.║3║= λpλtST-T.  s1 [p & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
d.║4║=  s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart)) & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
 
Another point of interest in this derivation is the consequence of having a unique 
State-Time. Line (49d) shows that Voice maps only s1 to the State-Time, while the 
result-state argument, s2, remains free. 
On this proposal, it will be bound under Existential Closure at the discourse level. 
Existential closure will provide the existential quantification over the result-state, but 
this result-state will not be mapped to time in the narrow syntax/LF in the past simple. 
In the case of the past simple, I propose that the temporal trace of the result-state is 
interpreted inferentially with respect to the LF interpretation of the completed 
derivation, conceptual knowledge of the predicate, and discourse context. 
Since a causative predicate contains causing-state and result-state sub-parts that are 
not necessarily interpreted as co-extensive, the default inference regarding the temporal 
trace of the result-state is that it lasts longer in time than the temporal trace of the 
causing-state. This will become relevant in section 4.2.2.5.2, where the interpretative 
properties of the present simple with respect to different predicate classes is analysed.
17
 
                                                          
17
 I leave to future research the consequences of not mapping the result-state to time explicitly in 
examples such as this. This may require revision, but there are reasons to think that it is correct. (i) First, 
it is reasonable to assume that the State-Time in the derivation is unique, just like the Assertion-Time and 
Utterance-Time are unique. (ii) Second, in the analysis of the continuous in section 4.2.2.2, the 
uniqueness of the State-Time plays a crucial role in capturing the continuous’ temporal properties. (iii) 
Third, as observed by Myriam Uribe-Etxebarria (p.c.), the different parts of an eventuality cannot be 
modified temporally. For example, if two temporal modifiers are added to Peter broke the window, they 
cannot be interpreted as modifying the causing and result sub-parts: the ungrammaticality of *Peter broke 
the window at 8:00 at 8:01 shows that the two temporal modifiers cannot mean that the breaking began at 
8:00 and the result obtained at 8:01. When two temporal modifiers are interpretable, one specifies the 
other: Peter broke the window at 8:00 on Tuesday. As a counter-point, there is the case of inner-aspectual 
modification. The different readings of adverbs are often argued to follow from the modification of the 
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Picking up the derivation again, from this point on it is the same as the derivation of 
own above. The tree in (50) completes the syntactic derivation and (51) its 
interpretation. 
 
(50) Victoria pushed the cart 
T
8 
2 
Victoriav     T   
 
2 
UT-T          T 
 2 
Tpast
7
     Asp
6
 
uS [s]       2 
AST-T      Asp 
2 
Asp
5
    Voice
4
 
  uS [s]      2 
ST-T         Voice 
2 
Voiceactive
3
    push
2
 
iS [s]         2 
tv         push 
2  
s1           push 
iS [s]      2 
s2        push 
iS [s]       2 
 push
1
       the 
cart 
 
The final interpretation on line (51i) reads: Victoria’s pushing of the cart is a stative 
causative relation whose causing-state is focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-
Time is after the simultaneous Assertion- and State-Times.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
different parts of the inner-aspectual decomposition of the predicate. One example is the repetitive and 
restitutive readings of again (e.g. Rachel closed the door again; cf. von Stechow 1996; Martin and 
Schafer 2014). If the aspectual sub-parts of the predicate were all mapped to time in the syntax, the 
expectation would be to be able to target them with temporal modification, which does not seem to be 
possible. So, the State-Time may well be unique. 
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(51) Interpretation of (50) 
a.║1║= λyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(push(x, s1), push(s2, y)) 
b.║2║= CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart)) 
c.║3║= λpλtST-T.  s1 [p & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
d.║4║=  s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart)) & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
e.║5║= λqλtAST-T.  tST-T [q & tAST-T, tST-T] 
f.║6║=  tST-T  s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart)) & tST-T   τ(s1)* 
& tAST-T, tST-T] 
g.║7║= λrλtUT-T.  tAST-T [r & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
h.║8║=  tAST-T tST-T  s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T  & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
i. Interpretation with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T  s1 2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T  & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
 
Comparing these two derivations, in both Voiceactive selectively binds the closest 
state argument. But only in the case of causative predicates is the interpretative result 
non-trivial: in mapping the causing-state to the State-Time, the result-state is 
backgrounded. But with simple states (e.g. own), there is only one state argument, so 
when voice maps it there is no contrastive effect. 
Now that we have seen the role of Voice in mapping an inner-aspect argument to 
time in the active voice, the next section extends the analysis to the passive. 
 
 
4.2.1.5.3 Derivation of the Passive Voice 
Let’s consider the derivation of the passive expression The cart was pushed by Victoria. 
The passive is more complicated because it has to accomplish three things at once: it 
has to account from its meaning, its syntax, and the properties of the external argument.  
The first new step in the derivation is the formation of the passive participle. In (52a) I 
propose that the passive participle morpheme is a modifier of the result-state description 
Chapter 4 
227 
 
of a causative relation that places a containment relation on its state arguments, namely 
that the causing-state is contained in the result-state.
18
 
 
(52) a.║-enpassive║ = λPλyλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(P(x, s1), en(P(s2, y))) & s1   s2] 
b. Formal features on -en: {iS [  ], iPart [Pass]} 
 
In (52b), the participle carries two formal features. First, it has an unvalued 
interpretable iS [ ] feature that will agree with the state feature on s2. Then, it has a 
valued interpretable participle feature. It specifies that the sort of participle is passive 
and it will make the participle visible to the agreement features on the passive Voice 
head. So, the passive participle puts a containment relation on a causative predicate’s 
state arguments and morphologically marks its result-state description.  
                                                          
18 Regarding the form of the English participle, -en, it is tempting to analyse it as an allomorph of the 
preposition in. This would account for the containment relation I have given it in the denotation.  
It is of obvious interest to see how this analysis of the passive participle relates to that of the outer-
aspect perfect participle. I will not pursue this here because it would broaden the scope too much, and 
distract from the main purpose. However, since I am pursuing the idea that there is a compositional 
distinction between the domain inner-aspect and the domain of time, the position I intend to explore is 
that the passive participle is a containment relation for state arguments, and the perfect participle is a 
containment relation for time arguments. 
In this connection, and before setting the perfect participle aside, it is worth showing that the passive 
participle is distinct from the perfect participle, so the two participles cannot be assumed to be the same 
items. Examples (i)-(iii) show this. Starting with (i), in the simple past active voice, there is no participle 
((i.a)), and in the passive voice, a passive participle appears ((i.b)). 
 
(i) a. Hugo pushed a button 
b. A button was pushed (by Hugo) 
 
Next, in the present perfect active voice, the perfect participle appears ((ii.a)); and in its passive there are 
now two participles, one for the perfect (been) and one for the passive (pushed) ((ii.b)).    
 
(ii) a. Hugo has pushed a button 
b. A button has been pushed (by Hugo) 
 
Lastly, the present perfect continuous shows that in the active voice, the perfect participle and the gerund 
co-occur ((iii.a); and its passive shows that the perfect participle, the gerund, and the passive participle 
co-occur ((iii.b)) in that order. 
 
(iii) a. Hugo has been pushing a button 
b. A button has been being pushed (by Hugo) 
 
These ordering facts are consistent with the present perspective on the passive as an interpretative 
operation on inner-aspectual structure, because the passive participle is structurally closest to the inner-
aspectual domain of the clause. It is also independent of perfect outer-aspect, which appears above the 
morphology of the continuous. So it seems viable to pursue an analysis of the passive and the passive 
participle as operations on the interpretation of inner-aspect, and perfect outer-aspects as orderings of 
times (cf. Hornstein 1990; Giorgi and Pianesi 1997; D&U-E 2000). I set aside more detailed analysis of 
perfect outer-aspects because it would take the discussion in the direction outer-aspect, and the objective 
here is to stay narrowly focussed on diagnosing the content of inner-aspect. 
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The structure in (53) continues the derivation combining the participle morpheme 
with push, and (54) provides its LF translation. Line (54b) reads: Victoria’s pushing of 
the cart is a causative stative relation such that its causing-state is in its result-state. 
 
(53) Victoria pushedpassive the cart 
push
2
  
2 
Victoria     push 
2  
s1           push 
iS [s]      2                                                 
-en        push 
{iS [s], iPart [Pass]}    2 
Agree       s2         push 
iS [s]       2 
push
1
    the cart 
(54) Interpretation of (53) 
a.║1║= λyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(push(x, s1), push(s2, y)) 
b.║2║= CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) & s1   s2 
 
The next step is the merger of the passive Voice head, Voicepassive. Its denotation in 
(55a) is the same as the active Voice head, but it selectively binds a result-state, s2, and 
maps it to the State-Time. 
 
(55) a.║Voicepassive║ = λpλtST-T.  s2 [ p & tST-T   τ(s2)*]          
b. Formal features on Voicepassive:{{iS [  ], uPart [  ], EPP}; {φ-set[  ]}} 
 
Its formal features in (55b) come in two bundles, the first for its aspectual 
properties and the second for the stranded external argument. The first bundle contains 
an unvalued morphological state feature, an unvalued Part feature that targets the 
participle, and an EPP feature that provokes movement of the participle structure. 
The second bundle addresses the co-occurrence of the passive Voice and the 
syntactically active external argument that can be realised under the preposition by. I 
follow Chomsky (2001) in the proposal that Case is a reflex of an agreement relation. 
Since the preposition case-marks the external argument, there must be an agreement 
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relation between them. The nominal features in the set are unvalued, so the external 
argument will value them. 
Furthermore, I follow Landau (2010a) in his proposal that implicit arguments that 
are syntactically active are made so by formal feature agreement. So the nominal feature 
set on Voicepassive requires there to be a corresponding nominal in the structure to value 
it, even if it is null. This accounts for data such as (56) and (57) (repeated from (16) and 
(17)) where the external argument is syntactically active in the passive. 
 
(56) a. The enemy sank the ship   
b. The ship was sunk (by the enemy) 
c. The ship sank (*by the enemy) 
(57) a. They decreased the price willingly 
b. The price was decreased willingly 
c. *The price decreased willingly 
 (Jaeggli 1986: 611, ex. (53)) 
 
This implies that English has a null pronominal of some kind. I will not explore this 
issue in detail, but we will return to it in chapter 5 when discussing the differences 
between passives and unaccusatives. The tree in (58) completes the derivation.
19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 The representation in (58) will be modified in one respect when there-insertion is analysed in section 
4.2.2.5.3. Although the object in (58) is shown as moving straight from its base position to Spec, T, it is 
more accurate have it move through an intermediate position. I will assume that the closest DP adjoins to 
VoiceP in a low focus movement (cf. Belletti 2004). This movement seems to parallel the interpretation 
of the state argument that is selectively bound by Voice. I set this aside for simplicity in (58), and leave 
open the question of how general this movement is. Lastly, this movement replaces Collins’ (2005) 
proposal that the object moves to specifier of the participle in the passive ((13)). 
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(58) The cart was pushed by Victoria 
                 T
8 
             2 
        The           T
 
       cartc       2 
                UT-T          T   
                         ru 
                       Tpast
7
        Asp
6 
2 
                                AST-T        Asp 
                                          ru 
 Asp
5
          Voice
4 
                                          g          ei 
                                       be      pushp               Voice
 
   2        2 
                                                                      -en           push       ST-T          Voice 
         2        2 
                                                  s2       push     Voicepassive
3    push
2
                          
                                                                      2       g              2 
                                                     push
1
        tc   by     Victoria    push 
                                                                                                  2  
                                                                                                 s1            tp 
 
Voicepassive values its unvalued features upon merging. The nominal phi-set is 
valued by the external argument. Since the external argument is overt, Voicepassive is 
realised as by (Collins 2005). 
As for the aspectual bundle {iS [  ], uPart [  ], EPP}, it is valued by the features on 
the passive participle morpheme –en. The probe economy principle in (59) allows the 
passive Voice head to target the features on –en and values its features with a single 
probe. After valuation, the bundle looks like this: {iS [s], uPart [Pass], EPP}. 
 
(59) Maximise matching effects                       (Chomsky 2001: 15, ex. (14)) 
 
Without this economy principle, the unvalued aspectual features could be valued by 
two separate probes: iS [ ] could be valued by the structurally closer s1, and uPart [ ] by 
the participle.  A consequence of having both its unvalued features valued by –en is that     
–en is the unambiguous target for satisfaction of the EPP feature, triggering movement 
of the participle to Spec, Voicepassive. 
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Regarding the movement of the participial structure, I would like to suggest that it 
occurs as represented in (58) because the participle is not yet a morpho-phonological 
unit in the syntax. Voicepassive agrees with –en, and it is targeted by the EPP, but –en 
must be in the domain of the lexical predicate in order to form the participle in morpho-
phonology. So the suggestion is that the structure that moves to Spec, Voicepassive is the 
smallest structure that allows participle formation at PF.
20  
Lastly, in (58) be is generated under the Asp
0
, realising the state feature. This 
foreshadows the proposal to be developed below that the base position of be is Asp
0
. At 
PF be will raise and spell-out T
0 
as was. 
The interpretation of this structure is in (60). Line (60i) says that Victoria’s pushing 
of the cart is a stative causative relation such that its causing-state is in its result-state 
and its result-state is focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-Time is after the 
simultaneous Assertion- and State-Times. The relevant interpretative detail is that 
Voicepassive selectively binds and focalises the result-state. 
 
(60) Interpretation of (58) 
a.║1║= λyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(push(x, s1), push(s2, y)) 
b.║2║= CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) & s1   s2 
c.║3║= λpλtST-T.  s2 [p & tST-T   τ(s2)*] 
d.║4║=  s2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) & s1   s2 
& tST-T   τ(s2)*] 
e.║5║= λqλtAST-T.  tST-T [q & tAST-T, tST-T] 
f.║6║=  tST-T  s2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) & s1   s2 
& tST-T   τ(s2)* & tAST-T, tST-T] 
g.║7║= λrλtUT-T.  tAST-T [r & tUT-T  > tAST-T] 
h.║8║=  tAST-T   tST-T  s2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) 
& s1   s2 & tST-T   τ(s2)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T  > tAST-T] 
i. Interpretation with Existential Closure 
=  tUT-T tAST-T tST-T  s2 1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) 
& s1   s2 & tST-T   τ(s2)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T  > tAST-T] 
 
                                                          
20
 This contrast between non-movement in the active voice versus movement in the passive is reminiscent 
of Move-F versus pied-piping for PF convergence (Chomsky 1995). 
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One final point to observe is that, because of the uniqueness of ST-T, in the passive 
voice it is now s1 that is bound under Existential Closure, and not mapped to time at LF. 
Once again, I propose that the temporal trace of the unmapped state argument is 
interpreted inferentially. In the passive, this is done with respect to the participle’s 
containment relation.
21
 
So, the syntax and the meaning restriction on the passive are captured by the 
combination of the passive participle morpheme that modifies a result-state, and the 
meaning of the passive Voice head, which focalises that result-state in the IP domain. 
While the active voice maps the closest state argument to time, and passive voice maps 
a result-state. This captures the empirical fact that simple states are ungrammatical in 
the passive because they have no result-state:
22
 
 
(61) a. *John was fit by the new suit 
b. *To help was willing of Emma/*It was willing of Emma to help 
 
It also follows that verbs traditionally classified as activities ((62a)), accomplishments 
((62b)), achievements ((62c)), as well as stative causative verbs ((62d)) and stative 
causative adjectives ((62e)) passivise because they are all causative. 
 
(62) a. The cart was pushed by Victoria 
b. Willistead Manor was built by Hiram Walker 
c. The race was won by Katherine 
d. The books were kept on the table by the Tony 
e. To leave was rude of Emma/It was rude of Emma to leave  
 
In conclusion, the passive’s distribution restriction supports this theory of aspectual 
composition because passivisation is sensitive to precisely the causative/simple state 
distinction. It is also consistent with the conclusion that activities, accomplishments and 
achievements do not have distinct syntactic aspectual representations because the 
passive is not sensitive to them. In other words, it is consistent with the conclusion that 
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 This becomes relevant in section 4.2.2.5.3 when analysing the data pattern of existential there.  
22
 See footnote 12 for qualification of the acceptability of simple states in the passive voice. There I 
suggest that placing a passivised simple state in a discourse context that implies clausal relations is one 
way to make it felicitous—but this is done at the discourse-level, not at syntax/LF. 
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they all have the same causative structure. Lastly, this analysis of the passive is not 
sensitive to lexical category, so verbs, adjectives, and nouns are all free to passivise. 
 
 
4.2.1.6 First Argument for the State Argument and against the Event 
Argument 
On the analyses of push above, one of two aspectual arguments gets mapped to the 
State-Time: the causing-state in the active voice and the result-state in the passive voice. 
In the passive voice the auxiliary be appears ((63a)). I would like to propose that this 
mundane fact about the passive—that a stative auxiliary surfaces—is not a coincidence. 
Rather, it reflects the stative content of the aspectual argument interpreted in the IP 
domain and spelt-out via the state feature.
23
 
 
(63) a. The cart was pushed by Victoria  
b. Victoria pushed the cart 
 
The auxiliary verb is needed in the passive because the lexical verb carries the 
participle morphology and cannot bear IP domain morphology, as it does in (63b). On 
the present analysis of the passive, the interpretative process goes like this: the result-
state is mapped to the State-Time by Voicepassive, carrying its state feature with it, and 
Asp
0
 then relates the State-Time and its state feature to the Assertion-Time. So, the 
State-Time carries the content of the result-state argument all the way to the outer-
aspect head. In the passive derivation in (58) I analysed the outer-aspect head as 
auxiliary be’s base-position. In section 4.2.2.5.1 it will be argued that be is always base-
generated in the IP domain. 
The first argument for the state argument goes like this: an auxiliary surfaces in the 
passive because a stem is needed to bear IP domain morphology. Be surfaces in the 
passive because it reflects the stative content of the aspectual argument that is 
interpreted in the IP domain. So, the argument from the passive for the state argument 
comes from a proposal for the content of auxiliary be. In the case of the passive, the 
content is the result-state argument of the predicate interpreted in the IP domain. 
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 See section 3.7.3 for an extended argument against the existence of “active” be; thus be can only be 
stative. 
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Now, auxiliary be appears regardless of whether the lexical predicate is an 
achievement, an accomplishment, or an activity. I have used the activity verb push 
throughout this section because activities are assumed to have a primitive event 
argument in the result part of their causative relation. This event argument is proposed 
to capture the “process” nature of atelic events. 
In (64) (repeated from (6)) we see that Parsons’ (1990) representation of atelic 
causation specifies a relation between two primitive event arguments. 
 
(64) Parsons’s (1990) Analysis of Atelic Causation 
a. Victoria pushed the cart 
b. (  )[Agent(e, Victoria) & (  ’)[Pushing(e’) & Theme(e’, the cart) & 
CAUSE(e, e’)]] 
  (cf. Parsons 1990: 109) 
 
Ramchand (2008), in partial contrast, analyses the causing sub-part in all causatives 
as stative ((65) repeated from (7c, d)). This difference between Parson’s and 
Ramchand’s analyses illustrates that nothing crucial in the account of activities hinges 
on the causing argument’s content. However, Ramchand’s decomposition of activities 
makes it clear that the second aspectual argument is an eventive process: 
 
(65) Syntactic Representation of Atelic Causation 
a.                 initP 
                        3 
                    init             procP 
                                  3 
                             proc               ... 
b. s → e 
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 61) 
 
Another function of the primitive event argument in the caused sub-part of 
activities is to distinguish the decomposition of atelic predicates from that of telic ones. 
Telic predicates, such as break, are sometimes analysed as containing three aspectual 
arguments; the third one, on standard assumptions, is uncontroversially stative. In (66) 
and (67) (repeated from (8), (9)) the decompositions of telic predicates are the same as 
the atelic ones above with the addition of a result-state: 
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(66) Parsons’s (1990) Analysis of Telic Causation 
a. Peter broke the chair 
b. (  )[Agent(e, Peter) & ( e’)[Theme(e’, the chair) & CAUSE(e, e’) & 
    [being-broken(s) & Theme(s, the chair) & BECOME(e’, s)]]] 
(cf. Parsons 1990: 120) 
(67) Ramchand’s (2008) Syntax and Semantics of Telic Verbs 
  a.            initP 
                     3 
                  init            procP 
                               3 
                          proc            resP 
                                        3                                     
                                      res             … 
 
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 39, ex. (1)) 
b. s → e → s 
(Ramchand 2008: 42-45) 
 
So when it comes to predicate decomposition, an event argument is central in 
distinguishing atelic predicates from telic ones. State arguments suffice for the rest. 
However on the present analysis of the passive, the appearance of a stative auxiliary 
with activity verbs indicates that their caused sub-part is also stative. If this is the case, 
then we can conclude further that the more complex decomposition of telic predicates 
collapses into an aspectual decomposition with only two aspectual arguments. 
Let’s consider Ramchand’s system first. Here the aspectual arguments are 
composed with a single interpretation rule of causal implication. In (67b) the second 
state argument is interpreted as a result-state because it is embedded under the eventive 
process. Without this eventive denotation of the process head in (65) and (67a), there is 
no representation of change or Davidsonian eventivity in this system.  
The present argument is that the appearance of a stative auxiliary in the passive of 
activities shows that their embedded aspectual argument is stative. This argues against a 
primitive event argument in the only place it was needed, and the only place where 
change was represented in the aspectual decomposition. And so, the more complex 
aspectual decomposition of telic predicates reduces to a decomposition with two state 
arguments. 
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A system that makes use of BECOME to produce a result-state such as Parsons’ is 
susceptible to the same argument. The representation of activities in (64) has an event 
argument in the second part of the CAUSE relation to reflect the intuition that there is a 
process involved, i.e. CAUSE(e, e’). In representation of telic predicates in (66b), 
BECOME marks the transition from the process event in the causative relation to a 
state, i.e. BECOME(e’, s). However, if the content of e’ is stative as the present 
argument suggests, then BECOME no longer provides the desired juxtaposition with 
atelic predicates because the result sub-part of CAUSE already denotes a result-state; 
BECOME is vacuous.
24
 
In sum, if there is no primitive event argument, adding a stative sub-part to the 
decomposition of telic predicates no longer distinguishes atelic predicates from telic 
predicates because both have result-states. In this case, a causative relation with state 
arguments is sufficient to account for eventivity effects. The implication would then be 
that change is represented conceptually, but not in the aspectual decomposition. 
Let’s consider just one observation supporting this argument that auxiliary be in the 
passive reflects the stative content of the promoted aspectual argument. One could 
suggest that a stative auxiliary appears because passive expressions are stative, while 
active voice expressions can be either eventive or stative.  
However, examples (68)-(72) weigh against this possibility. They show that 
eventive verbs behave the same with respect to inner-aspect diagnostics in the active 
and passive voice. Examples (68) and (69) show that achievements and 
accomplishments remain telic. The examples in (70) show that activities remain atelic. 
Lastly, (71) and (72) show that the results of the eventivity diagnostics of locative 
modification and manner adverbs are unchanged in the passive. So, the passive voice 
does not modify a predicate’s aspectual status. 
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 I have discussed telicity in this section using the accomplishment verb break, and set aside discussion 
of achievements. This is partially to simplify the discussion, but also because accomplishments and 
achievements pattern together in many respects. In addition, achievements are often analysed as complex 
events with a process and/or as causatives (cf. Levin 2007; Ramchand 2008), and so I am assuming that 
their aspectual decomposition falls under the arguments given above. Lastly, the differences that do 
appear to exist between accomplishments and achievements can be analysed as pragmatic (cf. Verkuyl 
1993). I am taking a combination of these positions: accomplishments and achievements are causatives 
with the same aspectual decomposition, and the differences between them are pragmatic/conceptual. The 
status of telicity and boundedness in this system is discussed below in section 4.2.2.4. 
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(68) a. Katherine won the race in twenty-five minutes 
b. The race was won by Katherine in twenty-five minutes 
(69) a. Hiram Walker built Willistead Manor in three years 
b. Willistead Manor was built by Hiram Walker in three years 
(70) a. Victoria pushed the cart for hours 
b. The cart was pushed by Victoria for hours 
(71) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom 
b. The toast was buttered by Jones in the bathroom 
(72) a. They decreased the price willingly 
b. The price was decreased willingly 
 
Since passive expressions still test positive for eventivity, the question of why they 
come with stative morphology is an interesting one. The present analysis provides a 
principled reason that implies that eventivity effects are epiphenomenal. It has the 
additional strength of explaining why auxiliaries are stative.
25
 
 
 
4.2.2 The Continuous Aspect 
In this section we turn to the analysis of the continuous. Section 4.2.2.1 outlines the 
empirical ground. Section 4.2.2.2 provides the derivations of the continuous in the 
active voice and passive voice. Section 4.2.2.3 presents the argument for state 
arguments from the continuous. Lastly, section 4.2.2.4 discusses the representation of 
telicity in this system, the status of the Imperfective Paradox, and why the continuous 
aspect is an environment for agentive coercion. 
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 In addition to be, auxiliary have is stative, and the do that appears in do-support is a bleached stative 
form, and not the action lexical verb. Examples (i) and (ii) illustrate this last point. On the one hand, do-
support occurs with all predicates, even simple states, such as own ((i)). On the other, (ii) shows that 
simple states are infelicitous with lexical do, which implies an action.  
 
(i) Emma did not own a typewriter 
(ii) #What Emma did then was own a typewriter 
 
This shows that the do in do-support and lexical do are different items, the former being bleached of the 
action connotation of the latter. On this theory it is not a coincidence that auxiliaries are stative, but an 
account of why different auxiliaries appear where they do is a project for future research. 
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4.2.2.1 The Distribution of the Continuous 
The distribution of the continuous aspect has the same semantic restriction as the 
passive: only simple states are ungrammatical. The examples in (73) show that 
activities, accomplishments, achievements, and stative causative verbs and adjectives 
take the continuous naturally, but simple state verbs and adjectives do not.  
 
(73) a. Victoria is pushing the cart 
b. Hiram Walker is building Willistead Manor 
c. Katherine is winning the race 
d. He is keeping the books on the table 
e. Emma is being rude  
f. *Emma is owning a typewriter 
g. *Emma is being anxious/nervous/eager/willing 
h. *Peter is being tall/Canadian 
 
From the perspective of this thesis, what (73a-e) share is a causative aspectual structure, 
so the obvious suggestion is that the continuous aspect is another function that operates 
on a causative in-put. 
Interestingly, the out-put of the continuous has the temporal properties of a simple 
state. Vlach (1981) (who argues that the continuous is a stativiser) observes with respect 
to Vendler’s (1967) classification that predicates that take the continuous allow a 
temporal succession reading with a when-clause ((74a-c)). In contrast, simple state 
predicates only have a temporal overlap reading ((74d)). 
 
(74) a. Victoria pushed the cart when I arrived 
     I arrived, then Victoria pushed the cart 
b. Hiram Walker built the house when I arrived 
     I arrived, then Hiram Walker built the house 
c. Katherine won the race when I arrived 
     I arrived, then Katherine won the race 
d. Emma owned a typewriter when I arrived 
     I arrived and Emma already owned a typewriter 
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In the continuous aspect, however, continuous-taking predicates now have the same 
temporal overlap interpretation as simple states (cf. (75d)): 
 
(75) a. Victoria was pushing the cart when I arrived 
     I arrived and Victoria was already pushing the cart 
b. Hiram Walker was building the house when I arrived 
     I arrived and Hiram Walker was already building the house 
c. Katherine was winning the race when I arrived 
     I arrived and Katherine was already winning the race 
 
A related property in English is that simple states in the present simple have an 
existential reading, and continuous-taking predicates (i.e. causatives) do not ((76a-c) vs. 
(76d)): 
 
(76) a. Victoria pushes the cart   (  /Gen) 
b. Hiram Walker builds the house  (  /Gen) 
c. Katherine wins the race   (  /Gen) 
d. Emma owns a typewriter    ( /Gen) 
 
But, the examples in (77) show that the continuous aspect makes this possible for 
causatives: 
 
(77) a. Victoria is pushing the cart    ( ) 
b. Hiram Walker is building the house  ( ) 
c. Katherine is winning the race  ( ) 
 
The meaning of the continuous is intuitively described as an unfinished process, 
especially of someone doing something. One analysis of the continuous is to assume 
Vendler’s aspectual classification of activities, accomplishments, achievements, and 
states, and treat the continuous as an intentional operator that maintains the predicate’s 
aspectual properties (cf. Dowty 1979; Higginbotham 2009).  
On that approach, the continuous invokes inertia worlds (i.e. possible worlds 
representing potential outcomes of the eventuality) to capture the atelicity of the 
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continuous in the actual world: if a predicate is an accomplishment or achievement, the 
eventuality they describe becomes atelic in the actual world because the continuous 
operator shifts the culmination into inertia worlds, and so in the actual world the 
eventuality is not yet finished. 
Inertia world analyses have three significant linguistic drawbacks: (i) since the 
continuous maintains the predicate’s original aspectual classification, the grammatical 
distribution of the continuous—the ungrammaticality of simple states in the 
continuous—has to be stipulated (Higginbotham 2009: 133); (ii) it does not explain why 
Vendlerian non-states take on the temporal properties of simple states in the continuous, 
and not activities; and (iii) it is unclear why activities, which are already atelic, should 
be meaningful in the continuous. 
In contrast, the fact that the continuous aspect is sensitive to just this 
causative/simple state distinction takes on certain significance here. In addition, it 
extends to account for the fact that EAs take the continuous, and other adjectives do not. 
Now, the data presented above illustrating the distribution of the continuous and its 
interpretive parallels with simple states show that the intuitive meaning of the 
continuous aspect is not sharp enough to characterise its grammatical function. The data 
imply that the continuous is defined over causatives, and this underwrites the general 
intuition that the continuous involves something happening. But, we have seen that 
causation does not entail change, so the intuition is misleading. 
Instead, I propose that the continuous aspect gives causatives the temporal 
properties of simple states by mapping both aspectual parts of a stative causative 
relation to the State-Time. Since both the causing-state and the result-state in the stative 
causative hold together at this one time, it is interpreted as atelic. 
The interpretative properties of the continuous and the present and past simple with 
respect to aspectual structure are discussed in section 4.2.2.5.2. First, the next section 
presents the analysis of the continuous. 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Derivation of the Continuous 
I propose (78) as the lexical entry of the continuous. Beginning with the denotation in 
(78a), it is designed to work in combination with the out-put of the voice head. First, it 
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presupposes there is a State-Time argument for it to bind, i.e. tST-T. For this to be the 
case, a voice head must have already merged and selectively bound a state argument. 
 
(78) a.║-ing║ = λp.  ST-T s [p & tST-T   τ(s)] 
b. Formal features on -ing: iS [  ] 
 
Second, the existential quantifier over states will unselectively bind any free state 
argument in the predicate, and map it to the State-Time. This means that it will bind the 
state argument that Voice
0 
leaves behind, and map it to the same State-Time. A well-
formed out-put will say that the State-Time is one at which both the causing-state and 
result-state hold simultaneously. Lastly in (78b), the continuous morpheme comes with 
a morphological state feature. 
Regarding the intuition that the continuous involves a “process”, I suggest it is 
derivative of the continuous operating on causatives, and mapping the causing-state and 
the result-state to the State-Time. Since most predicates that appear in the continuous do 
imply change, the continuous induces the inference that it is about an altelic “process”. 
However, the proposal here is that the continuous is truly about the temporal 
interpretation of a stative causative aspectual structure. Importantly, since the 
overarching argument is the there is no primitive event argument, but only state 
arguments, it is impossible for the continuous to be about a “process” in this system. 
Note that on this proposal, the continuous aspect is not an outer-aspect in the sense 
of being a temporal ordering relation (cf. D&U-E 2000). Instead, it is like Voice in this 
theory in that it maps an aspectual argument to the State-Time. But unlike Voice, it 
unselectively binds and it does not focalise. 
The structure in (79) illustrates the active voice derivation of Victoria was pushing 
the cart. Once again, be is generated under Asp
0
 in order to bear the temporal and 
aspectual morphology that the lexical predicate cannot. The lexical predicate cannot 
carry this morphology because the gerund morphology intervenes, and so it carries –ing. 
Be will raise to T
0 
and spell-out as was in PF. The gerund will also form in PF. 
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(79) Victoria was pushing the cart 
T
6 
2 
Victoriav      T   
                    2 
UT-T          T 
2                                                            
Tpast   Asp 
uS [s] 2 
AST-T        Asp 
       2 
Asp     ing
5 
g   2 
be     -ing
4  
   Voice
3
 
  uS [s]   iS [s]        2 
  ST-T       Voice 
2 
       Voiceactive
2
     push
1 
iS [s]      2 
tv        push 
2  
s1           push 
 iS [s] 2 
s2        push 
 iS [s]     2 
push      the 
cart 
 
The interpretation of this structure is in (80). Everything is the same here as in the 
active voice derivation of Victoria pushed the cart in (50), with the addition of the 
continuous. In (80e), the continuous explicitly binds the state argument that Voice
0 
leaves behind, and maps it to the State-Time, but without focalising it. Line (80f) reads: 
Victoria’s pushing of the cart is a stative causative relation whose causing- and result-
states hold at the State-Time, which focalises the causing-state, and the Utterance-Time 
is after the simultaneous Assertion- and State-Times. Since only the temporal trace 
function in Voice focalises, there is still the intuition that an active voice continuous 
expression is about the causing-state. 
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(80) Interpretation of (79) 
a.║1║= CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), (push(s2, the cart)) 
b.║2║= λpλtST-T.  s1 [p & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
c.║3║=  s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), (push(s2, the cart)) & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
d.║4║= λq.  tST-T s [q & tST-T   τ(s)] 
e.║5║=  tST-T s2 s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), (push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tST-T   τ(s2)] 
f.║6║=  tAST-T ST-T s2 s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), (push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tST-T   τ(s2) & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
 
So, the proposal is that the continuous aspect establishes that the State-Time is one 
when both the causing-state and caused-state hold simultaneously. Without the 
continuous to specify that the State-Time has this property, if a predicate is causative, 
then Voice maps one state argument to the State-Time but nothing in the semantics says 
the State-Time holds of both aspectual sub-parts. Without the continuous to make this 
meaning contribution, if a predicate is causative, then the default inference is that the 
two aspectual parts do not hold at the same time. We will return to this in section 
4.2.2.5.2 when discussing the interactions between temporal interpretation and inner-
aspect. 
Let’s turn now to the derivation of the passive continuous expression The cart was 
being pushed by Victoria in (81). The copula is once again generated under Asp
0
 under 
morphological necessity, and it moves to T
0 
and it spelt-out as was in PF. Regarding the 
gerund, it is no longer able to attach to the verbal predicate because the passive 
morpheme –en intervenes. So, the morphological state feature on –ing spells out as be 
in order to provide the gerund morphology with a stem. 
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(81) The cart was being pushed by Victoria 
T
6 
2 
The   T
 
cartc     2 
UT-T          T 
2 
Tpast   Asp 
 2 
AST-T      Asp 
3 
Asp          ing
5 
 g     3 
 be ing       Voice 
  1     3 
        be –ing4 pushp      Voice
3
 
2     3 
–en           push ST-T         Voice 
 2     3 
s2 push Voicepassive
2 
  push
1
 
2      g       2 
push       tc    by  Victoria    push 
  2 
s1   tp 
 
There are two points that differentiate the interpretation of this derivation from that 
of the active voice continuous derivation: the passive participle and the passive voice 
head. Line (82f) says that Victoria’s pushing of the cart is a stative causative relation 
such that its causing-state is in its result-state and its result-state is focalised by the 
State-Time, which holds simultaneously of the causing-state, and the Utterance-Time is 
after the simultaneous Assertion- and State-Times. 
Aside from its length, the problematic point in this paraphrase seems to be the 
containment relation on the states. This is where the choice of the sub-set, instead of the 
proper sub-set relation comes into play. It allows for the two states to be interpreted co-
extensively even though they stand in a formal containment relation. This allows for the 
correct interpretation of this sentence, while capturing the focalisation on the result-state 
that the passive induces on the continuous.    
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(82) Interpretation of (81) 
a.║1║= CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) & s1   s2  
b.║2║= λpλtST-T.  s2 [p & tST-T   τ(s2)*] 
c.║3║=  s2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) & s1   s2  
& tST-T   τ(s2)*] 
d.║4║= λq.  ST-T s [q & tST-T   τ(s)] 
e.║5║=  ST-T s1 s2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart))) & s1   s2  
& tST-T   τ(s2)* & tST-T   τ(s1)] 
f.║6║=  tAST-T ST-T s1 s2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), en(push(s2, the cart)))  
& s1   s2 & tST-T   τ(s2)* & tST-T   τ(s1) & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T]  
 
In this section I have proposed a novel analysis of the continuous that captures its 
temporal properties and its grammatical distribution, while fitting naturally into the 
inner-aspectual system under construction. While it may be strange to conceive of the 
continuous as a statement about simultaneous states, we will continue to see in this 
chapter that this characterisation accounts straightforwardly for an array of facts.
26
 
 
 
4.2.2.3 Second Argument for the State Argument and against the 
Event Argument  
The argument from the continuous aspect for the sole existence of state arguments 
builds on the argument from the passive. In the argument from the passive we saw that 
decomposition approaches to inner-aspect agree that atelic causation has a primitive 
event argument in the caused sub-part, while differing on whether the causing sub-part 
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 Just as with the analysis of the passive above, this analysis does not imply that simple states cannot 
appear in the continuous. It implies that when they do so, it is at the pragmatic/discourse level. An 
example: the verb live in (i) is a simple state. Traditional grammars describe that, in the continuous ((ii)), 
live implies a temporary situation (Quirk et al. 1985: 198-199). But notice that, in the continuous, (iii) is a 
natural continuation of (ii). 
 
(i) Alex lives in Toronto 
(ii) Alex is living in Toronto 
(iii) Alex is living in Toronto because he is going to school there 
 
Rather than simply describing a temporary situation, a causal relation is inferred. The present analysis 
predicts that causation will be involved, either at the lexical level or at the discourse level. So, simple 
states can and do appear in the continuous, but their felicity depends on the discourse context and our 
ability to conceptualise a simple state in causal relation: live works well, others (e.g. own: Emma is 
owning a typewriter) are more resistant. 
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is an event argument or a state argument (cf. Parsons 1990; Ramchand 2008). The 
proposal was that the appearance of a stative auxiliary in the passive with all causative 
predicates reflects the stative content of the aspectual argument in their caused sub-part. 
This specifically ruled out the existence of an event argument in the caused-part of 
atelic predicates—the only place it is necessary. 
The argument from the continuous assumes the same logic, but the continuous 
provides overt evidence that the content of both the causing-part and the result-part is 
stative. The derivations of the active continuous in (79) and the passive continuous (81) 
interpret both aspectual sub-parts of the predicate, and the stative auxiliary be always 
appears. So, the second argument for the state argument and against the event argument 
is that the appearance of a stative auxiliary in both the active and passive continuous 
provides evidence that the content of the arguments is stative in all cases. 
Elaborating further, note that just as with the passive, the base predicate retains its 
eventive character in the continuous aspect. The examples in (83) show causative 
predicates continue to accept manner and locative modification. So, it cannot be argued 
that the continuous induces stativity. 
 
(83) a. Victoria was pushing the cart angrily in the hardware store 
b. Hiram Walker was building a still secretively in the garage 
c. Katherine was winning the race quickly in the stadium 
d. He kept was keeping the books carefully in the library 
e. Emma was being elegantly modest in the foyer 
 
Interestingly, what happens in the continuous is that all causative predicates 
become atelic—but more to the point—they all take on the temporal properties of 
simple states. Furthermore, these data show with respect to what we saw with the 
passive above that the continuous only affects the temporal interpretation of the 
predicate’s aspectual structure—but it does not change its behaviour with respect to 
eventivity diagnostics. The analyses of Voice and the continuous proposed here capture 
exactly this empirical pattern: they explain why simple state properties emerge while 
event diagnostics continue to give positive results ((83)). 
In conclusion, on this theory of inner-aspect the stative causative nature of the 
predicates that accept the continuous allows us to explain the emergence of stative 
properties in predicates that continue to appear eventive: the content of their aspectual 
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arguments is stative, and eventivity effects are derived from causation. Section 4.2.2.5.2 
will return to address in more detail how it is that the continuous takes on the temporal 
properties of simple states. 
 
 
4.2.2.4 Telicity, the Imperfective Paradox, and Continuous Coercion 
The data in (84) (repeated from (73)) show that the continuous aspect is, like the 
passive, sensitive to the distinction between causatives (84a-e) versus simple states 
(84f-h). 
 
(84) a. Victoria is pushing the cart 
b. Hiram Walker is building Willistead Manor 
c. Katherine is winning the race 
d. He is keeping the books on the table 
e. Emma is being rude  
f. *Emma is owning a typewriter 
g. *Emma is being anxious/nervous/eager/willing 
h. *Peter is being tall/Canadian 
 
The continuous aspect has a complex cluster of properties: (i) it applies to 
causatives, (ii) it gives causatives the temporal interpretation of simple states, (iii) it has 
stative morphology, (iv) it is atelic, (v) it tests positive for eventivity, and (vi) it gives 
rise to agentive inferences. This section addresses how they interact and bear on the 
representation of telicity, boundedness, agentivity. 
On the present analysis of the continuous, its atelicity follows from the mapping of 
states to a single State-Time. Since telicity is not represented in the predicate’s aspectual 
structure, this analysis of the continuous does not have to posit an operation that 
removes the formal property of telicity from a predicate’s aspectual decomposition.  
Although I will leave a fuller account of telicity to future research, the logic of the 
present inner-aspectual system provides a clear picture of how telicity is represented. 
There are two types: (i) predicates that imply a natural culmination, such as arrive, 
break or find (e.g. I found my keys on the table), and (ii) predicates that vary between 
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telic and atelic usages (e.g. build, draw, eat, run; I ran (to the store)). We’ll call the 
former “telic” and the latter “bounded”. 
Telic verbs such as arrive, break and find motivate the more complex aspectual 
decompositions with an additional result-state. Since telicity is a property of the 
predicate itself, it is reasonable to encode it lexically in order to be able to capture its 
distribution. For this reason, Ramchand (2008) proposes that telic verbs list this 
information in their lexical entry as a [res] feature in order to associate with a result-
state phrase, resP (Ramchand 2008: 32; 57-58; 77-78).
27
 
In the system being developed here, we can say that telicity—rather than being a 
lexical/syntactic feature—is a simply a conceptual property of the predicate with no 
decompositional reflex. So all else being equal, a predicate that is telic is associated 
with a natural culmination conceptually.
28
 
However, the continuous aspect is a case where all is not equal. Since it 
semantically entails that the causing- and result-states hold at the State-Time, 
culmination is explicitly denied at the compositional level. This means that the 
semantics of the derivation imposes a restriction on the default conceptual knowledge 
associated with the predicate. 
The examples of telic predicates in (85) show that each predicate handles the 
imposition of the continuous in its own way, depending on its own conceptual 
particularities. 
 
(85) a. Victoria is arriving 
b. Peter is breaking the window 
c. I am finding my keys 
d. Hugo is reaching the summit 
e. Katherine is winning the race 
 
                                                          
27
 The sort of lexical feature that Ramchand proposes projects into aspectual structure is not a formal 
feature that enters into Agree relations. Ramchand (2008: 25ff.) argues against the representation of 
telicity as a morpho-syntactic formal feature (cf. Borer 2005a, b, a.o.). The present theory takes the same 
position because, here, telicity is not represented as a syntactic property. 
28
 Even though telicity is not represented in the aspectual decomposition, as a conceptual property, I do 
expect telicity to have morphological reflexes. In chapter 1 it was argued the category distinction between 
verbs and adjectives tracked the conceptual notion of change. Also, in chapter 5 it will be argued that the 
reflexive se that appears on some causative unaccusatives in Romance languages is 
conceptual/morphological. So, in this theory, conceptual knowledge can have a linguistic representation, 
i.e. in morphology, but it is not necessarily reflected in the syntax/LF mapping. 
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Nevertheless, the proposal here is that telic predicates have a causative aspectual 
decomposition, and for that reason the continuous aspect applies to them as a general 
compositional operation. In other words, the individual differences among the examples 
in (85) are conceptual and beyond the domain of the analysis of the continuous and 
inner-aspect decomposition. 
Turning to bounded readings, there is agreement that they are the product of the 
composition of the whole predicate description (i.e. in traditional terms, the verb 
phrase), and that they are not directly encoded in the aspectual decomposition of the 
predicate. 
Calculating a bounded reading is generally proposed to be a semantic operation that 
measures out the event-denoting verb against the content of its complement. The event 
argument is needed to measure this process (cf. Hay et al. 1999; Kennedy 2012; Krifka 
1989, 1992, 1998; Ramchand 2008; Tenny 1987, 1994; Verkuyl 1993). 
Such an approach to bounded readings bears a fundamental connection to the 
Imperfective Paradox (Dowty 1979). The challenge posed by the paradox is to explain 
the entailment patterns of the continuous aspect with respect to the aspectual class of 
verb (Dowty 1979: 133). 
On the one hand, the activity verb in (86) has the same atelic interpretation in the 
past simple ((86a)) and the in the past continuous ((86b)). More specifically, they both 
entail that it is true that a cart was pushed. 
 
(86) a. Emma pushed a cart 
      A cart was pushed  
b. Emma was pushing a cart 
      A cart was pushed 
 
In contrast, an accomplishment verb phrase, such as draw a circle, appears to have 
differing entailments in the simple past and in the past continuous. In (87a), the past 
simple expression seems to say that the event of drawing is bounded by the completion 
of the circle, while in (87b) in the continuous that entailment is lost. 
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(87) a. Rachel drew a circle 
     Rachel completed a circle 
b. Rachel was drawing a circle 
     Rachel completed a circle 
 
The original conception of the paradox hinged on the intuition that accomplishment 
verbs such as draw entail that their direct objects are complete entities. So draw in the 
past simple in (92a) behaves as expected because the circle is a complete entity. But the 
continuous example in (87b) is a semantic problem because the entailments of draw 
change.  
Above we saw that Dowty proposed a modal analysis of the continuous that moves 
the entailed completion of the drawing of the circle into inertia worlds, and this explains 
the lack of the completion entailment in the actual world. 
However, if this is a mischaracterisation of the semantics of (87a), i.e. if the 
completeness intuition is not an entailment in (87a), then there may be no paradox 
because the examples in (87) could have the same entailments as push in (86). 
The examples in (88) suggest the latter possibility. They show that completeness is 
an implicature, and not an entailment. Example (88a) combines draw with a direct 
object with a more complex part-structure than a circle. Example (88b) combines it with 
the vaguest direct object possible. 
 
(88) a. Emma drew a face, but her sister told her it wasn’t complete without a nose 
b. Emma drew something today, but she didn’t finish it 
 
I would like to add that even in (87a) the extent to which the circle has to be complete 
(or perfect) is unclear. So, what is behind the completion intuition in (87)? Let’s 
consider the properties of a causative predicate in the past simple to explore it.  
A causative predicate contains a cause and a result. All else being equal, in the past 
simple we infer that there is a result, and we infer that the result is as complete as the 
content and context of the utterance allow. So on its own, (89a) is compatible with any 
degree of completeness or sophistication. However, the examples in (88) above show 
that the extent of the completeness can be specified further. In other words, the effect is 
due to default reasoning with respect to the temporal interpretation of the aspectual 
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structure of the predicate in combination with pragmatic informativeness (cf. Grice 
1989). 
 
(89) a. Emma drew a face 
b. Emma owned a typewriter 
 
In this connection, (89b) highlights the contrast between action causatives, such as 
draw, and simple states: simple states do not produce any inference to completion 
because they do not contain a cause-result structure.  
However, both examples in (89) minimally entail the existence of some face 
drawing and some typewriter ownership, respectively. The same is true of the past 
simple circle drawing example in (87a) (i.e. Rachel drew a circle): there is the minimal 
existence entailment of some circle drawing. 
Now, the denotation of the continuous aspect (repeated in ((90)) has the 
compositional effect of explicitly denying the completion of a stative causative 
predication at the State-Time. 
 
(90) ║-ing║ = λp.  ST-T s [p & tST-T   τ(s)] 
 
Considering the circle drawing example again, this means that the continuous 
entails that the drawing is not completed at the State-Time. However, there is still a 
minimal existence entailment of some circle drawing at the State-Time.   
The conclusion is that the past simple and the continuous aspect differ in their 
temporal implicatures, but share a minimal existence entailment, and so there is no 
entailment paradox in the contrast in (87). Furthermore, this means that all the examples 
(86) and (87) have the same, minimal existence entailments. 
With this being the case, a semantic analysis of compositionally bounded readings 
that involves measuring-out a process over an event argument also dissolves because 
the continuous is about mapping states time, and past simple shares the same 
entailments. Therefore, measuring-out is an implicature, and there is no event argument. 
With the existence entailment of the continuous in mind it becomes clear why 
examples of RAs in the continuous such as (91) are derived by discourse-level coercion, 
as discussed in section 3.7. 
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(91) Katherine is being French/tall 
  Katherine is French/tall 
 
(i) First, they violate the existence entailment that the individual has the property. As 
shown in (91), it can be true that Katherine is not French or tall. (ii) Second, these 
predicates are simple states, so they do not satisfy the denotation of the continuous in 
the first place. (iii) Third, they are only interpretable on an agentive reading (and in the 
case of French, with a relevant stereotype), but the semantics of inner-aspectual 
composition and the continuous refer only to states, so agentivity is an enrichment of 
the semantics but not encoded in it. 
In this connection, the agentive reading that RAs have specifically in the 
continuous seems to be based on the conscious impression that the continuous aspect 
means that an Agent is in the process of doing something (cf. Partee 1977; Dowty 
1979). 
In contrast, I have proposed here that semantically, the continuous aspect is defined 
by stative causation—not agentivity or a process. I have aimed to show that narrowing 
in on the grammatical distribution of the continuous, its simple state temporal 
properties, and its stative morphology reveals that the continuous is an operation on 
stative causatives, and that the event argument is epiphenomenal. 
 
 
4.2.2.5 Outstanding Aspectual Issues 
This section clarifies some of the aspectual topics that have surfaced. Section 4.2.2.5.1 
argues that be and its inflected forms are not lexical verbs, but auxiliaries that appear in 
the IP domain to satisfy morphological requirements. Section 4.2.2.5.2 analyses the 
present simple and accounts for its interpretational pattern with respect to the type of 
predicate. Lastly, 4.2.2.5.3 extends the previous section’s discussion to account for the 
distribution of there-insertion and provide a further argument for the sole existence of 
state arguments. 
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4.2.2.5.1 The Copula: an Auxiliary 
Chapter 1 and section 2.4 argued that a lexical predicate’s inner-aspectual structure is 
dissociated from lexical category information because verbs and adjectives have the 
same range of aspectual complexity. So, the aspectual structure in the syntax of the 
causative verb push in (92), and that of the causative adjective rude in (93a) are the 
same. On this proposal, the category distinction between verbs and adjectives is not 
determined by syntax, but by morphology. 
 
(92) Syntax of push 
push 
2 
DP1   push 
2  
s1       push 
2 
s2     push 
2 
push       DP2 
(93) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
   
This differs from analyses where the maximal projection of push in (92) is verbal, 
and adjective predications are embedded under a lexical copula be. The structures in 
(94) illustrate analyses of these types. The structure in (94a) is a partial representation of 
Ramchand’s aspectual decomposition of verbs. Although the category “verb” does not 
appear, the aspectual heads are meant to decompose it (2008: 57). 
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(94) Representations of the Assumptions that Verbs and Adjectives Have Different 
Aspectual Structures, and that the Copula is a Lexical Verb 
a. Lexical Verbs 
               
initP 
     3 
init            procP 
3 
proc             … 
 
 
 
 
(cf. Ramchand 2008: 61) 
b. Adjective Predications 
                    ... 
               3 
              I              VP 
                       3 
                    V                SC 
                     g            3 
                   be       DP             AP 
                                                  g 
                                                 A 
(cf. Becker 2004: 416, ex. (39)) 
 
On the other hand, (94b) is an alternative way of representing adjective predications 
(e.g. Emma is tall). The copula be is assumed to be a lexical verb that is layered on top 
of the adjectival predication structure, followed by the IP domain. This type of analysis 
often implies that the internal structures of verbs and adjectives are fundamentally 
different. 
In this section, I will argue in favour of the proposal that be is an auxiliary in all 
cases, and so there are not two forms of be (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002; Payne 
2011). In particular, be helps to spell-out IP domain morphology that cannot be borne 
by the lexical predicate. This supports the parallel in (92) and (93), as well as the 
direction of this theory of inner-aspect: verbs and adjectives have parallel inner-
aspectual structures, and aspectual structure is divorced from lexical category. 
A long-observed empirical point is that auxiliaries are the only verbs that appear in 
T
0
 in English. The examples in (95) and (96) show that a lexical verb stays below 
negation, which requires do and auxiliary have to bear tense, respectively. 
 
(95) a. Victoria pushed the cart 
b. Victoria did not push the cart 
c. *Victoria not pushed the cart 
d. *Victoria not did push the cart 
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(96) a. Victoria has pushed the cart 
b. Victoria has not pushed the cart 
c. *Victoria not pushed the cart 
d. *Victoria not has pushed the cart 
 
Bringing be into the picture, the present perfect examples in (97) show that it 
appears to carry the prefect participle morphology in the passive ((97a) vs. (97b)). 
Example (97c) shows that be is generated below T
0
 and negation. 
 
(97) a. Victoria has pushed the cart  
b. The cart has been pushed by Victoria 
c. The cart has not been pushed by Victoria 
 
Further, the past simple examples in (98) show that when no other auxiliary 
occupies T
0
, be raises past negation to carry tense: 
 
(98) a. Victoria pushed the cart  
b. The cart was pushed by Victoria 
c. The cart was not pushed by Victoria 
 
Together, examples (95)-(98) show: 
 
(i) Auxiliaries appear to carry IP-domain morphology. 
(ii) Only auxiliaries move to T0 in English. 
(iii) Be materialises to carry IP-domain morphology and it is generated below T0. 
  
Now a defining property of adjectives is that they do not carry tense and aspect 
morphology. Bearing this in mind, adjective examples (99) and (100) show that be 
follows the same pattern as verbs in (95)-(98). Namely, be appears to carry IP-domain 
morphology, it is generated below negation, and it raises to T
0
 if no other auxiliary is 
present. 
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(99) a. Emma is rude 
b. Emma is not rude 
c. *Emma not is rude 
(100) a. Emma has been rude 
b. Emma has not been rude 
 
Throughout the derivations above, be was analysed as the spell-out of IP heads 
when the lexical predicate was not available. The data presented in this section show 
that the materialisation of forms of be correlates with IP domain considerations: it 
appears to license IP morphology. So, be raises to T
0
 in English because it is an 
auxiliary and not a lexical verb, and it does not originate in the inner-aspectual domain 
of the clause. 
The evidence that be and its forms originate in the IP domain is additional evidence 
that the syntactic structure below the IP domain—the domain of inner-aspect—is not 
distinguished as verbal or adjectival. It supports the conclusion that inner-aspectual 
structure is category neutral, and therefore that verbs and adjectives can project 
isomorphic inner-aspectual structure.
29
 
 
 
4.2.2.5.2 Present Simple, Continuous Aspect, and the Individual/Stage 
Distinction 
This section addresses the behaviour of the present and past simple and the continuous 
aspect with respect to the inner-aspect of the predicate. The examples in (101) (repeated 
from (76)) showed that in the present simple in English, causative verbs lack the 
existential reading ((101a-c)) that simple state verbs have ((101d)). 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 With regard to the category distinction between verbs and adjectives, an interesting prospect is that an 
“adjective” stays in its base position, and a “verb” raises in PF to at least Voice0 (e.g. English) and as far 
as T
0
 (e.g. Romance languages). Voice
0
, Asp
0
, and T
0
 introduce the State-Time, Assertion-Time, and 
Utterance-Time, respectively. If the predicate raises to a time-denoting head (e.g. Voice
0
), and therefore 
stands in a temporal relation to T
0
, tense could be passed down to the predicate through the temporal 
relational heads and manifest on the predicate without the predicate having to raise to T
0
. On the other 
hand, if there is intervening morphology (i.e. –en, –ing), tense is blocked from attaching to the lexical 
predicate and the latter will have adjectival properties. In sum, the difference between verbs and 
adjectives may reduce to the predicate reaching the morphological domain of time. 
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(101) a. Victoria pushes the cart   (  /Gen) 
b. Hiram Walker builds the house (  /Gen) 
c. Katherine wins the race  (  /Gen) 
d. Emma owns a typewriter   ( /Gen) 
 
In contrast, the examples in (102) (repeated from (77)) showed that the continuous 
aspect provides causatives with this existential reading.  
 
(102) a. Victoria is pushing the cart    ( ) 
b. Hiram Walker is building the house ( ) 
c. Katherine is winning the race  ( ) 
 
The examples in (103) and (104) confirm that stative causative verbs and EAs 
follow this pattern, showing that the dividing line is stative causatives versus simple 
states, and not lexical category. 
 
(103) a. Hugo sleeps  (  /Gen) 
b. Hugo is sleeping ( ) 
(104) a. Emma is rude (  /Gen) 
b. Emma is being rude ( ) 
 
In this section I will first propose that these facts, and parallel ones in the past 
simple, follow from the mapping of inner-aspect to time. Then, I will discuss the 
representation of the individual/stage intuition. 
Beginning with the present tense data in (101)-(104), the particularity of the 
interpretation of the present simple is that that all three times are anchored to the 
Utterance-Time, i.e. the time of speech: 
 
(105) Time Orderings of the Present Simple 
 
      ST-T, AST-T, UT-T 
 
On this theory, simple state predicates contain only one state argument, and it is 
mapped to the State-Time by the voice head. This is shown in (106). The interpretation 
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of the simple state present simple expression in (106a) is given in (106b). It shows that 
the aspectual argument is mapped to time, and so the aspectual structure of the predicate 
is completely mapped to time and anchored to the Utterance-Time. This makes it 
consistent with (105), as shown in (106c). I propose that this complete mapping and 
anchoring accounts for the existential reading of these simple states in the present 
simple. 
 
(106) a. Emma owns a typewriter ( ) 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 [own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) & tST-T   τ(s1)*  
& tUT-T, tAST-T, tST-T] 
c.  
      ST-T, AST-T, UT-T 
 
Now let’s compare simple states with causatives, which lack this existential reading 
((107a)). On this theory, causatives have two state arguments and Voice
0
 maps only one 
to the State-Time. So in (107b), s1 is mapped to time, but s2 is not. It was proposed 
above that in the cases where a state argument is not mapped to time in the semantics, it 
is done inferentially. The inferential nature of the temporal interpretation of s2 is marked 
with the square brackets in (107c).  
 
(107) a. Victoria pushes the cart (# ) 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tUT-T, tAST-T, tST-T] 
c. 
    ST-T(s1), AST-T, UT-T                      [ST-T(s2)]     
 
On the time-line in (107c) it falls after the Utterance-Time because, all else being equal, 
there is no reason to infer that the result-state of a causative predicate, s2, holds at the 
same evaluation-time as s1. 
We will return to this below in more detail, but I would like to suggest that 
causative predicates lack an existential reading in the present simple because of this 
ordering particularity: in the present simple the Utterance-Time is the only time of 
semantic evaluation, and the time when the result-state is inferred to hold falls outside 
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of it. This has the effect that the instantiation of the predicate is not properly contained 
by the Utterance-Time, and so the existential reading is undefined. 
Comparing the present simple with the present continuous shows that there is no 
pragmatic pressure to infer that the s1 and s2 are evaluated at the same time in the present 
simple because the continuous aspect does this explicitly. This makes the present 
continuous more informative than the present simple.  
In (108b), the contribution of the continuous is to map both state arguments to the 
State-Time. So just as with simple states in (106), the predicate’s aspectual description 
is completely mapped to time, and the existential reading becomes available because 
everything is properly anchored to the Utterance-Time. The timeline in (108c) shows 
this parallel with (106c). So, if speakers intend the existential interpretation of a 
causative predicate in the present tense, they should choose the continuous aspect.  
 
(108) a. Victoria is pushing the cart  ( ) 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s2 s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tST-T   τ(s2) & tUT-T, tAST-T, tST-T] 
c. 
           ST-T(s1, s2), AST-T, UT-T 
 
Otherwise, the generic, or habitual, interpretation remains. This interpretation is 
available to all predicates, irrespective of aspectual classification ((109), (110)). If we 
are willing to posit a generic quantifier (G) to account for this reading, it can be 
analysed as generic quantification over the Assertion-Time. The generic reading is, thus, 
not a formal property of any predicate’s denotation.30 
 
(109) a. Emma owns a typewriter  (Gen) 
b.  UT-T GtAST-T tST-T s1 [own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) & tST-T   τ(s1)*  
& tUT-T, tAST-T, tST-T] 
 
 
                                                          
30
 Exactly how the Generic/Habitual reading should be formalised is a complicated issue that will not be 
resolved here (cf. Cohen 1997, 2004). The representations in (110) and (111) is inspired by Heim (1982), 
and are simply intended to convey the conclusion favoured here that genericity/habitualness is not a 
lexical property of any predicate that applies to individual. We will come to the issue of the representation 
of Individual-Level predicates presently. 
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(110) a. Victoria pushes the cart  (Gen) 
b.  UT-T GtAST-T tST-T s1 2 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tUT-T, tAST-T, tST-T] 
 
So far we have seen how the continuous aspect provides causatives with the 
temporal properties of simple states, and accounted for their readings in the present 
tense.
31
 Now we will move on to the related past tense facts.  
The examples in (111) (repeated from (74)) showed that causatives modified by a 
when-clause in the simple past have a temporal succession interpretation, while simple 
states have a temporal overlap one (cf. Vlach 1981; Kamp and Rohrer 1983; Smith 
1999; Arche 2006). 
  
(111) a. Victoria pushed the cart when I arrived 
     I arrived, then Victoria pushed the cart 
b. Hiram Walker built the house when I arrived 
     I arrived, then Hiram Walker built the house 
c. Katherine won the race when I arrived 
     I arrived, then Katherine won the race 
d. Emma owned a typewriter when I arrived 
     I arrived and Emma already owned the typewriter 
 
But in the continuous aspect examples in (112) (repeated from (75)), causatives 
now have the same temporal overlap interpretation as simple states (cf. (111d)):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Languages that do have an existential reading of causative predicates in the present simple tend to 
correlate with verb movement to T
0 
(e.g. Romance languages; cf. Zagona 1988, a.o.). This could be 
analysed as the verb being able to incorporate the continuous aspect as it passes through. On such an 
analysis, adjectives are not expected to be ambiguous because they do not raise, so overt continuous 
morphology distinguishes the present simple and the continuous; unless a language does not have 
productive continuous aspect morphology to make the distinction (e.g. Romanian, Swedish; cf. section 
3.7.2). In this case, the auxiliary could incorporate the continuous by originating lower down the clause. 
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(112) a. Victoria was pushing the cart when I arrived 
     I arrived and Victoria was already pushing the cart 
b. Hiram Walker was building the house when I arrived 
     I arrived and Hiram Walker was already building the house 
c. Katherine was winning the race when I arrived 
     I arrived and Katherine was already winning the race 
 
The examples in (113) and (114) show that stative causative verbs and EAs 
conform to this pattern: 
 
(113) a. Hugo slept when I arrived 
  I arrived, then Hugo slept 
b. Hugo was sleeping when I arrived 
  I arrived and Hugo was already sleeping 
(114) a. Emma was rude when I arrived 
  I arrived, then Emma was rude 
b. Emma was being rude when I arrived 
  I arrived and Emma was already being rude 
 
These readings can be accounted for by relativising the explanation for the present 
simple facts given just above to the past simple. The timeline for the past simple is in 
(115): the Utterance-Time is after the simultaneous State- and Assertion-Times. 
 
(115) Time Orderings of the Past Simple 
 
          ST-T, AST-T    UT-T 
 
Beginning with the overlap reading of simple states, (116) shows that there is only 
one State-Time, which aligns with the Assertion-Time, and the time introduced by the 
when-clause identifies with that time. So, the time of the owning and the time of the 
arriving are the same, accounting for their overlap in the past. 
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(116) a. Emma owned a typewriter (when I arrived) 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 [own(Emma, s1, the typewriter) & tST-T   τ(s1)*  
& tAST-T, tST-T, & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
c.  
        ST-T, AST-T, WHEN-T            UT-T 
 
However, with causatives there are two state arguments, and in the simple past only 
one is mapped to time, while the second is interpreted inferentially. Just as with the 
present simple, the causing-state time and the result-state time are inferred to be 
disjoint. 
The timeline in (117c) shows the disjoint interpretation that is given to the causing-
state time and the result-state time, accounting for the temporal succession interpretation 
of causatives in the past simple: 
 
(117) a. Victoria pushed the cart (when I arrived) 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2 [CAUSE(push(Emma, s1), push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
c. 
   ST-T(s1), AST-T, WHEN-T   [ST-T(s2)]                   UT-T 
 
On the other hand, since the continuous is more specific, if speakers intend the 
temporal overlap interpretation, the continuous aspect provides it explicitly. The 
timeline in (118c) shows that the time introduced by the when-clause identifies with the 
unique main-clause State-Time. Now that s2 is interpreted at the same time, the overlap 
reading is the only reading available, and causatives again take on the interpretative 
properties of simple states. 
 
(118) a. Victoria was pushing the cart (when I arrived) 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s2 s1 [CAUSE(push(Victoria, s1), push(s2, the cart))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tST-T   τ(s2) & tAST-T,  tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
c.  
        ST-T(s1, s2), AST-T, WHEN-T           UT-T 
 
The one difference that emerges in the past simple is that, in contrast with the 
present simple ((119a)), causatives now have an existential reading ((119b)): 
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(119) a. Victoria pushes the cart (# /Gen) 
b. Victoria pushed the cart ( /Gen) 
 
I suggested above that the existential reading is unavailable in the present simple 
((119a)) because of the interpretive property of its time-line: the only evaluation time is 
the time of speech ((120a)), and since the result-state is inferred to hold outside of it, the 
existential reading is undefined ((120b)). 
 
(120) a. Time Orderings of the Present Simple 
 
        ST-T, AST-T, UT-T 
b. Interpretation of the Time Orderings of Causatives in the Present Simple 
 
      ST-T(s1), AST-T               [ST-T(s2)]        UT-T 
 
However, comparing the orderings of the present simple and the past simple, in the 
latter there is now a minimal sequence of two evaluation times ((121a)). The suggestion 
in the case of causatives in the simple past is that the existential reading becomes 
available because the inferred temporal interpretation of the unmapped state argument 
can be coherently ordered with respect to this temporal sequence: it can be mapped to a 
time that is before the time of speech ((121b)). This gives causatives in the past simple a 
defined existential reading that they cannot have in the present simple because the 
present simple is only evaluated with respect to the time of speech.  
 
(121) a. Time Orderings of the Past Simple 
 
          ST-T, AST-T    UT-T 
b. Interpretation of the Time Orderings of Causatives in the Past Simple 
 
         ST-T, AST-T                                                 [ST-T(s2)]               UT-T 
 
The issue that remains is the simple state predicates that never have an existential 
reading in present or past tenses. These are the predicates labelled RA here, such as 
Canadian and tall ((122a)), the classic Individual-Level predicates.  
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(122) a. Victoria is/was Canadian/tall (# /Gen) 
b. Emma is/was available/sick  ( /Gen) 
 
On the other hand, traditional intransitive Stage-Level predicates, such as available and 
sick, behave as simple states have been described in this section: they have an 
existential interpretation in simple tenses ((122b)). 
I would like to suggest that this residual distinction among simple state predicates 
reduces to the Figure/Ground distinction. Tamly (2000) describes this as a general 
cognitive distinction: the Ground anchors the concept conveyed by the predicate and the 
Figure is orientated with respect to it: 
 
(123) The General Conceptualisation of Figure and Ground in Language 
The Figure is a moving or conceptually moveable entity whose path, site, or 
orientation is conceived as a variable, the particular value of which is the relevant 
issue. 
The Ground is a reference entity, one that has a stationary setting relative to a 
reference frame, with respect to which the Figure’s path, site, or orientation is 
characterised. 
(Talmy 2000: 312, ex. (2)) 
 
Talmy distinguishes the two notions further with associated characteristics (2000: 
315-316): 
 
(124) a. Figure: more movable, more recently in awareness, less immediately 
perceivable, more dependent 
b. Ground: more permanently located, more familiar/expected, more immediately 
perceivable, more independent 
 
In section 4.4.3 it will be proposed that these domain general notions of 
Figure/Ground and this restricted theory of inner-aspect have the potential to derive 
thematic roles. Here, I would like to suggest that they account the basic Individual/Stage 
intuition of permanent versus contingent. 
Example (125) illustrates these Figure/Ground notions in language. The pen is the 
Figure, and the table is the Ground anchoring the predicate with a location: 
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(125) The pen lay on the table    (Talmy 2000: 311, ex. (1a)) 
 
In terms of structural terms, the complement position is associated with the Ground, 
and external positions are associated with the Figure: the external position places the 
Figure in an asymmetric relationship to the Ground. 
Returning to the contrast in (122) (repeated as (126)), it represents the basic 
Figure/Ground contrast: properties like those in (126a) are more permanent, more 
independent, while this in (126b) are less permanent, more dependent. 
 
(126) a. Victoria is/was Canadian/tall (# /Gen) 
b. Emma is/was available/sick  ( /Gen) 
 
The conceptual contrast can be mapped to language as in (127). Simple state 
predicates that are interpreted as more permanent generate their state argument as the 
Ground and their nominal as the Figure ((127a, b)). In turn, simple state predicates that 
are interpreted as more transitory do the opposite, generating their more permanent 
nominal as the Ground and their less permanent state and the Figure ((127c, d)) (cf. 
Carlson 1977). 
 
(127) Syntax and Denotations of (126) 
a. Syntax of (126a) 
PP 
2 
DP         P’ 
2 
 P           s1 
 
b. Denotation of (126a) 
║P║= λs1λx. [P(x, s1)] 
c. Syntax of (126b) 
PP 
2 
 s1          P’ 
2 
 P           DP  
 
d. Denotation of (126b) 
║P║= λxλs1. [P(s1, x)] 
 
 With respect to the missing existential reading in (126a), the proposal here is that 
in a normal discourse context the existential reading is incompatible with the concepts 
underlying these predicates. These are concepts that are simply generally true at more 
than a single evaluation time, and so they are not meaningfully restricted by it. In other 
words, an existential interpretation generates inferences that are generally unsupported 
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by conceptual knowledge, e.g. that an individual’s height changes from one moment to 
the next. 
In this connection, predicates will vary in terms of the conceptual knowledge they 
invoke. For example, adults’ height is generally more fixed than their weigh needs to be 
(cf. short, tall vs. fat, skinny). But it is still true that these are states that do not change 
from one moment to the next. So, the existential reading is filtered out with these 
predicates as a general proposition. 
This section has dealt with a complex range of temporal interpretation facts based 
on the interaction with the inner-aspectual structure. With respect to the main objective 
of this thesis, it provides more support for the analysis of EAs as causatives. 
 
 
4.2.2.5.3 Third Argument for the State Argument and against the Event 
Argument: There-Insertion 
The previous section leads to a final discussion of existential there. The blocks in (128) 
and (129) illustrate the description of the pattern in terms of the individual/stage 
distinction. As discussed in chapter 3, on that description Stage-Level (SL) predicates 
accept there-insertion because they have bounded existential readings that come from 
existential quantification over a stage argument in their lexical entry ((128b), (129b)). 
On the other hand, Individual-Level (IL) predicates are ungrammatical because they 
lack this stage argument, which accounts for their lack of an existential reading ((128a, 
c)) while making them unacceptable in existential contexts ((129a, c)). 
 
(128) a. People are rude   (* /Gen) 
b. People are sick   ( /Gen) 
c. People are tall   (* /Gen) 
(129) a. *There are people rude 
b. There are people sick 
c. *There are people tall 
 
Yet, the data pattern of existential there is more complex than this description 
implies. First, if EAs are analysed as IL predicates on the basis of (128a) and (129a), 
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then the null hypothesis is that they will never accept there-insertion. Yet, we saw in 
chapter 3 that there-insertion becomes possible for EAs in the continuous aspect: 
 
(130) There are people being rude 
 
In this connection, it is a curious fact that this is generally true of causative 
predicates. The examples in (131) show that these predicates lack an existential reading 
in the present simple ((131a)), but have one in the past simple ((131b)). Even so, there-
insertion is ungrammatical in both tenses with any ordering of the DPs ((131c, d)). This 
shows that the existential reading alone is not predicting the distribution of existential 
there. In support of this, (131e, f) show that there-insertion is possible in both tenses in 
the continuous aspect.
32
 
  
(131) a. People sing songs    (# /Gen) 
b. People sang songs    ( /Gen) 
c. *There (people) sing (people) songs (people) 
d. *There (people) sang (people) songs (people) 
e. There are people singing songs 
f. There were people singing songs 
 
The examples in (132) show the same pattern in the active and passive voices. 
Taking (132a) as the baseline, there is no acceptable word-order for there-insertion in 
the active voice in (132b), but the passive is fine in (132c). 
 
(132) a. Police killed a Swabian 
b. *There (Police) killed (Police) a Swabian (Police) 
c. There was a Swabian killed (by police) 
 
                                                          
32
 Note that the ungrammaticality of the causative predicate in (131) is independent of the use of simple 
tenses: the present perfect example in (i) is ungrammatical in the active voice on any combination in (ii), 
but grammatical in the passive in (iii). In this connection, see the explanation below of (132). 
 
(i) People have eaten cake 
(ii) *There (people) have (people) eaten (people) 
(iii) There has been cake eaten 
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Lastly, to return to some basic facts, existential there works perfectly with 
temporally restricted simple state predications: 
 
(133) a. There were kids at the park 
b. There were books on the shelf 
 
These last examples support the original SL intuition regarding there-insertion, 
but the overall pattern goes beyond it because the ability of a predicate to have an 
existential reading does not account for the distribution of existential there. They also 
show that eventivity is not central to there-insertion, either.  
I would like propose that this thesis’ theory of inner-aspect allows for the proper 
characterisation of this pattern. Namely, it shows that existential there is felicitous when 
it picks out a temporally restricted State-Time that encapsulates the instantiation of the 
predicate. 
First, I propose the lexical entry in (134) for there. The denotation in (134a) is 
meant to convey that there has the existential content of the State-Time and the state 
argument(s) mapped to it. In (134a), I use sx to represent that there associates with the 
state arguments that are mapped to the State-Time, and not unselective binding. The 
state feature in (134b) is interpretable and unvalued because existential there is a 
demonstrative that takes its content and value from its referents. 
 
(134) a. ║there║ =  tST-T sx[tST-T   {τ(sx)}] 
b. Formal features on there: iS [  ] 
 
In this connection, existential there is intuitively an extension of the locative 
demonstrative there, which is singular in origin and picks out an identified space as its 
referent. In consonance, the felicitous use of existential there requires a single, 
identified referent; in this case, the restricted time when the state(s) that realise the 
predicate hold. 
Let’s begin with the derivation of (129b) in (135) to see how this handles a simple 
case. First in the general case, in a derivation, T
0 
attracts the closest DP or CP argument 
to its specifier to satisfy the EPP (cf. chapter 5). In contrast, there does not appear to 
move. Rather, the evidence suggests that it is base generated directly in subject position 
(cf. Boskovic 2002). 
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The proposal here is that there binds the State-Time, and thus picks up its relation 
to the predicate and the state arguments already mapped to the State-Time in the 
derivation. Since sick is a predicate with only one state argument, which is interpreted 
as temporally restricted, there is felicitously interpreted as picking out the time that 
instantiates the state of sickness. The simple state examples in (133) are understood in 
the same way. In contrast, simple state predicates such as tall are not felicitous because 
they are conceptually temporally unrestricted (section 4.2.2.5.2).
33
 
 
(135) There are people sick 
T 
2 
Therei       T 
 iS [s]      2 
    UT-T       T    
2                                              
Tpresent     Asp 
  uS [s]       2 
AST-T     Asp 
2 
  Asp      Voice 
g          2 
be      peoplep    Voice 
 uS [s]        2 
ST-Ti      Voice 
2 
Voiceactive  sick 
iS [s] 2 
s1        sick 
 iS [s]       2 
sick        tp      
 
                                                          
33
 Before moving on to discussion of the other there-insertion data, in order to achieve the word-order in 
(135) I posit movement of the DP argument to Spec, Voice as a type of low focus movement (Belletti 
2004). I leave open how general this movement is, but it is also necessary to achieve the word-order in 
existential passives (e.g. There were Swabians killed).  
Speculating further, the pattern seems to be that the DP associated with the state that is selectively 
bound by Voice moves into the projection of Voice. For example, in (135) s1 is bound by Voice, and 
people then moves to associate with the locus of new focus property acquired by s1.  
Lastly, if existential there in Spec, T is interpreted as the predication topic, this activity around 
Voice may represent the establishing of a topic-focus structure between there and the other arguments of 
the predicate. I leave these considerations for future research and a better understanding of the topic/focus 
properties of Voice. 
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Turning now to the causative pattern in (136) (repeated from (131)), (136a-d) are 
infelicitous because, as discussed above, they all have a result-state argument that is 
inferred to fall outside of the State-Time, which frustrates there’s attempt to pick out a 
single referent that encapsulates the instantiation of the predicate. On the other hand, the 
continuous examples become acceptable because the continuous maps both the causing-
state and the result-state to the State-Time, thus giving the instantiation of the predicate 
a temporally restricted reading and satisfying there. 
 
(136) a. People sing songs    (# /Gen) 
b. People sang songs    ( /Gen) 
c. *There (people) sing (people) songs (people) 
d. *There (people) sang (people) songs (people) 
e. There are people singing songs 
f. There were people singing songs 
 
Lastly, the causative data in (137) (repeated from (132)) receive a related 
explanation. Namely, there-insertion is out in the active voice in (137b) because the 
result-state is again inferred to fall outside of the State-Time.  
 
(137) a. Police killed a Swabian 
b. *There (Police) killed (Police) a Swabian (Police) 
c. There was a Swabian killed (by police) 
 
But in the passive in (137c), the passive participle orders the causing-state inside the 
result-state, and the passive voice head maps the result-state to the State-Time. So, in 
this case the causing-state can be inferred to fall within the State-Time, and there can be 
understood to pick out a temporally restricted instantiation of the predicate. Note that 
the clear pattern in (137) is independent evidence for the present analysis of the passive 
participle and the passive voice head. 
In conclusion, we can now characterise there in more detail. In general terms, the 
argument that appears in Spec, T can be described as the predication topic. On the 
present theory, predicates also have state arguments. It becomes possible to characterise 
inserting there directly in Spec, T as a way of overriding the attraction of a DP or CP, 
and making the instantiation of the predicate’s aspectual description—the state 
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argument that gets mapped to the State-Time—the topic of the predication. In other 
words, there-insertion has an interpretative motivation: it is the way to realise the 
predicate’s state argument in subject position. 
So far this chapter has argued that auxiliaries in the passive voice and the 
continuous aspect show that there are state arguments in all parts of the aspectual 
composition of all predicates. Additional support comes from the possibility that there-
insertion is their nominal manifestation.  
Nevertheless, all these arguments for states and against events are theory internal. 
So, building on chapter 3, the next section attempts to provide a theory-independent 
argument against the existence of a primitive event argument from unexpected 
variability in eventivity diagnostics themselves. 
 
 
4.2.3 The Fourth Argument for the State Argument and against the 
Event Argument 
The most straightforward argument against a primitive event argument is variability 
across diagnostics that are supposed to return uniform results. In section 4.1.1 we saw 
that an example such as (138) sets out the properties of event argument: it is spatial, it is 
temporal, and it can be referred to by a pronoun. The acceptability of the continuation in 
(138) is meant to be indicative of the presence of the event argument. 
 
(138) Jones buttered the toast. It happened in the bathroom at midnight 
 
The examples in (139)-(140) use two causatives verbs, the action causative break 
and the stative causative sleep to show how the diagnostics break down. First, the 
examples in (139) set the baseline. Examples (139a, b) show that both causatives accept 
eventive spatio-temporal modification. Example (139c) provides the contrast with 
simple states. In this last example, the locative modifies the direct object, but not the 
verb. It is precisely the event argument that is supposed to justify the acceptability of 
spatio-temporal modification in the first two examples. 
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(139) a. Peter broke the stick in the garage in 2 seconds 
b. John slept in the car for three hours 
c. Emma owned the typewriter in her office for many years  
 
Now, the expectation is that both causative verbs in (139) will behave in parallel 
with respect to other event argument diagnostics. The next pair dashes that expectation. 
The action causative accepts the It happened… continuation, but the stative causative is 
less felicitous: 
 
(140) a. Peter broke the stick. It happened in the garage in 2 seconds 
b. John slept. #It happened in the car for three hours 
 
The problem here is that sleep does not imply a change, making the verb happen 
inappropriate. So, when an It happened… continuation is acceptable, it is not picking 
out an event argument, but an action. Both verbs nevertheless accept spatio-temporal 
modification. 
Comitatives using a prepositional with-phrase are another test that is used to 
diagnose an event argument (cf. Maienborn 2005b). The examples in (141) establish the 
baseline. Both the action causative and the stative causative again yield the eventive 
interpretation of accompaniment ((141a, b)), but the simple state does not ((141c)). 
 
(141) a. Peter broke the kite with his brother 
b. Julia sleeps with her ducky 
c. #Emma owns the typewriter with her sister  
 
Now, we have seen the EAs are the only adjectives that pass eventivity diagnostics. 
Example (142) shows that they accept spatio-temporal modification: 
 
(142) Peter was rude in the kitchen at six o’clock 
 
Yet out-of-the-blue, EAs are odd on a comitative interpretation. The most natural 
interpretation of (143a) is an alternative way expressing the to-PP, as in (143b):
34
 
                                                          
34
 In this connection, in some languages the English EA to-PP is expressed as a with-PP:  
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(143) a. #Peter was rude with his friend 
b. Peter was rude to his friend 
 
With added context, however, a comitative interpretation becomes the acceptable one: 
 
(144) Peter was always rude with John. Whenever they were together I avoided them 
because I knew that Peter tried to impress John by talking down to his 
subordinates 
 
This shows that quantification and discourse can shore up an eventivity diagnostic, 
implying that eventivity is an inference, but not a semantic entailment. 
Notice that the results so far indicate inconsistency in individual predicates across 
eventivity tests. On the one hand, the contrast in (139) and (140) showed that the felicity 
of picking out a referent with the it happened... continuation is affected by whether or 
not the preceding predicate implies a change: action causative break does, stative 
causative sleep does not. On the other, the comitative contrast between (141) and (143) 
has break and sleep patterning together, while EAs are problematic. So, even break and 
sleep are patterning inconsistently. 
Yet, both sleep and EAs are stative causatives. The difference between them, 
though, is that sleep is a physical state, while EAs, such as rude, are abstract states. It is 
straightforward to conceive of a physical state being accompanied by something, but not 
so with an abstract one—unless the discourse determines that interpretation, as in (144). 
Another component that affects the results of event diagnostics is the qualities of 
the subject. The What X did was... is sometimes used as an event diagnostic, and 
predicates that pass it do accept spatio-temporal modification. The block in (134) is 
repeated from chapter 3. It starts at the top with an activity predicate with an animate 
subject and finishes with a simple state with an inanimate one. The examples in between 
illustrate the continuum that emerges by systematically varying (i) the animacy of the 
subject and (ii) the type of predicate. The predicates range from the activity verb roll 
((145a)), to various types of stative causatives ((145b-i)), to simple states ((145j, k)). 
The stative causatives are ordered with respect to the expansion (justified in chapter 3) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(i) Juan fue muy cruel con Pedro    
Juan was very cruel with Pedro  
‘John is very cruel to Peter’    (Spanish, cf. Arche 2006: 96, ex. (58)) 
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of Rappaport Hovav and Levin’s (RH&L) (2000) stative causative continuum for 
emission verbs ((146)). 
 
(145) a. What John did was roll down the hill 
b. What the boulder did was roll down the hill 
c. 
(?)
What Peter did was sleep 
d. 
(?)
What Peter did was be rude 
e. 
?
What Peter did was be intelligent 
f. What Emma did was hum 
g. 
??
What the computer did was hum 
h. 
?
What Philip did was be noisy 
i. 
??
What the computer did was be noisy 
j. *What Hugo did was be sick/tall 
k. *What the pole did was be tall 
(146) Continuum of Emission Verb Stativity (RH&L 2000: 283) 
Most Stative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most Process-Like 
Smell Emission  Light Emission  Sound/Substance Emission 
(stink)   (gleam)   (hum/bubble) 
 
Now, all of the causative predicates used here accept eventive locative 
modification, and the simple states do not. At the top, the activity verb is natural with 
both an animate and inanimate subject because the predicate implies change. But once 
we transition to stative causatives (where no change is implied), there is a scale of 
acceptability according to the animacy of the subject, and whether the predicate is a 
physical state, and the degree of abstractness of an abstract state.  
The continuum indicates that animacy improves acceptability across the board. But 
an event argument analysis predicts uniformity rather than a continuum: this test should 
be sensitive to spatio-temporality, and the properties of the subject should not be an 
issue. 
Upon closer inspection of (145), even the activity verb roll is more acceptable with 
an animate rather than an inanimate subject ((145a, b)). In fact, I would like to show 
with (147) that animacy plays a role in eventivity diagnostics with verbs that clearly 
imply a change, such as the paradigmatic break.  In (147) we have simple examples 
with an animate agent and a natural force causer. 
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(147) a. John broke the kite 
b. The wind broke the kite 
 
These examples seem simple enough, but when they are put through the event 
diagnostic of locative modification, the results differ: 
 
(148) a. John broke the kite on the driveway 
b. The wind broke the kite on the driveway 
 
Example (148a) has three interpretations: (i) the eventive reading with the locative 
modifying the verb, (ii) a non-eventive reading where it modifies the DP object, and 
(iii) an eventive instrumental reading where John uses the driveway as a means of 
breaking the kite. 
Example (148b), with inanimate subject, is different. The salient reading becomes 
the DP modification one ((ii)), and the instrumental reading is still available ((iii)). But 
the classic statio-temporal locative modification reading is not apparent. 
The instrumental reading is generally taken to be indicative of eventivity, so break 
is the same verb in both examples. However, the disappearance of the spatio-temporal 
locative reading with an abstract Cause indicates that abstract causes interfere with the 
results of eventivity tests. It shows that the conceptual strength of the cause matters: if 
the Causer becomes abstract, the causal relation becomes more abstract, and the spatio-
temporal relation weakens, i.e. it is more difficult to locate an abstract cause in space. 
This loss of locatedness is an indication that location is not specified in the content of 
the inner-aspectual arguments themselves.  
To bring this into focus, the Davidsonian analyses of (148) in (149) show that the 
locative is an event-modifier that is semantically independent of the subject: the locative 
does not modify the subject. They thus predict that the properties of the subject are 
independent of locative event modification, and that both of these examples should have 
the three readings enumerated just above in parallel irrespective of the subject’s 
properties. 
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(149) a. John broke the kite on the driveway 
( e) (break(John, the kite, e) & OnLOC(the driveway, e)) 
b. The wind broke the kite on the driveway 
( e) (break(the wind, the kite, e) & OnLOC(the driveway, e)) 
 
In sum, a spatio-temporal event argument analysis entails that every predicate that 
accepts eventive locative modification will behave uniformly across other event 
diagnostics. In this section we have seen that a semantic analysis of spatio-temporal 
eventivity makes the wrong predications. On the other hand, specific of parameters 
variability have been identified: 
 
(150) Factors Affecting the Results of Eventivity Diagnostics 
a. Causative versus simple state 
b. The notion of change versus no change 
c. The physical versus the abstract quality of the predicate 
d .The animacy versus the inanimacy of the external argument 
 
We have also seen how the discourse can influence the results of an eventivity 
diagnostic. The variability shown in this section is a direct argument against a primitive 
event argument. But, it fits predictably with this proposal that only state arguments 
exist, and that eventivity effects centre around causation. Section 4.5 will present the 
analysis of spatio-temporal modification within this proposal. 
 
 
4.2.4 Interim Conclusion 
From a theory-internal perspective this section has argued that (i) stative auxiliaries 
provide evidence for the existence of state arguments, (ii) telicity and boundedness are 
pragmatic/conceptual, (iii) existential there is the manifestation of state arguments in 
subject position, (iv) predicate decomposition using three aspectual arguments to 
represent telicity collapses into stative causation, and (v) there was no evidence that 
predicates conveying a change or a process contain a primitive event argument. This is 
consistent with the argument for the state argument in chapter 1. 
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From a theory-neutral perspective, it was shown that positing a primitive event 
argument to account for spatio-temporality is not supported empirically because there is 
identifiable non-uniformity across the diagnostics. 
All the evidence presented is consistent with the present theory that only state 
arguments exist, and that the distinction between simple states and stative causatives is 
the only aspectual decomposition distinction that is represented in the mapping from 
syntax to LF. In the next section, we pull together the evidence for state arguments. 
 
 
4.3 Evidence for Aspectual Decomposition 
The start point for positing that predicates take state arguments is establishing that they 
take at least one. The existence of predicates that denote simple states (e.g. available, 
believe, Canadian, know, fat, fear, love, own, sick, tall, etc.) motivates the position that 
a predicate takes an argument that gives it stative properties. In the derivations proposed 
in this chapter, the aspectual argument is mapped to time compositionally. This 
accounts for all predications’ ability to accept temporal modification. It was also 
proposed that the essence of the IL/SL intuition is represented in the configuration of 
the state argument with respect to Figure/Ground relations. Lastly, existential there was 
argued to refer to the instantiation of a state. Positing the existence of a single state 
argument in simple state predicates offers explanations for this cluster of facts. 
Evidence for two state arguments comes from the interpretative distinction between 
causatives and simple states. (i) First, we have seen that they have clearly 
distinguishable aspectual signatures; the most significant one is that causatives trend 
“spatio-temporal”, and while simple states are limited to temporality. (iii) Second, 
representing them accounts for their differing interpretive patterns in the present simple 
and past simple. (iii) Third, including the aspectual arguments as arguments of the 
predicate will be important in deriving thematic roles. We take this up in section 4.4.3. 
(iv) Fourth, the distribution of the passive voice and the continuous aspect shows that 
both operate over causative predicates. Representing a causative relation with two 
aspectual arguments captures these facts, while allowing for the proper statement of 
their meanings. In this connection, overt evidence for the syntactic presence of the 
aspectual arguments comes from the alternation that occurs in the passive: the result-
state is targeted for modification and movement. 
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In conclusion, representing the two parts of the causative relation with aspectual 
arguments accounts for a series of patterns and points of interaction. The next sections 
will attempt to substantiate the proposal that causation is properly represented as a 
lexical property, and not a causative head or interpretation rule. 
 
 
4.4 The Representation of Causation 
This section tackles the representation of causation and the nature of thematic roles. 
Section 4.4.1 introduces three ways of representing causation formally: as a lexical 
property, syntactic head, or an interpretation rule. Section 4.4.2 provides evidence from 
Japanese and periphrastic causatives that there is no causative functional head in the 
syntax of causative predicates. Arguments against an interpretation are also given. The 
lexical representation of causation emerges as the only supported option, and the results 
of this chapter reinforce it. Lastly, section 4.4.3 proposes that this restricted aspectual 
system that only distinguishes between simple states and stative causatives, in 
combination with the Figure/Ground distinction (Talmy 2000), makes it to possible to 
dispense with thematic roles and a thematic hierarchy as grammatical primitives. 
 
 
4.4.1 Lexical Causation versus Causative Configuration versus 
Causative Head 
Throughout this thesis, causation has been represented as a lexical property. In (151) 
(repeated from (2)), the causal relation is part of the meaning of the predicate itself 
((151a)), and there is no causative head in the syntax ((151b)). 
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(151) Generalised Representation of Lexical Causation 
a. ║P║ = λPλyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(P(x, s1), P(s2, y))  
b.    PP 
    2 
  XP1      P’ 
2 
 s1         P’ 
2 
s2          P’ 
2 
P         XP2 
 
Hale and Keyser (H&K) (1993) propose a causative syntax with the same syntactic 
configuration ((150a)). However on their analysis two verbal heads, one immediately c-
commanding the other, are interpreted as one event implicating the other ((152b)). So, 
their proposal is that a causative interpretation is due to a rule stated over this syntactic 
configuration (cf. Ramchand 2008). 
 
(152) Lexical Causation in H&K 1993 
a. Syntax: 
 
VP 
3 
                     V              V’ 
                  3 
                                 V                 … 
 
(cf. H&K 1993: 69, ex. (24)) 
b. Interpretation: 
 
 
e1 → e2 
 
 
 
 
(H&K 1993: 69, ex. (23)) 
 
The other alternative to representing causation lexically is a syntax with a dedicated 
functional head. The structure in (153) is an example of this approach, where a little v 
head is responsible for causativising a root (cf. Chomsky 1995: 352). 
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(153) Causative Verbs on a CAUSE0 Analysis 
                                                
                                                vP 
                                         3 
                                                          v’ 
                                                   3 
                                                 v
0
               √P 
                                             CAUS      3   
                             √ 
 
(cf. Harley 2008: 39, ex. (29b)) 
 
The next section compares periphrastic causatives ((154a)) with lexical causatives 
((154b)) in order to show that there is no causative head in the syntax.  
 
(154) a. Emma made Peter break the kite 
b. Peter broke the kite 
 
In addition, arguments against an interpretative rule are given. The evidence against the 
alternatives leaves representing causation as a lexical property as the only option, but as 
we will see, it is also the option that fits this theory of inner-aspect composition. 
 
 
4.4.2 Periphrastic versus Lexical Causatives   
Cross-linguistically, periphrastic causatives are morphologically overt and regular. 
English uses a verb that stands on its own, such as make in (154a), while Japanese has a 
specific morpheme, –sase–, that attaches to the lexical verb: 
 
(155) Taroo ga Ziro o   tomar-ase-ta 
Taro NOM Jiro ACC stop-sase-PAST 
‘Taro made Jiro stop’    (Japanese, Shibatani 1976: 18, ex. (26a)) 
 
In contrast with periphrastic causatives, cross-linguistically lexical causatives vary 
morphologically. English lacks causative morphology ((154b)), while Japanese has a 
range of morphemes that goes from null ((156a)) to the same morpheme that appears in 
periphrastic causatives ((156h)) (Harley 2008; Jacobsen 1992; Miyagawa 1989). 
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(156) Japanese Lexical Causative Morphemes  
a. –Ø–: husag-Ø-u ‘obstruct’ 
b. –e–: ak-e-ru ‘open’ 
c. –s–: ama-s-u ‘remain’ 
d. –as–: hekom-as-u ‘dent’ 
e. –os–: horob-os-u ‘(fall to) ruin’ 
f. –se–: abi-se-ru ‘pour over’ 
g. –akas–: hagur-akas-u ‘evade’  
h. –sase–: toosans-ase-ru ‘bankrupt’ 
 
The consensus is that Japanese lexical causative morphemes are unpredictable (Harley 
2008: 23). Example (157) illustrates a lexical causative appearing with the morpheme   
–e– (cf. (156b), (155)) 
 
(157) Taroo ga Ziroo o tom-e-ta 
Taro NOM Jiro ACC stop-CAUS -PAST 
‘Taro stopped Jiro’   (Japanese, Shibatani 1976: 18, ex. (26b)) 
 
Harley (2008) proposes that Japanese causative morphology realises a CAUSE 
head. On her analysis lexical causatives contain one occurrence of causative v
0
 ((158)), 
and periphrastic causatives two ((159)), with –sase– appearing consistently in 
periphrastic causatives because it is listed as the morphological elsewhere case. 
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(158) Japanese Lexical Causatives 
a. Taroo-ga    tenoura-o kae-s … 
Taroo-NOM palm-ACC return-CAUS 
‘Taroo changed his attitude suddenly’  (Harley 2008: 42, ex. (35a’)) 
b. 
vP 
                                                          3 
                                                      DP                v’ 
                                              Taroo-ga       3 
                                                                 √P               v0               
                                                          3       -s 
                                                       DP               √ 
                                                   tenoura-o        kae 
(Harley 2008: 42, ex. (35a)) 
(159) Japanese Periphrastic Causatives 
a. Taroo-wa Hanako-ni  hanasi-o tutae-sase-ta 
 Taroo-TOP Hanako-DAT story-ACC convey-CAUS-PAST 
 ‘Taroo made Hanako convey a story’  (Harley 2008: 42, ex. (35b’) 
b. 
                                                             vP 
                                                      3 
                                                 DP                 v’ 
                                           Taroo-wa       3 
                                                              vP               v
0 
                                                       3      -ase 
                                                   DP                v’ 
                                            Hanako-ni       3 
                                                               √P                 v0               
                                                         3          Ø 
                                                      DP               √ 
                                                  hanasai-o        tutae 
(Harley 2008: 42, ex. (35b)) 
 
So on Harley’s analysis, causation is encoded in a syntactic head, and Japanese 
morphology is visible evidence of the head’s existence. 
Evidence against treating causation as a head in Japanese is provided by Ackema 
(2014). He shows that periphrastic –sase– behaves like a syntactically active element, 
and lexical causative morphemes do not. 
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First, periphrastic –sase– scopes. In (160) the single occurrence of –sase– scopes 
over the disjunction. The same is true of the English gloss. 
 
(160) Hanako-ga      Masao-ni     uti-o         soozisuru ka heya-dai-o haraw-ase-ru koto 
ni sita 
Hanako-NOM Masao-DAT house-ACC clean    or room-rent-ACC pay-sase that to did 
‘Hanako decided to make Masao clean the house or pay room rent.’ 
(Japanese, Ackema 2014: 187, ex. (36)) 
 
Second, periphrastic –sase– can stand alone. In ka… ka… ‘either… or…’ 
structures, periphrastic –sase– appears separated from the lexical verb: 
 
(161) Hanako-ga     Masao-ni      uti-o      soozisuru ka heya-dai-o   harau  ka sase 
Hanako-NOM Masao-DAT house-ACC       clean     or room-rent-ACC pay   or sase 
‘Hanako decides to either make Masao clean the house or make him pay room 
rent.’ 
(Japanese, Ackema 2014: 189, ex. (39)) 
 
Lexical causative morphemes can do neither of these things: a single lexical 
causative morpheme cannot be interpreted as applying to a verb in another conjunct, and 
it never stands alone. Example (162) illustrates the non-existence of the latter. 
 
(162) *Hanako-ga   made-o         ak  ka tegami-o  todok ka  e(-ta) 
  Hanako-NOM window-ACC open or letter-ACC arrive or CAUSE(-PAST) 
  ‘Hanako either opened the window or delivered the letter.’  
 
Ackema (2014) concludes that periphrastic –sase– is a syntactic head because it 
behaves like an independent syntactic element, but lexical causative morphemes are not 
because they have no syntactic effects. 
Combining their divergent syntactic behavior with the fact that periphrastic 
causatives are morphologically regular cross-linguistically, while lexical causative 
markers range from null to unpredictable makes a strong case that causation is 
associated with the predicate itself. 
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So, periphrastic causatives in English (make) and Japanese (–sase–) are 
morphologically regular because they are predicates. And as predicates, the well-known 
fact that they introduce a clause boundary follows automatically. The examples in (163) 
use manner adverbs illustrate one of the ways of showing that periphrastic causatives 
are biclausal, and lexical causatives are monoclausal (cf. Shibatani 1973, 1976; Harley 
2008, a.o.). 
 
(163) Japanese 
a. Lexical Causative  
 Taroo ga Hananko o damatte heya ni ire-ta 
 = Taro put Hanako into the room silently         (Shibatani 1973: 361, ex. (88)) 
b. Periphrastic Causative 
 Taroo ga Hanako o damatte heya ni hair-ase-ta 
 = Taro silently made Hanako enter the room 
 = Taro brought it about that Hanako entered the room silently  
(Shibatani 1973: 360, ex. (86)) 
   
On the other hand, lexical causative markers are morphologically irregular and fail 
to introduce a clause boundary because there is no syntactic head. The conclusions are 
that (i) causation is a property of the predicate, and (ii) clause boundaries are marked by 
predicates. So, analysing causation as a lexical property that the morphology can reflect 
fits the facts. 
Turning to causation as an interpretative rule, the syntactic configuration proposed 
by H&K is the same as proposed here, but it has one significant drawback: the rule 
cannot be stated compositionally. In particular, the rule in (164) (repeated from (152)) 
does not interpret immediate sisters: rather than interpreting V1 and V’, it interprets V1 
and V2; and it looks their semantic content (i.e. eventive), rather than their semantic 
type (e.g. <e>, <t>, etc.). 
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(164) Lexical Causation in H&K 1993 
a. Syntax: 
 
VP 
3 
V              V’ 
                  3 
                                 V                 … 
 
(cf. H&K 1993: 69, ex. (24)) 
b. Interpretation: 
 
 
e1 → e2 
 
 
 
 
(H&K 1993: 69, ex. (23)) 
 
Interestingly, the analysis of the passive voice and the passive participle provided 
evidence that compositionality is at issue. The only way to map the syntax of the 
passive to LF compositionally is if the denotation of the passive participle morpheme 
can make reference to the representation of causation, and state that it modifies the 
result-state description, as in (165) (repeated from (52a)). And the only way to do this 
compositionally is if causation is represented lexically.   
 
(165) ║-enpassive║ = λPλyλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(P(x, s1), en(P(s2, y))) & s1  s2] 
 
That empirical and theoretical considerations point to the lexical analysis of 
causation provides interesting support for the present theory of inner-aspect. On the one 
hand, the passive voice, the continuous aspect, and eventivity effects are all phenomena 
that rely on the stative causative/simple state distinction: causation is the only aspectual 
decomposition distinction. On the other, we have seen evidence that predicates are not 
aspectually ambiguous: they are either causatives or simple states, and they maintain 
their formal properties even when conceptual knowledge and implicatures seem to 
indicate variation.
35
  
In connection to the representation of aspectual properties, the next section will 
attempt to derive thematic roles. 
 
 
4.4.3 Deriving Thematic Roles 
The status of thematic roles, such as Agent, Causer, Instrument, Experiencer, and 
Theme, is controversial because research on them has led to an impasse. On the one 
                                                          
35
 See chapter 3, footnote 34 for specific discussion of this point. 
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hand, there are the regularities in their distribution that make them seem derivative. 
Baker’s Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) speaks of assignment to 
unique syntactic positions ((166)). And the UTAH has been re-interpreted as an 
indication that thematic roles are inferred from specific syntactic positions (Hale and 
Keyser 1993; Chomsky 1995). 
 
(166) Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identical 
structural relationships between those items at the level of D-Structure. 
(Baker 1988: 46, ex. (30))        
 
On the other hand, there is no agreement on a hierarchy, the number of roles, or 
their content (cf. RH&L 2007). Experiencers represent one problematic case in 
establishing a hierarchy. In (167), the Experiencer role appears in both subject ((167a)) 
and object ((167b)) position. 
 
(167) a. Hugo feared the call 
b. The called scared Hugo 
 
Another complication is that there is general agreement in the research on Causers 
Agents, and Instruments that arguments with these interpretations are located in the 
same structural position ((168)) (cf. Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995; Alexiadou and 
Schafer 2006; Folli and Harley 2008; Alexiadou et al. 2015). This has sometimes led to 
the conclusion that the external position that introduces these roles has an 
underspecified causative interpretation (cf. Ramchand’s 2008 Initiator). 
 
(168) a. Peter broke the window 
b. The explosion broke the window 
c. The hammer broke the window 
 
Lastly, complement position is associated with a wide range of interpretations. 
Example (169a) is unaccusative. Examples (169b, c) show that predicates bear different 
relationships to their complement CPs. Examples (169d, e) show that complement DPs 
can be inferred to undergo a change-of-state or not, respectively. And (169f) shows that 
complements can identify a path. 
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(169) a. The problem existed 
b. It seemed that the problem would be addressed 
c. Victoria decided that the problem would be addressed 
d. Peter broke the window 
e. Victoria pushed the cart 
f. Emma ran into the house 
 
Together these examples show that there is a great deal of variation and overlap in 
content and syntactic position. When thematic roles are taken as primitive entities, 
delimiting their number, specifying their content, and pinpointing their relationship to 
syntax has proven problematic. It will be proposed here that combining this restricted 
theory of inner-aspect with the Figure/Ground distinction introduced above derives 
these patterns. 
Beginning with (169), the complement position establishes the Ground, i.e. the 
anchor of the predication. The precise conceptual character of the Ground is determined 
by the predicate, formally no thematic role is assigned, and the variation is expected 
across predicates. 
Regarding the problematic Experiencer data ((167)), research on subject 
Experiencer and object Experiencer predicates has found that they differ aspectually. 
Namely, the former are simple states and the latter causatives (Pesetsky 1995; Arad 
1998; Landau 2010b, a.o.). Adopting this conclusion, we can say that subject 
Experiencers are Figures with respect to a simple state description:  
 
(170) a. Hugo feared the call 
b.║Hugo fear the call║ = fear(Hugo, s1, the call) 
c.      fear 
2 
Hugo        fear 
2 
s1         fear 
2 
fear       the 
call 
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Object Experiencers, in contrast, are interpreted as the Ground with respect to the 
causing Figure ((171)). Since the Experiencer role is not actually assigned, it is a 
conceptual property of a causative predicate like scare that its Ground is inferred to be 
psychologically affected by the cause, and the Causer interpretation maps to position 
that is structurally higher because it is associated with the causing-state.  
 
(171) a. The call scared Hugo 
b.║The call scare Hugo║ = CAUSE(scare(the call, s1), scare(s2, Hugo))  
c. scare
 
2 
the       scare 
call       2 
s1       scare 
2 
s2    scare 
2 
scare Hugo 
 
In this connection, consider (172). Since the Experiencer role is not assigned, it is 
not a problem that simple state predicates such as fear and own generate their Figures in 
the same position and interpret them differently: the former denotes a psychological 
state and the latter does not. 
 
(172) a. Hugo feared the call 
b. Emma owned a typewriter 
 
Lastly, let’s consider the set of causing roles, i.e. Causer, Agent, and Instrument.  
As mentioned above, there is consensus that arguments interpreted in these ways are 
generated in the same syntactic position, and the notion of Causer is the common 
denominator. This last fact falls out of the present theory, where causation is stative. So 
in the template denotation of a causative predicate in (173), the semantics of causation 
makes the external Figure argument what can only be characterised, informally, as a 
Causer. 
 
(173) ║P║ = λPλyλs2λs1λx. CAUSE(P(x, s1), P(s2, y)) 
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As for Agents, an argument can be considered such when it has these properties: 
 
(174) Properties of Arguments Inferred to be Agents 
a. It is associated with the causing-state description of the CAUSE relation. 
b. It is animate. 
c. The predicate conveys the notion of change. 
 
The last property distinguishes Agents from animate Causers. But it has been argued 
here that change is represented conceptually, and not in the aspectual decomposition. 
The present possibility of deriving thematic roles reinforces that conclusion. 
An additional property associated with Agents is intentionality. Chapter 3 showed, 
however, that there are predicates that entail intentionality, and others for which it is an 
implicature. Once again, because agentivity is only conceptual, this kind of variation 
does not affect the decomposition of inner-aspect.  
Lastly, in consonance with the research on causing arguments, an argument is 
considered an Instrument when it is inferred that it has to be used by an Agent in order 
to bring about the result.
36
 
In conclusion, this restricted aspectual system has the added benefit of making 
thematic roles epiphenomenal by supplementing it with the domain general 
Figure/Ground distinction. 
 
 
4.5 Analysis of Spatio-Temporal Modification 
Now that the arguments against the event argument have been offered, the challenge is 
to account for the classic Davidsonian spatio-temporal data, such (175a). 
 
(175) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom at midnight 
b. ( e) (Butter(Jones, the toast, e) & In(the bathroom, e) & At(midnight, e)) 
(cf. Davidson 1967: 93, ex. (20)) 
 
                                                          
36
 Note that deriving thematic roles, and in particular deriving the set of causing thematic roles, requires 
that the external argument be an argument of the predicate. If the external argument were introduced by a 
separate head (e.g. Voice; cf. Kratzer 1996; Alexiadou et al. 2015), then the global set of properties of 
external arguments could not be derived (cf. (168), (174)). 
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On a Davidsonian analysis in (175b), both the locative and temporal modifiers are 
modifiers of the event argument itself.   
However, the contrast in the examples in (176) (repeated from (149)) showed that 
the qualities of the external argument affect the locative reading: the concrete cause in 
(176a) allows the eventive locative reading, but this reading disappears with the abstract 
cause in (176b). The corresponding Davidsonian representations do not allow for this 
variation because the locative modifies the spatio-temporal event argument in both.  
 
(176) a. John broke the kite on the driveway 
( e) (break(John, the kite, e) & OnLOC(the driveway, e)) 
b. The wind broke the kite on the driveway 
( e) (break(the wind, the kite, e) & OnLOC(the driveway, e)) 
 
The explanation offered here for the disappearance of this locative reading is that 
eventivity effects are signs of stative causation, but location is not represented as a 
primitive. Since the causative relation is stative and location is not represented in it, the 
variation in (176) is expected. In particular, we can say that the locative modifies the 
stative causative relation.  
In this case, the details of the predicate description will play a role in the ability of 
the locative to restrict it: if the external argument is concrete as in (176a), the locative 
can orient the individual with respect to the place; but when the external abstract is 
abstract as in (176b), the locative accordingly fails to do so, and the locative reading 
disappears. Further, the general infelicity of Davidsonian locative modification with 
simple states can be explained by the lack of a causal relation for the locative to restrict: 
 
(177) #Emma owned the typewriter in the office 
  
This evidence suggests that the locative modifier modifies the predicate description, 
and if the predicate description is causative and concrete, the locative receives a sensible 
interpretation. 
On the other hand, we have seen that both causatives and simple states accept 
temporal modification ((178)). 
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(178) a. Jones buttered the toast for three minutes 
b. Emma owned the typewriter for years 
 
This generality follows from the presence of a voice head mapping a state to time in 
both cases. So, temporal modification can be seen as a modifier of voice, where the 
State-Time is introduced. 
Implementing this, the Davidsonian spatio-temporal modification receives the 
analysis in (179). 
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(179) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom at midnight 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2  
[IN(CAUSE(butter(Jones, s1), butter(s2, the toast)), the bathroom) &  
AT(tST-T   τ(s1)*, midnight) & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
c.    T
 
2 
Jonesj        T   
2 
UT-T   T 
2                                                            
Tpast      Asp 
2 
AST-T    Asp 
2 
Asp at
 
3 
Voice
                 
at 
 2       2 
ST-T    Voice   at    midnight 
2         
Voiceactive     in         
 3 
butter          in 
2      2 
tj      butter   in         the 
2  bathroom 
s1        butter           
2   
s2       butter 
2 
butter       the 
toast 
 
In the representations in (179b) and (179c), the locative and temporal modifiers take the 
appropriate segments of the structures as arguments: the locative modifies the predicate 
description as a whole, and the temporal modifier appears higher up to modify the State-
Time (cf. Cinque 2006: 152-153). In this case, the locative properly restricts the 
predicate description because of its details: it is a stative causative that implies change 
with a concrete external argument. This also applies equally to (180). 
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(180) a. John broke the kite on the driveway 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2  
[ONLOC(CAUSE(break(John, s1), break(s2, the kite)), the driveway)  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
 
However, we can now capture the variation in the acceptability of the locative 
reading when these criteria do not hold. In (181), the locative reading does not obtain 
because it cannot restrict the abstract cause, and in (182) because there is no causal 
relation for the locative to restrict, and the simple state itself is true at times that are 
independent of the locative. 
 
(181) a. #The wind broke the kite on the driveway 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2  
[ONLOC(CAUSE(break(the wind, s1), break(s2, the kite)), the driveway)  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
(182) a. #Emma owned the typewriter in the office 
b.  UT-T tAST-T tST-T s1  
[IN(own(Emma, s1, the typewriter), the office) & tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T 
& tUT-T > tAST-T] 
 
This section has offered an analysis of locative and temporal modification that is 
independent of the event argument. It has attempted to formalise the data pattern that 
strongly suggests that spatio-location is not a primitive property of predicates or 
aspectual arguments. We have seen instead that eventivity effects correlate with 
causation, in addition to other factors, such as the qualities of the external argument.   
 
 
4.6 Overview of the Aspectual System 
The logical arguments and the empirical evidence presented since chapter 1 leads to an 
internally consistent formal representation of inner-aspect that contains two primitives: 
a state argument and the CAUSE relation. The only formal distinction is between 
simple state predicates and stative causatives, and causation is represented lexically.  
The notion of change has been placed in the conceptual domain for principled 
reasons. Chapter 1 showed that representing change formally entails a logical 
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inconsistency in definitions of aspectual arguments and eventivity. Instead, eventivity is 
proposed to derive from stative causation. A broad range of empirical evidence has 
supported the conclusion that eventivity is epiphenomenal, from the distribution of 
passive and the continuous, to inconsistency across eventivity diagnostics. 
Along the way we have also seen reasons to conclude that thematic roles, “active” 
be, the Individual/Stage distinction, the Vendlerian classification of predicates, and DO 
and BECOME are not formal properties of predicate decompositions. 
Instead, the single distinction is stative causative/simple state. And because this 
system carries over to adjectives, EAs fall into line as unambiguous stative causatives 
that undergo the causative alternation. The analyses of the passive voice and the 
continuous aspect developed in this chapter carry over to them, as well. In the final 
chapter we consider their particularities, such as the causative alternation, and compare 
their causative alternation paradigm cross-linguistically. 
  
 
Chapter 5: 
EA Derivations 
 
5 Introduction 
The preceding chapters diagnosed the argument structure of Evaluative Adjectives 
(EAs), their inner-aspect, and presented of a theory of inner-aspect that accounts for 
their unexpected behaviour. This chapter completes this investigation with the analysis 
of their causative alternation paradigm: 
 
(1) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition  
            + Passive 
 
Adopting the aspectual system developed in chapter 4, causative predicates contain 
two state arguments and causation is a lexical property. As causatives, EAs carry this 
information in their denotation ((2a)). Expanding on Rappaport Hovav and Levin 
(RH&L) (2012: 175), I propose that the denotation is the part of the lexical entry that 
encodes the arguments that a predicate entails on all its usages. The denotation plays the 
role of restricting generative capacity. 
We have seen that EAs are always causative and they are factive, so they also 
always entail the truth of their situational complement. In this chapter, it will be argued 
that they also always entail an external argument, even in unaccusative structures. The 
EA paradigm in (1) will be derived from the denotation below, where the factive 
presupposition is now removed. This denotation says that an EA is a stative causative 
with an individual causing argument and a propositional result. 
 
(2) a. Template EA Denotation  (Version 2 of 2) 
║EA║= λqλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(EA(x, s1), EA(s2, q))] 
b. Formal feature on a state argument: iS [s] 
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In addition to the denotation, a lexical entry also contains phonological and 
morphological information, as well as conceptual knowledge associated with the 
predicate. In chapter 4 it was proposed that state arguments come with a morphological 
state feature, as shown in (2b), which is mapped to the IP domain and appears as 
auxiliaries. 
We will proceed as follows: section 5.1 presents the derivations of the EA 
paradigm, and introduces the use of implicit arguments other than the state arguments 
that have been posited thus far. Section 5.2 builds on the previous one and analyses the 
verbal causative alternation, picking up on the use of implicit arguments to address the 
behaviour of external arguments in passives and unaccusatives. It goes on to argue that 
null pronouns and individual-denoting variables exist in the syntax just as state-denoting 
variables have been argued to (chapter 4). Section 5.3 compares the present analysis of 
the causative alternation with Alexiadou et al. (2015), who develop a proposal based on 
the Kratzer’s (1996) severed external argument hypothesis. It also attempts to answer 
the question of why it is that EAs alternate. Section 5.4 compares the EA causative 
alternation paradigm cross-linguistically. And finally, section 5.5 presents the 
conclusions. 
 
 
5.1 Deriving the EA Paradigm 
This section presents the derivations of the EA causative alternation paradigm in (1). 
We will work backwards, beginning with the passive structures in section 5.1.1, and 
then the transitive active voice structures in section 5.1.2, and end with the unaccusative 
structures in section 5.1.3. 
 
 
5.1.1 Passive Structures 
Beginning with the derivations of the EA passive voice structures in (3) (repeated from 
(1e, f)), here the focus is on long passives, i.e. where the external argument is overt. 
Short passives, where the external argument is implicit, are compared with 
unaccusatives in section 5.2.
 1
 
                                                          
1
 In chapter 2 it was shown that the EA infinitive has a full CP structure. The inventory of natural 
language implicit arguments is a topic for future research, but I assume for present purposes that the null 
infinitival subject is PRO (Landau 1999; cf. Duguine 2013). 
Chapter 5 
297 
 
(3) a. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
b. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition  
            + Passive 
 
Chapter 4 argued that the passive is an operation that is restricted to causative 
predicates and insensitive to lexical category. The denotation of the passive participle 
morpheme in (4a) says that –en modifies the result-state description of a causative 
predicate and orders the causing-state in the result-state. 
 
(4) a. ║-enpassive║ = λPλyλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(P(x, s1), en(P(s2, y))) & s1   s2] 
b. Formal features on -en: {iS [  ], iPart [Pass]} 
 
Its formal features in (4b) agree with the state feature on the predicate’s result-state 
argument. Since adjectives do not carry aspectual morphology, in the examples in (3)    
–en receives a null spell-out, just as it does in the case of passivised nominalisations 
(e.g. The city’s destruction by the barbarians). 
Chapter 4 also proposed that the passive voice head selectively binds and focalises 
the result-state argument as it maps it to the State-Time ((7a)). 
 
(5) a.║Voicepassive║ = λpλtST-T.  s2 [p & tST-T   τ(s2)*]          
b. Formal features on Voicepassive: {{iS [  ], uPart [  ], EPP}; {φ-set[  ]}} 
 
As for the formal features in (5b), the first set will cause the passive voice head to 
attract the participle to its specifier with the EPP feature, and the phi-feature set 
addresses this case-marking property of the passive voice head (cf. Chomsky 2001). 
Collins (2005) proposed for verbs that the passive by is the materialisation of the 
passive voice head when the external argument is overt. In the case of EAs, we can posit 
that this head is spelt-out as of, and that it is a morphological reflex of the category 
difference between verbs and adjectives. In support of this, section 5.5 compares the 
English EA paradigm cross-linguistically and shows that other languages use the same 
preposition for verbal and EA passives. So, the choice of preposition is a superficial 
one. 
Turning now to the derivation of the EA passive structures, the analysis of the 
verbal passive from chapter 4 carries over. In (6) below as in chapter 4, the auxiliary be 
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realises Asp
0
 to bear the IP morphology that the lexical predicate cannot. In this case, 
since adjectives do not carry aspectual morphology of any kind, the auxiliary will raise 
to T
0
 in PF and spell-out as was, and the passive participle morphology is null. This null 
morphology is depicted as Ø-en. 
A further point of interest is that upon movement of the participle structure past the 
external argument to Spec, Voice, the propositional argument is the closest argument to 
T
0
, and so it is targeted for movement. 
 
(6) To leave was rude of Emma 
                 T
 
             2 
        To           T
 
Leavei   2 
UT-T          T   
 2 
Tpast
         
Asp 
2 
AST-T      Asp
 
ru 
 Asp  Voice
 
g         ei 
be    rudep               Voice
 
2     2 
Ø-en       rude        ST-T    Voice
 
2  2 
s2      rude  Voicepassive
    rude                         
 
2      g           2 
rude        ti   of    Emma     rude 
2 
s1         tp 
 
Because of the complexity of this topic I represent CP subjects and CP 
Extraposition as derived through movement. This is a simplification, however (cf. 
Alrenga 2005; Alves Castro 2015; Baltin 2006; Davies and Dubinsky 2001, 2010; 
Koster 1978, 2000; Moulton 2013; Takahashi 2010).  
Although I will leave the exploration of the syntactic properties of CPs and the 
connection to EAs to future research, since the CP is able to appear in subject position 
when it is the argument closest to T
0
, it must have formal features that make it visible to 
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syntactic operations. In this respect, these CPs will be different from argument denoting 
variables, which will be proposed below to be invisible to syntactic operations because 
of their lack of formal features. 
The final interpretation of the structure is in (7). It reads: Emma’s rudeness to leave 
is a stative causative relation such that its causing-state is contained in its result-state 
and its result-state is focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-Time is after the 
simultaneous Assertion- and State-Times. 
 
(7) Interpretation of (6) with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T s2  1 [CAUSE(rude(Emma, s1), en(rude(s2, to leave)))  
& s1   s2 & tST-T   τ(s2)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T ] 
 
Regarding the EA nominalisation in this paraphrase, chapter 2 discussed the 
marked nature of the EA nominalisation when both the external argument and the 
infinitive co-occur, as they do here. 
There it was suggested that this was conceivably related to factivity. As EAs are 
presuppositional, there is a certain awkwardness to spelling-out both arguments inside a 
nominalisation. Although marked, section 2.3.2 provided the paradigm of EA 
nominalisations with all variations of their argument structure, including authentic 
examples with this structure. The only structure that is marked is precisely this one, 
where both the external argument and CP are realised together. Nominalisations will 
play a role as we advance, so we will be considering the curiousness of this markedness 
again below. 
Let’s turn to the passive Extraposition structure in (8). Taking Extraposition to be a 
discourse-oriented operation, the semantic interpretation is the same as in (7). The 
particularity here is that Extraposition spells-out the CP at the right edge of the 
projection of the predicate (cf. Baltin 2006).  
But passivisation, just as in (6), takes the CP past the external argument and makes 
it the closest argument to T
0
. So, there are conflicting conditions on the CP: 
Extraposition spells-out the CP on the right edge, while the EPP is pulling it to the left 
edge. I would like to suggest that the pronoun it appears in Spec, T in order to resolve 
this tension. And so the content of it in these cases is not vacuous, but that of the 
extraposed CP (cf. Bennis 1986). 
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(8) It was rude of Emma to leave 
 T
 
            2 
Iti   T 
 2 
UT-T         T   
ru 
Tpast
  
   Asp 
2 
AST-T Asp 
ru 
  Asp         Voice
 
g        ei 
be  rudep                Voice
 
 2  2 
 Ø-en        rude             ST-T       Voice
 
 2         2 
s2       rude   Voicepassive
      rude                         
 
2        g       2 
rude
 
        ti    of   rude         to leavei 
2 
Emma     rude 
2 
s1       tp 
 
With this analysis of (8), examples such as (9) are accounted for as ellipsis of the 
CP under semantic identity with the content of it (cf. Hardt 1992; Merchant 2001; 
Potsdam 2003): 
 
(9) Iti was rude of Emma (to leavei) 
 
These derivations account for the properties of the EA long-passive data. We have 
applied the analysis of the passive from chapter 4 to EAs, and extended it to include 
Extraposition. Although the details of CP syntax were set aside, combining this 
aspectual analysis of the passive with the structural configuration of Collins’ (2005) 
passive syntax and Extraposition provides a principled account for the EA passive data. 
We will return to the analysis of short passives 5.2. 
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5.1.2 Transitive Active Voice Structures 
We turn now to the active voice structures in (10) (repeated from (1c, d)). First, the 
derivation of (10a) is provided in (12). This is the simplest structure because both the 
external argument and complement CP are overt, and in their base order. Here, the 
external argument raises to Spec, T and the copula is generated under Asp
0
. The 
interpretation is in (12) below. 
  
(10) a. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
b. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
(11) Emma was rude to leave 
T
1 
2 
Emmam       T   
 
2 
UT-T          T 
 2 
Tpast
 
      Asp 
2 
AST-T      Asp 
2 
    Asp  Voice 
g          2 
be     ST-T          Voice 
2 
Voiceactive     rude 
2 
tm         rude 
2  
s1           rude 
2 
s2        rude 
2 
 rude        to 
leave 
(12) Interpretation of (11) with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T  s1 2 [CAUSE(rude(Emma, s1), rude(s2, to leave))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T  & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
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As discussed in chapter 4, the relevant meaning difference between the active and 
passive voices is in the state argument that is mapped to the State-Time and focalised by 
the voice head. Since this is an active voice expression, Voice maps the causing-state to 
the State-Time; (14) reads: Emma’s rudeness to leave is a stative causative relation, 
whose causing-state is focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-Time is after the 
simultaneous Assertion- and State-Times. With the qualifications introduced above 
regarding the markedness of the nominalisation, this derivation does a fair job of 
characterising the expression’s meaning. 
The challenge is to capture (10b), analysed in (13) below. In chapter 3 it was 
argued that EAs always entail a CP and so, on the present approach, it is recorded in the 
EA lexical entry. Throughout this thesis I have posited the existence of state arguments 
exist and their syntactic reality. Section 4.3 gathered evidence for the usefulness of 
doing so. In this chapter, I will argue that the same is true of implicit arguments that are 
individual- and proposition-denoting. 
In particular, accounting for (13) will involve an implicit argument. Here I propose 
that the EA takes a proposition denoting variable with no formal features as its 
complement. This lack of formal features makes it syntactically inert. With this one 
difference, this syntactic derivation is the same as the overtly transitive one above in 
(11). 
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(13) Emma was rude 
T
 
2 
Emmam       T   
 
2 
UT-T          T 
 2 
Tpast       Asp 
2 
AST-T      Asp 
2 
 Asp        Voice 
g  2 
be           ST-T          Voice 
2 
Voiceactive     rude 
2 
tm         rude 
2  
s1           rude 
2 
s2         rude 
 2 
 rude        q  
 
The interpretation is slightly different, though, because now the proposition is a free 
variable that is unselectively bound under Existential Closure:  
 
(14) Interpretation of (13) with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T  s1 2 [CAUSE(rude(Emma, s1), rude(s2, q2))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
 
This formula can be read as: Emma’s rudeness is a stative causative relation with some 
situation that manifests that rudeness such that the causing-state in the relation is 
focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-Time is after the simultaneous Assertion- 
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and State-Times. With the inclusion of the propositional variable, the result is an 
appropriate existential interpretation.
2,
 
3
 
 
 
5.1.3 Causative Unaccusative Structures 
Moving on now to the analyses of the EA unaccusative structures in (15) (repeated from 
(1a, b)), the analysis will extend the use of inert entailed arguments from the previous 
section. The next section will address implicit arguments in more detail comparing 
unaccusatives and short passives. 
 
(15) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
 
The structure in (16) provides the syntax of (15a). In contrast with the previous 
example, here the external argument that is realised in the syntax as a free individual-
denoting variable, represented as x. Since it has no formal features, it is syntactically 
inert and the closest available argument to T
0
 is the CP, which duly moves to it satisfy 
the EPP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 It was argued throughout chapters 3 and 4 that EAs are not Individual-Level predicates. Section 
4.2.2.5.2 analysed non-existential interpretations with respect to inner-aspect, tense, and generic/habitual 
quantification. There it was suggested that a true generic/habitual interpretation—and not one falsely 
induced by the present simple with causative predicates—is the product of such quantification over the 
Assertion-Time, and not an inherent lexical property. 
3
 Ideally, this analysis of implicit objects carries over to verbs, such as eat, that can drop their objects with 
a non-referential interpretation and maintain their existential entailment, e.g. Victoria ate.   
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(16) That Emma left was rude 
T
 
2 
That Emma     T   
 
lefti  2 
UT-T T 
2 
Tpast
  
    Asp 
2 
AST-T Asp 
2 
Asp     Voice 
g      2 
be   ST-T          Voice 
2 
Voiceactive  rude 
2 
x         rude 
 2  
s1          rude 
2 
s2   rude 
2 
rude         ti 
 
The other notable aspect is that unaccusatives are active voice expressions: the only 
difference between transitive causatives and causative unaccusatives is the syntactic 
activity of the external argument. 
The interpretation of (16) is in (17). In section 5.3 below, where unaccusatives are 
discussed in more detail, I will argue that they entail an external argument even though 
it is not overt. So, just as in the analysis of the implicit complement proposition above, 
the external argument in unaccusatives will receive its existential force under Existential 
Closure. Implementing this here, the interpretation in (16) can be paraphrased as 
follows: The rudeness of Emma’s leaving is a stative causative relation whose causing-
state is focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-Time is after the simultaneous 
Assertion- and State-Times. 
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(17) Interpretation of (16) with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2 [CAUSE(rude(x2, s1), (rude(s2, that Emma left))  
tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T ] 
 
Since this is an active voice expression, the focus is still on the causing-state, but it 
is underspecified by the lack of a referential external argument. In this connection, the 
nominalisation used for the interpretation of this structure is interesting in two ways. 
First, note that the nominalisation used here, repeated in (18a), has an overt 
propositional complement and it is grammatical. This is interesting because it shows 
that EA nominalisations do take CP complements, but that the markedness of (18b) is 
an effect of both arguments being overt at the same time. This is another reason to 
conclude the markedness of (18b) is pragmatic and not syntactic. 
 
(18) a. The rudeness of Emma’s leaving  = Unaccusative Nominalisation 
b. #Emma’s rudeness to leave   = Transitive Nominalisation 
 
The second interesting point regarding the unaccusative nominalisation ((18a)) is 
the use of the definite article in the external position. I have used in purposively in order 
to include the Existential Closure over the external argument in the paraphrase. Namely, 
the pair in (19) shows that the definite article has existential quantification over an 
individual inside of it: in (19b) the individual is overt and referential, and in (19a) is it 
underspecified just as with non-referential existential quantification. 
 
(19) a. The rudeness 
b. The girl’s rudeness 
 
This will be elaborated on further below when we turn to the causative alternation 
in general, but I will argue that causative unaccusatives always entail an external 
argument, that Existential Closure over that argument captures its underspecification, 
and that the invocation of the definite article in the paraphrase of unaccusatives is a 
useful illustration of this. 
It is worth bearing in mind, however, that including reference to the external 
argument in the predicate’s lexical entry and placing it in the syntax as a variable bound 
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under Existential Closure in unaccusatives accounts for both the entailment of the 
external argument in unaccusatives, and its non-referential character.   
Turning now to the syntax of (15b) in (20), the only important difference with the 
previous unaccusative example is that Extraposition has occurred. As proposed with the 
passive example above, the CP has been extraposed to the right edge, but it is also the 
closest referential argument to T
0
, so it appears to resolve the tension and provide an 
overt subject. At the semantic level, I propose that the interpretation of this structure is 
the same as for (16) in (17) above. 
 
(20) It was rude that Emma left 
 T
 
 2 
Iti        T 
2 
UT-T  T 
2 
Tpast      Asp 
2 
AST-T   Asp 
2 
 Asp     Voice 
  g       2 
  be    ST-T   Voice 
2 
Voiceactive     rude
 
2  
rude       that Emma lefti 
2 
x rude 
2 
s1           rude 
2 
s2    rude 
2 
rude        ti 
 
This section has introduced the proposal to be explored more below that 
unaccusatives have a variable in the external argument position bound by Existential 
Closure. This will account for the character of the external argument in unaccusatives, 
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while maintaining the argument selection properties of the predicate’s denotation. It is 
also an expansion of the proposal that state arguments are present in the syntax in that it 
provides evidence that other types of argument variables are, as well. 
 
 
5.2 Two Types of Implicit Arguments and the Causative 
Alternation 
I have proposed that implicit objects and unaccusatives are two cases where argument 
variables are present in the syntax and bound under Existential Closure. This captures 
the cases in which an argument is entailed, but implicit and non-referential. 
Short passives are another case where an entailed argument is implicit. They differ, 
though, in showing signs of being referential. 
The data in (21) illustrate the kind of contrast in argument behaviour that requires 
analysis. In (21), the active voice example with an overt external argument ((21a)) and 
the passive with an implicit one ((21b)) pattern together in accepting modification of the 
external argument, to the exclusion of the unaccusative ((21c)). 
 
(21) a. They decreased the price willingly 
b. The price was decreased willingly 
c. *The price decreased willingly 
 (Jaeggli 1986: 611, ex. (53)) 
 
The interesting point here is that there is general agreement that unaccusatives are 
aspectually causative (see discussion in section 2.1.2), so the pertinent difference 
between these three examples does seem to centre on the representation of the external 
arguments. 
Control is another environment where the implicit external argument in the passive 
shows signs of being referential. In chapter 2 it was shown that EAs are Obligatory 
Control predicates in all their infinitival structures. Example (22), also from chapter 2, 
shows that cases where EAs appear to allow a long distance or an arbitrary Control 
interpretation receive a uniform Obligatory Control analysis with an intermediate 
implicit argument. These are structures that have been analysed as passives here, as well 
as in Bennis (2000, 2004) and Landau (2009). 
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(22) a. Mary knew that it was foolish to perjure herself/oneself 
a’. Maryi knew that it was foolish of-i/j [PROi/j to perjure herselfi/oneselfj] 
 
In this connection, in his study of implicit arguments Landau independently 
concludes the following: 
 
(23) Implicit argument controllers are syntactically represented. 
(Landau 2010a: 370, ex. (45)) 
 
Of interest in the present setting is Landau’s proposal that in the passive voice the 
implicit external argument has formal agreement features (i.e. Number, Person, and 
Gender) that make its syntactic representation necessary, accounting for its syntactic 
behaviour as a controller of PRO. 
Moving one level up in the passive from the external argument to the passive voice 
head, following Collins’ (2005) we have identified the passive voice head with the 
preposition that case-marks the stranded external argument, namely by with verbs and of 
with adjectives. Correspondingly, in addition to its aspectual features, the passive voice 
head has nominal agreement features. In the denotation in (24) it was allocated a set of 
nominal agreement features. So, Landau’s conclusion regarding implicit controllers in 
the passive interlocks with the properties of the passive voice head. 
 
(24) a.║Voicepassive║ = λpλtST-T.  s2 [p & tST-T   τ(s2)*]          
b. Formal features on Voicepassive: {{iS [  ], uPart [  ], EPP}; {φ-set[  ]}} 
 
In contrast, the active voice head does not place any demands on the external 
argument, and so it does not have nominal formal features. Instead it has the one 
dimensional function of mapping the predicate’s aspectual argument to the State-Time. 
 
(25) a. ║Voiceactive║ = λpλtST-T.  s1 [p & tST-T   τ(s1)*] 
b. Formal feature on Voiceactive: iS [  ] 
 
I would like to propose that, extending Landau and Collins with an eye to 
accounting for the behaviour of the implicit arguments in unaccusatives and passives, it 
is because of the formal features on the passive voice head that the external argument is 
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necessarily present in the syntax and participating in syntactic relations. Further, in 
short passives the implicit external argument has referential pronominal properties 
because of these features that agree with the nominal features on the passive head. For 
present purposes, I will call the pronominal in short passives pro (Landau 2010a; cf. 
Duguine 2013). 
On the other hand, I propose that the lack of nominal formal features on the active 
voice head allows the external argument to be interpreted as a variable in the syntax in 
unaccusatives, thus accounting for its syntactic inertness in these structures. 
So, I am making a two-pronged proposal. First, the contrasting referential 
properties of external arguments in short passives and unaccusatives provide evidence 
for two different kinds of implicit arguments: pronouns and variables, respectively. 
Second, the fact that both kinds are entailed even though implicit, is evidence for their 
syntactic reality. 
To see this in action let’s run through the derivation of the paradigm of break in 
(26) using the denotation in (27). 
 
(26) a. Peter broke the window = Transitive Causative 
b. The window broke  = Causative Unaccusative 
c. The window was broken = Short Passive 
(27) ║break║= λyλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(break(x, s1), break(s2, y))] 
 
The derivation of (26a) in (28), and its interpretation in (29), is an active voice 
expression where both of the predicate’s DP arguments are realised. It can be read: 
Peter’s breaking of the window is a stative causative relation whose causing-state is 
focalised by the State-Time, and the Utterance-Time is after the simultaneous Assertion- 
and State-Times. 
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(28) Peter broke the window 
T
 
2 
Peterp     T   
 
 2 
UT-T T 
2 
Tpast
  
    Asp 
2 
AST-T Asp 
2 
Asp
 
     Voice 
      2 
    ST-T          Voice 
2 
Voiceactive  break 
2 
tp     break 
2  
s1           break 
2 
s2       break 
2 
break   the window 
(29) Interpretation of (28) with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T  tAST-T  tST-T  s1  2 [CAUSE(break(Peter, s1), (break(s2, the window)))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T] 
 
The derivation of the unaccusative (26b) in (30) is the same, with the difference 
that the external argument is an individual variable in the syntax. So in the interpretation 
in (31) the non-referential existential entailment of the external argument comes from 
Existential Closure over the predicate. 
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(30) The window broke 
T
 
2 
The     T   
 
windowi 2 
UT-T T 
2 
Tpast
  
    Asp 
2 
AST-T Asp 
2 
Asp
  
    Voice 
2 
ST-T           Voice 
 2 
Voiceactive   break 
2 
x        break 
2  
s1         break 
2 
s2       break 
2 
break       ti 
(31) Interpretation of (30) with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2 [CAUSE(break(x2, s1), (break(s2, the window)))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T ] 
 
The pertinent part of (31) can be read as: the breaking of the window is a causative 
stative relation whose causing-state is focalized by the State-Time. Once again, in this 
paraphrase the definite article conveys the Existential Closure over the external 
argument in the syntax. This addresses that argument’s maximal under-specification in 
unaccusatives. This analysis also accounts for its syntactic inertness. 
The final derivation is of the short passive (26c) in (32). This derivation is different 
because the unvalued formal features on the passive voice head require an element with 
which to agree. The valued formal features on pro are represented as φ-set[v] in (32).   
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(32) The window was broken 
T
 
2 
        The     T
 
windowt   2 
UT-T T   
ru 
Tpast
  
       Asp 
2 
AST-T      Asp
 
ru 
Aspneutral  Voice
 
g         ei 
be   breakp              Voice
 
2     2 
-en       break        ST-T    Voice
 
2  2 
s2      break  Voicepassive
    break                         
 
2      g           2 
break        tt  Øby    pro     break 
φ-set[v]      2 
s1         tp 
 
In the interpretation of this structure in (33) the external argument is bound under 
Existential Closure, just as it was in the interpretation of the unaccusative structure in 
(31) above. The difference here is that the implicit element carries formal features make 
pro referential and allow it to participate in syntactic relations such as modification 
((21)), and pronominal co-reference and Control ((22)) (cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998: 
239-245). 
 
(33) Interpretation of (32) with Existential Closure 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T s2 1[CAUSE(break(x1, s1), en(break(s2, the window)))  
& s1   s2 & tST-T   τ(s2)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T ] 
 
The pertinent part of this formula can be read as: something’s breaking of the 
window is a stative causative relation such that its causing-state is contained in its 
result-state and its result-state is focalised by the State-Time. 
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This paraphrase uses the indefinite pronoun both to reflect the pronominal element 
in the syntax, and to contrast short passives with unaccusatives. Intuitively, the implicit 
external argument in short passives is more salient than the implicit external argument 
in unaccusatives, and the paraphrases reflect that intuition by using the pronoun in the 
interpretation of the former (i.e. Something/one’s breaking of the window), and the 
definite article in the latter (i.e. The breaking of the window). This seems to be a close 
approximation to the degree of implicitness of the respective external arguments in 
these two structures. 
Summing up, on this analysis the presence of nominal formal features on the 
passive voice head conditions the syntactic presence of a nominal external argument in 
the syntax. Unaccusatives, on the other hand, are active voice expressions, and the 
active voice places no syntactic conditions on external argument of the predicate, and so 
the external argument can be realised a variable in the syntax that is interpreted non-
referentially under Existential Closure. 
 
 
5.3 Alternative Analysis and the Heart of the Causative 
Alternation 
This section is divided in three parts. First section 5.3.1 contrasts the present analysis of 
the causative alternation with the recent analysis of Alexiadou et al. (2015). Their 
analysis differs in two ways: (i) the external argument is introduced by Voice, and not 
the predicate (Kratzer 1996), and (ii) it is absent from the syntax of unaccusatives. It 
will be argued that exclusion of the external argument leads to undesirable 
consequences that the present analysis avoids. Second section 5.3.2 expands on the 
results of 5.3.1 in order to show how the facts about Spanish and Italian reflexive 
unaccusatives fit naturally into this thesis’ theory of inner-aspect.4 Third section 5.3.3 
addresses the looming question of why it is that EAs undergo the causative alternation. 
 
 
5.3.1 Alternative Unaccusative Analysis: Alexiadou et al. (2015) 
Alexiadou et al. (2015) analyse the causative alternation adopting Kratzer’s (1996) 
hypothesis that an external argument is an argument of Voice
0
, and not the predicate.  
                                                          
4
 See section 2.1.2 for arguments against the reflexive analysis of unaccusatives. 
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On this approach, the denotation of a causative alternating verb, such as open, is as 
shown in (34a). This denotation makes reference to an event argument and a Theme, but 
not the external argument. In (34b) the unaccusative structure is made causative via a 
causative functional head, but there is still no external argument associated with 
causation. In the transitive structures in (34c, d), the different sorts of external 
arguments are introduced by voice heads that determine the thematic role of the 
argument (Alexiadou et al. 2015: 8-9). On their proposal, the role of Voice
0 
is strictly to 
introduce external arguments (2015: 12; cf. Kratzer 1996: 124). In this sense, their 
development of the severed external argument hypothesis is a pure test study. 
 
(34) Alexiadou et al.’s (2015) Analysis of the Causative Alternation in English 
a. ║√OPEN ║= λxλe. [open(e) & Theme(e, x))] 
(cf. Alexiadou et al. 2015: 9) 
b. The door opened 
vCAUSE   
2 
vCAUSE     √OPEN 
2 
√OPEN   the door 
(cf. Alexiadou et al. 2015: 29, ex. (31); 97, ex. (1)) 
c. John opened the door 
VoiceAGENT 
2 
John   VoiceAGENT 
2 
VoiceAGENT  vCAUSE   
 2 
vCAUSE     √OPEN 
2 
√OPEN   the door 
(cf. Alexiadou et al. 2015: 9, ex. (12)) 
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d. The wind opened the door 
VoiceCAUSER 
2 
The   VoiceCAUSER 
 wind     2 
VoiceCAUSER  vCAUSE   
 2 
vCAUSE     √OPEN 
2 
√OPEN   the door 
(cf. Alexiadou et al. 2015: 9, ex. (13)) 
 
The central difference between Alexiadou et al.’s analysis and the present one is the 
character of the external argument.  There are two drawbacks to the proposal that the 
external argument is not an argument of the predicate.  
The first is that once arguments are separated out from the predicate, an array of 
dedicated functional heads is required to specify aspectual relations. This is why a 
causative little v head and voice heads that specify thematic roles are needed in (34). On 
the present proposal, the inventory of primitives is reduced to two: a state argument and 
a lexical causal relation. 
The second is that the analysis of the unaccusative in (34b), where there is no 
causing argument, does not capture the contradiction in (35). Here, the continuation 
denies that there was a causing force of any kind.  
 
(35) #The window broke, but nothing broke it 
 
I submit that stated literally, this sentence is a contradiction in the fundamental 
sense that, in the final analysis there are no uncaused causes. Rather if an utterance 
along the lines of (35) is made, its meaning is rhetorical. 
In this connection, in accordance with Schafer and Vivanco’s (2016) weak scalar 
analysis of unaccusatives, I take unaccusatives convey that the speaker asserts the cause 
is unknown—but there is a causing force of some kind, abstract as it may be (cf. 
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Rappaport Hovav 2014). Thus an unaccusative expression can be followed up with a 
specification of the cause: 
 
(36) a. The glass broke. In fact, John broke it 
b. The glass broke. In fact, the earthquake broke it 
(cf. Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 25, ex. (70), (71)) 
 
On the present analysis the external argument is present in the unaccusative syntax 
as an existentially bound variable: 
 
(37) Interpretation of The glass broke 
 tUT-T tAST-T tST-T s1 2 [CAUSE(break(x2, s1), (break(s2, the glass)))  
& tST-T   τ(s1)* & tAST-T, tST-T & tUT-T > tAST-T ] 
 
This captures the contradiction in (35), the continuations in (36), and the analysis of 
unaccusatives as producing weak scalar implicatures regarding specification of the 
causing force: existential quantification makes the weakest possible claim regarding the 
cause.
5
 
An additional drawback to not including the external argument in the lexical entry 
is that the generalisation on the availability of the unaccusative form in (38) seems 
unavoidably missed. 
 
(38) Underspecified External Argument Generalisation 
Only transitive verbs that do not restrict the Θ-role of their external argument to 
Agents enter the causative alternation. 
(cf. Schafer and Vivanco 2016: 7, ex. (12)) 
 
In positive terms, the generalisation is that only causative predicates that allow a 
Causer external argument can have an unaccusative form. The examples in (39) and 
(40) illustrate this. Examples (39a, b) show that break allows a Causer external 
argument, and (39c) shows it has an unaccusative form. In contrast, (40a, b) show that 
                                                          
5
 Incorporating the weak scalar analysis of causative unaccusatives, the different assertions that causative 
unaccusatives and short-passives make with respect to their implicit external arguments can be 
characterised as the former asserting X happened, but why is unknown, and the latter X happened, but why 
is unimportant. 
Leferman 
318 
 
assassinate is restricted to an Agent interpretation of its external argument, and (40c) 
shows it lacks an unaccusative form. 
 
(39) a. The terrorist broke the window  = Transitive Causative 
b. The explosion broke the window  = Transitive Causative 
c. The window broke    = Causative Unaccusative 
(cf. Martin and Schafer 2014: 211, ex. (5)) 
(40) a. The terrorist assassinated the senator = Transitive Causative 
b. *The explosion assassinated the senator = Transitive Causative 
c. *The senator assassinated   = Causative Unaccusative 
(cf. Martin and Schafer 2014: 211, ex. (3)) 
 
On an analysis where predicates do not have external arguments in their lexical 
entries and the unaccusative structure makes no reference to the external argument, it 
does not seem possible to state a generalisation about the character of the external 
argument that is stronger than the null hypothesis that all verbs can appear without an 
external argument such that it is interpreted inferentially to have the same properties 
that is does when overt. 
On the other hand, the present analysis can capture the Causer criterion. On this 
theory of inner-aspect the causative relation is stative. So semantically, the external 
argument can only be characterised as a Causer: 
 
(41) Template Causative Denotation 
║P║= λyλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(P(x, s1), P(s2, y))] 
 
Now add to this the discourse function of the unaccusative that the speaker 
communicates the weakest possible claim about the causing force. This is the existential 
quantification over the external argument in (37), which establishes a connection to the 
generalisation in (38). 
On the other hand, predicates that conceptually necessarily imply agentivity, such 
as assassinate, are infelicitous in the unaccusative because the implication of agentivity 
is unavoidable, and that is a stronger implication than the unaccusative form makes. 
However, capturing this series of properties requires reference to the relation between 
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external arguments and predicates, which a severed external argument analysis does not 
have access to. 
In conclusion, including the external argument in the lexical entry captures the 
entailment of an external argument, and having the variable existentially bound in the 
syntax captures its non-referential properties. 
 
 
5.3.2 Reflexive Unaccusatives in Spanish and Italian  
This section compares Alexiadou et al.’s analysis of morphologically unmarked 
unaccusatives in English and marked unaccusatives in Romance. It will be proposed 
that the properties of data pattern have a natural place in the present theory. 
The Spanish causative alternation pair in (42) shows that some languages realise 
their unaccusative structure with a third person reflexive clitic, se in (42b), which is 
absent in transitive structure ((42a)). 
 
(42) Spanish 
a. Pedro rompió      la ventana  = Transitive Causative 
  Peter break-PAST the window 
‘Peter broke the window’ 
b. La ventana  se rompió  = Causative Unaccusative 
the window SE break-PAST 
‘The window broke’ 
 
Alexiadou et al. (2015) and Schafer and Vivanco (2016), argue persuasively that 
this clitic is not semantically reflexive. Further, they conclude that the clitic is 
semantically vacuous in these unaccusative structures. In turn, Alexiadou et al. analyse 
these morphologically marked unaccusatives as in (43). They propose that there is an 
expletive active voice head, introducing no semantic content (2015: 108-109), that hosts 
the semantically null reflexive in its specifier. 
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(43) Alexiadou et al.’s (2015) Analysis of Marked Unaccusatives 
La ventana  se rompió 
VoiceExpl.Act 
2 
SE   VoiceExpl.Act 
2 
VoiceExpl.Act   vCAUSE 
 2 
vCAUSE    √ROMPER 
2 
√ROMPER   la ventana 
(cf. Alexiadou et al. 2015: 109, ex. (12c); 111, ex. (14)) 
 
Comparing with their analysis of morphologically unmarked English unaccusatives 
in (44) (repeated from 34b)), the sole difference is in the null elements (43). 
 
(44) Alexiadou et al.’s (2015) Analysis of Unmarked Unaccusatives 
The door opened 
vCAUSE   
2 
vCAUSE     √OPEN 
2 
√OPEN   the door 
(cf. Alexiadou et al. 2015: 29, ex. (31); 97, ex. (1)) 
 
Having concluded that the clitic is semantically null, Alexiadou et al. (2015) adopt 
Haspelmath’s (1993) proposal regarding its import. Haspelmath proposes that the clitic 
appears in correspondence with a scale of spontaneous change. In particular, the clitic 
appears on unaccusatives that are conceptualised as unlikely to lack an identifiable 
cause of change. So, the morphology is marking a conceptual scale. 
Now, Haspelmath (1993) also highlights that within and across languages that mark 
unaccusatives, it is impossible to predict how a predicate will be conceptualised with 
respect to the scale. For example, (45) and (46) provide minimal pairs in Spanish and 
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Italian. The (a) examples show that both languages require the clitic with break, but the 
(b) examples show that the clitic is not always necessary. In particular, with sink it is 
obligatory in Spanish, but optional in Italian. Haspelmath et al. (2014) propose that this 
fine-grained variation indicates language particular conceptual choices that are 
countenanced by frequency effects. 
 
(45) Spanish 
a. La ventana  se rompió 
the window SE break-PAST 
‘The window broke’ 
b. El barco  se hundió 
the boat  SE sink-PAST 
‘The boat sank’ 
(46) Italian 
a. La finestra si  è  rotta 
 the window SE is break-PART 
‘The window broke’ 
b. La barca (si) è affondata 
  the boat   SE  is sink-PART 
‘The boat sank’ 
 (cf. Chierchia 2004) 
 
The interesting point here is that in chapters 1 and 4 it was independently argued 
that the notion of itself change is conceptual, and not represented in a predicate’s 
aspectual decomposition. In particular, the category distinction between verbs and 
adjectives was proposed to reflect that verbs can convey change, but adjectives cannot. 
However, this distinction is a conceptual one that is reflected in morphology, not in the 
syntax. 
Now, we are in a position to conclude that marked unaccusatives in Romance are 
another morphological reflection of the conceptual notion of change. This allows for the 
principled elimination of a null voice head and a null clitic in the syntax ((43)), and the 
elimination of optionality in the analysis of unaccusatives within and across languages 
((44), (46b)), at least in these cases. 
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Instead, unaccusatives have the single analysis proposed here with an existentially 
bound individual variable that is an argument of the predicate, and morphological 
marking is—when it occurs—a morphological operation. Thus, Spanish and Italian 
unaccusatives are a conceptual phenomenon that this theory of inner-aspect can identify 
as morphological on principled grounds. 
 
 
5.3.3 So, Why Do EAs Alternate? 
In closing this section, I would like to address the question of how it is that an adjective 
class, i.e. EAs, can undergo the causative alternation. The generalisation regarding verbs 
that can undergo the alternation is that they allow a Causer interpretation of their 
external argument ((38)). Break is the prototypical example here. The examples in (47) 
(repeated from (39)) show that it allows an Agent and a Causer external argument, and 
its unaccusative form is compatible with either interpretation. 
 
(47) a. The terrorist broke the window  = Transitive Causative 
b. The explosion broke the window  = Transitive Causative 
c. The window broke    = Causative Unaccusative 
(cf. Martin and Schafer 2014: 211, ex. (5)) 
 
Not all alternating verbs are like this, however. RH&L (2012) discuss in detail 
many of particularities across verb classes. For example, the pair in (48) shows that 
clear allows a Causer external argument and it alternates. But the ungrammaticality of 
the pair (49) shows that clear alternates only on a Causer interpretation of its external 
argument. This is a stronger restriction that simply allowing a Causer external argument 
(cf. break). 
 
(48) a. The wind cleared the sky 
b. The sky cleared 
(49) a. The waiter cleared the table 
b. *The table cleared 
(cf. Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2012: 157, ex. (8)) 
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Yet, the generalisation that verbs that can alternate accept a Causer external 
argument does hold. Let’s assume that this is the core condition on the ability of a 
predicate to undergo the causative alternation. 
I have proposed here that verbs and adjectives are the same underlying predicate 
category, and that they have the same range of aspectual decompositions: stative 
causative or simple state. Further, all causative predicates have the same aspectual 
content in their decompositions: a stative causative relation. 
The lexical category distinction however, tracks that, conceptually, a verb can 
convey change and therefore also Agentivity, while the adjective category is a 
transparent marker of stativity across these levels of representation because it does not 
convey change. 
Now, the generalisation on the causative alternation and the comparison between 
break and clear show that the causative alternation is sensitive to the interpretation of 
the external argument, and that Agentivity interferes with the alternation. On the 
pragmatic approach to the alternation that is assumed here, the conceptual 
representation of Agentivity can interfere with the pragmatic calculation, and so not all 
verbs will behave equally. 
But, stative causative adjectives are transparently stative both in terms of their 
aspectual decomposition and at the conceptual level: the adjective category is an 
unambiguous marker of stativity. This means that their external argument meets the 
Causer criterion across both the syntax/LF and conceptual levels. So, they should be 
free to alternate, and in fact, the whole class does so freely. 
In conclusion, the exploration of the proposal that EAs undergo the causative 
alternation has turned the question on its head. Given the Causer criterion on the 
causative alternation, within this system of inner-aspect, the question is no longer: How 
could adjectives possibly be causative or alternate? But rather: What are the pragmatic 
factors that restrict individual verbs? 
 
 
5.4 The EA Paradigm Cross-Linguistically 
Now that the English causative alternation paradigm has been analysed, this section 
compares Germanic, Romance, and Basque. The English paradigm is repeated in (50). 
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(50) English 
a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition  
            + Passive 
 
Beginning with Germanic and Romance, there are only two points of relevant 
variation: (i) the form of the preposition fulfilling the role of of in the passive structures, 
and (ii) the grammaticality of the overt infinitive in complement position in the (d) 
examples. We’ll comment each in turn, but first, here are the data:6 
 
(51) Dutch 
a. Dat  hij dat  zal zeggen is gemeen 
that he that will  say    is mean 
‘That he will say that is mean’ 
b. Het  is gemeen dat hij that zal zeggen 
 it    is  mean   that he that will say 
‘It is mean that he will say that’  (cf. Bennis 2000: 35, ex. (22a)) 
c. Jan   is gemeen 
John is mean 
‘John is mean’    (cf. Bennis 2000: 36, ex. (26)) 
d. 
(*)
Jan  is gemeen om  dat tegen haar te zeggen 
  John is  mean  COMP that PREP   her   to say-INF 
‘John is mean to say that to her’  (cf. Bennis 2000: 41, ex. (39a)) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The data for Central Flemish and Italian have been omitted because they pattern with Dutch and 
German, and Spanish respectively. 
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e. Om  dat tegen har te zeggen is gemeen (van Jan) 
COMP that PREP   her to say-INF   is mean    (of John) 
‘To say that to her is mean (of John)’ (cf. Bennis 2000: 39, ex. (35b)) 
f. Het  is gemeen (van Jan)  om  dat tegen har te zeggen 
 it    is mean     (of John) COMP that PREP  her to say-INF  
‘It is mean (of John) to say that to her’ (cf. Bennis 2000: 39, ex. (35a)) 
(52) German 
a. Dass Hans gegangen ist war unhöflich 
that  John   go-PART     is was impolite 
‘That John left was impolite’ 
b. Es   war    unhöflich, dass Hans gegangen ist 
it was impolite   that John    go-PART is 
‘It was impolite that John left’ 
c. Hans war unhöflich 
John was impolite 
‘John was impolite’ 
d. 
(*)
Hans war unhöflich zu gehen 
   John was impolite   to go-INF 
‘John was impolite to leave’ 
e. Zu gehen war unhöflich von Hans 
to  go-INF  was impolite   by  John 
‘To leave was impolite of John’ 
f. Es war  unhöflich von Hans zu gehen 
 it  was  impolite   by  John to   go-INF 
‘It was impolite of John to leave’ 
(53) Afrikaans 
a. Dat    Jan die kamer verlaat   het, was    ongeskik 
COMP John the room left-PART has, was rude 
‘That John left the room was rude’ 
b. Dit was ongeskik  dat    Jan  die kamer verlaat het 
 it  was    rude     COMP John the room   left-PART has 
‘It was rude that John left the room’ 
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c. Jan   was ongeskik 
John was rude 
‘John was rude 
d. 
(?)
Jan was ongeskik om die kamer te verlaat  
John  was    rude     COMP the room  to leave-INF 
‘John was rude to leave the room’ 
e. Om   die kamer te verlaat,   was ongeskik (van Jan) 
COMP the room   to leave-INF, was rude      (from John) 
‘To leave the room was rude of John’ 
f. Dit was ongeskik (van  Jan)   om die kamer te verlaat  
 it  was     rude  (from John) COMP the room to leave-INF 
‘It was rude of John to leave the room’ 
(54) Swedish 
a. Att   Johan    gick      var  ohövligt  
COMP John leave-PAST was rude-NEUT 
‘That John left was rude’ 
b. Det var ohövligt    att   Johan gick 
 it   was rude-NEUT COMP John leave-PAST 
‘It was rude that John left’ 
c. Johan var ohövlig 
John  was rude 
‘John was rude’ 
d. *Johan  var ohövlig att  gå  
   John  was rude      to leave-INF  
‘John was rude to leave’ 
e. Att     gå      var  ohövligt   (av Johan) 
 to  leave-INF was rude-NEUT (by John) 
‘To leave was rude (of John) 
f. Det var ohövligt  (av Johan) att gå  
 it   was rude-NEUT (by John)   to leave-INF 
‘It was rude (of John) to leave’ 
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(55) Romanian 
a. Faptul că  Maria   a    plecat       a    fost  nepoliticos 
fact   COMP Mary  has leave-PART has be-PART impolite 
‘The fact that Mary left was impolite’ 
b. A     fost    nepoliticos că  Maria  a     plecat       
has be-PART   impolite COMP Mary has leave-PART  
‘That Mary left was impolite’ 
c. Maria  a    fost   nepoliticoasă 
Mary was be-PART impolite-FEM 
‘Mary was impolite’ 
d. *Maria  a    fost  nepoliticoasă     să           plece      
  Mary has be-PART impolite-FEM COMP-SUBJ leave-SUBJ-3 
‘Mary was impolite to leave’ 
e. Să              plece       a    fost   nepoliticos (din partea Mariei) 
COMP-SUBJ leave-SUBJ-3 has be-PART impolite (from part Mary-GEN) 
‘To leave was rude (on Mary’s part)’ 
f. A            fost   nepoliticos (din partea Mariei)       să       plece   
AUX-PRES-3 be-PART impolite (from part Mary-GEN) COMP-SUBJ leave-SUBJ-3  
‘It was impolite (on Mary’s part) to leave’  
(56) Spanish 
a. Que María se marchara  fue prudente 
COMP Mary SE leave-SUBJ was prudent  
‘That Mary left was prudent 
b. Fue prudente que María se marchara  
was prudent COMP Mary SE leave-SUBJ  
‘It was prudent that Mary left’ 
c. María fue prudente    
Mary was prudent 
‘Mary was prudent’ 
d. *María fue prudente marcharse   
 Mary was prudent   leave-INF-SE 
‘Mary was prudent to leave’ 
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e. Marcharse fue prudente (por parte de Mary)  
leave-INF-SE was prudent (by  part  of Mary) 
‘To leave was prudent on Mary’s part’ 
f.  Fue  prudente (por parte de María) marcharse  
was  prudent   (by  part   of Mary)  leave-INF-SE 
‘It was prudent on Mary’s part to leave’ 
 
Regarding the cross-linguistic realisation of the light preposition of, it has been 
proposed throughout that it is the equivalent of the verbal passive preposition by, and 
that of surfaces in passive EA structures as a morphological reflex. In connection to the 
passive, German ((63e, f)) and Swedish ((65e, f)) use the same light prepositions (von 
and av, respectively) in their EA passive structures as in verbal passives.  
The fact that languages as closely related as German and Dutch make different 
choices here indicates how superficial the difference is. In this connection, while 
Spanish ((67e, f)) and Italian lack a light preposition equivalent to of, they use complex 
prepositional phrases to license the EA external argument in the passive structures that 
are built from the same light prepositions that they use in verbal passives (por and da, 
respectively). So, there are languages that show the same morphology in EA and verbal 
passives. 
Regarding grammaticality, there is only one point of variation in the whole 
paradigm: the overt realisation of the infinitive in complement position (the (d) 
examples). This structure is completely grammatical in English, completely 
ungrammatical in Romance and Swedish, and there is variation in Dutch, German, 
Central Flemish, and Afrikaans. 
 An important point is that the unaccusative and passive forms show that EAs in all 
of these languages take a CP. The question is why realising the CP in complement 
position is problematic in languages other than English.
7
 
                                                          
7
 When testing for these structures, it is important to make sure that one has identified the (equivalent of 
the) infinitival structure. For example, Spanish has the structure in (i), which seems similar to (56d) (i.e. 
*María fue prudente marcharse): 
 
(i) Spanish 
María fue prudente      al       marcharse  = Causative + Null CP + High Adjunct 
Mary was prudent PREP-DET leave-INF-SE 
‘Mary was prudent in leaving’  = Causal 
‘Mary was prudent when she left’  = Temporal 
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I would like to suggest two possibilities for addressing the variability, one through 
formal feature agreement on adjectives, the other through factivity. Beginning with the 
first, all the languages but English have some form of non-neutral formal feature 
agreement when a non-proposition denoting DP is in Spec, T. Romance has Number 
and Gender agreement, as shown in Romanian (55c) with an animate feminine 
argument in Spec, T. On the other hand, when a CP is interpreted in Spec, T, neutral 
agreement appears ((55b)). Similarly in Swedish, when a CP is interpreted in Spec, T 
the neutral marker –t appears ((54a, b, e, f)) (cf. Josefsson 2014), but an animate 
argument triggers non-neutral agreement ((54c, d)). 
The cases of Dutch, German, Central Flemish, and Afrikaans are interesting for two 
reasons. First, there is genuine variety in speakers’ judgements. For example, Bennis 
accepts the overt infinitive in complement position as grammatical, but comments in a 
footnote that some speakers find them ungrammatical, and that he finds them marked 
(2000: 63, fn. 8). The Dutch speakers I have conferred with find them ungrammatical. 
This is why (51d) has the asterisks in brackets (i.e. 
(*)
Jan is gemeen om dat tegen haar 
te zeggen). 
Informants in German and Central Flemish report the same sort of variety, with 
some speakers accepting it as (highly) marked, but most judging it (highly) 
ungrammatical. 
Afrikaans is from the same family, but geographically removed. Once again, the 
overt infinitive in complement position was the example that produced judgement 
variation. But in this case, the tendency was for speakers to accept it as grammatical, 
with some finding it slightly marked. This is indicated with the question mark in 
brackets in (53d). 
The second interesting point is the formal feature agreement system on adjectives in 
these Germanic languages. It happens to be the case that in predicative structures in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The difference is that (56d) has a bare infinitive, while in (i) the infinitive is preceded by the complex 
preposition al. This prepositional form is not a complement, but a high adjunct that can be interpreted 
causally or temporally (cf. Rico Rama 2014). 
An adjunct form can be distinguished from a complement with the CP/PP restriction. Example (ii.a) 
shows that the to-PP can appear in the adjunct structure. Example (ii.b) shows that it cannot be added to 
the otherwise grammatical infinitival structures ((56e, f)). 
 
(ii) Spanish 
a. María fue amable  con  Pedro       al        intentar   ayudarle 
 Mary was   kind    with Peter PREP-DET  try-INF    help-INF-3-CL 
‘Mary was kind to Peter in trying to help him’     
b. *Fue amable   con Pedro (por parte de María) intentar ayudarle  
 was   kind    with Peter   (by part of Mary)    try-INF     help-INF-3-CL 
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Dutch, German, Central Flemish, and Afrikaans there is no agreement ((57)), but in 
attributive structures, there is ((58)): 
 
(57) German 
a. Maria ist klug 
‘Mary is intelligent’  
b. Hans ist klug 
‘John is intelligent’ 
(58) German 
a. Eine           kluge         Frau   kommt  nach Hause 
DET-FEM intelligent-FEM woman comes   to    house 
‘An intelligent woman comes home’ 
b. Ein           kluger          Mann kommt nach Hause 
DET-MASC intelligent-MASC man  comes   to    house 
‘An intelligent man comes home’ 
 
It’s interesting that this group of Germanic languages that has a more intricate 
agreement pattern is the group that shows speaker variation. 
Considering Basque in this regard, it also has the unaccusative structure ((59a)), 
and it has the monadic active voice structure ((59b)). 
 
(59) Basque 
a.  Aitorrek  alde egin      izana    zakarra izan    zen  =  Causative Unaccusative 
Aitor-ERG side do-INF be-INF-DET rude    be-INF was 
‘That Aitor left was rude’ 
b.  Aitor zakarra izan zen    = Causative + Implicit CP 
Aitor-ABS rude-SING be-INF was 
‘Aitor was rude’ 
c.  Aitor        zakarra  izan   zen  alde egitean  = Causative + Null CP + High Adjunct  
Aitor-ABS rude-SING be-INF was side do-LOC 
‘Aitor was rude in leaving’ 
‘Aitor was rude when he left’ 
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The structure in (59c), however, is an adjunct structure, and not the equivalent of an 
overt infinitive in complement position. Basque does not have that EA structure. But it 
also has Number agreement on adjectives, so it fits in the pattern of languages that have 
non-neutral agreement not allowing an overt infinitive in complement position. 
In addition, Basque also lacks the EA passive structures. This is interesting because 
Basque also lacks a verbal passive in general. So, this gap in the paradigm is predicted 
on the present proposal. 
Yet, it is unclear how non-neutral agreement affects the realisation of an overt 
infinitive in complement position of an adjective. It is, however, a consistent factor that 
separates English from the other languages under consideration. 
Another possibility is that the factivity of EAs is the crux of the matter. There are 
two interesting points here. First, the only structure that is problematic is the one where 
the presupposed CP is interpreted in complement position, such that it is under 
Existential Closure. 
Second, this adjective structure which is natural in English ((60a)), but marked or 
considered ungrammatical in these other languages, is the basis of the same 
nominalisation structure that is considered marked ((60b)) or ungrammatical ((60c)) in 
English: 
 
(60) a. Emma was rude to leave  
b. #Emma’s rudeness to leave 
c. *Authur’s silliness/stupidity to press the matter was not at issue  
(Kertz 2010: 288, ex. (104)) 
 
Additional examples of these EA nominalisation structures were presented in 
chapter 2, and the conclusion I offered was that these structures are pragmatically 
marked, but not ungrammatical. It seems that the other languages considered here are 
judging the EA adjective structure in (60a) in a similar way that English speakers judge 
the nominalisations in (60b, c). Exactly how to express the restriction, in terms of 
presuppositions or otherwise, is a further topic for future research.  
The salient conclusion from this section, however, is that the cross-linguistic data 
show how consistent the EA causative alternation paradigm is. It shows that EAs 
always have an unaccusative form with a CP complement. It shows that they take an 
external argument. And it shows that they passivise, if the language has a passive (cf. 
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Basque). The specific gap is in realising the infinitive in complement position. This 
seems to require an independent analysis because the overall pattern shows that the 
complexity in EA argument structure recurs cross-linguistically in way that is consistent 
with this causative alternation analysis. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has implemented the objective of accounting for the EA paradigm with a 
principled analysis. We then extended the logic of the theory of inner-aspect developed 
thus far to propose that, in addition to state arguments, other individual and 
propositional variables are also realised in the syntax.  
This allowed for an analysis of the causative alternation and its Causer criterion that 
followed without stipulation. It was also proposed that the properties of Spanish and 
Italian marked unaccusatives fit the structure of this theory of inner-aspect. 
Lastly, we saw that the EA causative alternation paradigm manifests itself cross-
linguistically in a predictable way, thus supporting the underlying mechanisms of the 
proposed theory of inner-aspect. 
Chapter 6: 
Results and Final Remarks 
 
6 EAs and the Theory of Inner-Aspect 
The aim of this thesis was to develop an analysis of Evaluative adjectives (EAs) that 
explains their puzzling aspectual properties. The principle theoretical challenge that 
EAs have posed at least since Lakoff (1966) is to explain their dual nature as adjectives 
that behave like prototypical states in some environments, such as the present simple 
((1a)), and like agentive events in others, such as the continuous aspect and with 
intention adverbials ((1b, c)). The most puzzling feature of this dual stative/eventive 
behaviour is that it occurs in adjectives, a lexical category generally assumed to be 
uniquely state-denoting. 
 
(1) a. Emma is arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
b. Sam was being arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude 
c. Victoria was arrogant/brave/nice/obnoxious/rude on purpose 
 
Analyses of EAs can be characterised in two ways: either that they are inherently 
ambiguous—aspectually and/or syntactically (cf. Partee 1977: Dowty 1979; Stowell 
1991; Bennis 2000, 2004; Landau 2009), or that they are primarily stative but coerced 
into an eventive use (cf. Fernald 1999; Arche 2006; Kertz 2006, 2010). These are 
natural approaches to the EA paradox, but neither explains in a predictive way why 
EAs—and not other adjective classes—have this character, or how EAs relate to a 
general theory of inner-aspect composition. 
This thesis has proposed a novel solution to the paradox. It combines the aspectual 
and syntactic lines of research on EAs with the aims of showing that they inform each 
other, and that EAs are, despite first impressions, unambiguous. The key to capturing 
EAs’ apparently anomalous character was identifying them as aspectually causative, 
particularly: 
 
Proposal: EAs are stative causatives with an animate external argument and 
a propositional complement that undergo the causative alternation just as 
many causative verbs do. 
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Once they are identified as causatives, the solution to EAs’ apparent agentive properties 
is that they are implicatures generated by the combination of EAs’ causative inner-
aspect and their animate external argument. 
With respect to the causative alternation part of the proposal, research on EA 
argument structure has shown that EAs are also unique among adjectives in the range of 
syntactic structures their animate and clausal arguments can appear in (cf. Wilkinson 
1970, 1976; Stowell 1991; Bennis 2000, 2004; Arche 2006; Kertz 2006, 2010; Landau 
2009). The innovation here has been to organise that data into the paradigm in (2), and 
to show that it is a special case of the paradigmatic verbal causative alternation in (3). 
 
(2) a. That Emma left was rude  = Causative Unaccusative 
b. It was rude that Emma left  = Causative Unaccusative + Extraposition 
c. Emma was rude to leave  = Transitive Causative  
d. Emma was rude   = Transitive Causative with Implicit CP 
e. To leave was rude (of Emma) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
f. It was rude (of Emma) to leave  = Transitive Causative + Extraposition  
            + Passive 
(3) a. The window broke   = Causative Unaccusative 
b. Peter broke the window  = Transitive Causative 
c. The window was broken (by Peter) = Transitive Causative + Passive 
 
This causative alternation analysis of EAs raises an immediate question because the 
causative alternation has never before been posited outside of the verbal domain. In 
order to explain how the causative alternation can apply to both verbs and adjectives, a 
new theory of inner-aspect composition was developed and defended, one in which the 
event argument does not exist: 
 
Auxiliary Proposals:  
(i) The only primitive aspectual argument denotes a state.  
(ii) CAUSE is the only aspectual relation.  
(iii) The only aspectual distinction stated over aspectual arguments is 
between simple states and stative causatives. 
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Over this base of two primitives, i.e. a state argument and a causal relation, the 
factors in (4) were isolated and shown to influence the results of eventivity diagnostics. 
 
(4) Factors Affecting the Results of Eventivity Diagnostics 
a. Causative versus simple state 
b. The notion of change versus no change 
c. The physical versus the abstract quality of the predicate 
d. The animacy versus the inanimacy of the external argument 
 
The consequence of this is that eventivity effects are in fact signs of causation, and 
sensitive to the properties of the predication description and the conceptual knowledge 
associated with the predicate. So, the event argument is epiphenomenal. 
Interestingly, the event argument is needed to represent the notion of change and/or 
a process in aspectual decomposition (cf. Parsons 1990; Ramchand 2008). In this 
connection, the fundamental difference in meaning between verbs and adjectives is that 
verbs can be stative or convey actions, i.e. change, while adjectives are limited to being 
stative. But without the event argument, change is not represented in the predicate 
decomposition of inner-aspect. This means that (i) change is represented conceptually, 
(ii) both verbs and adjectives are represented as stative in their aspectual 
decompositions, and (iii) the category difference between verbs and adjectives is 
morphological. 
The importance of EAs is that they show that adjectives can also be causative, and 
this is the source of their apparent “eventive” properties. This means that both verbs and 
adjectives can be simple states, i.e. states mapped only to time, and stative causatives, 
i.e. states in a causal relation mapped only to time.  
These results are diagrammed in (5), which generalises over verbs and adjectives as 
predicates. The consequence here is that spatial location is no longer a primitive 
property of a predicate, but something that must be contributed specifically by a spatial 
modifier, or else inferred. This is marked by the square brackets in (5). 
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(5) Eventivity versus Stativity versus Spatio-Temporality 
Stative 
                     
   Stative Causative  Simple State 
                  Predicates   Predicates 
       
Causative:     Temporal 
[Spatio-]Temporal 
 
With the notion of change relegated to conceptual knowledge, and with verbs and 
adjectives having the same degree of inner-aspect complexity, the null hypothesis is that 
the causative alternation can apply to both categories. The properties of EAs now fit 
within a general picture of inner-aspect composition. 
Further results that follow from this analysis of EAs are that, like the event 
argument, the posits below are also epiphenomenal:  
 
(i) The Individual/Stage distinction     (Carlson 1977) 
(ii) The Vendlerian predicate classification   (Vendler 1967) 
(iii) “Active” be       (Partee 1977) 
(iv) The BECOME operator and the predicate-modifier DO (Dowty 1979) 
(v) Thematic roles 
 
The remainder of this closing chapter briefly summaries the results of the individual 
chapters and concludes with some remarks on the broader consequences of this minimal 
theory of inner-aspect. 
  
 
6.1 The Properties of Aspectual Primitives 
Chapter 1 introduced Maienborn’s (2005b, 2007) findings that the distinction between 
eventive verbs and stative verbs cannot be characterised by the notions of action or 
change, as implied in Davidson (1967), because there are verbs that simultaneously test 
positive for aspectual stativity and spatio-temporal eventivity. 
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Rather than concluding with Maienborn that aspectual stativity comes in two 
primitive sorts, i.e. temporal and spatio-temporal, I argued that eventivity is derivative 
of stative causation, and that there is no primitive event argument. The consequence is 
that change is not represented in inner-aspectual decomposition, and it predicts that 
verbs and adjectives should be aspectually parallel. 
 
 
6.2 Argument Structure 
Chapter 2 presented evidence for the adjectival argument structures in (6). The EA 
structure in (6a) differs from that of psychological experience adjectives (PA) in (6b) 
and relational/physical property adjectives (RA) in (6c) in being aspectually complex. 
This complexity corresponded with evidence for a causative analysis. 
 
(6) Argument Structures of the Three Main Adjective Classes 
a. EAs: 
Emma was rude to leave  
EAP 
             2 
         DP         EA’ 
                     2 
                    s1        EA’ 
                             2 
                           s2         EA’ 
                                     2 
                                 EA        CP 
b. PAs: 
Sam was eager to help 
PAP 
               2 
            DP        PA’ 
                        2 
                      s1          PA’ 
                                 2 
                              PA        CP 
c. RAs: 
Victoria was Canadian/tall 
                   RAP 
                 2 
              DP       RA’ 
                         2 
                      RA         s1 
 
These argument structures were further justified through a comparison with verbs. 
Adjectives and verbs were found to behave in parallel fashion with respect to a 
significant number of phenomena, such as ellipsis, Control, thematic roles, raising, 
factivity, and unaccusativity. 
It was shown that adjectival argument structure is generally varied and on a parallel 
level of complexity with verbs. This provided a syntactic argument in support of the 
conclusion that the distinction between verbs and adjectives is morphological, rather 
than syntactic. And so, there were grounds for generalising the adjectival structures in 
(6) to the category neutral ones in (7). 
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(7) Generalised Argument Structures (Adjectives and Verbs) 
a. Lexical Causatives 
   PP 
             2 
         XP          P’ 
                     2 
                    s1          P’ 
                             2 
                           s2           P’ 
                                     2 
                                    P        XP 
b. Type 1 Simple States 
   PP 
               2 
            XP          P’ 
                        2 
                      s1            P’ 
                                 2 
                                P        XP 
c. Type 2 Simple States 
                    PP 
                 2 
              XP          P’ 
                         2 
                        P          s1 
 
The consequence was that the survey of adjectival argument structure 
independently confirmed the argument in chapter 1 from the properties of aspectual 
primitives that adjectives and verbs are of parallel complexity. 
Crucially, verbal causative alternation data showed that the causative alternation is 
not defined by a change-of-state, because the verbal causative alternation can occur in 
cases where the interpretation must be static, e.g. to narrow. This provided a parallel 
between the causative alternation with verbs and the causative alternation with EAs. 
Following Schafer and Vivanco (2016) and Rappaport Hovav (2014), the causative 
alternation was argued to be subject to pragmatic conditions. These conditions, 
however, are independent of change, and so they apply to verbs and adjectives. 
 
 
6.3 Inner-Aspect 
Chapter 3 showed the verbs and adjectives can be simple states and stative causatives. It 
provided an extended argument against the Individual/Stage distinction as it began to 
present evidence that eventivity diagnostics are inconsistent. This substantiated the 
semantic argument from chapter 1, and was the beginning of the independent empirical 
argument against a primitive event argument developed in chapter 4. 
In place of a spatio-temporal event argument, it was proposed that stative causation 
is the linguistically relevant dividing line for aspectual diagnostics. Then, in support of 
Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2000), it was concluded that the fundamental notion 
implied in natural language causation is not change, but responsibility. And 
responsibility is a notion independent of change. This further supported the general 
aspectual and syntactic results that verbs and adjectives are parallel. 
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6.4 The Theory of Inner-Aspect and Its IP-Interpretation 
Chapter 4 collected more evidence for the theory of inner-aspect. Evidence from the 
proposed analyses of the passive voice, the continuous aspect, existential there, and 
fundamental inconsistency in event diagnostics was argued to support this theory of 
inner-aspect. 
Developing Gehrke and Grillo’s (2009) proposal regarding the meaning of the 
passive voice, the passive voice was analysed as an operation relating inner-aspect to its 
temporal interpretation. The general proposal was that the function of voice is to map a 
state argument to time, and thus establish the perspective from which the eventuality is 
view in time. 
The active voice maps the highest state argument to time. With causative 
predicates, this has the effect of viewing the eventuality from the perspective of the 
causing-state. On the other hand, the passive voice maps the result-state to time, to the 
effect that the eventuality is viewed from the perspective of the result-state. This 
contrast in perspectives, however, can only arise in causatives because simple states 
only contain one state argument, and so they do not have a result-state for the passive 
voice to target. 
As for the continuous aspect, it was argued to be a function that maps inner-aspect 
to the same time as the voice head, but without providing a perspective on that time. So, 
like the passive voice, the continuous has to apply to a causative predicate in order to 
make a meaningful contribution to the derivation. 
On these analyses, voice heads and the continuous are operations on the 
interpretation of inner-aspect, and not temporal ordering functions, and they refer 
specifically to the causative nature of a predicate. This is an interesting result because 
the causal relation is the only formal aspectual relation that remains in this theory of 
inner-aspect. 
In this connection, independent arguments in favour of a lexical analysis of 
causation, and against the existence of a CAUSE head and causative interpretation rule 
were given. The lexical entry of a causative predicate was proposed to contain a 
denotation that specifies its causative nature and its argument selection properties. The 
template causative denotation in (8a) is valid for both verbs and adjectives. It says that 
the predicate is a stative causative relation between two individual. The template EA 
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denotation is (8b) says the same, with the specification that EAs select a propositional 
complement, q. 
 
(8) a. Template Causative Denotation 
║P║= λyλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(P(x, s1), P(s2, y))] 
b. Template EA Denotation  (Version 2 of 2) 
║EA║= λqλs2λs1λx. [CAUSE(EA(x, s1), EA(s2, q))] 
 
Positing denotations makes this thesis Lexicalist in that lexical entries contain 
argument-selection information. It was argued that the denotation plays a crucial role in 
restricting generative capacity, and producing the rigidity that exists in argument 
entailments and in inner-aspectual behaviour with respect to the stative causative/simple 
state divide. 
 
 
6.5 The Causative Alternation 
Chapter 5 applies the aspectual system developed in chapter 4 to EAs. As stative 
causatives, the EA aspectual signature is now predicted and regular with respect to the 
general theory of inner-aspect composition. 
The causative alternation itself was analysed as an alternation between an active 
voice expression of a causative predicate that has a referential external argument (i.e. 
the transitive structure), or an existentially bound variable (i.e. the unaccusative 
structure). The maximally underspecified nature of the external argument in the 
unaccusative structure follows on this analysis from existential closure. 
This last property of the analysis supports this Lexicalist theory of argument 
structure because it allows for the generalisation regarding the causative alternation to 
be captured. The generalisation is that only causative predicates that allow a Causer 
interpretation of their external argument (rather than an Agent or Instrument one), can 
participate in the causative alternation. EAs fit with this generalisation because they are 
adjectives; adjectives are the lexical category that is transparently stative, so their 
external argument can only be interpreted as a Causer. 
In contrast, a theory on which external arguments are not arguments of the 
predicate (cf. Kratzer 1996; Alexiadou et al. 2015) cannot capture the generalisation 
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because it is unable to form a generalisation about an argument that is absent from the 
relevant levels of analysis. 
A final important result of the analysis of the EA paradigm and the causative 
alternation, with its various implicit arguments, was that it provided evidence that 
individual and propositional variables are present in the syntax and bound under 
Existential Closure, just as state variables are. This generalised support for the 
conclusion that the implicit arguments are a syntactic reality. 
 
 
6.6 Consequences for Linguistic Representation 
The most significant result of this thesis is that the representation of inner-aspect 
decomposition is much simpler than it appears. This is clearly at odds with tradition. 
But, it is not necessarily at odds with our intuitions. For example, the conclusion 
that the inner-aspectual decomposition of break does not encode the implication of a 
change-of-state does not mean that that knowledge is not represented at another level of 
analysis. And it does not mean that that knowledge is not encoded linguistically: the 
category distinction between verbs and adjectives seems to track the concept of change 
morphologically, in that verbs can convey change, but adjectives cannot. 
What is interesting is that this minimal theory of inner-aspect has a set of two 
primitives: a state argument and a causal relation. This set is not only small, it is also 
not ad hoc. If this theory is right, it expresses something deep about the organisation of 
the linguistic computation system: at its lowest level, inner-aspect representation is real, 
but it is static. So, in order to get the range of intuitions that we have at the highest level 
of cognition, various levels of analysis have to be embedded in the broader cognitive 
system: it is an interesting result that a consistent argument can be made for the poor 
syntax/LF representation of something as rich as the perception and knowledge of 
eventualities. 
Before closing this chapter and this thesis, I will recall some of the interesting 
topics that have been left for future endeavours. These include factivity, Control, case 
assignment, the structure of CPs, Extraposition, the relationship between morphology 
and conceptual knowledge, and the exploration of the consequences of this theory of 
inner-aspect/time mapping for a broader theory of tense. Puzzles await. 
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Appendix: 
 On-Line Data 
Chapter 2 
(41)/ 
(77) 
a. I called him back and said it was rude of him for him to hang up on me and 
he said leave me alone and hung up again so i called back nd said tell me if 
you're serious and he said yes and hung up. 
  URL:http://www.relationshiptalk.net/my-boyfriend-is-being-mixy-
39541224.html 
 b. It is her money. As makeup is not a necessity, it is quite nice of her for her 
to buy you any at all.  
  URL:https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110305135124AA
kpQTT 
 c. If you have Gmail and any other email that supports filtering into spam by 
email address, just do that. Simple. 
It might not work, but there is no harm in trying as @Mario1992 said, and 
with over 30k people who signed that petition so many people want it, and 
I think it would be stupid of them for them to just ignore it. If it's not 
possible to unlock the console via a system update, they could make it so 
that all future games are not region-locked and are region free. 
  URL:http://forum.3dspedia.com/threads/wii-u-and-3ds-region-lock.4876/ 
(78) b. I'm so mad and I spoke to DH this morning but I don't want to offend him 
and run his parents down, but at the same time, I am NOT having this 
special time ruined because it's my last baby and the afterglow of my 
wedding was also ruined because they were all here then too so we all had 
to go away together after our wedding because we felt it was rude of us for 
his family and extended family to come all the way from England to New 
Zealand and have us disappear alone the day after our wedding for a 
honeymoon. 
  URL:http://babyandbump.momtastic.com/pregnancy-third-
trimester/862059-big-whinge-laws-coming-next-week.html 
 c. Re: So why No Kane at Tribute to The Troops?  
It would have been stupid of them for him to make an appearance, on a 
taping before Raw. Well at least they mentioned his appearance on Raw, 
and showed some footage of it. We'll see him at TLC. 
  URL:http://www.wrestlingforum.com/raw/590626-so-why-no-kane-tribute-
troops-2.html 
(113) a. I was appalled by her stupidity to scheme in such a dangerous way. 
  URL: https://twitter.com/wisuqihyzig/statuses/211801761831321600 
 b. It was sheer stupidity to refuse at the price they were offering. 
  URL: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/stupidity 
 c. All this compounded by her stupidity to paint a RENTAL 
  URL: http://getoffmyinternets.net/forums/lifestyle-bloggers/that-wife-
1/page-767/ 
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(117) a. That they should afterwards, notwithstanding, request him to present their 
petitions, was to him a gratifying proof of their confidence in his sincerity 
of the desire he had expressed for peace. 
  The Parliamentary Register, Vol. 2, ed. Parliament of Great Britain. 
 b. It was through his generosity of the donation of the land the Union Senior 
Center became a reality. 
  URL: http://funeralplan2.com/OLTMANN/archive?id=38536  
 c. Although Sharon was a great general he did not die as a hero because he 
botched his fame and name up at the end of his life with his stupidity of the 
expulsion to please the leftists, bringing a curse on himself. 
  URL:http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/App/TalkBack/CdaViewOpenTalkBac
k/0,11382,L-4475698,00.html 
(134) b. I am proud that my parents rose from homelessness, oppression, and 
poverty to achieve their American dream. 
  URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julia-t/dear-donald-trump-im-proud-
that-my-parents-are-immigrants_b_9408948.html 
 
Chapter 3 
Fn. 9 URL: http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?t=2285271 
(27) a. Let me say that I think Danielle has been stupid to trust him after everything he 
has done to her, but he seems to take great pleasure in laughing at her. 
  URL:https://twopeasinabucket.com/mb.asp?cmd=display&thread_id=3193056 
 b. For me we need the best dutch players for NT, no matter what they do with 
their clubs. I agree Afellay has been silly to stay there though. 
  URL: http://dutchsoccersite.org/some-good-some-bad-hup-holland-hup/ 
 c. She has been foolish to believe the tittle-tattle that has reached her – very 
foolish to oblige me to give you this annoyance 
  Trollope, Anthony. The Small House at Allington. 
 d. If Peking has known that outside support was crucial to fomenting insurgency, 
then it has been foolish to voice so much endorsement while supplying so little 
support. 
  Quester, George H. Offense and Defence in the International System, p.175. 
 
 e. Part of the strategy is to try to enable amplified usage of the capacity, so it has 
been intelligent to bring prices down by at least 80% since combined the 
market. 
  URL: http://news.cheapflightghana.co.uk/category/aviation/ 
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 f. So out of all of us Nikki is probably the furthest away from the gospel. I don’t 
blame her – she has seen enough in her lifetime and has been brave to just 
hang on as long as she has..... 
  URL: http://www.exmormon.org/mormon/mormon642.htm 
(51) a. She is viciously arrogant in her treatment to her inferiors, addressing everyone 
but Caesar and her brother in the third person – presumably in Greek. 
  Rome, Season One – Television makes History. Edited by Monica S. Cyrino. 
Blackwell, p. 150. 
 b. This all said, I think it does very little to the reputation of AF (i.e. neither good 
or bad). If it had an impact (notwithstanding AFF or other flying forums), 
surely AF would be silly and viciously arrogant to think they can do nothing 
and expect it to go away. After all, they still keep advertising those dirt cheap 
Euro fares here (with first leg on CZ usually)...  
  URL: http://www.australianfrequentflyer.com.au/community/travel-news/air-
france-incidents-not-good-49153-3.html 
(52) a. You all are fools if you think these bastards will stupid enough to to wear blue. 
They will be deviously careful and will use EVERY advantage. 
  URL:https://www.facebook.com/GunControlKills/posts/370204629715835 
 b. The lobbyists for the open border, business consortium's are deviously careful 
not to mention E-Verify, that discrepancies can be resolved at the Social 
Security agencies? Nor do they inform of the success rate of E-Verify, the fed 
immigration tool identifying illegal labor. 
  URL:http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/18/obama-encourages-
illegals/ 
(85) b. I'm so mad and I spoke to DH this morning but I don't want to offend him and 
run his parents down, but at the same time, I am NOT having this special time 
ruined because it's my last baby and the afterglow of my wedding was also 
ruined because they were all here then too so we all had to go away together 
after our wedding because we felt it was rude of us for his family and 
extended family to come all the way from England to New Zealand and have 
us disappear alone the day after our wedding for a honeymoon. 
  URL:http://babyandbump.momtastic.com/pregnancy-third-trimester/862059-
big-whinge-laws-coming-next-week.html 
 c. Re: So why No Kane at Tribute to The Troops?  
It would have been stupid of them for him to make an appearance, on a taping 
before Raw. Well at least they mentioned his appearance on Raw, and showed 
some footage of it. We'll see him at TLC. 
  URL: http://www.wrestlingforum.com/raw/590626-so-why-no-kane-tribute-
troops-2.html 
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(136) a. If you add anti vibration mounts and you still find your computer is being 
noisy, you may want to take a closer look at the fan and fan filter. 
  URL: http://www.icomputer.ga/2015/02/is-your-pc-noisy.html 
 b. If the packet loss or jitter seems to be coming from inside your own network, 
check your connections yet again and try switching out equipment on your 
network to see if something on your LAN is being noisy. 
  URL:http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-to-check-on-your-internet-
connection/ 
 c. Being regular may also be one of the reasons why gas can occur more 
frequently in the mornings, although for most, that is hardly a bad thing. 
WebMD mentions that contractions from the small intestine can actually cause 
gassiness and a noisy tummy, which most people refer to as a growling 
stomach. The stomach however is being quiet and the noises heard and 
excessive stomach gas that can result are simply a product of contracting 
muscles as they move air about through the digestive tract during regular 
morning bowel movements. 
  URL: http://stomachbloating.net/excessive-stomach-gas-in-the-morning-only-
why-does-it-happen/ 
 d. I added in two Corsair Air Series 120mm Fans in case the radiator is being 
loud. 
  URL: http://pcpartpicker.com/forums/topic/24650-my-hopefully-final-2200-
gaming-and-slight-workstation-pc 
 
Chapter 4 
Fn. 12 The risk that drinking water in Sussex could be contaminated by fracking 
chemicals was known by the Government more than a year ago, previously 
secret documents reveal.  
Ministers were privately briefed by the Environment Agency (EA) that 
fracking near aquifers – underground rocks which contain water – should 
not be permitted.  
  URL:http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/10610762.Secret_emails_reveal_the
_risk_to_water_in_Sussex_from_fracking_was_known_by_officials/ 
 
 
References 
Aarts, Bas (2001). English Syntax and Argumentation. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 — (2011). Oxford Modern English Grammar. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Abrusan, Marta (2011a). “Predicting the Presuppositions of Soft Triggers”, Linguistics 
and Philosophy 34: 491-535. 
— (2011b). “A Semantic Explanation of Factive and Wh-islands”, Keynote paper 
delivered at the Islands in Contemporary Linguistic Theory workshop at the 
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain, 16-18 Nov. 
2011. 
— (2011c). “Triggering Verbal Presuppositions”, in Nan Li, and David Lutz (eds), 
Proceedings of the Twentieth Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference. Ithaca, 
NY: CLC Publications, 684-701. 
Ackema, Peter (2014). “Japanese Causatives are Not Relevant to Lexical Integrity”, 
Studia Linguistica 68.2: 169-197. 
Alrenga, Peter (2005). “A Sentential Subject Asymmetry in English and Its Implications 
for Complement Selection”, Syntax 8.3: 175-207.  
Alexander, L.G. (1988). Longman English Grammar. New York: Longman. 
Alexiadou, Artemis (2014). “Roots Do Not Take Complements”, Theoretical 
Linguistics 40.3/4: 287-297.  
— Elena Anagnostopoulou, and Florian Schafer (2015). External Arguments in 
Transitivity Alternations: A Layering Approach. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
— and Florian Schafer (2006). “Instrument Subjects are Agents or Causers”, in Donald 
Baumer, David Montero, and Michael Scanlon (eds), Proceedings of the Twenty-
Fifth West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla 
Proceedings Project, 40-48. 
Alves Castro, Maria Angeles (2015). “Extraposition in English and Spanish: A 
Comparative Study”, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of the Basque Country. 
Ambridge, Ben, Amy Bidgood, Juliam M. Pine, Caroline F. Rowland, and Daniel 
Freudenthal (2016). “Is Passive Syntax Semantically Constrained? Evidence from 
Adult Grammaticality Judgment and Comprehension Studies”, Cognitive Science 
40.6: 1435-1459. 
Leferman 
348 
Anand, Pranav, and Valentine Hacquard (2014). “Factivity, Belief and Discourse” in 
Luca Crnic, and Uli Sauerland (eds), The Art and Craft of Semantics: A Festschrift 
for Irene Heim. Cambridge, MA: MITWPL, 69-90. 
Arad, Maya (1998). “Psych-Notes”, UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 10: 1-22. 
Arche, Maria Jesus (2006). Individuals in Time. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins. 
Asher, Nicholas (1993). Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse: A Philosophical 
Semantics for Natural Language Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Bach, Emmon (1986). “The Algebra of Events”, Linguistics and Philosophy 9: 6-15. 
Baker, Mark (1988). Incorporation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
— (2003). Lexical Categories: Verbs, Nouns, and Adjectives. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
— Kyle Johnson, and Ian Roberts (1989). “Passive Arguments Raised”, Linguistic 
Inquiry 20.2: 219-251.  
Baltin, Mark (2006). “Extraposition”, in Martin Everaert, and Henk Van Riemsdijk 
(eds), Blackwell Companion to Syntax: Volume 2. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
237-271.  
Barker, Chris (2002). “The Dynamics of Vagueness”, Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 1-
36. 
Beaver, John I. (1992). “The Kinematics of Presupposition”, in Paul Dekker, and Martin 
Stokhof (eds), Proceedings of the Eight Annual Amsterdam Colloquium. ITLI: 
Amsterdam, 17-36.   
Becker, Misha (2004). “Is isn’t be”, Lingua 114: 399-418. 
Beedham, Christopher (1987). “The English Passive as an Aspect”, Word 30.1: 1-12.  
Belletti, Adriana (2004). “Aspects of the Low IP Area”, in Luigi Rizzi (ed.), The 
Structure of CP and IP: The Cartography of Syntactic Structures: Volume 2. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 16-51. 
Bennett, Michael, and Barbara Partee (2004). “Toward the Logic of Tense and Aspect 
in English”, in Barbara Partee, Compositionality in Formal Semantics: Selected 
Papers by Barbara H. Partee. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 59-109. [Originally 
published as a technical report for System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, 
CA, 1972. Republished with postscript by the Indiana University Linguistics Club, 
1978.] 
References 
 
349 
Bennis, Hans (1986). Gaps and Dummies. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.  
— (2000). “Adjectives and Argument Structure”, in Peter Coopmans, Martin Everaert, 
and Jane Grimshaw (eds), Lexical Specification and Insertion. Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 27-67. 
— (2004). “Unergative Adjectives and Psych Verbs”, in Artemis Alexiadou, Elena 
Anagnostopoulou, and Martin Everaert (eds), The Unaccusativity Puzzle: 
Explorations of the Syntax-Lexicon Interface. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 84-113.  
Bhatt, Rajesh, and Roumyana Izvorski (1998). “Genericity, Implicit Arguments and 
Control”, in MIT Working Papers in Linguistics: Proceedings of the Student 
Conference in Linguistics 7. Available at: http://www-
bcf.usc.edu/~pancheva/lingpapers.html. 
Blackburn, Simon (1996). The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Bomani, Olivier, and Daniele Godard (2008). “Lexical Semantics and Pragmatics of 
Evaluative Adverbs”, in Louise McNally, and Christopher Kennedy (eds), Adjectives 
and Adverbs: Syntax, Semantics, and Discourse. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 274-304. 
Borer, Hagit (1994). “The Projection of Arguments”, in Elena E. Benedicto, and Jeffrey 
T. Runner (eds), University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics 17: 
Functional Projections. Amherst: GLSA Publications, 19-47.  
— (2005a). Structuring Sense: Volume I: In Name Only. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
— (2005b). Structuring Sense Volume: II: The Normal Course of Events. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
— (2014). “Wherefore Roots?”, Theoretical Linguistics 40.3/4: 343-359. 
Boskovic, Zelijko (2002). “Expletives Don’t Move”, in Mako Hirotani (ed.), NELS 32: 
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the North East Linguistic 
Society. Amherst: GLSA Publications, 21-40. 
Bowers, John (1993). “The Syntax of Predication”, Linguistic Inquiry 24: 591-656. 
Carlson, Gregory N. (1977). “Reference to Kinds in English”, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
Chierchia, Gennaro (1985). “Formal Semantics and the Grammar of Predication”, 
Linguistic Inquiry 16: 417-444. 
Leferman 
350 
— (1995). “Individual-Level Predicates as Inherent Generics”, in Gregory N. Carlson, 
and Francis Jeffry Pelletier (eds), The Generic Book. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 176-223. 
— (2004). “A Semantics for Unaccusatives and its Syntactic Consequences”, in Artemis 
Alexiadou, Elena Anagnostopoulou, and Martin Everaert (eds), The Unaccusativity 
Puzzle: Explorations of the Syntax-Lexicon Interface. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 22-59.  
— and Sally McConnell-Ginet (2000). Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to 
Semantics. Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chomsky, Noam (1957). Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton and Co.  
— (1981). Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: Foris Publications. 
— (1993). “A Minimalist Program for Linguistic Theory”, in Kenneth Hale, and 
Samuel Jay Keyser (eds), The View from Building 20. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1-52.  
— (1994). “Bare Phrase Structure”, in Gert Webelhuth (ed.), Government and Binding 
Theory and the Minimalist Program. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 383-439.  
— (1995). The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
— (2001). “Derivation by Phase”, in Michael Kenstowicz (ed.), Ken Hale: A Life in 
Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1-52. 
Cinque, Guglielmo (1990a), “Ergative Adjectives and the Lexicalist Hypothesis”, 
Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 8.1: 1-39. 
— (1990b). Types of A’-Dependencies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
— (2006). Restructuring and Functional Heads: The Cartography of Syntactic 
Structures: Volume 4. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, Ariel (1997). “Default Reasoning and Generic”, Computational Intelligence 
13.4: 506-533. 
— (2004). “Generics and Mental Representations”, Linguistics and Philosophy 27: 529-
556. 
Collins, Chris (2005). “A Smuggling Approach to the Passive in English”, Syntax 8.2: 
81-120. 
Cuba, Carlos de, and Barbara Urogdi (2009). “Eliminating Factivity from Syntax: 
Sentential Complements in Hungarian”, in Marcel den Dikken, and Robert Vago 
(eds), Approaches to Hungarian. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 29-
63. 
References 
 
351 
Davidson, Donald (1967). “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”, in Nicholas Resher 
(ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
81-95. 
— (1970). “Events and Particulars”, Noûs 4.1: 25-32. 
Davies, William D., and Stanley Dubinsky (2001). “Functional Architecture and the 
Distribution of Subject Properties”, in William D. Davies, and Stanley Dubinsky 
(eds), Objects and Other Subjects: Grammatical Functions, Grammatical Categories 
and Configurationality. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 247-280. 
— — (2010). “On the Existence (and Distribution) of Sentential Subjects”, in Donna B. 
Gerdts, John C. Moore, and Maria Polinsky (eds), Hypothesis A/Hypothesis B: 
Linguistic Explorations in Honour of David M. Perlmutter. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 111-128. 
Demirdache, Hamida, and Myriam Uribe-Etxebarria (2000). “The Primitives of 
Temporal Relations”, in Roger Martin, David Michaels, and Juan Uriagereka (eds), 
Steps by Step: Minimalist Essays in Honor of Howard Lasnik. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 157-186.  
— — (2004). “The Syntax of Time Adverbs”, in Jacqueline Gueron, and Jacqueline 
Lecarme (eds), The Syntax of Time.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 143-180. 
— — (2005). “The Syntax of Time Arguments”, Lingua 117: 330-366. 
Diesing, Molly. (1992). Indefinites. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Dixon, Robert M.W. (2004). “Adjective Classes in Typological Perspective”, in Robert 
M.W. Dixon, and Alexandra Aikhenvald (eds), Adjective Classes: A Cross-Linguistic 
Typology. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1-49.  
— (2010). Basic Linguistic Theory: Volume 2: Grammatical Topics. Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Dowty, David (1975). “The Stative in the Progressive and Other Essence/Accident 
Contrasts”, Linguistic Inquiry 6.4: 579-588. 
— (1979). Word Meaning and Montague Grammar: The Semantics of Verbs and Times 
in Generative Semantics and in Montague’s PTQ. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Duguine, Maia (2013). “Null Arguments and Linguistic Variation: A Minimalist 
Analysis of Pro-Drop”, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of the Basque Country. 
Epstein, Samuel (1984) “Quantifier-pro and the LF Representation of PROarb”, 
Linguistic Inquiry 15: 499-505. 
Leferman 
352 
Fabregas, Antonio, Bryan Leferman, and Rafael Marin (2013). “Evaluative Adjective 
are Davidsonian States”, in Emmanuel Chemla, Vincent Homer, and Gregoire 
Winterstein (eds), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 17. Available at: 
http://semanticsarchive.net/sub2012/, 237-253. 
Fernald, Theodore (1999). “Evidential Coercion: Using Individual-Level Predicates in 
Stage-Level Environments”, Studies in the Linguistic Sciences 29.1: 43-63. 
Filip, Hana (1999). Aspect, Eventuality Types and Nominal Reference. New York: 
Routledge. 
Fiske, Edward, Jane Mallison, and Margery Mandell (2006). Fiske WordPower. 
Naperville: Source Books. 
Folli, Raffaella, and Heidi Harley (2008). “Teleology and Animacy in External 
Arguments”, Lingua 118: 190-202. 
Fox, Danny, and Yosef Grodzinsky (1998). “Children’s Passive: A View from the by-
Phrase”, Linguistic Inquiry 29.2: 311-332. 
Garcia del Real Marco, Isabel (2009). “Caracterización Sintáctica de las Perífrasis 
Verbales en Español”, Qualifying Paper, University of the Basque Country.   
Gehrke, Berit, and Nino Grillo (2009). “How to Become Passive”, in Kleanthes K. 
Grohmann (ed.), Explorations of Phase Theory: Features, Arguments, and 
Interpretation at the Interfaces. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 231-268. 
Geuder, Wilhelm (2004). “Depictives and Transparent Adverbs”, in Jennifer R. Austin, 
Stefan Engelberg, and Gisa Rauh (eds), Adverbials: The Interplay between Meaning, 
Context, and Syntactic Structure. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 
131-166. 
Giorgi, Alessandra (2009). “Toward a Syntax of the Subjunctive Mood”, Lingua 119: 
1837-1858. 
— and Fabio Pianesi (1997). Tense and Aspect: From Semantics to Morphosyntax. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Goodall, Grant (1997). “Θ-Alignment and the by-Phrase”, in Kora Singer, Randall 
Eggert, and Gregory Anderson (eds), Chicago Linguistics Society 33: Papers from 
the Main Session. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 129-139. 
Grice, Herbert Paul (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.    
Grimshaw, Jane (1990). Argument Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
References 
 
353 
Grodzinsky, Yosef (1995). “Trace Deletion, Θ-Roles, and Cognitive Strategies”, Brain 
and Language 51: 469-497. 
Hale, Kenneth, and Samuel Jay Keyser (1993). “On Argument Structure and the Lexical 
Expression of Syntactic Relations”, in Kenneth Hale, and Samuel Jay Keyser (eds), 
The View from Building 20. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 53-110. 
Hardt, Daniel (1992). “VP Ellipsis and Semantic Identity”, in Chris Barker, and David 
Dowty (eds), Ohio State University Working Papers in Linguistics: Volume 40: 
Proceeding of the Second Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference. Columbus: 
Ohio State University, 145-162. 
Harley, Heidi (2008). “On the Causative Construction”, in Shigeru Miyagawa, and 
Mamoru Saito (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Linguistics. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 20-53. 
Haspelmath, Martin (1993). “More on the Typology of Inchoative/Causative 
Alternations”, in Bernard Comrie, and Maria Polinsky (eds), Causatives and 
Transitivity. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 87-120. 
— Andrea Calude, Michael Spagnol, Heiko Narrog, and Elif Bamyaci (2014). “Coding 
Causal-Noncausal Alternations: A Form-Frequency Correspondence Explanation”, 
Journal of Linguistics 50: 587-625.  
Hay, Jennifer, Christopher Kennedy, and Beth Levin (1999). “Scalar Structure 
Underlies Telicity in ‘Degree Achievements’”, in Tanya Matthews, and Devon 
Strolovitch (eds), Proceeding of the Ninth Semantics and Linguistic Theory 
Conference. Ithaca: CLC Publications, 127-144. 
Heim, Irene (1982). “The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases”, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
— and Angelika Kratzer (1998). Semantics in Generative Grammar. Malden MA, 
Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing. 
Higginbotham, James (1983). “The Logic of Perceptual Reports: An Extensional 
Alternative to Situation Semantics”, The Journal of Philosophy 80: 100-127. 
— (2009). Tense, Aspect, and Indexicality. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
— and Gillian Ramchand (1997). “The Stage-Level/Individual-Level Distinction and 
the Mapping Hypothesis”, Oxford University Working Papers in Linguistics, 
Philology and Phonetics 2: 53-83. 
Leferman 
354 
Horn, Laurence R (1985). “Metalinguistic Negation and Pragmatic Ambiguity”, 
Language 61: 121-174.  
Hornstein, Norbert (1990). As Time Goes By: Tense and Universal Grammar. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
— (1999). “Movement and Control”, Linguistic Inquiry 30.1: 69-96. 
Horvath, Julia, and Tal Siloni (2002). “Against the Little-V Hypothesis”, Rivista di 
Grammatica Generativa 27: 107-122. 
Huddleston, Rodney, and Geoffrey K. Pullum (2002). The Cambridge Grammar of the 
English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jackendoff, Ray S. (1972). Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Jacobsen, Wesley (1992). The Transitive Structure of Events in Japanese. Tokyo: 
Kurosio Publishers. 
Jaeggli, Osvaldo (1986). “Passive”, Linguistic Inquiry 17.4: 587-622. 
Jager, Gerhard (2001). “Topic-Comment Structure and the Contrast between Stage 
Level and Individual Level Predicates”, Journal of Semantics 18: 83-126. 
Johnson, Kyle (2001). “What VP Ellipsis Can Do, and What It Can’t, but Not Why”, in 
Mark Baltin, and Chris Collins (eds), The Handbook of Contemporary Syntactic 
Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 439-479. 
Josefsson, Gunlog (2014). “Pancake Sentences and the Semanticization of Formal 
Gender in Mainland Scandinavian”, Language Sciences 43: 62-76. 
Kallulli, Dalina (2007). “Rethinking the Passive/Anticausative Distinction”, Linguistic 
Inquiry 38.4: 770-780. 
Kamp, Hans, and Christian Rohrer (1983). “Tense in Texts”, in Rainer Bauerle, 
Christoph Schwarze, and Arnim von Stechow (eds), Meaning, Use, and 
Interpretation of Language. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter., 250-269. 
Karttunen, Lauri, Stanley Peters, Annie Zaenen, and Cleo Condoravdi (2014). “The 
Chameleon-Like Nature of Evaluative Adjectives”, in Christopher Piñón (ed.), 
Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 10.  
Available at: http://www.cssp.cnrs.fr/eiss10/, 233-250. 
Katz, Graham (2000). “Anti Neo-Davidsonianism”, in Carol Tenny, and James 
Pustejovsky (eds), Events as Grammatical Objects. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 
393-416.  
Kearns, Kate (2011). Semantics. Second Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
References 
355 
Keenan, Edward L., and Matthew S. Dryer (2007). “Passive in the World’s Languages”, 
in Timothy Shopen (ed.), Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Volume I: 
Clause Structure. Second Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 325-361. 
Kennedy, Christopher (2012). “The Composition of Incremental Change”, in Violeta 
Demonte, and Louise McNally (eds), Telicity, Change, and State: A Cross-
Categorial View of Event Structure. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
103-121. 
Kertz, Laura (2006). “Evaluative Adjectives: An Adjunct Control Analysis”, in Donald 
Baumer, David Montero, and Michael Scanlon (eds), Proceedings of the Twenty-
Fifth West Conference on Formal Linguistics. Somerville: Cascadilla Proceedings 
Project, 229-235.  
— (2010). “The Argument Structure of Evaluative Adjectives: A Case of Pseudo-
Raising”, in Norbert Hornstein, and Maria Polinsky (eds), Movement Theory of 
Control. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 269-297. 
Kiparsky, Paul, and Carol Kiparsky (1970). ‘Fact’, in Manfred Bierwisch, and Karl 
Heidolph (eds), Progress in Linguistics: A Collection of Papers. The Hague: 
Mouton, 143-173. 
Koontz-Garboden, Andrew (2009). “Anticausativization”, Natural Language and 
Linguistic Theory 27: 77-138. 
Koster, Jan (1978). “Why Subject Sentences Don’t Exist”, in S. Jay Keyser (ed.), 
Recent Transformational Studies in European Languages. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 
53-64. 
— (2000). “Extraposition as Parallel Construal”, Manuscript, University of Groningen. 
Kratzer, Angelika (1995). “Stage-Level and Individual-Level Predicates”, in Gregory N. 
Carlson, and Francis Jeffry Pelletier (eds), The Generic Book. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 125-175. 
— (1996). “Severing the External Argument from its Verb”, in Johan Rooryck, and 
Laurie Zaring (eds), Phrase Structure and the Lexicon. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 109-138.  
— (2000). “Building Statives”, in Lisa J. Jonathan, Jeff Good, Darya Kavitskaya, 
Alyssa B. Wulf, and Alan C. L. Yu (eds), Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual 
Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society: General Session and Parasession on 
Aspect. Ann Arbor: Berkeley Linguistics Society, 385-399. 
Leferman 
356 
— (2005). “Building Resultatives”, in Claudia Maienborn, and Angelika Wollstein-
Leisten (eds), Event Arguments in Syntax, Semantics, and Discourse. Tubingen: 
Niemeyer, 178-212. 
Krifka, Manfred (1989). “Nominal Reference, Temporal Constitution and 
Quantification in Event Semantics”, in Renate Bartsch, Johan van Benthem, and 
Peter von Emde Boas (eds), Semantics and Contextual Expression. Dordrecht: Foris 
Publications, 75-115. 
— (1992). “Thematic Relations and Links between Nominal Reference and Temporal 
Constitution”, in Ivan A. Sag, and Anna Szabolcsi (eds), Lexical Matters. Stanford, 
CA: CSLI Publications, 29-53. 
— (1998). “The Origins of Telicity”, in Susan Rothstein (ed.), Events in Grammar. 
Dortrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 197-235. 
Laca, Brenda (2004). “Romance ‘Aspectual Periphrases’: Eventuality Modification 
versus ‘Syntactic’ Aspect, in Jacqueline Gueron, and Jacqueline Lecarme (eds), The 
Syntax of Time.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 425-440. 
Lakoff, George (1966). “Stative Verbs and Adjectives in English”, in Harvard 
Computation Laboratory Report NSF-17. Cambridge, MA: Harvard. 
Landau, Idan (1999). “Elements of Control”, Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT. 
— (2009). “Saturation and Reification in Adjectival Diathesis”, Journal of Linguistics 
45: 315-361. 
— (2010a). “The Explicit Syntax of Implicit Arguments”, Linguistic Inquiry 41.3: 357-
388. 
— (2010b). The Locative Syntax of Experiencers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Levin, Beth (2007). “Lexical Semantics of Verbs II: Aspectual Approaches to Lexical 
Semantic Representation”, handout from course offered at the Linguistic Society of 
America 2007 Linguistic Institute, Stanford University, 1-3 July 2007.    
— (2015). “Semantics and Pragmatics of Argument Alternations”, Annual Review of 
Linguistics 1: 63-83. 
— and Malka Rappaport Hovav (1995). Unaccusativity: At the Syntax-Lexical 
Semantics Interface. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mahajan, Anoop (1995). “ACTIVE Passives”, in Raul Aranovich, William Byrne, 
Susanne Preusse, and Martina Senturia (eds), The Proceedings of the Thirteenth West 
Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 286-301.  
References 
357 
Maienborn, Claudia (2005a). “A Discourse-Based Account of Spanish Ser/Estar”, 
Linguistics 43.1: 155-180. 
 — (2005b). “On the Limits of the Davidsonian Approach: The Case of Copula 
Sentences”, Theoretical Linguistics 31: 275-316. 
 — (2007). “On Davidsonian and Kimian States”, in Ileana Comorovski, and Klaus von 
Heusinger (eds), Existence: Semantics and Syntax. Dordrecht: Springer, 107-130. 
Manzini, Maria Rita (1983). “On Control and Control Theory”, Linguistic Inquiry 14.3: 
421-446.   
Marantz, Alec (1984). On the Nature of Grammatical Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
— (1997). “No Escape from Syntax: Don’t Try Morphological Analysis in the Privacy 
of Your Own Lexicon”, University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics 
4.2: 201-225.  
Maratsos, Michael, Dana E.C. Fox, Judith A. Becker, and Mary Anne Chalkley (1985). 
“Semantic Restrictions on Children’s Passives”, Cognition 19: 167-191. 
Martin, Fabienne (2008). “Deux Types de ‘Stage Level’ Predicates”, Langages 169.1: 
111-128. 
— and Florian Schafer (2014). “Causation at the Syntax-Semantics Interface”, in 
Bridget Copley, and Fabienne Martin (eds), Causation in Grammatical Structures. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 209-244. 
McNally, Louise (1998). “Stativity and Theticity”, in Susan Rothstein (ed.), Events and 
Grammar. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 293-307. 
Meltzer-Asscher, Aya (2012). “The Subject of Adjectives: Syntactic Position and 
Semantic Interpretation”, The Linguistic Review 29: 149-189. 
Merchant, Jason (2001). The Syntax of Silence: Sluicing, Islands, and the Theory of 
Ellipsis. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.  
Milsark, Gary (1974). “Existential Sentences in English”, Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT. 
— (1977). “Toward an Explanation of Certain Particularities of the Existential 
Construction in English”, Linguistic Analysis 3.1: 1-29.  
Miyagawa, Shigeru (1989). Structure and Case Marking in Japanese. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Moulton, Keir (2013). “Not Moving Clauses: Connectivity in Clausal Arguments”, 
Syntax 16.3: 250-291. 
Leferman 
358 
Muller, Stefan, and Stephen Wechsler (2014). “Lexical Approaches to Argument 
Structure”, Theoretical Linguistics 40.1/2: 1-76. 
Musan, Renate (1997). “Tense, Predicates, and Lifetime Effects”, Natural Language 
Semantics 5: 271-301. 
Overfelt, Jason (2011). “Structural Constraints on Antecedent Retrieval: The View from 
Adjunct Clauses”, Manuscript, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.  
Parsons, Terence (1990). Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic 
Semantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Partee, Barbara (1977). “John is Easy to Please”, in Antonio Zampolli (ed.), Linguistic 
Structures Processing. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Group, 281-312. 
Payne, Thomas E. (2011). Understanding English Grammar: a Linguistic Introduction. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pesetsky, David (1995). Zero Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
— and Esther Torrego (2007). “The Syntax of Valuation and the Interpretability of 
Features”, in Simin Karimi, Vida Samiian, and Wendy Wilkins (eds), Phrasal and 
Clausal Architecture: Syntactic Derivation and Interpretation. Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 262-294. 
Pinker, Steven (1989). Learnability and Cognition: The Acquisition of Argument 
Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
— (2014). The Sense of Style: The Thinking Person’s Guide to Writing in the 21st
Century. London: Allen Lane.  
— David S. Lebeaux, and Loren Ann Frost (1987). “Productivity and Constraints in the 
Acquisition of the Passive”, Cognition 26: 195-267. 
Platzack, Christer (2013). “Head Movement as a Phonological Operation”, in Lisa Lai-
Shen Cheng, and Norbert Corver (eds), Diagnosing Syntax. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 21-43. 
Potsdam, Eric (2003). “Evidence for Semantic Identity under Ellipsis from Malagasy 
Sluicing”, in Shigeto Kawahara and, Makoto Kadowaki  (eds), NELS 33: 
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the North East Linguistic Society. 
Amherst: GLSA Publications, 285-302.   
Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik (1985). A 
Comprehensive Grammar of the English Grammar. New York: Longman. 
Ramchand, Gillian Catriona (2004). “Time and the Event: The Semantics of Russian 
Prefixes”, Nordlyd 32.2: 323-361. 
References 
359 
— (2008). Verb Meaning and the Lexicon: A First-Phase Syntax. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rappaport Hovav, Malka (2014). “Lexical Content and Context: The Causative 
Alternation in English Revisited”, Lingua 141: 8-29. 
— (2016). “A Question Regarding Internal Causation”, E-mail reply to author, 12 Nov. 
2016. 
— and Beth Levin (2000). “Classifying Single Argument Verbs”, in Peter Coopmans, 
Martin Everaert, and Jane Grimshaw (eds), Lexical Specification and Insertion. 
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 269-304.  
— — (2007). ”Deconstructing Thematic Hierarchies”, in Annie Zaenen, Jane Simpson, 
Tracy Holloway King, Janr Grimshaw, Joan Maling, and Chris Manning (eds), 
Architectures, Rules, and Preferences: Variations on Themes by Joan W. Bresnan. 
Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 385-402. 
— — (2012). “Lexicon Uniformity and the Causative Alternation”, in Martin Everaert, 
Marijana Marelj, and Tal Siloni (eds), The Theta System: Argument Structure at the 
Interface. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 150-176.  
Rawlins, Kyle (2008). “Unifying ‘Illegally’”, in Johannes Dolling, Tatjana Hayde-
Zybatow, and Martin Schafer (eds), Event Structures in Linguistic Form and 
Interpretation. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 81-102.  
Reichenbach, Hans (1947). Elements of Symbolic Logic. London: MacMillan. 
Rico Rama, Pablo (2014). “La Construcción Al + Infinitivo: Lecturas Temporales y 
Causales. Una Perspectiva Sintáctica”, Master’s Dissertation, Autonomous 
University of Barcelona. 
Rothmayr, Antonia (2009). The Structure of Stative Verbs. Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Rothstein, Susan (1999). “Fine-Grained Structure in the Eventuality Domain: The 
Semantics of Predicative Adjective Phrases and BE”, Natural Language Semantics 7: 
347-420. 
— (2004). Predicates and Their Subjects. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Roy, Isabelle A. (2013). Non-Verbal Predication: Copular Sentences at the Syntax-
Semantics Interface. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Schafer, Florian, and Margot Vivanco (2016). “Anticausatives are Weak Scalar 
Expressions, not Reflexive Expressions”, Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics 
1.1: 18.1-36. 
Leferman 
360 
Schoorlemmer, Erik, and Tanja Temmerman (2012). “Head Movement as a PF-
Phenomenon: Evidence from Identity under Ellipsis”, in Jaehoon Choi, E. Alan 
Hogue, Jeffrey Punske, Deniz Tat, Jessamyn Schertz, and Alex Trueman (eds), 
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics. 
Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project, 232-240.  
Shibatani, Masayoshi (1973). “Semantics of Japanese Causativization”, Foundations of 
Language 9.3: 327-373. 
— (1976). “The Grammar of Causative Constructions: A Conspectus”, in Masayoshi 
Shibatani (ed.), Syntax and Semantics 6: The Grammar of Causative Constructions. 
London: Academic Press, 1-40. 
Side, Richard, and Guy Wellman (2002). Grammar and Vocabulary for Cambridge 
Advanced and Proficiency. Essex: Longman. 
Smith, Carlota (1999). “Activities: States or Events?”, Linguistics and Philosophy 22: 
479–508. 
Stalnaker, Robert C. (1974). “Pragmatic Presuppositions”, in Milton K. Munitz, and 
Peter K. Unger (eds), Semantics and Philosophy. New York:  New York University 
Press, 174-214. 
Stechow, Arnim von (1996). “The Different Readings of Wieder ‘Again’: A Structural 
Account”, Journal of Semantics 13: 87-138. 
Stowell, Timothy Angus (1981). “The Origins of Phrase Structure”, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
MIT. 
Stowell, Tim (1991). “The Alignment of Arguments in Adjective Phrases”, in Susan D. 
Rothstein (ed.), Syntax and Semantics: Volume 25: Perspectives on Phrase 
Structure: Heads and Licensing. London: Academic Press, 105-135. 
— (1996). “The Phrase Structure of Tense”, in Johan Rooryck, and Laurie Zaring (eds), 
Phrase Structure and the Lexicon. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 277-
291.  
Szabolcsi, Anna, and Frans Zwarts (1993). “Weak Islands and an Algebraic Semantics 
for Scope Taking”, Natural Language Semantics 1: 235-284. 
Takahashi, Shoichi (2010). “The Hidden Side of Clausal Complements”, Natural 
Language and Linguistic Theory 28: 343-380. 
Talmy, Leonard (2000). Toward a Cognitive Semantics: Volume 1: Concept Structuring 
Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
References 
361 
Tenny, Carol (1987). “Grammaticalizing Aspect and Affectedness”, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
MIT 
— (1994). Aspectual Roles and the Syntax-Semantics Interface. Dortrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Travis, Lisa deMena (2010). Inner Aspect: The Articulation of VP. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Vendler, Zeno (1967). Linguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Verkuyl, Henk J. (1993). A Theory of Aspectuality: The Interaction between Temporal 
and Atemporal Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vlach, Frank (1981). “The Semantics of the Progressive”, in Philip J. Tedeschi, and 
Annie Zaenen (eds), Syntax and Semantics: Volume 14: Tense and Aspect. London: 
Academic Press, 271-292. 
Wilkinson, Robert (1970). “Factive Complements and Action Complements”, in Papers 
from the Sixth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society. Chicago: 
Chicago Linguistics Society, 425-446. 
— (1976). “Modes of Predication and Implied Adverbial Complements”, Foundations 
of Language 14.2: 153-194. 
Wold, Dag E. (1996). “Long Distance Selective Binding: The Case of Focus”, in Teresa 
Galloway, and Justin Spence (eds), Proceedings of the Sixth Semantics and 
Linguistics Theory Conference. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 311-328. 
Zagona, Karen (1988). Verb Phrase Syntax: A Parametric Study of English and 
Spanish. Dortrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
